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1. RESEARCH ABSTRACT
The managerial issue being addressed in this research is perceived environmental uncertainty
(experienced by corporate strategists) and its implications for strategy development processes
at the strategic business unit level (or business-level strategy) across Barclays Bank PLC.
The objectives of the research are achieved through: an extensive review of the strategy and
uncertainty literature (Project 1); a series of semi-structured interviews with fifteen members
of the Group Executive Committee at Barclays (Project 2); and the completion of 731 self-
administered questionnaires covering the seventeen strategic business units within the
Barclays portfolio (Project 3).
Through its findings, this research concludes that any link between perceived environmental
uncertainty (at the corporate level) and strategy development processes (at the business unit
level) across the Barclays portfolio is largely irrelevant. Strategists at Barclays are concerned
mainly with the maximisation of shareholder value and concepts such as uncertainty, change
and complexity are not within the managerial lexicon.
Based on this observation, strategy development at Barclays does not involve a carefully
managed reciprocal relationship between the firm and its environment, or a skilfully
manipulated balance of the degree of change and the level of complexity with which the
organisation is deemed able to cope.
Strategy development involves the dedicated and ruthless stewardship of a highly successful
and resilient business model that could not fail within the economic environment experienced
during the period of this research (1999–2005). Consequently, the Bank’s strategic capability
(e.g. people) and assets (e.g. brand and technology) are geared towards protecting and
developing the business model, or in simpler managerial terms, ‘defending the money-printing
machine’.
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2. INTRODUCTION
2.1 Background
2.1.1 The Origins Of Barclays Bank PLC
Hudson Gurney (1900, p.140), the nineteenth-century East Anglian banker and descendant of
the Barclays family, emphasised the importance of recognising the origins of Barclays Bank as
a starting point for assessing its future:
“You may perhaps lay it down as a universal proposition, that he who judges merely
by time present, judges wrong; and if you do not know what went before, you cannot
calculate what follows after.”
The origins of Barclays Bank PLC can be traced to a modest business based in the heart of
London’s financial district in the late seventeenth century. At the time, Lombard Street was
the location of merchants, goldsmiths, jewellers and coin dealers, and of banking in its nascent
stage (Ackrill and Hannah, 2001). John Freame founded the original goldsmith–banker
partnership in Lombard Street in April 1690; it was to be the address of Barclays’
headquarters for over three hundred years.
John Freame was the son of Robert Freame, a prosperous Quaker textile merchant from
Cirencester in Gloucestershire. The Quaker connection was to prove critical to the
development of the partnership and still has relevance for Barclays today. Freame began
trading as a goldsmith after he had completed his seven-year apprenticeship and became a
freeman of the City of London. Freame’s partner, Thomas Gould, was also a Quaker. He was
formally named in the business some months later, after he too completed his London
apprenticeship and became a freeman of the City.
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Similarly to the original partners, the Barclay family were also newcomers to London and had
made their way by a judicious mixture of Quaker business connections and strategic marriages
(Ackrill and Hannah, 2001). David Barclay was the second son of a Scottish Quaker family of
landed gentry. His father, Robert Barclay ‘the Apologist’, was influential in Quaker politics
and long revered in Quaker circles – according to Ackrill and Hannah a reverence that is
perhaps second only to that accorded to the founder of the Quakers himself, George Fox.
Robert Barclay died in 1690 when David was still a child. As a result of his inheritance, David
was able to fund a London apprenticeship and, in 1707, married Ann, daughter of a London
linen draper, James Taylor. After Ann died, leaving David a widower turned 40, David
Barclay married Priscilla Freame, John Freame’s daughter.
Ten years later, in 1733, James Barclay (David Barclay’s eldest son by his first wife) married
Priscilla’s younger sister Sarah. James, already the stepson of a daughter of the founder, John
Freame, joined the bank on becoming his son-in-law too. The Lombard Street bank was
thereafter known as Freame & Barclay, Bankers.
As a private banking business in the eighteenth century the partnership thrived, keeping their
clients’ gold deposits secure and lending to creditworthy monarchs and merchants. During the
coming years the partnership operated under a variety of names before settling down to the
name of Barclay, Bevan, Tritton & Co in 1783.
In 1896 twenty private banking businesses merged to form a new joint-stock bank. The senior
partners of the new limited liability company, which was named Barclay & Company, were
already connected through an intricate web of family, business and religious relationships
(Ackrill and Hannah, 2001). The new company became known as ‘the Quaker Bank’,
reflecting the family tradition of its Quaker founders.
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The new Barclay & Company had 182 branches based predominantly in South East England,
holding deposits in excess of £26m – a substantial sum at the time. The Bank expanded
rapidly through the acquisition of competitors, including Bolithos in the South West of
England in 1905, and the United Counties Bank in the Midlands in 1916. In 1917 the Bank
became known as Barclays Bank Ltd, latterly known as Barclays Bank PLC, and the following
year amalgamated with the London, Provincial and South Western Bank. This gave the Bank a
distribution network of 1,837 branches and status as one of the ‘big five’ banks in the UK.
The latter half of the twentieth century brought further merger and acquisition activity with the
purchase of Martins Bank in 1969, followed by the purchase of the Woolwich in 2000, and
Gerrard Investment Co. in 2003.
The international development of the Barclays business began in earnest in 1925, with the
merger of three banks – the Colonial Bank, the Anglo Egyptian Bank and the National Bank
of South Africa. This merger added businesses in much of the old British Empire, primarily
Africa, the Middle East and the West Indies.
International expansion gained momentum in 1981 when Barclays became the first foreign
bank to file with the US Securities and Exchange Commission and raise long-term capital on
the New York market. In 1986 Barclays became the first British bank to have its shares listed
on the Tokyo and New York stock exchanges.
At the same time, Barclays’ global expansion was given added impetus with the creation of an
investment banking operation. This has now developed into Barclays Capital, which manages
larger corporate and institutional business. In 1995 Barclays purchased the US fund manager
Wells Fargo Nikko Investment Advisers, and the business was successfully integrated with
Barclays de Zoete Wedd to form Barclays Global Investors.
Over the course of the last three centuries Barclays has grown from a group of English Quaker
partnerships to a truly global bank operating in Europe, the United States of America, Latin
America, Africa, the Caribbean, Asia, the Middle East and Australasia.
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2.1.2 Barclays: Building A Reputation As An Innovator And Pioneer
Throughout its history Barclays has built a reputation as a pioneer in financing industry and
retail banking, and this reputation has ramifications for the way the Group develops strategy
today. Early signs of innovation and entrepreneurship were displayed back in 1697 when the
Bank launched its first advertisement relating to a Gloucestershire client’s lost horse at a race
meeting in Newmarket. At the same time the Freame & Gould partnership was dealing in the
stock of the Bank of England helping the new regime of William and Mary finance its debt
more securely following the Glorious Revolution. The early eighteenth century saw the Group
at the heart of financing the commercial activities of new pioneers in the Industrial
Revolution. The Bank was a major stockholder in the Welsh Copper Company, and in 1703
financed the development by the London Lead Company of Dr. Edward Wright’s reverbatory
furnace for lead smelting.
In this new industrial age the role of Quaker bankers was critical to financing the pioneers of
new large-scale industry. The Bank provided funding for the pioneering Stockton and
Darlington Railway (1825), the Battersea Bridge (1771–2) and the Leeds–Liverpool Canal
(1770–7). The new joint-stock bank of the late eighteenth century further enhanced its
tradition of breaking new ground, being the first bank to formally recognise the emerging
status of trade unions following the First World War, and the first to employ women in the
1920s. In 1956 Barclays was the first to promote a woman to the role of branch manager.
Over the last fifty years Barclays has further enhanced its reputation as a pioneer in large-scale
retail banking through a series of innovative developments. In 1966 it was the first to launch
the credit card into the UK, and the following year it was responsible for the first automated
teller machine in the world. During the 1970s the Bank was the first to introduce personal
bankers; in 1982 it was the first to re-open its branches on a Saturday; and it launched the first
UK debit card in 1987. The 1990s were no different: in 1995 the Bank was the first to launch
an internet-based website and in 1998 was the pioneer of the first ‘drive thru’ cash machine. In
2001 the Group maintained its reputation as an innovator of new products when it launched its
OpenPlan product, the first bank to offer truly ‘joined-up’ banking.
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2.1.3 The Strategy Development Process: Value-Based Management
As the research identified in Section 2.1.2, the development of strategy has been central to the
evolution of Barclays Bank PLC. In September 2000, the Bank’s new Chief Executive Officer,
Matthew Barrett (2000, p.1), announced the Group’s commitment to adopting value-based
management as its new process for developing strategy:
“Positioning Barclays among the leading value-creating companies is my highest
priority. This year we will move ‘managing for value’ to the top of the organisational
agenda. Building a structure based on strategic business units was a step in the right
direction, but now it’s time to put value creation at the heart of everything we do.”
Value-based management is a management philosophy that applies analytical tools and
processes to focus an organisation on the single objective of creating shareholder value
(Martin and Petty, 2000). Therefore the Barclays approach to developing strategy is based on
the belief that the overriding goal is to maximise shareholder value over time, and at any point
in time. Consequently this belief is intended to underpin all strategic decisions made within
Barclays and is the key criterion that should never be compromised (Barrett, 2000).
The application of value-based management as the process for developing strategy across a
portfolio of businesses involves a series of four rational steps (Condon and Goldstein, 1998).
Initially the business creates the ‘value model’, which allows it to recognise which areas of the
business create or destroy value, thereby allowing it to build a strategic plan. Second the
organisation develops its ‘value maximising strategy’ by identifying and evaluating strategic
options and choosing the option deemed to add the most value. Third, the business
‘implements the strategy’ by linking the drivers of value with the strategic initiatives to form
the plan. The final step is the development of the ‘value climate’, which in Barclays ensures
that its people understand their role in delivering value and empowers them to contribute to
the maximisation of shareholder value.
The application of a rational model for developing strategy across a diverse portfolio of
businesses, operating in very different environments, is pivotal to this research.
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2.1.4 Barclays: Introducing The Portfolio Of Businesses
Today Barclays is a UK-based, sophisticated global financial services group engaged primarily
in banking, investment banking and investment management. In terms of assets employed,
Barclays is one of the largest financial services groups in the UK. It is also a leading provider
of co-ordinated global services to multi-national corporations and financial institutions
worldwide. The Group currently operates in over sixty countries with over 74,800 employees.
During the period of the research (1999–2005) Barclays was organised into seven business
groupings (see Table 1 below):
Table 1 – The Structure Of The Barclays Businesses 2002–3
Barclays’ Businesses Nature Of Business
Barclays Africa Provides a range of banking services to personal and corporate customers inNorth Africa, sub-Saharan Africa and islands in the Indian Ocean
Barclaycard Provides more than 11m credit cards to personal and corporate customers inEurope, Africa and the Caribbean
Barclays Capital
The investment banking division, focused on financing, risk management and
corporate finance advisory services. It is unique among investment banks in its
exclusive concentration on these products and services
Barclays Global Investors Manages financial assets principally for institutional customers such as pensionfunds. It is one of the world's largest institutional asset managers
Barclays Private Clients The wealth management business providing personal financial services and assetmanagement for affluent clients in over 160 countries
Business Bank Provides a full range of corporate banking services to small, medium and largebusinesses in the UK
UK Retail Bank Combines Barclays and Woolwich and provides a wide range of products andservices to 14m personal customers in the UK.
*Source – Barclays Bank PLC, Audited Accounts 2003, Published February 2004
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 8 of 444
2.1.5 Barclays’ Performance In 2003: The Creation Of Shareholder Value
One aspect of the Barclays’ business objectives that has remained constant since the days of
the Quaker partnerships is the desire to create value for its owners or, in today’s terms, its
shareholders. During 2003 the Group achieved record pre-tax profits of £3,845m (economic
profit: £1,420m). In the Barclays Bank PLC Audited Accounts, the Chief Executive Officer
Matthew Barrett (2004, p.1) explains the importance of the 2003 results:
“These are strong results, which demonstrate the momentum we have generated over
our first four-year goal period. We have strengthened our diversified portfolio of
businesses while maintaining downward pressure on costs and a prudent approach to
risk. As a result, we have achieved top quartile total shareholder return relative to our
peers. This is an important milestone for Barclays.”
Again it is possible to draw parallels with the Quaker traditions of serving the community as
the Group paid £1,067m in taxes, and contributed £32m to community involvement in
education, the environment, the arts, sports, disability and social inclusion. The financial
summary for 2003 is set out in Table 2 below:
Table 2 – Barclays Bank PLC: Financial Summary 2003
Financial Measure 2003 £m 2002 £m % Variance
Operating income 12,411 11,327 9.57%
Operating expenses -7,253 -6,624 9.50%
Provisions for bad and doubtful debts -1,347 -1,484 -9.07%
Operating profit 3,812 3,218 18.46%
Profit before tax 3,845 3,205 19.97%
Profit after tax 2,769 2,250 23.06%
Economic profit 1,420 1,237 14.79%
Earnings per share 42.3p 33.7p 25.52%
Dividend per share 20.5p 18.35p 11.72%
Post-tax return on average shareholders’ funds 17% 15% 2.00%
*Source – Barclays Bank PLC, Audited Accounts 2003, Published February 2004
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2.1.6 The Creation Of Shareholder Value: Economic Profit
A supporting goal of the Barclays Group during the four-year period (2000–2003) was to
double economic profit. Economic profit is defined as:
“Profit after tax and minority interests plus certain gains (and losses) reported within
the statement of total recognised gains and losses where they arise from the Group’s
business activities and which are in respect of transactions with third parties, less a
charge for the cost of average shareholders’ funds (which includes purchased
goodwill).” (Barclays Bank PLC, 2004)
When computing economic profit, the cost of shareholders’ funds is calculated using the
capital asset pricing model for the Group. The cost of equity comprises three key components:
the equity risk premium, the market beta, and the risk-free rate of capital.
It is important to note that the success criterion across the Group is purely the measured
growth of economic profits across the portfolio – against the four-year goal set out in the
previous section. No consideration or weighting is given to additional competitive factors (or
volatility), for example relative market growth across the portfolio or prevailing economic
conditions. The performance of the seven clusters during 2003 is set out in Table 3 below:
Table 3 – Value Creation: Economic Profit Across The Barclays Group In 2003
2003 (£m) % Contribution 2002 (£m) % Variance
Barclaycard 319 22.46% 267 19.48%
Barclays Africa 36 2.54% 22 63.64%
Barclays Capital 320 22.54% 178 79.78%
Barclays Private Clients 163 11.48% 328 -49.70%
UK Retail Bank 460 32.39% 395 16.46%
Business Bank 623 43.87% 574 8.54%
Barclays Global Investors 112 7.89% 56 100.00%
Head Office Functions -98 -6.90% -126 22.33%
Goodwill1 -442 -31.13% -398 -11.06%
Variance To Shareholders Funds -73 -5.14% -59 -23.7%
TOTAL 1,420 100.00% 1,237 14.79%
*Source – Barclays Bank PLC, Audited Accounts 2003, Published February 2004
1 Cost of equity charge on purchased goodwill
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 10 of 444
2.1.7 Mapping The Future For Barclays: The Current Strategy
After looking at the origins of Barclays Bank PLC, together with its current structure and
performance, it is appropriate to take a look at what the future may bring through
implementation of the current strategy. From the statement of strategic intent it is again
possible to identify the recurring themes of: recognition as an innovator; close relationships
with its people; caring for the community; and finally, adopting a value-based management
approach. Of primary interest to this research from the strategy statement in the Barclays 2003
Audited Accounts is the Group’s application of a very rational approach to the process of
strategy development (Barclays Bank PLC, 2004, p.4):
“We aspire to be one of the most admired financial services organisations in the world,
recognised as an innovative, customer-focused company that delivers superb products
and services, ensures excellent careers for our people and contributes positively to the
communities in which we live and work.
Our long-term strategy is to remain a financial services company. We will continue to
grow in the UK, and build our business in retail and commercial banking outside the
UK, with a bias towards continental Western Europe. We will develop our services
and products for wealthy customers, and we will build our global businesses, such as
investment banking and credit cards.
Our strategy also determines the way in which we will achieve our goals. This includes
the way we're organised, our management beliefs and practices, and the way we
behave towards our customers and each other.
Foremost among our practices is the use of a management framework that shapes the
way in which we make business decisions, and ties all of our planning and operations
to the creation of economic value.”
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3. OVERALL SYNOPSIS: Linking The Research Projects
3.1 Identifying The Managerial Issue
3.1.1 Strategy Development Processes Across A Portfolio Of Businesses
This section moves on to set out the managerial issue being addressed through this research,
within the context of the introduction set out in Section 2, which recognised that Barclays has:
a long and successful reputation as an innovator and pioneer; a strong sense of community
responsibility; a real commitment to caring for and developing its people; continued the
Quaker belief in the maximisation of shareholder value through the effective financing of
industry and the provision of large-scale banking for the mass affluent retail market.
It is also clear from Section 2 that Barclays has a portfolio of strategic business units operating
in very diverse competitive environments. Clearly these businesses operate in different
markets. However they also differ in terms of: geographical locations, technologies, regulatory
and legal obligations, distribution networks, brands, product and service offerings, customer
bases, competitors, political and social surroundings, and economic surroundings.
Based on the above, and on the Group’s commitment to the creation of shareholder value,
reinforced through the application of value-based management as a process for developing
strategy, it is possible to identify the managerial issue:
Within an organisation that has such a diverse portfolio of strategic business units,
operating in very different competitive environments, experiencing varying degrees of
uncertainty, change and complexity, what are the implications of different degrees of
perceived environmental uncertainty for strategy development processes across the
Barclays Group?
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As a financial services organisation and international bank operating in the United Kingdom
in the twenty-first century, the Barclays Group is regulated by the Financial Services Authority
and as such is obligated to produce medium-term strategic plans. It is therefore not surprising
that across the organisation there is a juxtaposition of terms like 'strategy development' and
'planning'. Consequently, the management issue for Barclays is to understand whether
strategic plans are produced to support the implementation of corporate or business-level
strategy, or whether such plans are developed to meet the Group's legal and regulatory
obligations or satisfy the needs and expectations of key stakeholders.
Other key managerial issues associated with strategy development processes and the varying
levels of perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by strategists across Barclays are:
1. How appropriate is it for a Group that has such a diverse range of strategic business units
to apply a single process for developing strategy (planning), based on a rational model for
developing strategy (value-based management)?
2. Given the diversity of the various strategic business units within the Barclays Group, is the
significant investment made in the development of strategic plans truly aligned to the
organisational objective of maximising shareholder value?
3. When strategists within the Group are experiencing increased levels of perceived
environmental uncertainty, is it appropriate for the organisation to rationally adopt less
prescriptive processes for developing strategy, for example incrementalism, politics and
the cultural approach to strategy development?
4. When strategists within the organisation are able to forecast that the Group is moving into
a period where levels of perceived environmental uncertainty are likely to rise for
strategists (for example, high levels of unemployment, high interest rates, economic
recession or large merger and acquisition programmes), can the organisation take the
opportunity to vary its process for developing strategy as appropriate?
5. It is important for corporate strategists in an organisation like Barclays to be aware that
colleagues will experience different and varying levels of perceived environmental
uncertainty. Consequently, is there an opportunity to vary the process for developing
strategy in accordance with the individual's (or team's) experience of the competitive
environment?
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3.1.2 Breaking The Managerial Issue Down Into Its Component Parts
In order to address the managerial issue, the research investigates two aspects of the strategy
development process at Barclays (see Figure 1). The first part is an exploratory study of the
organisational context, through the identification of qualitative factors that create perceived
environmental uncertainty. This part of the research then goes on to examine a series of
propositions: first, the relationship between change and complexity as contributory factors to
the phenomenon referred to as perceived environmental uncertainty; second, the level of
consensus among strategists at Barclays; and finally, the relationship between perceived
environmental uncertainty, the ability to cope, and the importance of being able to cope.
The second facet of the research identifies the processes used for developing strategy across
the various strategic business units within the Barclays portfolio. Following this, the research
investigates whether the strategic business units modify their strategy development processes
in response to varying degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty; to ascertain how the
Barclays Group maintains effectiveness in the above relationship in order to maximise
shareholder value.
Figure 1 – Breaking The Managerial Issue Down Into Its Component Parts
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty: Examining The Implications
For Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays Bank PLC
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty Strategy Development Processes
Qualitative Exploration Testing Propositions Differences Relationship With
P.E.U.
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3.2 Theoretical Overview: Synthesis Of The Literature Review
3.2.1 The Linking Of Two Theoretical Concepts
This Executive Doctorate investigates a link between two theoretical concepts: strategy
development processes at the strategic business unit level; and levels of perceived
environmental uncertainty experienced by strategists on the Group Executive Committee at
Barclays Bank PLC, illustrated in Figure 2 below:
Figure 2 – Examining The Implications Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty For Strategy Development
In many ways, it is useful to regard the two theoretical concepts as separate studies. The
research collected 731 questionnaires (Bailey, Johnson, and Daniels, 2000) from senior
managers across the seventeen business units within the Barclays Group to discern the
processes applied for developing strategy. At the same time (2003), the researcher interviewed
fifteen members of the Group Executive Committee to ascertain their perspective on the level
of perceived environmental uncertainty faced by the various businesses, the ability of each
business unit to cope with such uncertainty and the importance of their being able to cope. The
third aspect of the research, the key contribution, is to understand the relationship that exists
between the two theoretical concepts and the ramifications of these findings for Barclays.
Strategy
Development
Processes
Perceived
Environmental
Uncertainty
Perceived Environm ental Uncertainty:
Examining The Implications For
Strategy Development Processes
Across Barclays Bank PLC
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3.2.2 Summarising Key Theoretical Arguments Informing The Research
Following an extensive review of the literature, this section identifies the central theoretical
arguments that inform the study. However, prior to that it is important to clarify a twofold
working assumption, namely that: a) the various businesses within the Barclays portfolio are
of more value to Barclays than to anyone else, otherwise they would have been sold; and b) by
the same token, no other organisation believes it could create significantly more value from
these businesses than Barclays does, or they would have acquired them.
The theoretical starting point lies in the assertion that there is a reciprocal relationship
between a firm and the environment within which it operates (Mintzberg, 1973). Therefore the
challenge for top management is to ensure that the firm adapts to its external environment in
order to remain viable and survive (Lenz, 1980; Chaffee, 1985). Senior management achieve
an alignment or ‘fit’ (Hatch, 1997) between the external environment and the internal structure
and processes of the firm, through a process which organisational theorists refer to as strategy.
The next theoretical argument pertains to an understanding of how organisations develop
strategy in order to achieve alignment with their external environments. Chakravarthy and Doz
(1992) recognised strategy as a process. They contend that the distinct and fundamental
questions for the process are threefold. The first question pertains to an understanding of the
relationship between a firm’s administrative systems and / or decision processes, and its
competitive and / or resource positions. The second is to understand how a firm maintains
effectiveness in the above relationship. The third basic question relates to how a firm modifies
its decision processes in response to environmental changes, and through its own actions.
Some theorists suggest that the strategy process is a rational process which, as the name
suggests, involves a logical, deliberate and rational approach to combining selected courses of
action with the allocation of resources to achieve strategic fit or alignment (Fredrickson, 1984;
Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984). This rational approach has been challenged by behavioural
theorists (Simon, 1957; Cyert and March, 1963) who argue that individuals, and organisations,
can only achieve rationality within certain parameters, therefore such rationality is necessarily
‘bounded’. Lindblom (1959) referred to this as ‘muddling through’.
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The next theoretical argument relates to the process applied by the organisation as it attempts
to achieve a ‘fit’ (Hatch, 1997) between its external environment and its internal structure and
decision processes. Evidently this ‘fit’ may have been achieved as a consequence of an
integrated system of planning (Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971). The
perspective offered by Quinn (1980) suggests that strategy is primarily a decision-making
process. Therefore a more productive area of research may be to study how firms make
individual decisions, and whether they attempt to integrate decisions into an overall strategy
(Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984).
The work of Bailey et al. (2000) investigated the specific processes adopted by organisations
to develop strategy and it is this approach that is applied to the research. Through an extensive
search of the literature, reviewed in Section 4.2, and an analysis of other models of strategy
development, most notably the work of Hart (1992), Bailey et al. discovered six discrete
dimensions of strategy development within three broad approaches to the strategy process.
This research programme adopts the conceptualisation developed by Bailey et al. and utilises
their questionnaire (with some modifications) to identify the strategy development processes
adopted by Barclays at the strategic business unit level. The research instrument (a self-
administered questionnaire) is set out in Appendix A.
Once strategy development has been defined as a process, it is possible to move on to the next
theoretical argument, the environment within which managers develop strategy. Brown and
Eisenhardt (1998) recognised that traditional approaches to strategy prove problematic in the
face of rapid and unpredictably changing environments. They suggest that issues arise because
strategists over-emphasise the degree to which it is possible to predict the growth of
industries, competences or the strategic positions that may provide a competitive advantage,
and the length of time for which they are likely to sustain such advantages. Brown and
Eisenhardt found that problems are compounded because strategists also under-emphasise the
importance, and challenge, of actually creating and then executing a chosen strategy.
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 17 of 444
Duncan’s (1972) conceptual dimensions are central to the research into the organisational
context or environment (Boyd and Fulk, 1996), and provide the next theoretical argument for
the investigation, namely perceived environmental uncertainty and its role in the
organisational context. Through the integration of work carried out by organisational theorists
(Emery and Trist, 1965; Thompson, 1967) and decision theorists (Luce and Raiffa, 1957),
Duncan proposed that perceived environmental uncertainty can be described along two
constructs: the simple–complex dimension and the static–dynamic dimension. Using this
conceptualisation, Duncan argued that any rise in change or complexity results in an increase
in the level of perceived environmental uncertainty being experienced by strategists.
The literature on perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes
appears to be based on an assumption that any lack of stability in the external environment
creates a barrier to effective decision-making, and is therefore dysfunctional to an organisation
achieving a ‘fit’ between its environment and its internal structures and decision processes.
The logical corollary of this theoretical argument (when applied to the Barclays Group) is that
any lack of stability in the organisational context or environment creates a barrier to the
effective development of strategy and therefore to the maximisation of shareholder value.
Consequently, based on this argument the challenge for strategists at Barclays must be to
reduce the lack of stability (or to create stability) in the organisational context or environment.
The final theoretical argument that the research investigates is the relationship between the
level of perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by strategists and the processes
adopted by senior managers to make strategic decisions as they seek to achieve an alignment
between the external environment and the internal structures and processes of the strategic
business unit. The theoretical argument underpinning this study is that the challenge for
strategists lies in achieving congruence in the above relationship, and that failure to achieve
congruence is necessarily dysfunctional and a barrier to effective strategic decision-making.
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3.2.3 Linking Theoretical Arguments To Frame The Research Question
Following on from the previous section, it is possible to illustrate how the literature links
theoretical arguments to frame the research question, as illustrated in Figure 3 below:
1. There is a reciprocal relationship between the organisation and the environment within
which it operates (Mintzberg, 1973).
2. Strategy is the process by which an organisation seeks to achieve an alignment or ‘fit’ with
its external environment (Hatch, 1997).
3. Strategy is a process, and relates to how a firm modifies its decision processes in response
to environmental changes and through its own actions (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992).
4. The above points are achieved through a process of decision-making (Quinn, 1980);
therefore the research adopts a decision-making perspective on strategy.
5. From the review of the strategy development literature it has been possible to discern six
discrete processes for developing strategy (Bailey et al., 2000).
6. Strategists experience a rise in levels of perceived environmental uncertainty when they
make decisions in environments typified by high velocity change and complexity (Duncan,
1972) or when they lack the relevant information (Perrow, 1967) or experience (Weick,
2001).
Figure 3 – Linking Theoretical Arguments To Frame The Research Question
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3.3 Identifying The Research Gap
3.3.1 The Research Question
Before considering the research question for this Executive Doctorate, there are three key
considerations to note at Barclays. First, the organisation is committed to the maximisation of
shareholder value. Second, organisational performance is measured within the context of
value-based management, therefore growth in economic profit is the universal criterion by
which to measure success – and by this measure Barclays is a highly successful organisation.
And finally, there are seventeen strategic business units within the Barclays Group, all
experiencing varying degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty in their competitive
environments.
Within this context, the research question for the Executive Doctorate is:
“What are the implications for strategy development processes at the strategic business
unit level when corporate strategists are experiencing varying degrees of perceived
environmental uncertainty?”
The history of the Barclays Group, the organisational structure and the process of value-based
management as the criterion for success are outlined in the introduction (see Section 2.1). The
literature review on both perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development
processes is covered in Project 1 (see Section 4). The research design and methodology are
also covered in Project 1 (see Section 4.6). The exploratory study of perceived environmental
uncertainty is covered in Project 2 (see Section 5). The investigation of strategy development
processes and the examination of the implications of perceived environmental for strategy
development process is covered in Project 3 (see Section 6).
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3.4 The Research Programme
3.4.1 Project 1
3.4.1.1 The Literature Review
3.4.1.1.1 Strategy Development Processes
The literature review identified that traditional approaches to strategy development argue that
there is a reciprocal relationship between an organisation (in this case Barclays) and the
environment within which it operates. Therefore, an organisation’s strategy development
process reflects the extent of alignment between the organisation’s external environment and
its internal structure. Consequently, the challenge for strategists is to adapt to their external
environment in order for their organisation to remain viable and survive, achieved through a
strategy development process that is effective (or fit for purpose).
The literature also identified that strategy development can be addressed from many different
perspectives, for example: planning, (Andrews, 1971; Chaffee, 1985) strong leadership,
politics or culture. This research into effective strategy development under varying degrees of
perceived environmental uncertainty addresses the issue from a decision-making perspective.
This range of views in the literature has spawned an array of conceptual models, with scores
of strategy-making typologies, both competing and overlapping.
Through a review of the literature, Project 1 identified a multi-dimensional model of strategy
development processes proposed by Bailey et al. (2000). Within three broad approaches to the
strategy process – strategic choice, social processes and environmental factors – Bailey et al.
identified six discrete dimensions of strategy development: command, planning, incremental,
political, cultural and enforced choice. As a component of their research, Bailey et al. were
able to develop a self-administered questionnaire, which they believed represented the
characteristics attributable to each of the dimensions. This research adopts the approach to
strategy development processes proposed by Bailey et al. and uses an adaptation of their self-
administered questionnaire to identify strategy development processes across the seventeen
strategic business units in the Barclays portfolio (see Appendix A).
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 21 of 444
3.4.1.1.2 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
In the same way that the literature review of strategy development process identified a level of
confusion that has arisen over the liberal use of the term ‘strategy’, the literature review also
revealed confusion over the use of the term ‘uncertainty’. Primarily this confusion arises
because theorists and researchers take different positions over outcomes that are ‘certain’ and
outcomes that are ‘probable’.
The review identified that the debate is split into two schools of thought because the term
‘environmental uncertainty’ is used to describe both the state of the competitive environment,
and the state of mind of an individual who perceives himself or herself to be lacking critical
information pertaining to the environment and is therefore ‘uncertain’. This has led to the
misleading nature of the term ‘environmental uncertainty’, where theorists assert that as
environments have no cognitive ability, they cannot feel uncertain, therefore only people
experience uncertainty. Acceptance of the objective perspective, implies that it is possible to
characterise environments in terms of how objectively uncertain they are. In contrast, if one
accepts that environmental uncertainty is inherently ‘in the eye of the beholder’, it ought to be
investigated as a subjective, or perceptual, phenomenon.
This research addresses environmental uncertainty as a perceptual phenomenon with the
environment depicted from the perspective of individuals within the organisation. Through the
integration of work carried out by organisational theorists and decision theorists, Duncan
(1972) proposed that perceived environmental uncertainty could be described along two
constructs: the simple–complex dimension and the static–dynamic dimension. This research
utilises the conceptual dimensions developed by Duncan to research perceived environmental
uncertainty.
This thesis applies the work of Duncan to identify different levels of perceived environmental
uncertainty being experienced by strategists, and any subsequent implications for strategy
development process. This investigation is not concerned with the modelling, measurement
and management of objective, archival or economic uncertainty (Boyd, Dess, and Rasheed,
1993); therefore concepts like ‘uncertainty absorption’ (March and Simon, 1958) sit outside
the scope of the literature review. This distinction is clearly set out in Section 4.3.10.
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3.4.1.1.3 Managing For Value: Introducing The Ability To Cope
The literature review indicated that theoretical concepts like strategy development processes
and perceived environmental uncertainty are only of interest within an organisation such as
Barclays if they are considered within the context of the organisation’s strategic objective, the
maximisation of shareholder value. Consequently, the relationship between these two
theoretical concepts must be considered within the context of value-based management or the
year-on-year growth in economic profit.
As strategy development is portrayed as being the process through which the organisation
adapts in order to create a match or ‘fit’ with its competitive environment (in order to
maximise the creation of shareholder value), the inherent assumption in the literature is that
any complexity or lack of stability in the external environment creates a barrier to strategy
development, and is therefore dysfunctional to an organisation maintaining its equilibrium and
achieving its strategic objectives (the maximisation of shareholder value).
Based on an extensive review of the literature this research concludes that, however
sophisticated theorists become in explaining the concept of perceived environmental
uncertainty, the phenomenon will not influence strategists at organisations such as Barclays
unless research includes a combination of two additional key factors that contribute to
successful strategy development: first, the ability of a strategic business unit to cope with the
degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity in its competitive
environment; and second, the importance of a strategic business unit being able to cope with
the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity in its competitive
environment.
Within the context of value-based management, the literature review suggested that theorists
and researchers must develop a far more sophisticated understanding of the relationship
between perceived environmental uncertainty and the process for developing strategy.
Therefore, a key consideration when considering the strategic capability of an organisation
like Barclays Bank PLC is to understand the relative abilities of its various businesses to cope
with their competitive environments coupled with the importance of their being able to cope.
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3.4.1.2 The Research Design And Methodology
3.4.1.2.1 Research Design
Through the literature review, it is possible to identify two groups of people within the unit of
analysis: first, the Barclays Group Executive Committee, who are the people responsible for
developing corporate strategy at Barclays; and second, the senior management teams across
the seventeen strategic business units at Barclays, who are responsible for developing business
strategy. The period of time on which the research focused was 2003.
Through a series of semi-structured interviews, fifteen members of the Group Executive
Committee were asked to assess the seventeen strategic business units (in the Barclays Group)
on a scale of 0–100 (0 representing no uncertainty and 100 being total uncertainty) in terms of
the degrees of uncertainty, change and complexity they are deemed to face in their competitive
environment. Following this, they were asked to plot on a numeric scale the ability of the
business unit to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity and the importance of its being
able to cope. The senior management team within each strategic business unit was asked to
complete the self-administered questionnaire developed by Bailey et al. (2000). The data were
analysed using principal components analysis.
3.4.1.2.2 Research Methodology
The phenomenon of interest for this research programme is the process for developing strategy
at the strategic business unit level. The research condition is the perception of environmental
uncertainty experienced by strategists at the corporate level. The study seeks to identify
implications arising from the research condition for the phenomenon of interest.
The research is founded on the basic premise of polemics – the art or practice of dispute or
argument. The art of polemics is demonstrated in the wide-ranging review of the literature
where a host of strong opinions and arguments are offered on a wide range of subjects resident
within the research domain: perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development
process. The purpose of the literature review is therefore twofold: first, to set out the body of
knowledge within which the research resides – the research domain; and second, to build
propositions based on the literature which the research goes on to examine.
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As the research is concerned with theory-building, the researcher has developed logical
corollaries from the literature to build a series of propositions for testing in the field at
Barclays. The researcher uses these literature-guided propositions to direct the assessment of
theory, which is a critical step in the ongoing process of theory development. The researcher
then goes on to use the results obtained from testing these literature-guided propositions to
improve current theory.
During the course of the investigation, the research process has emerged in three key areas:
first, a wide-ranging coverage and understanding of existing literature and research in the field
of perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes; second, the
author developing his skills as a researcher through the collection of both primary and
secondary research data; and finally, the author developing a deeper understanding of strategy
development processes at Barclays Bank PLC by working within the organisation prior to and
throughout the period of the research.
Two of the most central concepts in the philosophy of science are ontology and epistemology.
In social enquiry, ontology refers to the claims or assumptions that the research makes about
the nature of social reality – claims about what exists, what reality looks like, what units it
comprises, and how these units interact with each other. For this study, the researcher adopts a
realist ontology, where theoretical, or hypothetical, entities characterised by a true theory
actually exist even though they cannot be directly observed. As the research is concerned with
the examination of perceptions, the researcher has designed the logic and strategy of the
programme in a manner consistent with a subjectivist epistemological position.
As this research programme is an Executive Doctorate, the methodological approach is
applied research, as the investigation is intended to lead to the resolution of a specific problem
for Barclays. In terms of its theoretical grounding, the research is both inductive and
deductive, because it involves inference from new empirical work and combines this with
received theory to deduce new conclusions. In terms of researcher involvement, the position
adopted by the researcher for this research programme is independent of the unit of analysis.
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Another issue to be addressed is sample size. In order to complete the data collection, the
researcher interviewed fifteen members of the Barclays Group Executive Committee – the
researcher was unable to obtain access to Matthew Barrett the Chief Executive of Barclays
Bank PLC. At the same time the researcher gathered 731 strategy development questionnaires
from senior managers across the seventeen strategic business units.
The methodological approach combines the testing of received theory, identified through the
literature review, with the development of new theory. The design of the data collection was
influenced mainly by earlier research. However, from the data, the research was able to
explore relationships that had not previously been studied. Data were collected from
strategists on their experience of perceived environmental uncertainty while data were being
collected on strategy development processes across the Barclays portfolio. Through the data,
the researcher was able to investigate correlations that exist in the above relationship.
The realist epistemology is founded on the building of models that, if they were to exist and
act in the postulated way, would account for the phenomena under investigation – the research
programme is therefore concerned with theory building, as well as theory testing. The theory
being developed is based on the proposition that there may be a relationship between the
levels of perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by corporate strategists and the
processes adopted for developing strategy at the strategic business unit level.
This doctoral research programme applies various techniques and procedures for completing
research, which can be classified into two categories: qualitative and quantitative. As with the
theoretical groundings, the distinction between the two is not always clear. Within the
qualitative classification, researchers argue that data collection and analysis tends to be a
continuous and iterative process designed to uncover emerging patterns or concepts that
inform the investigation. By way of contrast, quantitative research utilises formally structured
techniques such as questionnaires and surveys. The structure enables the research to focus the
data on the central theme, restricting deviations. This investigation comprises qualitative
research as it explores in detail perceptual measures of uncertainty, and perceptions among
strategists of the processes used for developing strategy across Barclays. It does however use
quantitative measures to analyse summary measures of the variables identified.
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3.4.2 Project 2: Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
3.4.2.1 Setting The Context For The Qualitative Exploration
This section looks at the key qualitative and quantitative findings emanating from the research
into perceived environmental uncertainty completed in Project 2. However, as a pre-text for
the key findings it is important to remember that the primary purpose of Project 2 was to
obtain the quantitative assessment of perceived environmental uncertainty from the most
senior corporate strategists in the Barclays Group. The exploration of the qualitative
constructs that contribute to variances in the levels of environmental uncertainty being
perceived by strategists was very much secondary to the Project 2 investigation.
The relative importance of the quantitative and qualitative components of Project 2 is catered
for in the research design and methodology (see Section 4.6), and was successfully piloted at
the outset of Project 2 (see Section 5.4). The research design enabled respondents to give a
numeric assessment of: the level of uncertainty, change and complexity being experienced
across the portfolio; the ability of the various organisations within the Group to cope with
uncertainty, change and complexity; and the importance of the various strategic business units
being able to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity. Where time allowed, and time did
not allow in 50% of the interviews, respondents were asked to state the qualitative constructs
that underpinned their quantitative assessments. These factors have been compared to the
literature (see Section 5.8) and presented as findings, but they are very much secondary to the
objectives of Project 2.
It is important to remember that this Executive Doctorate is concerned with understanding the
implications of the relationship between levels of perceived environmental uncertainty
experienced by strategists, and the application of strategy development processes across the
Barclays Group. The collection of the qualitative constructs was useful in understanding
different factors that contribute to (or explain) variances in the levels of perceived
environmental uncertainty experienced by strategists. However, it was not an objective of this
research to apply the qualitative constructs in an attempt to measure, manage or model levels
of perceived environmental uncertainty.
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3.4.2.2 Qualitative Exploration: Key Findings
The first key finding is that the term ‘uncertainty’ is not commonly used in the managerial
lexicon at Barclays and therefore strategists on the Group Executive Committee manage the
organisation without even considering an abstract concept such as perceived environmental
uncertainty. This preference to observe the competitive environment from a positive
perspective is explained by Naguib Kheraj2, Chairman, Barclays Global Investors:
“I do not think it is useful to consider the competitive environment as inherently
‘certain’ or ‘uncertain’. I tend to view the marketplace as offering our various strategic
business units a whole range of exciting opportunities and interesting challenges.”
The second key finding is that when strategists at Barclays are asked to consider the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity being faced across the Group, a
level of managerial logic is applied. This logic dictates that it is not the level of uncertainty,
change or complexity that is significant but the ability of the strategic business units to cope
and the importance of the various businesses being able to cope. John Varley3, Group Finance
Director, explains:
“The nature of the business model determines the level of uncertainty faced by
particular business units. Where we have a well-proven business model operating in a
traditional marketplace, for example the Woolwich, then uncertainty is typically quite
low. When a business unit is operating a fee-based business model in a complicated
and volatile marketplace, for example Barclays Capital or Barclays Global Investors,
then one would expect levels of uncertainty to be considerably higher.”
2 Group Executive Committee Interview With Naguib Kheraj, Wednesday 9th July 2003
3 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Varley, Thursday 13th November 2003
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The research also finds that the ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity is not
achieved by creating a ‘match’ or strategic ‘fit’ between the organisation and its competitive
environment but through the protection of a highly successful and resilient business model,
banking. For more than 300 years, banking in the UK has proved a successful business model
with which an organisation such as Barclays cannot fail to create shareholder value in
favourable economic conditions such as those experienced during 2003. One of the members
of the Group Executive Committee4 explains:
“Developing strategy at Barclays is not uncertain and certainly not complex; we have a
terrific business model, a wonderful brand, great people and the most sophisticated
management information. Our people are so good that we on Group Executive
Committee could probably go to sleep for a year and still make £3 billion.”
The fourth key finding is that the importance of being able to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty at Barclays is driven by the strategic objective to maximise
shareholder value, that is either the current creation of value or the expectation of value
creation at some time in the future. The importance of being able to cope is not a function of
the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, or the level of complexity assumed to be present
in the Group’s competitive environment but the level of value each business unit creates and
the likelihood of it being able to sustain and improve its value contribution to the Group over
the long term. John Varley5, Group Finance Director, explains:
“All our strategic business units are not equally important; they are either central to
how we create value at present – ‘jam today’ – or they will be central to how we create
value at some time in the future – ‘jam tomorrow’. Therefore the key factor that drives
strategic importance is the level of value contribution forecasted by each of the
business units. Clearly it is important that the business units that make the most value
contribution are the ones most able to cope with uncertainty.”
4 Group Executive Committee Interview, Summer 2003
5 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Varley, Thursday 13th November 2003
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Project 2 also finds that although there is a high degree of synergy between the qualitative
factors that create uncertainty (e.g. technology), enable business units to cope (e.g. talented
leaders), and make it important that businesses are able to cope (e.g. value creation), there is a
high level of difference in perspectives among strategists at Barclays as to how the various
strategic business units are impacted by uncertainty, change, and complexity. This lack of
consensus is covered in further detail in the quantitative investigation. One of the members of
the Group Executive Committee6 explains:
“At Barclays we have great people who thrive on ambitious challenges and
opportunities, and it never ceases to amaze me how our people respond so positively to
uncertainty, complexity and change. As strategists it is our responsibility to ensure that
the Group is faced with the apposite degree of uncertainty in order to leverage the
greatest value from our resources. Consequently there are times when it is appropriate
to deliberately create, or actively seek, uncertainty, change and complexity.”
A sixth key finding from Project 2 is that there appears to be a substantive difference between
the qualitative factors that contribute to the rate of change being experienced across the
Barclays portfolio, and the qualitative factors that contribute to the level of complexity being
perceived across the Group.
The crucial difference that arose from the research in Project 2 is that the factors that create
change are very externally focused, for example competition, regulations and customer
requirements. By contrast, the factors that create complexity appear to be very internally
focused, for example managing and developing people, internal politics, effective cross-Group
integration, and the lack of high quality management information.
6 Group Executive Committee Interview, Summer 2003
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One of the members of the Group Executive Committee7 explains the key differences in the
factors that create change and the qualitative factors that contribute to complexity:
“When we as a senior team consider our strategic response to the rate of change, the
agenda tends to be dominated by external issues, for example customers or interest
rates – and let me tell you we have a great track record in being able to cope with such
strategic issues. However, when it comes to levels of complexity we have a history of
‘doing things to ourselves’. As you can imagine Barclays becomes a pretty complex
organisation when the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing. Be
assured that the level of complexity really goes through the roof, and the fun and
games really start, when the left hand tries to control the right hand.”
The seventh key finding from Project 2 is that the perceptual assessments of the degree of
perceived environmental uncertainty, the ability to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty, and the importance of being able to cope fluctuate over time. Such fluctuations
can be driven by events or by experience and knowledge.
An example of a fluctuation in the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty could be the
‘dot-com revolution’ of 2001; examples of event-driven fluctuations in the ability to cope
could be the survival of a crisis such as the large Russian debt write-offs by Barclays Capital
in 1998, or the successful acquisition and merger with the Woolwich by the UK Retail Bank
in the late 1990s. An example of a fluctuation over time would be where strategists claim to
develop a level of ‘immunity’ to uncertainty as their career develops and they feel better able
to cope with higher levels of uncertainty, or they increase their ability to cope by gaining more
experience.
7 Group Executive Committee Interview, Summer 2003
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The fluctuation is the experience of perceived environmental uncertainty over time is
explained by one of the members of the Group Executive Committee8:
“My experience of uncertainty is that it fluctuates over time. I remember having
sleepless nights in the 1980s about whether or not we should buy the Trustees Savings
Bank. During the 1990s the break up of BZW and the purchase of the Woolwich
created great uncertainty. With the advent of the new millennium we worried about the
dot.com revolution or whether to buy the Bradford & Bingley. Our current sources of
uncertainty are our regulation obligations, competition, and whether or not we will
acquire or be acquired. Yes, I think it is safe to say that the degree of uncertainty we
have experienced on Group Executive Committee over the years has fluctuated greatly
over time.”
Finally Project 2 finds that diversity and debate is actively encouraged in the development of
corporate strategy, therefore the ability to develop one’s own perspective on the competitive
environment and the Group’s strategy and be able to contribute effectively to the strategy
process is actively encouraged. The Group has developed fora and focus groups where
corporate strategists present the Bank’s strategy and members of the organisation are invited
to engage in the debate. The findings show that the Group goes to great lengths to ensure that
a diverse range of individuals, irrespective of gender or ethnic background, is able to
contribute to the strategy process.
The research in Project 2 also finds that under certain circumstances, strategists deliberately
create uncertainty and change, but not complexity. Uncertainty is created to ensure managers
are able to think creatively and be challenged; change is created to ensure the Group is able to
transform itself and continue to meet ambitious value targets. Complexity is avoided because
it is seen as a barrier to the strategic objective of maximising shareholder value.
8 Group Executive Committee Interview, Summer 2003
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One of the members of the Group Executive Committee9 highlights the importance of
diversity and debate in the strategy development process:
“Under Matt Barrett’s leadership we have built a Group Executive Committee made
up of very different personalities and backgrounds, and over the last five years Matt
has worked very hard to build an environment of trust, empathy, commitment and
teamwork. We don’t feel ‘consensually uncertain’ if one of our colleagues interprets
the competitive environment differently or proposes a different strategic course.
Personally, I enjoy having my views and assumptions challenged by highly
experienced and knowledgeable colleagues – invariably it informs and develops my
own strategic thinking. A diversity of views expressed within a mature debate is the
sign of a high-performing team and this is a very important aspect of the strategy
development process at Barclays.”
9 Group Executive Committee Interview, Spring 2003
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3.4.2.3 Quantitative Exploration: Key Findings
The key findings from the quantitative investigation into perceived environmental uncertainty
carried out in Project 2 fall into three categories: first, the investigation into the modernist
perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty; second, the examination of the lack of
managerial consensus concerning degrees of uncertainty being experienced in different
strategic business units; and finally, the identification of key managerial implications arising
out of the quantitative investigation into perceived environmental uncertainty.
Beginning with the investigation into the modernist perspective on perceived environmental
uncertainty, Project 2 finds that academic research needs to develop a far more sophisticated
model for conceptualising perceived environmental uncertainty than the modernist notion that
the degree of uncertainty is merely a product of the rate of change and the level of complexity.
This research also finds that the rate of change and the level of complexity cannot be regarded
as independent variables, with the degree of uncertainty being measured as the dependent
variable. Project 2 has uncovered a statistically significant relationship between the rate of
change and the level of complexity at Barclays, leading to the conclusion that an increase in
the rate of change is reflected in an increase in the level of complexity and vice versa.
Moving on to the examination of the lack of managerial consensus or individual perspectives
concerning degrees of uncertainty, Project 2 finds that there is a high degree of variance, or
lack of consensus, in the perceptual assessments made by corporate strategists at Barclays on
the level of perceived environmental uncertainty being encountered across the Group, the
ability to cope with such uncertainty, and the importance of the business units being able to
cope. This finding suggests that corporate strategists on the same Executive Committee in the
same organisation have developed very different perspectives on the competitive
environments within which the various business units operate, the ability of these latter to
cope, and the importance of their being able to cope. This finding is evidenced in the nebulous
use of terms such as ‘uncertainty’, ‘strategy’ and ‘complexity’, which appear to have very
different meanings for different members of the Group Executive Committee. It is an
important finding for strategists to be aware that the terms that they use in the development of
strategy may not be the terms that are heard by colleagues in the same organisation.
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Finally this section moves on to look at the identification of key managerial implications
arising out of the quantitative investigation. First, Project 2 finds that when strategists begin
to think about the managerial implications of perceived environmental uncertainty, then a
managerial logic becomes evident in their assessments which appears to be missing in some
cases when they are asked to assess uncertainty, change and complexity as abstract concepts.
This is evidenced in the strong correlation between the ability to cope with uncertainty and the
ability to cope with change and complexity, and the strong reciprocal relationship between the
importance of being able to cope with uncertainty and the importance of being able to cope
with change and complexity.
Interestingly this managerial logic extends across the section of the research concerned with
the managerial implications and is evidenced by some logical and fairly predictable reciprocal
relationships. Illustrations of such relationships are the strong correlation between the ability
to cope with uncertainty and the ability to cope with change, and the correlation (albeit much
weaker) between the degree of uncertainty and the rate of change being faced, and the
correlation (again weak) between the ability to cope with uncertainty and the ability to cope
with change. From a managerial perspective, however, the key finding here is the lack of
correlation between the ability to cope and the importance of being able to cope.
This finding suggests that the Bank does not send its most talented strategists into the areas
where it is deemed most important for the Group to be able to cope with uncertainty, change
or complexity. The finding suggests that the Group uses other factors to determine where it
sends these strategists. The results of Project 2 appear to suggest that the strategists most
capable of coping with uncertainty, change and complexity are sent to the areas of the Group
that create the highest shareholder value, or where the most shareholder value is at stake.
This finding also suggests that successful strategy development cannot be regarded merely as
reducing levels of perceived environmental uncertainty in order to maximise the match or ‘fit’
between the organisation and its competitive environment. It would appear that strategy
development in an organisation like Barclays involves effectively protecting and defending the
areas of the business that create the most shareholder value, and acting as responsible stewards
of a resilient and highly successful business model or ‘money-printing machine’.
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3.4.2.4 Project 2: Conclusions
Based on the findings of Project 2, the research draws four key conclusions counter to some of
those in the literature review set out in Project 1:
1. Academic research needs to develop a far more sophisticated conceptualisation of
perceived environmental uncertainty than the one offered by the modernist perspective
(Duncan, 1972). Project 2 concludes that the rate of change and the level of complexity
cannot be regarded merely as independent variables with perceived environmental
uncertainty measured as the dependent variable. The research also concludes that the
effect of these two variables on perceived environmental uncertainty is not equally
weighted and that the rate of change actually contributes to the level of complexity for
strategic business units within the Barclays portfolio.
2. The research challenges the modernist perspective on strategy and concludes that
strategy at Barclays cannot be described simply as creating a ‘match’ (Chaffee, 1985)
or a ‘fit’ (Hatch, 1997) between the Bank and its competitive environment. Strategy at
Barclays is a process of identifying the areas of the Group that create shareholder value
and then protecting, defending and growing them by acting as effective stewards of a
resilient and highly successful business model that, in favourable economic conditions,
cannot fail. There is a presumption that the resilience of the business model enables the
Group to cope with the challenges presented in its competitive environment.
3. The notion of ‘consensual uncertainty’ (Huff, 1978) is inappropriate for the strategy
development process at Barclays because the Group consistently seeks to encourage
diversity and debate in the strategy process. The research therefore concludes that
strategists seek to minimise consensus, and indeed there is evidence that too much
consensus can cause uncertainty in the process.
4. There is a high degree of variance, or lack of consensus (Bowman and Ambrosini,
2000), in the perceptual assessments of strategists as to the impact of uncertainty,
change and complexity on the various business units in the Barclays portfolio
(Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003a). This research concludes that the wide range of
diversity, debate and multiple perspectives on the strategy development process on the
Group Executive Committee and across the organisation as a whole makes an
invaluable contribution to the overall and ongoing success of the Group.
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3.4.3 Project 3: Strategy Development Processes
3.4.3.1 Key Methodological Findings
Project 3 discovered two key methodological findings: first, that the self-administered strategy
process questionnaire (Bailey, 2000) is an effective instrument for identifying strategy
development processes at Barclays; second, that in order for the research instrument to
produce the required results at Barclays then changes needed to be made to the questionnaire.
Allied to this adaptation of the questionnaire to the organisational context at Barclays, it was
necessary to test and validate the research instrument in the research field and undertake a
comprehensive analysis of the data prior to finalising the method for statistical analysis.
3.4.3.2 Key Empirical Findings
The investigation in Project 3 produced empirical findings in four key areas: the identification
of strategy development processes across Barclays PLC; consistency of the Barclays results
with the literature review and existing academic research; the identification of significant
differences in strategy development processes across the Barclays portfolio; and finally, the
existence across the Barclays Group of significant differences in degrees of perceived
environmental uncertainty, the ability to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty and
the perceived importance of being able to cope with such uncertainty.
Beginning with the identification of strategy development processes across Barclays PLC, the
first key empirical finding from Project 3 is that the strategy development process at Barclays
is typified by the incremental and planning approaches to strategy development. The results
also produced significantly low scores on the political and enforced choice dimensions.
Moving on to a comparison of the Barclays results with the literature review and existing
academic research, the research found that the Barclays results were highly consistent with
both the literature review and existing research – most notably the work of Bailey et al. (2000)
and Collier, Fishwick and Floyd (2004).
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The third key empirical finding is the discovery of significant differences in strategy
development processes across the Barclays portfolio. In keeping with the Group results, there
is a predominance of incrementalism and planning across the portfolio. However, some areas
showed statistically significant evidence of other dimensions, for example the enforced choice
dimension at Investment Management. Others showed a statistically significant move away
from certain dimensions, for example the lack of the command dimension at Barclaycard, and
the significantly low presence of the enforced choice dimension within Barclays Capital.
The final key empirical finding is the discovery of significant differences in degrees of
perceived environmental uncertainty across the Group. In Project 3, the data on perceived
environmental uncertainty have been revisited to identify significant differences between
business units and to determine whether these differences are related to strategy development.
Here, Project 3 identifies significant differences in the degree of uncertainty and the level of
complexity being experienced across Barclays. However, the findings show no significant
differences in the rate of change being perceived across the Group. Interestingly, there were
significant differences in the ability of the various units to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty, and the importance of their being able to cope with such uncertainty.
3.4.3.3 Key Inductive Findings
Two key inductive findings emerge from Project 3. First is the correlation between
organisational performance and strategy processes. Here, the research found that the
organisations that create the most value at Barclays are more likely to adopt the incremental or
planning approach to strategy development. By way of comparison, the less successful
organisations are more likely to adopt the political or the enforced choice dimensions.
The next key inductive finding is a significant correlation between perceived environmental
uncertainty and organisational performance. The research found a significant positive
correlation between the importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty and the level of value created. The study was unable to prove a negative
correlation between organisational performance and the degree of perceived environmental
uncertainty, or between performance and the ability to cope with such uncertainty.
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3.4.3.4 Project 3: Conclusions
There are eight key conclusions from the research in Project 3:
1. The strategy process questionnaire built by Bailey (2000), and enhanced by Bailey et
al. (2000), with minor modifications, has proved robust in its application in the
research field at Barclays. The consistency of results derived from the total population
of responses with the predictions from Bailey et al. is shown in Table 4 below:
Table 4 – The Group Correlation Matrix
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command -0.041873 1
Cultural 0.066435 0.181822 1
Planning 0.429834 -0.113938 -0.167811 1
Political -0.047269 0.319822 0.401973 -0.428980 1
Enforced Choice -0.083750 0.187310 0.229983 -0.273104 0.392108 1
Note: Critical Values Are 0.196 at 5% Significance Level (Bold Text) & 0.258 At 1% Significance Level (Red & Bold Text)
The predicted consistency between the dimensions is shown in Table 5 below:
Table 5 – Group Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  Not Significant
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  <1%
Planning Political Negative  <1%
Planning Cultural Negative  Not Significant
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  <1%
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  <5%
Note: Critical Values Are 0.196 at 5% Significance Level & 0.258 At 1% Significance Level
2. The strategy development process across Barclays is multi-dimensional and processes
transpire in combination, most notably the incremental approach to strategy
development and the planning dimension.
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3. A relationship between the command and enforced choice dimensions emerges in
certain clusters of strategic business units at Barclays, which appears to be peculiar to
the organisational structure of the Group.
4. The emergence of a relationship between the command and culture dimensions in
certain clusters of strategic business units at Barclays, highlights that the research
instrument may not be entirely applicable to every organisation.
5. There are significant differences in the processes that are applied for developing
strategy across the strategic business units within the Barclays Group.
6. There are also significant differences in the degree of uncertainty and the level of
complexity being experienced by strategic business units across the Barclays Group.
However, none of the strategic business units is deemed to face a significantly higher
or lower rate of change than elsewhere across the Group.
7. The worst-performing cluster of strategic business units (Barclays Private Clients)
shows a significantly lower score on the incremental and planning dimensions than the
Group as a whole – and a significantly higher score on the political and enforced
choice dimensions. The cluster with the second highest performance (Barclays Capital)
has a significantly above-average score on planning and significantly below-average
scores on the political and enforced choice dimensions. These results offer some
support to the conclusions of Bailey et al. (2000), see Table 6 below:
Table 6 – Variance In Value Contribution (Economic Profit) And Key Dimension Differences
Cluster
% Change In
Value
Contribution
Variation From Group (Significance Level)
Incremental Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard 19.48% + (5%) + (NS) - (NS) - (NS)
Barclays Africa 63.64% + (NS) + (NS) - (NS) - (NS)
Barclays Capital 79.78% + (NS) + (5%) - (1%) - (1%)
Barclays Private Clients -49.70% - (1%) - (1%) + (1%) + (1%)
UK Retail Bank 16.46% + (NS) + (5%) - (NS) - (NS)
Business Bank 8.54% + (NS) + (1%) - (NS) - (NS)
Barclays Global Investors 100.00% - (NS) + (NS) - (NS) - (NS)
Note: Critical Values Are 0.196 at 5% Significance Level (Bold Text) & 0.258 At 1% Significance Level (Red & Bold Text)
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8. There is a significant positive correlation between the perceived importance of ability
to cope with uncertainty (of each of the seven clusters of strategic business units) and
the size of the value contribution of that cluster. There is however no correlation
between the importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty and performance measured by the growth of value contribution (seconomic
profit). The results are set out in Table 7 below:
Table 7 – The Importance Of Being Able To Cope And Organisational Performance (Value Contribution)
Cluster Importance OfBeing Able To Cope
Value Created (Economic Profit) % Change
2002-03Rank 2003 Rank 2002
Business Bank 73.56 1 £1,308m 1 £1,227m 6.60%
Barclays Capital 66.66 2 £782m 3 £580m 34.83%
Barclaycard 64.00 3 £722m 4 £615m 17.40%
UK Retail Bank 61.44 4 £967m 2 £871m 11.02%
Barclays Global Investors 58.67 5 £192m 6 £111m 72.97%
Barclays Private Clients 55.14 6 £328m 5 £368m -10.87%
Barclays Africa 44.67 7 £113m 7 £89m 26.97%
3.4.4 Linking The Research Projects
3.4.4.1 Addressing The Managerial Issue
The managerial issue being addressed in this research is perceived environmental uncertainty
(experienced by corporate strategists) and its implications for strategy development processes
at the strategic business unit level (or business-level strategy), across Barclays Bank PLC. Or
in managerial terms, the implications of the conclusions of Project 2 for the conclusions drawn
in Project 3 – within the context of the comprehensive literature review set out in Project 1.
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3.4.4.2 Key Links – Findings
The key findings in terms of the linkage between perceived environmental uncertainty and
strategy development process are as follows:
1. Data from Barclays do not support the emphasis placed in the strategy literature on the
role of perceived environmental uncertainty in the strategy development process.
Perceived environmental uncertainty is a nebulous concept and is not within the
managerial lexicon at Barclays. This finding is revealed by Table 8 (below), which
shows the lack of consensus among the fifteen members of the Group Executive
Committee as to their perception of the environmental uncertainty being faced by each
of the seventeen strategic business units.
Table 8 – The Degree Of Uncertainty Faced By The Various Strategic Business Units
Strategic Business Unit Mean Standard Deviation Maximum Minimum
Woolwich 44.73 15.271 70 15
UK Retail Bank 46.40 15.838 70 20
Caribbean 46.67 15.774 75 20
Europe 55.67 15.453 90 30
International Bank 46.67 18.190 80 20
Private Bank 51.73 16.607 75 20
Premier Bank 46.00 18.342 75 10
Barclays Global Investors 50.07 21.349 85 10
Business Bank 42.00 19.254 85 10
Barclays Africa 49.00 15.721 75 15
Barclaycard Corporate 37.67 15.453 70 10
Barclaycard International 58.33 15.774 80 25
Barclaycard UK 48.40 16.513 70 10
Collateralised Financing 50.38 17.775 80 20
Global Financing 55.77 17.097 80 20
Global Markets 62.00 17.595 90 20
Private Equity 58.57 17.158 80 30
2. Strategists at Barclays are focused on the strategic objective of maximising shareholder
value. Consequently, perceived environmental uncertainty (as with all other
managerial issues) only becomes a strategic issue if it is perceived to create a barrier to
the maximisation of shareholder value. Therefore, the important strategic issue is not
the level of perceived environmental uncertainty experienced across the portfolio but
the ability of the various strategic business units to cope and the importance of their
doing so.
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3. Banking in the UK has been a successful business model for over 300 years.
Consequently, the challenge for strategists at Barclays is not managing a lack of
stability in the competitive environment but merely defending and growing a highly
successful business model; or, in managerial terms, effective management of a profit
and loss account that cannot fail by: growing revenues, reducing costs, minimising bad
and doubtful debt provisions and managing capital expenditure.
4. At Barclays, the importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty is not a function of the importance of being able to cope with the degree of
change or the level of complexity but a function of the level of economic profit
produced by the strategic business units.
5. Strategic business units in Barclays that were successful during 2003 applied the
incremental and planning dimensions of strategy development. The businesses that
were less successful applied the political dimension and experienced enforced choice
in their strategy development process. Therefore, the strategic business units that were
deemed most able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty applied the
incremental and planning dimensions of the strategy development process.
6. Although there is a high degree of synergy regarding the qualitative factors that create
uncertainty, change and complexity (e.g. technology, regulation and competition),
there is a low level of managerial consensus regarding the impact of perceived
environmental uncertainty across the Barclays portfolio and therefore the strategy
development process.
3.4.4.3 Key Links – Conclusions
There are two key conclusions that emanate from this research: first, the nature of the
relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes
across Barclays; and second, the correlation between strategy development processes and
organisational performance across the Barclays portfolio. These two conclusions are drawn
within the context of value-based management where strategists are primarily concerned with
the maximisation of shareholder value.
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Beginning with the relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy
development processes. The research concludes that concepts like uncertainty, change and
complexity are not within the managerial lexicon at Barclays. The lack of consistency among
the Group Executive Committee members' perceptions of the environmental uncertainty faced
by strategic business units reduces the dispersion of the mean values for these units and only
one statistically significant correlation was found: a negative one between perceived
environmental uncertainty and culture. Strategy development at Barclays does not involve a
carefully managed reciprocal relationship between the firm and its environment, or a skilfully
manipulated balance of the degree of change and the level of complexity with which the
organisation is deemed able to cope.
Based on this conclusion, strategy development involves the dedicated and ruthless
stewardship of a highly successful and resilient business model that cannot fail within the
economic environment experienced during the period of this research (1999–2005).
Consequently, the Bank’s strategic capability (e.g. people) and assets (e.g. brand and
technology) are geared towards protecting and developing the business model, or in simpler
managerial terms, ‘defending the money-printing machine’.
The conclusion here is that Barclays is operating a mature and successful business model in an
environment within which it is impossible to fail to create significant levels of shareholder
value. The Group operates in a highly regulated environment with considerable barriers to
entry, a dominant market position and a strong brand. To conclude, at Barclays the
relationship between strategy development process and perceptions of environmental
uncertainty is largely irrelevant.
The examination of the correlation between strategy development processes and
organisational performance across the Barclays portfolio provides some very interesting
conclusions. The first observation is that high performing clusters within the portfolio show
high levels of the incremental and planning dimensions of strategy development. These
organisations apply planning in a logical and incremental form, displaying the ability to
predict and understand their competitive environments, but also the ability to be flexible in
applying the strategy process and a willingness to allow strategy to emerge as events occur.
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By way of comparison, the lowest performing clusters in the Barclays portfolio apply politics
and experience enforced choice in the strategy development process. Strategy for these
organisations is a process of power and negotiation with corporate strategists on the Group
Executive Committee. For their part, members of the Group Executive Committee lack
confidence in the ability of the clusters to cope and therefore either prescribe solutions to
strategic issues or take action to ensure that the cluster conforms. This can be done by
changing Chief Executive Officers or sending specialist teams from the Group or
consultancies to determine strategy. Under these circumstances, the strategic business units (or
clusters) interpret this intervention as politics or interference (enforced choice).
3.5.4 The Original Contributions
3.5.4.1 Methodological Contributions
The Executive Doctorate programme has produced two key methodological contributions: the
research matrix (see Appendix B), and the modification and application of the strategy
development questionnaire (Bailey, 2000) in the research field at Barclays.
Beginning with the research matrix, the research instrument is the operationalisation of the
conceptual dimensions of perceived environmental uncertainty proposed by Duncan (1972).
The matrix also includes the operationalisation of the ability to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty, and the importance of being able to cope with such uncertainty.
Clearly, the purpose of the research matrix is to enable the researcher to examine empirically
the impact of perceived environmental uncertainty across a portfolio of seventeen strategic
business units. However, it is also designed to enable the researcher to facilitate a semi-
structured interview with the most senior executives at Barclays, where criteria like the
organisational power of the respondent, interview time (50 minutes), the face validity of the
researcher, and confidentiality of the response are catered for in an elegant, sophisticated, and
easily accessible format.
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The second important methodological contribution emanating from this research programme
is the modification and application of the strategy development questionnaire in the research
field at Barclays. This research took a well-developed research instrument and tailored it to a
global financial services organisation, making important modifications in both the structure of
the questionnaire and the method of analysing the research data.
In Project 3, the researcher completed the largest scale collection of data (within a single
organisation) using this instrument, to illustrate significant differences in strategy
development process across a diverse portfolio of strategic business units – within a single
parent organisation. The distribution and collection of the questionnaires was very successful
(48% response rate) and led to a highly sophisticated comparison with the results collected
from the research matrix in Project 2.
3.5.4.2 Theoretical Contributions
This research programme has achieved significant theoretical contributions, and these fall
within three categories: theoretical contributions that have been confirmed; theoretical
contributions that have been contradicted; and theoretical contributions that are new.
There are four theoretical contributions that have been confirmed. First, the literature in the
domain of both strategy and perceived environmental uncertainty is both confused and
fractured (see Sections 4.1–4.5). Second, the strategy development questionnaire developed by
Bailey (2000) and further enhanced by Bailey et al. (2000) is an effective instrument for
empirically examining strategy development processes across a portfolio of strategic business
units. Third, the research has found a high degree of consistency between the qualitative
factors that create uncertainty (e.g. competition), change (e.g. regulation) and complexity (e.g.
globalisation) at Barclays on the one hand and, on the other, the qualitative factors that are
deemed to create uncertainty, change and complexity in the literature (see Section 4.5). And
finally, there is a low level of managerial consensus (or high level of individual perspectives)
on the impact of perceived environmental uncertainty on strategy development across
Barclays.
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Two key theoretical contributions have been contradicted. First, the two conceptual
dimensions proposed by Duncan (1972) – the simple–complex dimension and the static–
dynamic dimension – are too simplistic in their conceptualisation of a concept like perceived
environmental uncertainty. The illustration of perceived environmental uncertainty on a two-
by-two matrix by Hatch (1997) highlights that researchers need a far more sophisticated model
(and understanding) of the certainty–uncertainty construct. As an example, this research finds
that the behaviours of people can create uncertainty – clearly, the actions and perceptions of
people are not two-dimensional.
Second, this research also challenges the notion of consensual uncertainty (Huff, 1978) as a
source of perceived environmental uncertainty. This research finds that diversity and debate is
encouraged in the strategy development process at Barclays and, rather than acting as a barrier
to effective strategic management, debate and discussion are encouraged as an integral part of
the process.
The final category is the theoretical contributions that are new, and here there are two key
contributions. The first is that within the context of value-based management, there is no
relevant relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty (at the corporate level) and
strategy development process (at the business unit or business level). The relevant relationship
at Barclays is that if a strategic business unit is successful, that is it creates year-on-year
growth in economic profit, it is deemed more able to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty.
Where the strategic business unit creates a large level of economic profit (relative to its peers),
it is deemed more important that the strategic business unit is able to cope with uncertainty.
The empirical evidence shows that the most successful organisations in Barclays use the
incremental and planning dimensions of strategy development, which makes them more able
to cope, more successful and therefore more important to the parent organisation. Their
success is not necessarily a reflection on the level of perceived environmental uncertainty they
are deemed to face.
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The second key theoretical contribution that is entirely new is the observation that strategy
development at Barclays does not involve a carefully managed reciprocal relationship between
the Bank and its environment, or a skilfully manipulated balance of the degree of change and
the level of complexity with which the organisation is deemed able to cope.
This research programme has found that strategy development at Barclays involves the
dedicated and ruthless stewardship of a highly successful and resilient business model. The
evidence at Barclays suggests that over the last 300 years this business model cannot fail
within favourable economic conditions. The economic environment experienced during the
period of this research (1999–2005) has been favourable, typified by low interest rates, low
inflation and a prosperous property market. Consequently, the Bank’s strategic capability (e.g.
people) and assets (e.g. brand and technology) are geared towards protecting and developing
the business model, or in simpler managerial terms, defending a highly successful and resilient
‘money-printing machine’.
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3.5.5 Developing A Deeper Knowledge Of Practice
There are four key learning areas for practitioners at Barclays that have been developed
through this research:
1. Within the context of value-based management, the primary strategic objective at
Barclays is the maximisation of shareholder value. Within this context, all programmes
of activity (e.g. customer service, regulatory change) are designed to serve the
objective of value maximisation – not the reduction of uncertainty change or
complexity.
2. Despite the global nature of the organisation and diverse range of strategic business
units, Barclays has a very simple business model. The Bank ‘buys’ money at the base
rate of interest, or attracts savings deposits and then ‘sells’ it at very wide margins. It
also sells associated financial products (e.g. pensions and buildings insurance) through
its distribution network on a commission basis. This simple business model has four
strategic ‘levers’: revenue in (income), revenue out (costs), bad and doubtful debt
provisions and capital expenditure.
3. Within this simple (but highly successful and resilient) business model, many potential
managerial issues become largely irrelevant. To illustrate this point, it is very difficult
as an individual manager to show how one has made a positive contribution. It is also
difficult as a project team to show how the benefits of a particular change programme
have been realised. The profits of the Bank are driven by a large stock (or back-book)
of highly profitable lending, therefore the role of the strategist is to motivate and
reward talented people and leave the business model to continue creating value.
4. This research has shown that successful organisations (at Barclays) adopt both the
incremental and planning dimensions to strategy whereas the strategy development
process at the less successful organisations (within Barclays) is typified by enforced
choice and politics. The key learning point here is that strategic business units must
ensure that they are more involved in the process (less enforced choice) and that they
reduce dysfunctional politics. Allied to this, strategic business units must develop the
ability to create plans but be prepared to re-visit and re-schedule strategic plans at
appropriate times during the strategy development process.
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3.5.6 Personal Development
As a student on the Executive Doctoral Programme at Cranfield School of Management, the
period of the programme (1999–2005) has proved a very stimulating ‘journey’. The key
personal development learnings of the researcher are set out below:
1. The wide-ranging literature review developed an ability to observe concepts (e.g.
strategy and uncertainty) through multiple perspectives. The level of reading required
in order to complete the literature review was an entirely new and very demanding
experience.
2. The sheer size of the research programme has created demands, with a concomitant
need to balance the requirements (and demands) of a senior full-time role at Barclays,
a family and a personal life. In retrospect, it might have been more practical to
investigate either perceived environmental uncertainty or strategy development
processes – as the combination of the two concepts has created a significant
programme of research.
3. In retrospect, the ambition to interview the fifteen most senior executives at Barclays
proved very difficult to manage logistically, primarily owing to the demands of their
diaries and their constantly changing priorities. Also, the circulation and collection of
1,522 self-administered questionnaires across the Barclays portfolio was a sunstantial
logistical exercise whose scale was under-estimated at the planning stage.
4. The quantitative analysis in both Projects 2 and 3 was very demanding and far beyond
the demands experienced by the researcher in previous courses. The invaluable
contribution, dedication, patience and professionalism of Dr Frank Fishwick are
acknowledged with gratitude.
5. The requirement to ensure that the investigation of the managerial issue was of interest
to both academics and practitioners proved challenging – particularly with regard to
Project 2. The inestimable commercial insight, experience and professionalism of
Professor Malcolm McDonald are acknowledged with gratitude.
6. The production of the final thesis is probably the most demanding life experience
encountered so far by the researcher, and its completion is a source of great personal
satisfaction.
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 50 of 444
3.5.7 Examining The Performance Of Barclays Bank PLC During 2004
3.5.7.1 The Performance Of The Barclays Group During 2004
As this research programme examines the organisational performance of Barclays Bank PLC
during 2003, it is useful to examine briefly the results of the Barclays Group during 2004 as
they are now in the public domain. During 2004 the Barclays Group moved from strength to
strength with: profit before tax rising 20% to £4,603m; earnings per share up 21% to 51.2p;
and the dividend per share rising by 17% to 24.0p. The overall return on equity across the
Group during 2003 was 19.3%. The detailed results for 2004 are set out in Table 9 below.
Table 9 – Barclays Bank PLC: Financial Summary 2004
Financial Measure 2004 £m 2003 £m % Variance
Operating income 13,945 12,411 12.36%
Operating expenses -8,350 -7,253 15.12%
Provisions for bad and doubtful debts -1,091 -1,347 -19.01%
Operating profit 4,504 3,812 18.15%
Profit before tax 4,603 3,845 19.71%
Profit after tax 3,314 2,769 19.68%
Economic profit 1,885 1,420 31.82%
Earnings per share 51.2 42.3p 21.04%
Dividend per share 24.0 20.5p 17.07%
Post-tax return on average shareholders’ funds 19.2 17% 12.94%
*Source – Barclays Bank PLC, Audited Accounts 2004, Published February 2005
With a total shareholder return of 23%, Barclays ranked top within its global peer group10, this
performance was almost double the average for the peer group and the Financial Times Stock
Exchange 100 Stock Index. John Varley11, the newly appointed Group Chief Executive reflects
on the strength of the performance during 2004 in the Barclays Annual Accounts (2005):
“Barclays had a record year, with strong profit growth across the Group. The
combination of income momentum and accelerated investment during 2004 creates a
good platform for future growth.”
10 Abbey, ABN Amro, BBVA, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Halifax Bank of Scotland, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, Royal Bank of
Scotland and Standard Chartered
11 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Varley, Thursday 13th November 2003
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3.5.7.2 The Performance Of The Various Clusters During 2004
Based on the performance of the Barclays Group, it is possible to examine the value
contributions made by the individual clusters during 2004. As detailed in Sections 2.1.5–2.1.6,
the single measure of organisational performance applied at Barclays (and therefore used in
this research) is annual growth in economic profit. As detailed in Section 2.1.6, no weighting
is applied to market volatility or risk in the allocation of economic capital.
The 2004 results show a 31.82% growth in economic profit across the Barclays Group, which
is impressive. The results show a total transformation at Barclays Private Clients with
economic profit growing by 260.53%. It is important to note that this is more likely to reflect
the acquisition of: Charles Schwab Europe, the Bank of Zaragozano and Gerrards; rather than
a transformation of the cluster. Elsewhere across the Group, Barclays Capital (53.01%) and
Barclays Global Investors (82.14%) were once again the highest performing clusters. The
results from Barclaycard (5.59%) and the UK Retail Bank (-0.17%) were considerably lower
than the Group as a whole. Interestingly, the results show a greatly increased cost of running
Head Office Functions. To conclude, the 2004 results are highly encouraging and the business
model continues to generate impressive levels of shareholder value, see Table 10 below:
Table 10 – Value Creation: Economic Profit Across The Barclays Group In 2004
2004 (£m) % Contribution 200312 (£m) % Variance
Barclaycard 321 17.03% 304 5.59%
Barclays Africa 127 6.74% 91 39.56%
Barclays Capital 534 28.33% 349 53.01%
Barclays Private Clients 137 7.27% 38 260.53%
UK Retail Bank 595 31.56% 596 -0.17%
Business Bank 717 38.04% 527 36.05%
Barclays Global Investors 204 10.82% 112 82.14%
Head Office Functions13 -149 -7.90% -68 119.12%
Goodwill14 -490 -25.99% -442 10.86%
Variance To Shareholders
Funds15 -111 -5.89% -77 44.16%
TOTAL 1,885 100.00% 1,430 31.82%
*Source – Barclays Bank PLC, Audited Accounts 2004, Published February 2005
12 Barclays 2003 figures adjusted to reflect changes in organisational structures and accounting policies in the audited accounts for 2004
13 Includes transition businesses
14 Cost of equity charge on historical purchased goodwill
15 Economic capital charge based on capital held at the Group Centre
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4. PROJECT 1: Literature Review And Research Methodology
4.1 Literature Review: Strategy Development
4.1.1 Strategy Development Under Conditions Of Uncertainty
Many traditional approaches to strategy development argue that there is a reciprocal
relationship between an organisation and the environment within which it operates
(Mintzberg, 1973). Therefore an organisation’s strategy reflects the extent of match or
alignment between the organisation’s external environment and its internal structure and
processes. Consequently the challenge for strategists is to adapt to their external environment
in order for their organisation to remain viable and survive (Lenz, 1980; Chaffee, 1985).
Some theorists suggest that this alignment, or ‘fit’ (Hatch, 1997), is achieved through an
integrated system of planning (Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971). Quinn (1980)
argues that this alignment is more likely to reflect the impact of countless strategic decisions
that have been made, one at a time, over a period of years.
Brown and Eisenhardt (1998) recognise that traditional approaches to strategy can prove
problematic in the face of rapid and unpredictably changing environments. They suggest that
issues arise because strategists over-emphasise the degree to which it is possible to predict
industries, competences or the strategic positions that will provide a competitive advantage,
and the length of time for which they are likely to be able to sustain such advantages. Such
problems are compounded because strategists also under-emphasis the importance, and
challenge, of actually creating and then executing the chosen strategy.
D’Aveni (1995) agreed when he identified that managers, and indeed strategy researchers,
have discovered traditional models of strategy development to be nearly obsolete in today’s
high speed, hyper-competitive and increasingly complex environment.
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A significant amount of research has found that an increase in the rate of change and the level
of complexity within the competitive environment leads to a rise in the degree of perceived
environmental uncertainty experienced by strategists (Emery and Trist, 1965; Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1967; Duncan, 1972).
Duncan (1972) is generally credited with initiating the study of perceived environmental
uncertainty, and his conceptual dimensions are central to the research into organisational
environments (Boyd and Fulk, 1996). Through the integration of work carried out by
organisational theorists (Emery and Trist, 1965; Thompson, 1967) and decision theorists
(Luce and Raiffa, 1957), Duncan proposed that perceived environmental uncertainty could be
described along two constructs: the simple–complex dimension and the static–dynamic
dimension. The logical corollary from this proposition is that any lack of stability in the
external environment creates a barrier to strategy development, and is therefore dysfunctional
to an organisation maintaining its equilibrium and achieving its strategic objectives (Jauch and
Kraft, 1986).
Subsequently research has therefore focused on identifying and prescribing methods designed
to reduce, or absorb, the negative consequences of environmental uncertainty. Cyert and
March provide evidence of this underlying assumption (1963, p.120):
“firms will devise and negotiate an environment so as to eliminate uncertainty … and
make the environment controllable.”
Through its explorations at Barclays Bank PLC, this research extends a different perspective
on perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development to that set out in the
literature. This research investigates whether effective strategy development can be regarded
simply as a reflection of the organisation’s ability to manage what the literature refers to as
perceived environmental uncertainty (Emery and Trist, 1965; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967;
Perrow, 1967; Duncan, 1972). The research also investigates whether the Bank is able to
influence its environment, and whether strategy is simply a process that enables the
organisation to adapt its internal structure and decision processes to its external environment.
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Based on a comprehensive review of the literature this research is built on the assumption that,
however sophisticated theorists become in explaining the concept of perceived environmental
uncertainty, the phenomenon will not influence strategists at organisations such as Barclays
unless research develops to include a fuller combination of the factors that contribute to
successful strategy development (Jauch and Kraft, 1986).
Theorists argue that in order to prosper and grow in rapidly and unpredictably changing
environments, organisations must return to the fundamental issues of strategy (Brown and
Eisenhardt, 1998). Traditional approaches have created a construct with strategy content at
one end of the continuum, typified by the dilemma ‘what do you want to do?’; and strategy
process, typified by the dilemma ‘how are you going to do it?’, at the other (Schendel, 1992).
The basic premise for this research is that strategists are able to influence their competitive
environments by adapting the strategy development process to the demands of the marketplace
as they create opportunities and defend against threats faced by the organisation. The
challenge for strategists therefore is to modify decision processes according to their perception
of the characteristics of the competitive environment. The starting point for this research is
that successful organisations, like Barclays, are able to develop congruence between the levels
of perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by strategists, and the processes that are
adopted by senior managers for developing strategy at the business unit level.
So what processes can strategists adopt to ensure that their businesses are capable of a
strategic response in environments typified by change and complexity, or perceived
environmental uncertainty (Duncan, 1972). The literature suggests: scenario planning (van der
Heijden, 1996); game theory (Dixit and Nalebuff, 1991); real options theory (Dixit and
Pindyck, 1997); systems dynamics (Senge, 1990); big bets / reserving the right to play
(Courtney, Kirkland, and Viguerie, 1997); patching (Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999); simulation
(Bertsche, Crawford, and Macadam, 1996); and revisiting strategic planning at Hewlett
Packard through the Hoshi Kanri Planning and Deployment System (Marsden, 1998). Some
researchers have suggested even more innovative approaches: Evans and Wurster (2000)
suggest a total transformation of the business model; Means and Faulkner (2000) have
prescribed a Continuous Asset Transformation Engine as a method of business transformation.
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4.1.2 Strategy: Understanding The Process Of Strategy Development
According to the literature, traditional approaches to strategy appear problematic under
conditions of perceived environmental uncertainty (Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998), therefore
this section of the report revisits the basic concept of strategy and the process of strategy
development, or strategic decision-making.
Derived from the Greek stratēgia meaning the art or function of a general, the concept of
strategy, a military metaphor, has been associated with the field of organisational theory since
the late 1950s (Hatch, 1997). Hatch explained that strategy is distinguished from tactics:
strategy involves the planning and directing of large-scale military operations, to find the best
possible position prior to engaging the enemy in battle, whereas tactics are concerned with
manoeuvring military forces during battle. In the business context Hatch depicted competitors
as the enemy, and resources as forces to be moved into combat. Through this metaphor,
practitioners and researchers apply the term strategy to this phenomenon.
Chaffee (1985) recognised some confusion as to the use of this metaphor; she contended that
it has led individuals to refer very generally to strategy, in the belief that they are all making
reference to the same conceptual model. As a consequence of this generalisation, Chaffee
argued that practitioners and researchers assume that there is no question pertaining to the
existence of strategy, and no doubt surrounding the nature of its anchoring concept. Mintzberg
(1973) recognised that it has multiple definitions, but maintained that all are equally
legitimate. In Game Theory it represents the sets of rules that govern the moves of players. In
sport it is used interchangeably with tactics, for example a ‘two-stop strategy’ in motor racing.
Chaffee (1985) contended that virtually everyone writing on strategy agrees that there is very
little consensus on a definitive explanation (Bourgeois, 1980b; Gluck, Kaufman, and Walleck,
1982). Hambrick (1980) argued that such inconsistency is due primarily to two factors: first he
suggested that strategy is multi-dimensional, and second that it is situational therefore it varies
across industries. It is differences such as these that contribute to a lack of consensus over
single definitions for strategy, and explain multiple definitions in the literature (Mintzberg,
1973).
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Some of the most frequently cited definitions of organisational strategy emphasise concepts
such as goals, resource allocations and plans (Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971).
Consequently the term strategy has become synonymous with an integrated plan (Fredrickson
and Mitchell, 1984). This has led to a proliferation of research seeking to classify firms as
formal or informal planners (Bourgeois, 1980b; Hambrick, 1980).
Other researchers have argued that an organisation’s strategy reflects the extent of match, or
alignment, between its external environment and its internal structure and decision processes
(Mintzberg, 1973). Evidently this ‘fit’ (Hatch, 1997) may have been achieved as a
consequence of an integrated system of planning, produced by a formal or informal planning
system. However, as the report identified earlier, Quinn (1980) found that it was more likely
to reflect the impact of countless strategic decisions that have been made, one at a time, over a
period of years.
The perspective offered by Quinn suggested that strategy is primarily a decision-making
process. Therefore a more productive area of research may be to study how firms make
individual strategic decisions, and whether they attempt to integrate decisions into an overall
strategy (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984). Since all organisations make strategic decisions,
Fredrickson and Mitchell argued that it is possible to move away from a view of strategy
based on planning towards one more closely associated with decision-making.
When tackling strategy from a decision-based perspective, it is important to note that the
strategic decision process is an organisation-level phenomenon (Fredrickson, 1984).
Fredrickson suggested that decision processes are patterns of behaviour that develop in
organisations, and therefore persist over time. These patterns of behaviour withstand turnover
of personnel and variations in the attitudes displayed by individuals who contribute to such
behaviour. Weick (1979) also recognised the existence of this pattern through contributions
made by interchangeable people; this pattern distinguishes the firm from other firms. As a
result of this uniformity the process remains constant over time across the organisation, and
can become self-perpetuating (Herold, 1972). The end result is that the process becomes
consistent across all decisions that are perceived as strategic (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984).
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4.1.3 Strategic Context
The Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999) defines strategic as ‘serving the ends of strategy:
useful or important with regard to strategy’. However, since the previous section has
highlighted a lack of consensus over definitions of the term strategy (Bourgeois, 1980b; Gluck
et al., 1982; Chaffee, 1985) this poses the question, useful with regard to what? If one chooses
to address strategy from a planning perspective (Chandler, 1962; Andrews, 1971) then
strategic can be regarded as useful with regard to planning. If strategy is addressed from a
decision-making perspective (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988), incorporating the rational–
incremental construct offered by Lindblom (1959) and the notion of bounded rationality
(Simon, 1957) somewhere along the continuum, then the term strategic becomes useful with
regard to decision-making.
If one accepts that strategy is situational and multi-dimensional (Hambrick, 1980), then the
issue of defining strategic is exacerbated, because it becomes important with regard to a
multitude of concepts, such as: command (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984); planning (Rhyne,
1986); incrementalism (Quinn, 1980); power and politics (Cyert and March, 1963); culture
(Johnson and Scholes, 1999a); vision (Pascale, 1985); and the growing complexity becomes
apparent.
Given that the term strategic is used throughout the literature, and subsequently this document,
it is necessary to anchor the concept in relation to this research. Eisenhardt and Zbaracki
(1992) tied it to decision-making, and defined strategic as involving the fundamental decisions
which shape the course of the organisation. Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Theoret (1976)
defined strategic as important in terms of the actions taken, the resources committed, or the
precedents set. Schendel and Hofer (1979, p.11) provided a definition that is highly relevant to
the use of strategic in this document, as they highlight the processual nature and character of
strategic management:
“Strategic management is a process that deals with the entrepreneurial work of the
organisation, with organisational renewal and growth, and more particularly, with
developing and utilising the strategy which is to guide the organisation’s operations.”
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4.1.4 Strategy Process: Histories, Metaphors And Multiple Perspectives
Whether the concept of strategy is viewed from a planning perspective, formal or informal, or
a decision-based perspective, the approach itself reveals very little about what actually occurs
during the strategy process (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984). Hatch (1997) offered an insight
into the historical development of the study into organisational strategy, through the
application of multiple perspectives and organisational metaphors, set out in Table 11 below:
Table 11 – Multiple Perspectives Of The Strategy Process
Perspective Authors Period Metaphor Strategy Process
Classical Fayol, Taylor,
Barnard
1950s &
60s
Machine Guidelines directing managers to best strategies
for particular situations.
Modernist Ansoff, Andrews,
Chandler
1960s &
70s
Organism Planned efforts by top management that influence
outcomes, by managing the organisation’s
relationship with its environment.
Symbolic-
Interpretivist
Quinn, Mintzberg,
Weick, Gilfillan,
Chaffee, Pettigrew
1980s &
Early
1990s
Culture Action by management produces strategy, which
becomes a powerful symbol; this legitimises
previous actions and communicates to others new
ideas and openness.
Post-
Modernist
Foucault Late
1990s &
2000s
Collage Strategy, organisation and environment are
narrative constructions, the result of actors
(practitioners and researchers) concocting
notions; they are not objective realities but are
objectivised through social construction.
Hatch observes that many studies have been conducted within the normative tradition, closely
associated with classical management theory of the 1950s and 1960s. Here the organisation is
viewed as a machine, and strategists develop guidelines that direct managers to the best
strategies for particular situations. The late 1960s and the 1970s heralded the modernist
perspective, where the concept of strategy refers to efforts by top management to achieve
desired outcomes, managing the relationship between the organisation and its environment.
The 1980s and 1990s brought a symbolic-interpretive focus on processes of enacting
strategies, advocating the symbolic role of strategy in the social construction of organisations.
The post-modernist perspective is still emerging, and postulates that ‘the strategy’ and ‘the
organisation’ do not really exist as objective realities but are objectivised through social
construction, by practitioners and researchers.
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4.1.5 Strategy Content, Strategy Process And Different Levels Of Strategy
Chaffee (1985) recognised that theorists who segment the strategy construct implicitly agree
that the study of strategy includes the actions taken or to be taken, the content of the strategy;
and the processes by which actions are decided and implemented, the strategy process.
Therefore a construct is created with strategy content (typified by ‘what’) and strategy process
(typified by ‘how’) at the two extremes of the continuum (Schendel, 1992).
Chakravarthy and Doz (1992) made the distinction that strategy content research focuses
exclusively on those strategic positions of the firm that lead to optimal performance, under
varying environmental conditions; whereas strategy process research is concerned with how an
organisation’s administrative systems and decision processes influence its strategic positions.
Evidently both segments of the construct are interested in improving the performance of the
firm, but emphasise different aspects of the strategic challenge for management.
A useful way to illustrate the strategy content–process construct is to consider different levels
of strategy within the firm (Ansoff, 1965; Hill and Jones, 1998). Ansoff argued that strategy
exists at three levels: the corporate level, the business level and the operational level. Ansoff
suggested that corporate-level strategy focuses on what businesses the firm should be in, to
maximise long-term profitability; business-level strategy resolves the way a company
positions itself within its marketplace; and operational-level strategy addresses issues of
efficiency and quality at a functional level. Hill and Jones agreed: they refer to the operational
level as the functional level and introduce a global level of strategy, a subset of corporate-level
strategy.
Using these different levels of strategy it is possible to distinguish that strategy content is
concerned with corporate-level strategy, including the global-level strategy introduced for
modern global economies by Hill and Jones. Strategy process, meanwhile, is more concerned
with the effective positioning of the firm vis-à-vis its environment (Chakravarthy and Doz,
1992) – that is, business-level strategy and aspects of operational-level strategy, as defined by
Ansoff (1965).
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4.1.6 The Strategy Process: A Rational Or Incremental Dilemma?
As this review has recognised, strategy process is concerned with the effective positioning of
the firm vis-à-vis its environment (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992). The normative tradition,
associated with classical and modernist management theory (see Table 11 in Section 4.1.4),
tackles strategy as a rational process (Ansoff, 1965; Weick, 1979; Wood and LaForge, 1979;
Utomi, 1998), sometimes referred to in the literature as linear (Chaffee, 1985), comprehensive
(Mintzberg, 1978; Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984), deductive (Allison,
1971), or systematic (Ansoff, 1965). The rational model, as the name suggests, takes a logical,
deliberate and rational approach to strategy development. Within this approach the
organisation finds ways of intentionally, and rationally, combining selected courses of action
with the allocation of resources to achieve strategic ‘fit’, and thereby obtains a competitive
advantage (Hatch, 1997).
Hatch (1997) identified an inherent assumption within the rational perspective that it is
possible to plan organisational activities, and performance, and therefore to equate strategy to
a rational decision-making process. Rhyne (1986) found in his study of strategic planning and
financial performance that the use of the term planning was synonymous with the theory of
strategic management. The juxtaposing of planning and strategy is evident within the
definition of a rational model of strategy offered by Chandler (1962, p.13):
“Strategy is the determination of the basic long-term goals of an enterprise, and the
adoption of courses of action and the allocation of resources necessary for carrying out
these goals.”
Hart (1992) argued that true rationality implies that a decision-maker must go through a series
of rational steps. Meyerson and Banfield (1955) stressed that this sequence involves a
consideration of all available alternatives leading to the identification, and evaluation, of all of
the consequences likely to follow the adoption of each alternative. The final step in the
process is the selection of the most favourable alternative, in terms of the most valued ends.
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Hart (1992) argued that if this level of rational decision-making, or comprehensiveness
(Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984), is to be applied to the strategy process
then management must undertake a systematic environmental analysis, an assessment of
internal strengths and weaknesses, explicit goal setting and the evaluation of numerous
alternative courses of action. Hart recognised that this can only be achieved through an
effective, formal strategic planning system (Wood and LaForge, 1979).
Not surprisingly the rational model, which calls for comprehensive and exhaustive analysis
prior to a decision (Fredrickson, 1984; Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984), has been challenged
by behavioural theorists (Simon, 1957; Cyert and March, 1963). The argument here is that
individuals, and indeed organisations, can only achieve rationality within certain parameters,
therefore such rationality is necessarily ‘bounded’. At the individual level these boundaries
may be set by, for example, cognitive limits, whereby managers may choose to simplify the
information they require to make a decision (Lindblom, 1959). Alternatively individuals
within the organisation may use techniques such as cognitive maps to organise the world into
more ‘manageable chunks’ (Schwenk, 1988).
Lindblom (1959) also recognised a simplified process which he referred to as ‘muddling
through’ at the organisational level, where, for example, strategic assumptions are made which
form the basis for what Mason and Mitroff (1981) referred to as organisational frames of
reference. Behavioural theorists identified another simplified process, the ‘garbage can’ model
of strategic choice (Cohen, March, and Olsen, 1972), where strategy is a consequence of
‘organised anarchy’.
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) characterised organisations as political systems, arguing that
the organisation acts as a coalition of people with competing and conflicting interests. These
differences arise from conflicting views of the future, biases induced by the position of
individuals within the organisation and clashes in personal objectives, motivations and
ambitions (Allison, 1971). Therefore decisions follow the desires, and consequent choices, of
the most powerful people within the organisation, primarily those occupying senior
management positions (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974).
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In summary, behavioural theorists challenged rationality as an approach to strategic decision-
making by suggesting that individuals within the organisation are key to the process
(Mintzberg, 1978; Nonaka, 1988). Such individuals are constrained from being entirely
comprehensive in their approach as a consequence of their cognitive limits and personal
motivations (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; Cyert and March, 1963).
An alternative to the normative ideal of strategy as a rational process is an option proposed by
Quinn (1980), advocating a process of ‘logical incrementalism’, sometimes referred to in the
literature as adaptive (Chaffee, 1985; Shrivastava and Grant, 1985), reactive (Ansoff, 1965),
or collaborative (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984). Quinn found that top management were
capable of predicting a broad strategic direction for the organisation, but were rarely capable
of predicting the precise strategy at the level of granularity mandated by the rational model.
Similarly to Mintzberg (1978), in her studies at Honda, Nonaka (1988) found that the
incremental model required involvement in strategy making from all levels of the
organisation, as opposed to the top-down prescriptive nature of the rational model. Nonaka
identified that an inductive approach can be adopted towards strategy making; consequently it
follows a process of reasoning. Therefore strategy can be seen as the direction an organisation
takes, irrespective of whether or not that direction was intentional. It is thus apparent that
strategy can be planned, but when it is not, it can emerge or be inducted from the activities of
individuals within the organisation. Not surprisingly it is sometimes referred to in the
literature as emergent strategy (Mintzberg, 1987).
The final development of the incremental model captured the symbolic-interpretive
management theory of the 1980s with the notion of strategic vision (Peters and Waterman,
1982; Pascale, 1985; Kotter, 1988), sometimes referred to in the literature as entrepreneurial
(Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999), perspective (Mintzberg, 1987) or cybernetic (Grandori, 1984).
Within this view, rather than seeking to be rational or comprehensive, managers create a sense
of purpose that organisational members interpret as a general sense of strategic direction. This
direction is symbolic in that it guides individuals within the organisation, and influences
decision-making.
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4.1.7 The Historical Development Of The Strategy Process
Earlier in this report, the literature review recognised that there has been considerable debate
over the use of the term strategy which has led to many definitive explanations (Mintzberg,
1973), and some confusion among scholars and practitioners alike (Chaffee, 1985).
Mintzberg, Quinn and Ghoshal (1998) gave a brief historical background on how the strategy
process has developed through different perspectives.
Mintzberg et al. (1998) started by recognising the normative approach to the intended strategy
process closely associated with the 1970s and dominated by the work of Andrews (1971); they
then moved on to the more analytical approaches to the strategy process synonymous with the
1980s, particularly the development of strategy formulation most notably within the work of
Porter (1980). Mintzberg et al. contended that Porter introduced economics into the debate by
observing industry structures and introducing generic strategies. Around the same time
Mintzberg (1978) identified patterns of strategy, and recognised that strategy can be a crafting
process. The 1990s ushered in the era of Hamel and Prahalad (1996) with their work on
strategic intent and various other insights such as the cultural web (Johnson and Scholes,
1993).
It is evident that there is some consistency across these perspectives, primarily that the
majority of these theorists view strategy as a process: Andrews (1971) highlighted the
separation of formulation from implementation; Mintzberg (1978) identified positioning and
then incremental patterns of emerging strategies; Johnson and Scholes (1993) recognised
strategic analysis as being distinct from choice and ultimately implementation. Applying this
to the Executive Doctorate, the recognition of strategy as a process is significant, because this
distinction has ramifications for another process, the research process (Pettigrew, 1992).
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4.1.8 Strategy Process Research
4.1.8.1 Distinguishing Process Research From Content Research
Once strategy has been identified as a process (Mintzberg et al., 1998), it is important to
recognise the implications of this observation for the research (Pettigrew, 1992). Chakravarthy
and Doz (1992) argued that as a starting point to understanding strategy process research, it is
useful to distinguish it from strategy content research. Chakravarthy and Doz recognised
strategy process research as being concerned with how an organisation’s administrative
systems and decision processes influence its strategic position. In contrast, they argued that
strategy content research focuses exclusively on which strategic positions lead to optimal
performance under varying environmental contexts.
Chakravarthy and Doz recognised that although strategy content and process are both
concerned with improving the performance of the organisation, they emphasise fundamentally
different aspects of the problem for management. Clear distinctions are made between the two
sub-fields and, in terms of research, the differences lie in three key areas: the focus of the
research; the disciplinary bases on which the research is built; and finally the methodology
that can be applied.
Beginning with focus, Chakravarthy and Doz argued that the focus of strategy content is the
scope of the organisation (Porter, 1980), and the ways of competing within individual markets
(Porter and Montgomery, 1991), sometimes referred to as business-level strategies (Ansoff,
1965). In contrast the focus of strategy process is the positioning of the organisation vis-à-vis
its environment: strategy process describes how firms achieve and maintain positioning
through deliberate (Andrews, 1971) or trial-and-error (Quinn, 1980) actions. Hirsch (1991) is
cited as a little disparaging towards strategy content research; he referred to it as black and
white as opposed to the full cinematography of process research. Through his analogy Hirsch
challenged content research to improve its focus, to attain the level achieved by process
research. These two fields were covered in more detail earlier in Section 4.1.5.
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After recognising the comparative focus of the two forms of research, Chakravarthy and Doz
went on to discuss the disciplinary bases, recognising that process research unlike content
research accepts bounded rationality (Simon, 1957). Most importantly for this research,
strategy process research also deals with the behavioural interactions of individuals and
groups within the firm, as opposed to content research which is predominantly concerned with
organisation–environment relations (Porter, 1980). Chakravarthy and Doz (1992, p.6)
recognised that:
“The multiple disciplines contributing to strategy process research can give it unique
vitality, provided this broad interest is funnelled through a shared understanding of the
fundamental questions for the sub-field.”
Chakravarthy and Doz asserted that the distinct and fundamental questions for strategy
process research are threefold. The first question pertains to an understanding of the
relationship between a firm’s administrative systems and / or decision processes, and its
competitive and / or resource positions; in the case of this investigation, how Barclays
develops strategy. The second is to understand how a firm achieves and maintains
effectiveness in the above relationship; in this study, the process Barclays adopts to develop
strategies as defined by the model (Bailey et al., 2000). The third basic question is how a firm
modifies its decision processes in response to environmental changes, and through its own
actions; in this enquiry, the implications of perceived environmental uncertainty among
strategists for strategy development processes at the business unit level.
Given that this investigation is strategy process research as defined by Chakravarthy and Doz
(1992), the study can begin to look at the ramifications for the methodological approach.
Chakravarthy and Doz argued that for strategy process research to address the three questions
outlined above, the organisation must be observed from within – the proverbial ‘black box’
must be opened. Again this differs from strategy content research, which they argued could be
accomplished through secondary data. The Executive Doctorate research comprises strategy
process research, which is best suited to this study of Barclays, where the author is within the
‘black box’ and the research methods include questionnaires, interviews and other intrusive
methods.
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4.1.8.2 Understanding The Meaning Of The Term Process
As the literature review identified in the previous section, this research is by definition
strategy process research (Chakravarthy and Doz, 1992; Pettigrew, 1992). In Section 4.1.3 this
paper covered in detail the meaning of the term strategic and in Section 4.6 it will move on to
look in detail at the specifics of the research process; it is therefore useful to dwell, if only for
a short time, on how the research is using the term process.
Van de Ven (1992) identified that the body of strategy process is diverse, and cannot be
contained within a single paradigm. He asserted that researchers adopt very different views on
the strategy process, which influences the questions they ask, the methods they employ and
consequently the contributions they make. To help address these problems van de Ven offered
three interrelated suggestions for studying the strategy process: he argued that defining the
meaning of process, clarifying the theory of process and designing research to observe process
helps researchers better understand the conceptual basis of their research. As the theory of
process is covered in Section 4.1.8.1, this section looks at defining the meaning of process for
this research.
Van de Ven contended that the numerous process models within the strategy literature
(Mintzberg, 1973; Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Hart, 1992; Hart and Banbury, 1994)
indicate that the term process is used in many different ways. In order to avoid confusion he
recognised three meanings of process: first process is a logic that explains a causal
relationship between independent and dependent variables; second it is used to describe a
category of concepts or variables that refers to actions of individuals or organisations; and
finally it is used to explain a sequence of events that describe how things change over time.
As this investigation is concerned with a category of concepts or variables, in this case the
level of perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by strategists and the implications
this has for strategy development processes at the business unit level, then van de Ven’s
(1992) second definition is relevant to this investigation.
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4.2 Literature Review: Strategy Development Processes
4.2.1 Strategy Development: A Decision-Making Perspective
The earlier review of literature identified that strategy development can be addressed from
many different perspectives, for example: planning (Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965; Andrews,
1971); achieving a match with the competitive environment (Lenz, 1980; Chaffee, 1985);
strong leadership (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984); politics (Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992); or
culture (Johnson and Scholes, 1993). This research into effective strategy development under
conditions of uncertainty addresses the issue from a decision-making perspective (March and
Simon, 1958; Cyert and March, 1963; Quinn, 1980).
The research investigates the phenomenon of uncertainty and tests the assumptions that it
leads to a lack of stability for the organisation, and that in order to achieve superior
performance strategists must adapt the firm to return to a state of equilibrium. The research
investigates how Barclays maintains effectiveness in its strategic decision-making processes
as it positions itself vis-à-vis its external environment. Gore, Murray and Richardson (1993,
p.8) define a decision-making process as:
“the whole range of activities involved in making a decision, not merely the point of
decision.”
The literature in the area of strategic decision-making processes shows very little consensus
about the number of stages that exist within the process or what each stage involves. Some
theorists suggest that this is not surprising owing to the heterogeneity of decision situations
(Nash, 1998).
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Simon (1960) argued that there were three major elements to the decision-making process:
finding occasions for making a decision; finding possible courses of actions; and choosing
among the courses of action. Schendel and Hofer (1979) identified six stages to the process:
goal formulation; issue identification; alternative generation; alternative evaluation; choice;
and finally implementation. Mintzberg et al. (1976) identified three common stages:
identification; development; and selection. Mintzberg et al. (1976, p.246) defined the process
as:
“a set of actions and dynamic factors that begins with the identification of a stimulus for
action and ends with a specific commitment to action.”
The common stages identified in the literature suggest a rational decision process, which calls
for comprehensive and exhaustive analysis prior to a decision (Fredrickson and Mitchell,
1984). These various stages of the process are set out in Table 12 below:
Table 12 – Literature Review: Stages Of The Strategic Decision-Making Process (Gore et al., 1993)
Author Set
Goals
Need Define
Problem
Info.
Search
Develop
Options
Evaluate
Options
Choice Implement Monitor
Simon (1960)   
Janis (1968)    
Schrenk (1969)   
Witte (1972)    
Mintzberg et al.
(1976)
      
Gordon and
Pressman (1978)
    
Gilligan, Neale
and Murray
(1983)
    
Harrison (1987)     
Bridge (1989)   
Hill (1989)    
Through his studies in the area of public administration, Lindblom (1959) argued that
developing strategy through rational, logical and sequential processes was unrealistic. He
argued that strategists could not possibly evaluate all the alternatives, consider all possible
outcomes and appraise these alternatives against pre-set unambiguous strategic objectives.
Cyert and March (1963) recognised that this was predominantly the case in organisational
contexts typified by conflicting views, values and power bases.
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 69 of 444
If all the individual stages identified in Table 12 above were to be incorporated into a single
decision process model then it would be possible to form a rational path through the decision
process, as set out in Figure 4 below:
Figure 4 – A Rational Decision Process: Gore et al. (1993)
Consequently the challenge for strategists lies in comparing options and considering which
would be the best strategic alternative to implement. Lindblom (1959) referred to this method
of strategy development as ‘successive limited comparisons’, which occur in the day-to-day
environment of strategists, rather than through exhaustive analysis and integrated planning
systems. It is therefore argued that strategy emerges (Mintzberg, 1987) as a consequence of
resolving often disconnected problems through a decision process captured by the notion of
‘muddling through’ (Lindblom, 1959), ‘logical incrementalism’ (Quinn, 1980) and ‘disjointed
incrementalism’ (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963).
This research investigates the decision processes that exist at Barclays and examines how
strategists modify these processes under conditions of change and complexity, referred to in
the literature as perceived environmental uncertainty (Emery and Trist, 1965; Lawrence and
Lorsch, 1967; Perrow, 1967; Duncan, 1972).
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4.2.2 Strategic Decision-Making
Strategic decision-making has emerged as one of the most active areas of current management
research (Papadakis, Lioukas, and Chambers, 1998). The subject has benefited significantly
from research traditions such as behavioural decision theory and transaction cost economics,
which has enabled it to gain its own momentum (Schwenk, 1995). As this paper identified
earlier, strategy development can be addressed from numerous perspectives, for example
planning or decision-making (Section 4.1.2) and rational or incremental (Section 4.1.6). The
report will also address further perspectives when it considers the nature of the relationship
between the organisation and its environment (Section 4.4).
These disparate perspectives have been mirrored in the literature as researchers and
practitioners have also investigated strategy from numerous perspectives (Lindblom, 1959;
Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971; Quinn, 1980; Chaffee, 1985; Mintzberg, 1987; Eisenhardt and
Zbaracki, 1992). The range of views has spawned an array of conceptual models, both
competing and overlapping (Hart, 1992; Hart and Banbury, 1994). Hart (1992) recognises
model proliferation where authors have developed scores of different strategy-making
typologies (Ansoff, 1965; Allison, 1971; Andrews, 1971; Miles and Snow, 1978; Quinn,
1980; Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984; Grandori, 1984; Chaffee, 1985; Mintzberg, 1987;
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992).
This element of the paper covers the literature using a multi-dimensional model of strategy
development processes proposed by Bailey et al. (2000). The structure of this section is
therefore aligned to the six dimensions of strategy development identified in their model:
command, planning, incremental, political, cultural and enforced choice. While the headings
used later in this section reflect the terms used by Bailey et al., the review attempts to embrace
research in all areas of the strategy development literature closely associated with these
classifications.
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4.2.3 A Multi-Dimensional Model Of Strategy Development Processes
From the literature review that informed their research Bailey et al. (2000) uncovered
numerous explanations and theories of strategy development processes (Bourgeois and
Brodwin, 1984; Chaffee, 1985; Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Hart, 1992; Hart and Banbury,
1994). Within three broad approaches to the strategy process – strategic choice (Ansoff, 1965;
Child, 1972), social processes (Cyert and March, 1963; Johnson, 1987) and environmental
factors (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) – Bailey et al. (2000) identified six discrete dimensions
of strategy development.
As a component of their research Bailey et al. were able to develop a self-administered
questionnaire, which they believed represented the characteristics attributable to each of the
dimensions. The content of each question was validated by a panel, which was considered to
be expert, comprising academics and practitioners. The panel were introduced to the model,
each dimension was discussed and referenced in the literature; they were then asked to analyse
the item pool and indicate questions which they regarded as inappropriate. Over a period of
time the instrument was validated. An exemplar of a possible profile of strategy development
is illustrated as a radar graph in Figure 5 below (Bailey et al., 2000):
Figure 5 – A Possible Profile Of Strategy Development Processes: Bailey et al. (2000)
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Following validation there was a final selection of 44 items, which were developed into single
questions attributable to each of the dimensions. Each question was rated on a ‘7-point’ Likert
scale (Black, 1999) anchored at the extremes with ‘strongly disagree’ (1) and ‘strongly agree’
(7) – such a scale is common in this type of investigation (Duncan, 1972; Hart and Banbury,
1994). To ensure that questions were asked in a consistent manner, respondents were asked to
assess ‘how strategic decisions are made in your organisation’.
Strategic decisions were defined as: being characterised by a large commitment of resources;
dealing with issues of substantial importance; having a long-term rather than short-term
impact; involving more than one function; and involving significant change. The scores from
each respondent were aggregated to give an indicative measure of the dimensions involved,
illustrated in Figure 5 above.
The six dimensions developed by Bailey et al. (2000) are covered individually in the body of
the literature review later in this section. Through the review it is evident that Bailey et al.
build on or closely relate their findings to other models of strategy development, most notably
the work of Hart (1992). This is detailed in Table 13 below. The development of Hart’s work
is particularly evident where Bailey et al. have not assumed the same level of managerial
discretion as Hart, and have instead introduced the dimensions of culture and enforced choice,
an extension of Hart’s symbolic dimension.
Table 13 – Bailey et al. (2000): Developing The Work Of Hart (1992)
Hart (1992) Bailey et al. (2000) Section Key Reference To Literature Source
Command Command 4.2.4 Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984), Hayward and
Hambrick (1997)
Rational Planning 4.2.5 Ansoff (1965), Andrews (1971), Mintzberg
(1978)
Transactive Incremental 4.2.6 Lindblom (1959), Quinn (1980)
Generative Political 4.2.7 Cyert and March (1963), Hickson, Butler,
Gray, Mallory and Wilson (1986)
Symbolic Cultural 4.2.8 Schein (1985), Johnson and Scholes (1999a),
Schön (1999)
– Enforced Choice 4.2.9 Aldrich (1979), Hannan and Freeman (1989)
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4.2.4 The Command Dimension
As the name for this construct of strategy development suggests, the Command Dimension
identified by Bailey et al. (2000), sometimes referred to as the Commander Model (Bourgeois
and Brodwin, 1984; Hart and Banbury, 1994), is an extension of the military metaphor
associated with the term strategy itself. This dimension assumes that strategy lies within the
remit of a single individual, usually the Chief Executive Officer (C.E.O.), who is assumed to
benefit from institutionalised authority, and is regarded as solely responsible for the strategic
direction of the organisation.
From a systems perspective, this Command Dimension is grounded in classical and modernist
management theory, where the organisation is regarded as a ‘closed-system’ (Hatch, 1997).
The C.E.O., or Commander, is responsible for internal operations, trying to determine a
strategic alignment between organisational competences and environmental opportunities. The
C.E.O. goes through a rational process, first identifying organisational objectives; moving on
to generating courses of action, which may achieve these objectives; evaluating them, subject
to economic efficiency; and finally choosing the preferred course of action for execution. This
model identifies the role of the C.E.O. with that of a rational actor issuing directives from the
seat of power. The actor is rational because the model assumes that exhaustive analysis is
completed prior to taking action (Fredrickson, 1984).
As with all rational models, the Command Dimension is challenged on its assumption that the
C.E.O. has access to complete information and perfect foresight; as a result this dimension has
a normative bias towards the rational, or comprehensive (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984),
model for developing strategy. As identified in Section 4.1.6, theorists recognise that
rationality is bounded under certain conditions (Simon, 1957); therefore the C.E.O. cannot
consider all options or acquire perfect foresight. The Command Dimension is also challenged
on the assumption that the C.E.O. holds absolute power – the influence of politics is only
considered when precipitated outside the organisation – whereas research suggests that
internal politics and power impact on the decision-making of individuals within organisations,
and therefore on the strategy process itself (Cyert and March, 1963; Pettigrew, 1973).
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Another area of contention surrounds whether the Command Dimension represents an overlap
with the incremental approach (Quinn, 1980). It is not clear which dimension is relevant in the
scenario where the C.E.O. identifies the existing strategy, evaluates opportunities and threats,
and then makes modifications to current strategy owing to changed environmental conditions.
In support of the dominant leader model offered by Bailey et al. (2000) in their Command
Dimension, Hayward and Hambrick’s study of C.E.O. pride and presumption (1997) found
that strong C.E.O. personalities could both benefit, and be the detriment to, strategic
decisions; however, there is also evidence of leaders taking responsibility for strategy making
and leading organisations to desired future states through strategy development processes that
are by nature visionary (Grandori, 1984; Chaffee, 1985).
Kotter (1988) asserted that the development of strategy as a consequence of an association
between the individual, in this case the C.E.O., and the organisation owed as much to the
contextual situation as to the individuals themselves. In their study of the high velocity micro-
computer industry, Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) found that observers can wrongly
attribute responsibility for successful or unsuccessful strategies to the C.E.O., as he or she is
perceived as a strong leader, exercising power and influence over strategic direction.
It is evident that the Command Dimension is a useful way of conceptualising the strategy
development process (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984), particularly in firms where the C.E.O.
enjoys a great deal of centralised power, and his or her objective function matches that of the
managers who implement strategy. The Command Dimension is also beneficial in the event
that current systems and structures are not expected to impede new behaviours, or the strategy
brings small, unthreatening change for example not involving large job losses.
Given its centralised function, Bourgeois and Brodwin argued that the Command Dimension
is best suited for organisations in stable environments with a low degree of diversity and
change; they argued that it should be effective when the organisation is in a strong competitive
position, enjoying a high degree of munificence, or slack, free to be utilised during strategic
implementation.
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4.2.5 The Planning Dimension
The second construct of strategy development identified by Bailey et al. (2000) is the Planning
Dimension. Similarly to the Command Dimension reviewed in Section 4.2.4, this dimension
identifies strategic management as the province of the organisational elite (Bourgeois, 1985).
However, within this dimension strategy formulation falls within the remit of a group of
individuals, usually the top management team. This dimension is closely associated with the
rational model of strategy development, sometimes referred to as ‘the planning school’
(Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999). As a school of thought it dominated the modernist literature of
the 1970s, but faltered in the 1980s with the advent of the symbolic-interpretive theory of
strategy (Hatch, 1997).
The basic assumption underpinning the Planning Dimension is that the development of
strategy is an intentional, rational process which involves a logical, sequential, analytical and
deliberate set of procedures (Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971). Therefore it is
subject to all the generic challenges to rational, comprehensive models of strategy
development proposed against the Command Dimension in the previous section.
With a few notable exceptions (Mintzberg, 1978; Quinn, 1980), various strategic management
theorists have recommended planning as an essential tool for managers (Rhyne, 1986).
However the value of planning systems has been increasingly questioned (Peters and
Waterman, 1982; Campbell, 1999); Rhyne (1986) argued that most of the criticism aimed at
planning is not so much critical of planning itself, but the manner in which planning is
actually carried out.
Rhyne asserted that the normative view of strategic management assumes the fundamental
objective of organisation-wide planning is to achieve a match, fit or alignment between the
external environment and the internal capabilities of the organisation. Consequently the
assumption is made that strategy is determined by the environment, not constrained by it
(Bourgeois, 1985). This view of the relationship between the organisation and its environment
is covered in more detail later in Section 4.4.
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The concept of a strategic ‘fit’ between the organisation and its environment (Hatch, 1997),
sometimes referred to as ‘the design school’ (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999), develops
concepts such as goals, objectives and resource allocations which all contribute to the formal
planning process (Andrews, 1971). The identification of a planning process has enabled
researchers to characterise organisations along a dichotomous construct, with planners at one
end of the continuum, and non-planners at the other. This dichotomy is subject to the
extensiveness of the formal planning process (Bourgeois, 1980b; Hambrick, 1980).
Rhyne (1986) recognised there can be an overemphasis on the importance of planning, which
can lead strategists to forget that planning represents only one element of the strategy
formulation and implementation process. He goes on to argue that the presence of an elaborate
planning system does not necessarily ensure that a firm’s planning process will be effective.
There are other problems associated with planning. First there is an inherent assumption that
well-defined strategic goals are set by senior managers and therefore strategy is a top-down
process. As the review identified earlier, this perspective has been challenged by Nonaka
(1988) and Mintzberg (1978). There is also an assumption that strategic thinking only takes
place at the outset of the planning process; this premise is most notably challenged by Quinn’s
(1980) notion of incrementalism, covered in Section 4.2.6. Studies have found that true
strategic planning has taken place in relatively few organisations (Gluck et al., 1982).
To conclude, it is evident that the Planning Dimension is a useful method of conceptualising a
prescriptive strategy development process (Ansoff, 1965). Planning is useful because it
reflects the consolidation of ideas and actions that has already begun to occur (Rhyne, 1986);
and reflects the concerns and objectives of the senior management team (Campbell and
Alexander, 1997). As with the Command Dimension the centralised function of planning is
best suited for firms in stable environments with a low degree of diversity and low rate of
change; it should be particularly effective when a firm is in a strong competitive position,
enjoying a high degree of munificence, or slack, free to be utilised in the planning process
(Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984).
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4.2.6 The Incremental Dimension
Evidently the strategy process can be viewed as a rational process, as in the Command and
Planning Dimensions; or it can be viewed as an incremental process (Lindblom, 1959), as
outlined in Section 4.1.6. It can also be split into stages, for example formulation and
implementation (Andrews, 1971; Porter, 1980). However, some theorists argue that most
existing strategy-making processes do not fully capture the complexity, and variety, of the
phenomenon when it is portrayed in such dichotomous terms (Hart and Banbury, 1994). With
this caveat in mind the literature review moves on to discuss the Incremental Dimension
(Bailey et al., 2000). The Incremental Dimension of the model refers to the incremental end of
the rational–incremental construct identified by Lindblom (1959). Unfortunately this is where
the simplicity ends, as reviewing the Incremental Dimension forces the study to understand the
true meaning of the term incremental. Lindblom himself recognised disjointed incrementalism
which, when applied to strategic choice, takes the form of successive limited comparisons.
Probably the most cited reference in the incremental literature is Quinn (1980), whose notion
of logical incrementalism is heavily cited by Bailey et al. (2000) in the development of their
model. Quinn argued that logical incrementalism is purposeful and intentional and is used
when managers cannot analyse all aspects of the environment or establish precise objectives,
owing to the high level of complexity. Using this method of strategy development, managers
accept environmental uncertainty and do not attempt to predict the future; any strategic goals
and objectives that are stated are couched in non-specific terms, so as not to stifle potentially
advantageous experimentation or new ideas; commitment to strategic options tends to be
tentative, therefore subject to early review.
As identified earlier, Hart and Banbury (1994) contended that the Incremental Dimension of
the model might lead to confusion. As a starting point they agreed that it is not entirely
rational or comprehensive, as defined by Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984). However, they
asserted that the rational–incremental dichotomous construct is problematic because goals are
stated, objectives set and strategic options chosen, therefore pure incrementalism is
misleading.
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Hart and Banbury (1994) recognised other problems with incrementalism; evidently decisions
are made, albeit with incomplete information, therefore a level of rationality is applied,
although such rationality is bounded (Simon, 1957). In addition Hart and Banbury argued that
a process is applied, hence the use of the word logical; decisions are made at the outset and
during the process, therefore strategy making appears to follow a deductive and inductive
process which, when combined, can be described as compressive or symbiotic (Nonaka,
1988).
Applying the Incremental Dimension also encourages middle management to develop new
opportunities as they arise; this characteristic fits with the crescive model developed by
Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) and the middle-up-down model offered by Nonaka (1988). It is
important to be a little careful drawing parallels with the work of Bourgeois and Brodwin
because the Incremental Dimension offered by Bailey et al. (2000) also includes elements of
their change model through the setting of goals, albeit at a high level, and their collaborative
model, where multiple inputs to group decisions lead to the emergence of strategy.
Developing this review, incrementalism is closely associated with emergent strategy
(Mintzberg, 1987) as it enables strategists to identify current strategies and adapt them in the
light of changes to environmental conditions. Mintzberg also recognised this ability to change
the strategy, and used the term ‘adaptive’ to describe this form of strategy development.
Chaffee (1985) also used the term ‘adaptive’, but she used it to recognise adaptation of the
organisation to its environment as opposed to adaptation of the strategy itself. Again it is
important to be careful drawing comparisons across strategy-making typologies, because the
Incremental Dimension offered by Bailey et al. also includes elements of Chaffee’s linear
model, such as setting goals and objectives and following a logical sequence.
The emergent approach to strategy within the Incremental Dimension, sometimes referred to
as ‘the learning school’ (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999), has a clear area of synergy as a result
of the intertwining of so-called formulation and implementation; this characteristic is close to
the retrospective sense-making mode of learning developed by Weick (1979), the notion of
venturing (Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983) and the reactor mode (Miles and Snow, 1978).
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The element of the Incremental Dimension that enables strategists to set goals and objectives,
albeit at a high level, takes logical incrementalism into the realms of strategic vision; here
senior management use broad and deliberately vague perspectives to describe a desired future
state (Peters and Waterman, 1982; Pascale, 1985; Kotter, 1988). Evidently this form of
strategy making throws the onus for development back on either the strategist, as in the
Command Dimension, or the strategists, as in the Planning Dimension. This provides further
evidence that it is important to be aware of overlapping typologies (Hart and Banbury, 1994).
Grandori (1984) recognised a visionary or cybernetic process of strategy development as
discrete from the incremental construct; Grandori’s incremental mode incorporates emergent
strategy. Like Grandori, Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) separated their visionary or
entrepreneurial school from their emergent or ‘learning’ school, which includes
incrementalism.
Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) argued that retaining the visionary process of strategy
development within the Incremental Dimension can lead to barriers breaking down between
the rational (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 1984), boundedly rational (Simon, 1957) and
incremental (Lindblom, 1959) models. Mintzberg and Lampel contended that the strategist
(Command Dimension) or strategists (Planning Dimension) maintain such close control over
the implementation of their formulated vision, that the distinction between the three
perspectives becomes unclear. Using this argument the boundary can also become blurred
between the Incremental Dimension and the Cultural Dimension when strategy is developed
from the very fabric of the organisation (Johnson and Scholes, 1999a); this is covered further
in Section 4.2.8.
To conclude this section, it is evident that the Incremental Dimension of the model developed
by Bailey et al. (2000) offers a useful way of conceptualising strategy development,
particularly when strategy development is not a centralised function, and where reflection,
experimentation and adaptation are inherent throughout the process. Bourgeois and Brodwin
(1984) asserted that elements of this format of strategy development prove beneficial where
the organisation is operating in an unstable environment.
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4.2.7 The Political Dimension
The next element of the Bailey et al. (2000) model is the Political Dimension. Eisenhardt and
Zbaracki (1992) recognised that all individuals within an organisation engage in politics, at
least some of the time; they defined politics as observable and usually covert actions
individuals take to enhance their power to influence a decision-making process.
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki argued that the roots of the political perspective on strategy
development lie in the political science literature of the 1950s; they asserted that during this
period various studies developed a view of decision-making in government which emphasised
the conflictual nature of the legislative process. This led them to conclude that decisions are
the result of a process in which decision-makers have different goals, come together through
coalitions, and in which the preference of the most powerful triumphs. Eisenhardt and
Zbaracki recognised, as one might expect in government, that competing interests, sharply
defined coalitions and clear distinctions between winners and losers were inherent within the
decision-making process.
March (1962) developed the argument further and identified the organisation as a political
system. In much the same way that the bounded rationality model for strategy development
(Simon, 1957) challenged rationality (Lindblom, 1959), March challenged the underlying
assumption that organisations possess a single, superordinate goal. He also took issue with
underlying assumptions pertaining to group behaviour – namely that although people are
individually rational, they are not necessarily collectively rational.
In his study of the Cuban missile crisis, Allison (1971) also found examples of politics in
decision-making, where organisations are coalitions of people with competing interests.
Allison recognised that deep divisions existed among President Kennedy’s advisors regarding
an appropriate reaction to the deployment of Russian missiles in Cuba. This led Allison to
conclude that conflicting preferences arose from different visions of the future, biases induced
by position, and clashes in personal ambitions.
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Evidently organisations are political arenas, and strategy development and decision-making is
a political matter (Pettigrew, 1973). Differences are resolved through bargaining, negotiation
and compromise, leading to the development of strategies that are generally accepted across
the whole organisation. This is sometimes referred to as the consensus mode for developing
strategy (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985), or making strategic decisions (Ouchi and Price, 1981).
As the review identified earlier, one observation of the political perspective is that strategic
decisions follow the desires and objectives of the most powerful people (March, 1962;
Hinings, Hickson, Pennings, and Schnenk, 1974; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974). The
investigation by Baldridge (1971) into conflict resolution at New York University provided a
colourful case study into the influence of power and politics in strategy development
processes.
Hickson et al. (1986) also recognised that when strategy development is addressed from a
decision-making perspective, it is important to recognise that organisations are political
systems and, as such, are susceptible to the influence of internal and external stakeholders.
Cyert and March (1963) found that under certain circumstances, stakeholders serve their own
self-interests, taking actions directed towards serving their own ends.
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) take a less extreme view, recognising that stakeholders may have
different concerns and therefore differing priorities. They recognised that the influence these
stakeholders are able to exert over the strategy development process is conditional on the
organisation’s dependency on such a group for its resources. Some theorists (Schwenk, 1988)
found that power and influence of the stakeholders is directly related to the difficulty the
organisation would expect to encounter should it choose to dispose of them.
In another colourful case study in the area of strategic choice, Pettigrew (1973) observed
influences impacting on the decision processes of three managers during the procurement of a
new computer. Pettigrew recognised that power and influence over the decision-making
process could be achieved when individuals filtered information in a manner that reflected
their own priorities and preferences.
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To summarise this section on the Political Dimension of the model offered by Bailey et al.
(2000), most theorists accept the central ideas of the political perspective (Eisenhardt and
Zbaracki, 1992): first that organisations consist of people with partially conflicting priorities;
second that strategic decision-making is inherently political and that the most powerful people
tend to get what they want; and finally that people engage in politics such as coalitions
(Allison, 1971) and use information (Pettigrew, 1973) to enhance their power.
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) went so far as to say that the debate over whether
organisations have single or multiple goals is no longer controversial. They developed a more
interesting debate concerning the process by which conflicts are resolved among people with
conflicting preferences, and recognised a divide in the literature. As the review has already
identified, the normative view is that politics arise from conflict (March, 1962); and people
with conflicting preferences engage in politics in the hope of securing a favourable decision.
Furthermore politics are deemed to be fluid, and strategists move from one alliance to another
(Allison, 1971); consequently politics are essential to the firm (Quinn, 1980), helping create
change and adaptation (Pascale, 1985).
The alternative to the normative view offered by Eisenhardt and Zbaracki (1992) is that
politics are triggered by imbalances of power, and strategists turn to politics as a last resort in
order to secure due consideration of their views. Within this school of thought politics are
static, with decision-makers relying on the same allies and the same politics time after time
(Pettigrew, 1973). However Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988) argued that lobbying is a waste
of valuable time, particularly in high velocity environments, and that it inevitably leads to
poor performance; politics can therefore be regarded as ineffective, unpleasant and
unnecessary (Gandz and Murray, 1980).
To conclude, it is apparent that the Political Dimension is an important element of the strategy
development model proffered by Bailey et al. (2000), particularly if the phenomenon is to be
addressed from a decision-making perspective. What is not clear is whether politics are a
positive conflict-driven phenomenon or a power-driven process signalling dysfunctional
decision-making as proposed by Bourgeois and Eisenhardt (1988).
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4.2.8 The Cultural Dimension
The fifth element of the model developed by Bailey et al. (2000) is the Cultural Dimension.
Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984), who also have a cultural element within their five approaches
to strategic implementation, argued that the proponents of this perspective lie in the classical
management theory approach to human relations of the 1950s (Likert, 1961); or the modernist
perspective of human resources entreaties of the 1970s (Miles, 1975).
According to Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984), the modernist perspective on culture, which
emerged in the late 1970s, led to the more sophisticated symbolic-interpretive perspective
synonymous with the 1980s. Bourgeois and Brodwin argued that as this understanding
advanced and became more sophisticated than the earlier writings (Martin, Feldman, Hatch,
and Sitkin, 1983; Schein, 1985; Johnson, 1988), then the area of organisational culture
improved in three ways.
The first improvement Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984) identified is that theorists are much
more subtle in their approach. Theorists observe that variables manipulated by organisational
culture go beyond the sharing of work-related decision-making. To illustrate this, theorists
observe that the symbolic-interpretive approach, as may be expected, includes intangibles such
as symbols and leader behaviour patterns (Peters, 1978); organisational clans (Ouchi and
Price, 1981); and the observation of different national cultures, for example the Japanese
(Ouchi, 1978; Pascale and Athos, 1981).
The second improvement brought about by the symbolic-interpretive approach to the Culture
Dimension, according to Bourgeois and Brodwin (1984), is that writers now focus on the
entire organisation. This widening of focus provides a significantly larger unit of analysis than
the face-to-face nature of the human relations era that dominated the modernist perspective.
Ouchi’s studies at Hewlett Packard (Ouchi and Price, 1981) identified the ‘H.P. way’, which
encouraged product innovation at every level and at every workbench. Pascale and Athos
(1981) found similar uniform behaviour and ritual values across the entire organisation at
I.B.M., for example the ritual singing of company songs and the displaying of national flags in
offices.
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The final area of improvement brought by the symbolic-interpretive perspective is that culture
serves as the handmaiden of strategy development within the firm (Bourgeois and Brodwin,
1984), rather than proselytising the balancing of power and the like for its own sake, as
suggested by the modernist perspective (Miles, 1975). Johnson and Scholes (1999a) develop
this cultural view of strategy development when they identify that strategies are the outcome
of assumptions and taken-for-granted routines; consequently management is about the
application of experience, rather than the manipulation of tools and techniques. Johnson and
Scholes identify that expertise is not only rooted in the individual but that groups will
accumulate experience, and this can also be reflected back in routines and behaviours.
This ‘taken-for-grantedness’ identified by Johnson and Scholes develops a cultural frame of
reference that can be handed down, over time, within a firm; they argue that it is these frames
of reference that influence managers, and can have a profound effect on the strategy
development process. Illustrations of such frames of reference could be marketing, finance or
accounting, for example, which one would expect to be prevalent in a financial institution like
Barclays or any of its competitors.
Johnson and Scholes map these frames of reference into a cultural web, which graphically
displays the organisational paradigm. When the review studies the relationship between the
organisation and its environment in Section 4.4, it observes that institutional theorists argue
that such synergies explain why firms operating in similar environments resemble each other
in terms of cultural norms, and therefore in the strategies they develop and pursue (Hatch,
1997). Johnson (1988) warned that although embedded frames of reference in organisational
activities may provide a repertoire for change, in turn they could also create resistance.
To conclude, it is evident that the Cultural Dimension of the model offers a useful way of
looking at the strategy development process. Again it is important to be aware of overlapping
typologies (Hart and Banbury, 1994), and that the influence of individuals moves it close to
the Political Dimension and the Incremental Dimension of the model owing to the incremental
use of norms and routines. Also if the leader, or top management team, takes too tight a grip
on the culture, it may overlap with the Command or the Planning Dimension.
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4.2.9 The Enforced Choice Dimension
The final element of the Bailey et al. (2000) model is the Enforced Choice Dimension, which
considers whether strategy is determined by the organisation or constrained by the
environment. Some researchers view the role of the strategist as determining strategic
decisions and processes in order to adapt the organisation to its environment (Papadakis et al.,
1998). Such adaptation enables the firm to create a strategic ‘fit’ (Hatch, 1997), sometimes
referred to as ‘the design school’ (Mintzberg and Lampel, 1999), between the competences of
the organisation and the demands of the environment (Andrews, 1971).
Achieving such a fit creates a competitive advantage (Porter, 1985), which assures long-term
profitability, reputation and ultimately survival (Porter and Montgomery, 1991). Evidently this
perspective assumes that managers are aware of the possibility of creating a ‘fit’ between the
organisation and its environment and, more importantly, that managers are capable of
achieving such a ‘fit’ (Hatch, 1997). Hatch developed three perspectives on the nature of the
relationship between the organisation and its environment when this ‘fit’ is achieved: first the
organisation is selected and retained, the population ecology view; second it is provided with
resources, the resource dependence view; and finally it is legitimised, the institutional theory
view.
Based in the modernist organisation theory literature, population ecology theory is
underpinned by the assumption that the environment exercises considerable influence over the
organisation, which is dependent on it for resources (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Aldrich,
1979). This perspective argues that the environment determines the patterns of success and
failure among organisations competing within the same resource pool.
Therefore, according to Hatch (1997), a Darwinian principle applies which determines the
survival of the fittest. An illustrative example for Barclays, within the financial services
industry, would be the movement of the resource pool from London to West Yorkshire during
the 1990s. It could be argued that inflated house prices and a subsequent increase in the cost of
living drove this section of the working population out of the environment, the single resource
pool in London.
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The resource dependence view also embraces the assumption that organisations depend on
their environment for resources; yet, unlike the population ecology view, it adopts the
perspective of the organisation (Hatch, 1997). Here the organisation is vulnerable to its
environment for resources, which are controlled by the environment. Hatch argued that the
challenge is to learn how to navigate the harsh seas of environmental domination. Managers
do this by creating counter-dependence, identifying organisation–resource exchanges.
The final perspective of the environment is institutional theory, which puts demands on the
organisation in two ways (Hatch, 1997): first, the environment makes technical and economic
demands that require organisations to produce their goods and services in a marketplace;
second, the environment makes social and cultural demands that require organisations to play
particular roles in society, and maintain certain outward appearances. Again applying this to
Barclays it could be argued that much of the bad publicity surrounding the closure of branches
is associated with the social and cultural demands made on a Bank. It is evident that the
location, and in many cases the similar appearance, of the majority of High Street Bank
branches is driven by the requirement / enforced choice to maintain outward appearances.
Rooted in classical management theory, Hatch identified contingency theory, built on the
observation that firms differ considerably depending on whether they operate in stable or
rapidly changing environments; she argued that the organisation is therefore necessarily
constrained (Papadakis et al., 1998). Contingency theory postulates that in stable
environments, organisations operate in a mechanistic manner, specialising in routine activities
with strict lines of authority and distinct areas of responsibility. However, modernist theory
developed the need for organisations to become organic in order that they are able to adapt to
circumstances (Hatch, 1997).
In conclusion the Enforced Choice Dimension offers a very useful concept when considering
the strategy development process. It recognises the role of prevailing environmental conditions
and challenges strategists to consider contingencies. Issues associated with the impact of
rapidly changing environments on strategy development lie at the heart of this research and are
therefore covered in more detail in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
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4.3 Literature Review: Understanding The Concept Of Uncertainty
4.3.1 Introducing Uncertainty
The use of the term uncertainty is synonymous with everyday life: news bulletins report
uncertainty over interest rates and inflation projections; journalist report uncertainty over the
war in Iraq or the next leader of the Labour Party; sports columnists report uncertainty over
the future of Silverstone as a future venue for Formula One motor racing. Invariably the news
and sport are followed by the weather forecast, which sometimes describes the outlook for the
Bank Holiday weekend or the prospects of a hot summer as ‘uncertain’.
The Oxford Concise Dictionary (1999) defined uncertainty as ‘the fact or condition of not
certainly knowing’. In the same way that Chaffee (1985) identified a problem with a level of
confusion that has arisen over the liberal use of the term strategy, the same can be said of the
term uncertainty (Milliken, 1987). The word uncertainty is so commonly used that Downey
and Slocum (1975, p.562) noted in their review of the uncertainty literature that:
“… it is all too easy to assume that one knows what he or she is talking about.”
Confusion arises because theorists and researchers take different positions over outcomes that
are certain and outcomes that are probable. Others take issue with the certainty–uncertainty
construct recognising that strategists make sense of their environments in different ways
(Weick, 1979), typified by the dilemma ‘how do we know when we are certain?’. Milliken
(1987) recognised that unclear assumptions may cause researchers to pay insufficient attention
to the conceptualisation, and operationalisation, of the uncertainty construct. Consequently she
postulated that practitioners and researchers must be careful concerning definitions of
uncertainty. Milliken (1987, p.134) drew attention to this point when she warned that:
“Researchers who assume agreement may interpret the literature as though there is
agreement when, in fact, there is tremendous inconsistency and confusion about how an
uncertainty construct is defined and used.”
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4.3.2 A Knightian View Of Uncertainty: The Economic Perspective
A search of the uncertainty literature invariably leads back to the school of economics and the
work of Frank Knight. In the final section of his book, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921),
Knight takes issue with the orthodox theory of imperfect competition, the opposite end of the
continuum to perfect competition, which he argued is the reduction of significant tensions
between economic freedom, economic power and economic efficiency.
Knight’s key concern with orthodox theory was that it failed to make a distinction between
risk and uncertainty. The broad distinction that Knight draws is between situations in which
the decision-maker is guided by a ‘known chance’ and situations in which he or she is not
(Runde, 1998). The traditional ‘Knightian’ distinction is therefore defined as being between:
situations of risk where the decision-maker assigns probabilities to events on the basis of
‘known chances’; and situations of uncertainty where the decision-maker is unable to assign
probabilities to events because it is not possible to calculate probabilities or ‘known chances’.
Consequently risk, according to Knight (1921), refers to the description of a set of possible
outcomes, where it is possible to discern a frequency distribution with the aid of statistical
data. The probability of an outcome occurring can be determined either on the basis of an a
priori calculation, or alternatively through statistical inference derived from experience of the
past, an a posteriori calculation.
In contrast uncertainty refers to a situation where the frequency distribution of possible
outcomes is unknown, therefore statistical techniques cannot be applied to individual
decisions. Knight postulated that the high degree of uniqueness of individual business
decisions invariably leads to a set of possible outcomes that are not subject to mathematical
statistics. In essence Knight’s position is that outcomes of business decisions are so unique
that it is impossible to quantify the likelihood of the outcome occurring.
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4.3.3 Discussing The Knightian Distinction Between Risk And Uncertainty
The very general formulation set out in Section 4.3.2 appears to cover what most people seem
to have in mind when referring to Knight’s (1921) distinction between risk and uncertainty.
Runde (1998) postulates that it is important to note that the definition of risk is broad enough
to encompass the classical, or what Knight refers to as the a priori, conception of probability,
frequency theories (Toffler, 1990; Thompson, 2003), certainty-equivalence (McCall, 1967;
Clarke, 1985; Rosenhead and Mingers, 2001) and even some non-standard interpretations of
probability such as Popper’s (1997) propensity theory.
Runde (1998) argues that Knight’s (1921) position is much more subtle than the simple risk–
uncertainty distinction might imply. Runde focuses not on a dichotomy, but on a trichotomy of
‘probability situations’. He argues that Knight summarises a priori probability, statistical
probability, and estimates.
According to Runde (1998), Knight (1921) defines a priori probability as an absolutely
homogeneous classification of instances completely identical except for wholly indeterminate
factors. The calculation of probability is therefore made on the same logical plane as the
propositions of mathematics.
By comparison Knight’s statistical probability, according to Runde (1998), is an empirical
evaluation of the frequency of association between predicates, not analysable into varying
combinations of equally probable alternatives. Consequently any high degree of confidence
that the proportions found in the past will hold in the future is still based on an a priori
judgment of indeterminateness. Runde (1998, p.540) argues that the main distinguishing
characteristic of this type is that it rests on an empirical classification of instances. In order to
achieve this, Knight (1921) keeps two complications separate:
“The impossibility of eliminating all factors not really indeterminate; and the
impossibility of enumerating the equally probable alternatives involved and
determining their mode of combination so as to evaluate the probability by an a priori
calculation.”
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The third dimension to Knight’s trichotomy of ‘probability situations’, identified by Runde
(1998), is estimates. The distinction made here is that the decision-maker has no valid basis of
any kind for classifying instances, sometimes referred to as trials. Runde asserts that this form
of probability is involved in the greatest logical difficulties of all, and therefore no very
satisfactory account of it can be given. However he emphasises its distinction from other types
and highlights some of its complicated relations.
As it is possible to assign numerical probabilities to events on the basis of the relevant
probabilities or ‘chances’ in each case, a priori probability and statistical probability fall into
the category of what Knight (1921) refers to as ‘risk’. As the third category of ‘estimates’
covers decision scenarios where there is ‘no valid basis for classifying instances’ then this
category corresponds to the situation of Knightian uncertainty. Runde (1998) argues that this
categorisation is made on the basis that it is impossible to assign probabilities to events
because the relevant instances are so dissimilar as to preclude classification and the
calculation of chances.
The discussion of Knight’s (1921) work offered by Runde (1998) appears to develop a
continuum of probability situations, depending on the degree of homogeneity of the
‘instances’, events or decisions in question. At the two extremes are decisions in which
instances are perfectly homogeneous save for ‘wholly indeterminate factors’ – corresponding
to the a priori probability; and situations in which there are insufficient instances similar
enough to be grouped together as members of the same class – corresponding to estimates.
Statistical probability falls somewhere between these two poles, that is, where it is possible to
arrive at groupings of only one more or less homogeneous instance.
To conclude, it is evident that Knight’s (1921) main reason for distinguishing between a priori
probability and statistical probability is to highlight that a priori probability is practically
never met within business while statistical probability is extremely common; and that
statistical probability never gives particularly accurate quantitative results. In Knight’s view it
is inconceivable that the classes with which decision-makers are faced in everyday life can be
sub-divided into decisions that are sufficiently homogeneous to permit the determination of
what he refers to as ‘real probability’.
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4.3.4 Developing The Debate: A Keynesian Perspective On Uncertainty
As the review of Knight’s (1921) work in the previous section identified, the probabilities on
which strategic decision-makers are forced to rely invariably fall short of the standards of
accuracy expected in situations involving throws of a perfect die, or spins of a well-calibrated
roulette wheel. Taken in isolation, Knight’s description of the differences between
mathematical or a priori probability and statistical probability are unobjectionable and
therefore entirely useful (Runde, 1998). Interestingly the manner in which Knight portrays the
differences between the two classifications of probability or risk, and the ways in which these
differ from estimates, or uncertainty, are echoed by another theorist who is often mentioned in
connection with the subject of risk and uncertainty: John Maynard Keynes.
In his book The General Theory Of Employment, Interest And Money (1936), Keynes took
issue with Knight’s (1921) objectivist conceptualisation of uncertainty and argued from a
subjectivist perspective that confidence in decision-making is conditional on the degree of
uncertainty recognised or admitted by the decision-maker, therefore uncertainty is attached to
beliefs about the material world. By way of contrast Knight took the position of a rational
expectations theorist arguing that it is possible to attach probability and therefore uncertainty
to the material world (Dow and Hillard, 1995).
Keynes (1936) agreed with Knight (1921) that in general, uncertainty refers to situations
where probability cannot be measured. However Keynes argued that where it is not possible to
measure the outcome of a decision objectively, it is possible to estimate frequency
distributions subjectively, through the application of what he referred to as subjective
probability. Here decision-makers subjectively establish measures of probability and Keynes
recognised that these probabilities can change from time to time under the weight of new
evidence.
Dow and Hillard (1995) recognised that Keynes’ (1936) subjective probability allows
uncertainty to be understood as a relative concept. Therefore more weight can be attached to
an assessment of probability proportionate to the amount of relevant evidence available,
irrespective of whether it makes the proposition more, or less, probable.
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In this sense Keynes uses weight as both an absolute and a relative concept. As an absolute
concept weight is measured by the absolute amount of relevant evidence. As a relative concept
Keynes introduces the notion of relative ignorance, which opens up possibilities for further
refinements because increased evidence, rather than increased weight, may reduce weight if it
reveals new realms of ignorance. Dow and Hillard (1995) illustrate this, suggesting that new
evidence can reveal that what was understood to be appropriate is in fact now inadequate.
From the work of Keynes (1936) it is possible to discern three orders of uncertainty (Dow and
Hillard, 1995). The first category accepts the rational expectations theorist view (Knight,
1921), that uncertainty is inherent in reality and can therefore be captured in the stochastic
term of relationships. Consequently any degree of uncertainty may be measured by the
variance of the stochastic term.
The second category of uncertainty is aligned to the subjectivist perspective that uncertainty is
associated with matters of belief. Therefore where probability is measurable, the lower the
degree of belief in the argument; where belief in the proposition is conditional on available
evidence, the greater the degree of uncertainty experienced by the decision-maker.
Finally Dow and Hillard (1995) offer the third category of Keynesian uncertainty, which
makes reference to the completeness of the evidence on which the judgment of probability is
based. It recognises weight as a measure of completeness of relevant evidence; therefore the
lower the weight of probability estimate, the greater the uncertainty experienced by the agent.
Consequently uncertainty of this type may be measured by the opposite of what Keynes (1936)
refers to as weight. Here Keynes uses the measure in two senses: absolute completeness and
relative completeness. Absolute completeness is the inverse of weight, where weight is a
measure of the absolute amount of relevant evidence. In the latter, relative completeness,
uncertainty is measured as a ratio of relevant evidence available relative to the total of relevant
evidence and ignorance. Measurement of both absolute and relative completeness requires
knowledge of what constitutes relevance and that knowledge and ignorance are of the same
dimension.
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4.3.5 Criticisms Of The Keynesian Perspective On Uncertainty
Dow and Hillard (1995) criticise Keynesian uncertainty on the grounds that logic dictates that
where knowledge of structure, the weight measure relevant to known situations, is completely
absent and ignorance is absolute then the decision-maker literally does not know. However
this absolute state, like that of complete certainty, is not feasible because absolute ignorance is
incompatible with knowledge of absolute uncertainty. Keynes (1936) fails to make a clear
distinction between rational argument and rational decision-making, because decisions are
taken and action undertaken in situations where rational argument would suggest that
decision-makers simply do not know, for example a twenty-year investment in a copper mine
or oil well.
Theorists also take issue with Keynes’ theory of probability in terms of grounds for rational
belief, which assumes that all relevant information is employed by decision-makers. As
identified earlier in the review, Pettigrew (1973) observed that strategists use information to
serve the ends of different stakeholders. Keynesian uncertainty also argues that confidence is
inspired by weight of argument, when the degree of evidence relative to ignorance is high.
Dow and Hillard citing Loasby (1976) argue that confidence may be the direct result of
ignorance if additional information were to detract from presumed knowledge.
The final criticism of the Keynesian perspective on decision-making under uncertainty
addresses the assumption that managers gather all available information based on their
knowledge of given processes, weigh up the absence of evidence relative to that knowledge,
weigh up their ignorance of the processes relative to that knowledge, weigh up their
understanding of knowledge and ignorance of processes relative to lack of understanding and
so on. In essence Keynes (1936) assumed that managers act as though are fully informed; that
there is no shortfall between managerial competence and the complexity of problems
encountered; and that managers are ‘utility maximising persons’ who make decisions or
choices after studying well-defined probability distributions. Like Knight (1921), Keynes
ignores the fact that the world may be evolving in such a way as to produce situations that
never existed before so that, in fact, probability distributions can never be well defined.
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4.3.6 Developing The Work Of Keynes: The Bayesian Perspective
Runde (1995) argues that the widespread acceptance of Bayesian decision theory has eroded
Knight’s (1921) famous distinction between risk and uncertainty. As outlined in Section 4.3.2,
decision-making under conditions of risk refers to situations in which managers can
numerically assess the probabilities of the possible consequences of their actions, and
uncertainty refers to situations in which they cannot numerically assess such probabilities.
Under Knightian uncertainty, assessments of numerical probability ultimately rest on
judgments of equiprobability, failing which it is possible only to arrive at qualitative
‘estimates’.
Building on the work of Keynes (1936), Bayesian decision theory also interprets probability as
a measure of subjective or personal belief in an uncertain proposition or event (Runde, 1995).
In contrast to Knight (1921), Bayesian decision theory identifies probabilities with betting
quotients elicited from coherent betting behaviour. Bayesian decision theory is behaviouristic
in orientation, based on the idea that the strength of belief is reflected in the decision-maker’s
propensity to take action. Under Bayesian decision theory, beliefs are measured by finding the
lowest betting odds that the decision-maker would be prepared to accept on the hypothesis or
event being true.
Here the decision-maker adopts the role of a Bayesian rational agent or subjective ‘expected
utility’ maximiser (Runde, 1995). The strategist makes a choice between the various risky
alternatives on the basis of two considerations: his or her subjective values and beliefs. Values
are represented by a utility function, unique in origin and scale, which assigns a utility index to
each of the set of possible consequences that might occur as an outcome of the decision.
Beliefs are represented by a probability function that assigns a probability index to each of the
possible ‘states of the world’ on which the outcomes of each decision are contingent.
When combined these two functions, values and beliefs, may be used to assign an expected
utility index to every course of action. As with Keynesian uncertainty, Runde recognises that
the Bayesian decision rule is to make the choice that maximises expected utility.
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4.3.7 Cumulative Prospect Theory
The most influential challenge to how people manage risk and uncertainty was conducted by
two Israeli psychologists, Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1974; 1979). Through the
development of what they referred to as Cumulative Prospect Theory, usually referred to
simply as Prospect Theory, Kahneman and Tversky took issue with Expected Utility Theory
(Keynes, 1936; Knight, 1921; Quiggin, 1991; Runde, 1995).
Cumulative Prospect Theory discovered behaviour patterns that had not previously been
recognised by proponents of rational decision-making (Bernstein, 1998): first, it identified that
emotion can destroy the self-control that is essential to rational decision-making; second, it
recognised that people are often unable to fully understand the problem they are dealing with.
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) drew a clear distinction between the processes people follow
when making gains as opposed to those processes followed when incurring losses. In their
paper, they describe an experiment which tested whether choices between negative outcomes
are mirror images of choices between positive outcomes.
In one of their experiments, Kahneman and Tversky first asked the subjects to choose between
an 80% chance of winning $4,000 and a 20% chance of winning nothing versus a 100%
chance of receiving $3,000. Even though the risky choice has a higher mathematical
expectation ($3,200), 80% of the subjects chose the certainty of £3,000. These people were
described as ‘risk-averse’.
Following this experiment Kahneman and Tversky then offered their subjects a choice
between taking the risk of an 80% chance of losing $4,000 and a 20% chance of breaking even
versus a 100% chance of losing £3,000. Under these conditions 92% of the respondents opted
to take the gamble, even though its mathematical expectation of a loss of £3,200 was once
again larger than the certain loss of $3,000. Based on these experiments Kahneman and
Tversky were able to conclude that when choices involve losses people are ‘risk-seekers’, as
opposed to being ‘risk-averse’ when choices involve gains (Bernstein, 1998).
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When applied to a managerial situation, Kahneman and Tversky (1974) found that this
asymmetrical pattern appeared consistently in a wide variety of experiments. For example they
asked their respondents to consider a problem where a rare disease is breaking out in a
community and is expected to kill 600 people. In order to address this problem, two different
solutions are available. If Solution A is applied, 200 people will be cured; if Solution B is
adopted, there is a 33% probability that everyone will be cured and a 67% probability that no
one will be cured.
Based on the findings of the earlier gambling experiment, namely that most people are risk-
averse in contexts that involve gambling upwards, it is assumed that rational people will prefer
Solution A’s certainty of saving 200 lives over the gamble set out in Solution B, which
interestingly has the same mathematical expectancy but involves taking a 67% risk that
everyone will die. Through this experiment Kahneman and Tversky found that 72% of the
subjects chose the ‘risk-averse’ option represented by Solution A.
As the next part of the experiment Kahneman and Tversky posed the identical problem very
differently. If Solution C is adopted, 400 of the 600 will die, while Solution D entails a 33%
probability that no one will die and a 67% probability that 600 will die. It is important to note
that the first of the options is now expressed in terms of 400 deaths as opposed to 200
survivors, while Solution D offers a 33% chance that no one will die. Through this experiment
Kahneman and Tversky found that 78% of the population were now ‘risk-seekers’: the
decision-makers just could not tolerate the prospect of the sure loss of 400 lives (Bernstein,
1998).
Based on the results of these experiments Kahneman and Tversky (1979) were able to
conclude that this behaviour, although entirely understandable, was inconsistent with the
assumptions of expected utility theorists or rational behaviour. The key challenge is that the
process for making a decision is not the same regardless of the environment within which the
problem is set. Importantly for this research Kahneman and Tversky found that people are
perfectly willing to modify their response, in this case gamble, if they consider it to be an
appropriate response to the problem they have been posed.
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4.3.8 An Organisational Theorist Perspective On Uncertainty
As this report goes on to identify in Section 4.3.9, there is some confusion in the
environmental uncertainty literature, because the debate is split into two schools of thought
(Milliken, 1987). Milliken identified that the term ‘environmental uncertainty’ has been used
to describe both the state of the competitive environment, and the state of mind of an
individual who perceives himself or herself to be lacking critical information pertaining to the
environment and is therefore uncertain. This equates to the Concise Oxford Dictionary (1999)
definition identified earlier, ‘the fact or condition of not certainly knowing’. Hatch (1997) also
identified the misleading nature of the term environmental uncertainty, asserting that as
environments have no cognitive ability, they cannot feel uncertain, only people do.
Acceptance of the objective, sometimes referred to as archival (Boyd et al., 1993), perspective
implies that it is possible to characterise environments in terms of how objectively uncertain
they are (Knight, 1921; Keynes, 1936; Nash, 1998). In contrast, if one accepts that
environmental uncertainty is inherently ‘in the eye of the beholder’, it ought to be investigated
as a subjective, or perceptual (Huber, O'Connell, and Cummings, 1975), phenomenon.
Milliken (1987) points out that the most commonly cited definitions of environmental
uncertainty interpret it as a perceptual phenomenon, but diverge when it comes to specifying
its experiential nature. The first definition is aligned to the Knightian perspective identified in
Section 4.3.3, the inability to assign probabilities to the likelihood of future events (Duncan,
1972; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). The second definition relates to a lack of information
concerning cause and effect relationships (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967; Duncan, 1972). The
final definition is the view of decision theorists which recognises uncertainty as the inability to
predict accurately the outcome of a decision (Duncan, 1972; Downey and Slocum, 1975).
Milliken (1987) recognised that as these definitions are essentially adaptations from theorists
in other fields, primarily psychology (Garner, 1962) and economics (Knight, 1921; Keynes,
1936), they could be restatements of one view, rather than qualitatively different types of
uncertainty experienced by managers as they observe and respond to the environment.
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4.3.9 Archival And Perceptual Perspectives On Uncertainty
The evidence from the review in the previous section has illustrated how the literature on
environmental uncertainty is split into two schools of thought (Milliken, 1987). At one end of
the continuum is an argument which suggests that environmental uncertainty should be
measured as a perceptual phenomenon (Child, 1972; Downey and Slocum, 1975); at the
opposite end is a school of thought which believes it is a characteristic of organisational
environments, and should therefore be observed as an objective phenomenon (Knight, 1921;
Keynes, 1936; Nash, 1998).
In order to measure organisational environments, researchers have tried to operationalise
objective measures (Tosi, Aldag, and Storey, 1973). This section of the report refers to
objective uncertainty as archival, as the use of the word objective can be misleading. Boyd et
al. (1993) recognised that all measures entail some degree of subjectivity, for example in the
creation of, or even the decision to use, secondary data. Boyd et al. identified that using
archival, or objective, data to measure organisational environments can appear attractive, as it
is very accessible and the opportunity for replication and comparison with other studies is
apparent.
However, in order to ensure that archival data are used correctly, Boyd et al. go on to classify
archival approaches to environmental measurement into three types: aggregation, recency and
correspondence. Aggregation is a method used to combine data from a selection of firms to
create an industry-level index – such as the volatility of sales. Recency is where indices
implicitly weight data points, but more recent data are weighted to give a view more relevant
to the current time frame. Correspondence is where the researcher takes care to ensure that the
conceptualisation of an environmental construct, for example complexity, corresponds to the
method used to measure it. Schwab (1980) recognised that a theoretically valid hypothesis
might not be proved in a study, owing to the incorrect operationalisation of the independent or
dependent variable.
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In contrast some researchers prefer to address environmental uncertainty as a perceptual
phenomenon. Thus perceptual measures, according to Boyd et al. (1993), enable theorists to
depict the environment from the perspective of individuals within the organisation. They
recognise two key advantages that arise from the use of perceptual measures: first, the ability
to make generalisations across industries; and second, that they are more likely to reflect the
current state of the environment as opposed to the long-term nature of archival measures.
Boyd et al. identified three categories of perceptual measure: generalisability, reliability or
validity, and sources of variation. Boyd et al. split the generalisability categorisation into two
parts: first descriptive, where findings based on a small number of cases may be relevant to a
broader population; and second theoretical generalisations, where variables are seen as
indicators of broader concepts, for example levels of complexity or the speed of change.
The second classification of perceptual measures identified by Boyd et al. is reliability or
validity; as an example Downey, Hellriegel and Slocum (1977) cited the poor reliabilities they
encountered when they compared results from the uncertainty scales developed by Lawrence
and Lorsch (1967) with those from the scale developed by Duncan (1972). The final
classification identified by Boyd et al. (1993) is sources of variation where perceptual
measures do not typically capture variations in the source of uncertainty; for example the
relative importance of technological as opposed to regulatory change may fluctuate over time.
In conclusion there are many pieces of research that have sought to measure both archival and
perceptual environmental uncertainty, in order that the relationship between the two measures
could be investigated or validated (Aldag and Storey, 1975; Downey et al., 1977). Tinker
(1976, p.507) warned that there is a danger in adopting a single approach. For example he
identified a problem should researchers adopt only a perceptual approach in that:
“the study of perceptions alone could reduce the study of organisations to merely the
problem of the psychoanalysis of actors”.
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4.3.10 An Environmental Or Contextual Perspective On Uncertainty
Many influential studies have attempted to isolate characteristics of the environment that
cause uncertainty for organisations. As the report identified in Section 4.1.1, it is Duncan
(1972) that is generally credited with initiating the study of perceived environmental
uncertainty, and his conceptual dimensions are central to the research into organisational
environments (Boyd and Fulk, 1996). Through the integration of work carried out by
organisational theorists (Emery and Trist, 1965; Thompson, 1967) and decision theorists
(Luce and Raiffa, 1957), Duncan proposed that environmental uncertainty could be described
in terms of two constructs: the simple–complex dimension and the static–dynamic dimension.
Duncan (1972) found that the environment could be described as simple if: there were only a
few factors in number; they were similar to one another; and they were located in only a few
of the decision units he was investigating. By comparison Duncan used complex to indicate
many factors, dissimilar in nature and located in the majority of the decision units under
observation. Child (1972) applied Duncan’s concept to the organisation as a whole, when he
conceptualised environmental complexity as the heterogeneity, and range, of an organisation’s
activities. Emery and Trist (1965) referred to increased complexity deriving from an increase
in the connectedness of the organisation. Aldrich (1979) referred to this complexity as the
concentration–dispersion dimension; Starbuck (1976) referred to it as density.
Duncan’s (1972) second dimension of contextual uncertainty was the static–dynamic
dimension. In his study of decision-making, this dimension indicated whether the decision
unit’s internal and external environment, or its context (Huff, 1978), remained basically the
same over time or whether it was dynamic, in a process of continual change.
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Dess and Beard (1984) argued that much of the literature in the area of organisation theory and
strategy has dealt with dynamism. They suggest that turnover unpredictability and the absence
of any patterns are the most appropriate measures of what they refer to as the instability–
stability construct. This is a slightly different perspective on the static–dynamic dimension
offered by Duncan (1972), though it is substantively the same. Hatch (1997) illustrated
Duncan’s conceptualisation of uncertainty in a two-by-two matrix (see Figure 6 below):
Figure 6 – Uncertainty: A Product Of The Level Of Complexity And The Rate Of Change (Hatch, 1997)
Miles, Snow and Pfeffer (1974) argued that it is important to distinguish between the rate of
environmental change and the unpredictability of such change. The logic for this distinction is
that change resulting from dynamism (Miles et al., 1974) or variability (Boyd and Fulk, 1996)
is reduced to change that is hard to predict, because it is the unpredictability that contributes to
the perception of uncertainty among organisational members, not the change itself. Pfeffer and
Salancik (1978, p.67) raise this point in their definition of uncertainty:
“Uncertainty refers to the degree to which future states of the world cannot be anticipated
and accurately predicted. […] Occasionally, uncertainty has been confused with change. It
is of course, quite possible to have rapid change which is predictable and, therefore, not
uncertain.”
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Evidently Pfeffer and Salancik were of the opinion that uncertainty could be determined by the
inability of the organisation to predict the future at a given point in time. Presumably as the
accuracy of the forecasts increases, uncertainty diminishes or decreases.
Probably the most influential study in the area of unpredictability was completed by Perrow
(1967), who argued that the key determinants of uncertainty were the frequency of interruption
to organisational routines, and the extent of the search undertaken for alternatives when
disruptions occurred. Aldrich (1979) referred to this unpredictability as turbulence and Tosi et
al. (1973) labelled it volatility. The organisation theory literature recognises techniques that
have been used to help cope with uncertainty created by unpredictability. Such methods
include boundary spanning (Sawyerr, 1993); buffers (Pagell, Newman, Hanna, and Krause,
1987); and scenario planning (van der Heijden, 1996).
Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) take a slightly different view of organisational task environments
and tie uncertainty in to three factors: clarity of information, reliability of causal relationships,
and time span of definitive feedback in relation to outcomes. The frequency with which
organisational routines are interrupted is also cited as an indicator of relative uncertainty
rooted in the work of Perrow (1967).
As the literature review identified in Section 4.1.5, it is possible to break the strategic
decision-making process down into three component parts: strategy context; strategy content;
and strategy process. In this research it is proposed that where strategists experience
uncertainty, the condition of not certainly knowing, in relation to one or a combination of
these three elements of the decision process, then it can be referred to as environmental
(Duncan, 1972) or contextual (Huff, 1978) uncertainty.
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4.3.11 A Consensual Perspective On Uncertainty
Earlier in the review this report recognised some major problems with the notion of perceived
environmental uncertainty. Two of the key issues identified were individual perspectives on
uncertainty (Hatch, 1997), and individual observations, attentions and perceptions (Boyd et
al., 1993). Huff (1978) developed the argument further when she introduced the notion of
consensual uncertainty, which she defined as a variance, or lack of consensus, between two or
more observers of the same decision context. Here Huff made an important distinction in the
concept of uncertainty as she diverted attention away from variance in the decision context, or
setting, to variance in the interpretations being made by those who perceive the setting.
It is important to note that for this research Huff’s ‘decision context’, or setting, has been
extended to include the content of the decision and the strategy development process. Huff
explains that such a measure is relative, since some difference between individuals is always
to be expected. Through her work Huff postulated that the greater the divergence, the higher
the degree of consensual uncertainty. Such a variance can be measured among the same
individuals over time, among different individuals in the same decision context, or among
different individuals in different decision contexts. Huff further postulated that uniformity in
interpretation of a decision context is, in general, an aid to the decision-makers, since
information gathered from experiences of others provides a consistent, interpretable picture to
augment directly available evidence.
Huff’s point is illustrated in Project 2 of this research where strategists at Barclays were asked
to assess the relative importance of factors influencing strategy development across the
Group’s portfolio of businesses. Barclays Capital, which appears to exist in a setting involving
a large and complex number of factors, was identified as operating in an industry in which
contextual uncertainty was high. By comparison, Barclays Africa, which was found to face
fewer influencing factors, was consensually uncertain than Barclays Capital, owing to a wide
variance in the interpretation of the political issues faced by organisations operating in Africa.
Interestingly Barclays Global Investors was deemed to be operating in the most uncertain
environment, as it appears to involve a large number of key factors reported in conflicting
patterns.
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When assessing businesses that exist within a single organisation like Barclays, one would
logically expect any variance in consensual uncertainty to be low because all the businesses
are operating within the same management structure and the same industry, therefore should
be experiencing similar environmental conditions – or what Huff (1978) would term
‘contextual’ conditions. However, Huff argues that uncertainty is high because consensus
appears to be low, therefore the uncertainty being experienced is due to high degrees of
consensual uncertainty.
Huff quoting Steiner (1969) shows that the problem can also be illustrated at the
organisational level. To illustrate, during Project 2 this investigation finds that managers
within the UK Retail Bank, which is recognised to be operating in a complex, fast moving
setting and experiencing a high degree of dependence on its environment for resources,
experienced a high degree of uncertainty. During the same project the researcher also
interviewed managers at Barclays Capital, which is also recognised to be complex, fast-
moving and experiencing a high degree of dependence on its environment for resources, but
found that they experienced a low degree of uncertainty. This is accounted for in the data
because Barclays Capital are deemed to ‘be able to cope’ as they consistently encounter such
phenomena. Clearly there is a degree of variance, or a lack of consensus, among observers as
to the interpretation of these two decision contexts, or settings, for the organisation.
Milliken (1987) splits the consensual uncertainty construct into three constituent parts: state
uncertainty, effect uncertainty and response uncertainty. State uncertainty according to
Milliken is when managers experience uncertainty about the state of the environment, or
decision context (Huff, 1978). Typically such uncertainty would pertain to the probability or
general nature of changes in the state of the organisational environment.
Milliken’s second type of consensual uncertainty is effect uncertainty. Managers experiencing
this type of uncertainty are unable to predict the nature of the impact, or effect, on the future
state of the environment and any ramifications for the organisation. To illustrate effect
uncertainty, Milliken draws an analogy with a hurricane; she identifies that a general
awareness that a hurricane is heading in the direction of a building does not necessarily equate
to a knowing whether the building will definitely be left standing after the hurricane.
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Using this analogy, state uncertainty, or contextual uncertainty (Huff, 1978), is low because
individuals have attained the knowledge that the hurricane is heading towards the building.
The ramifications for the building, the effect of the hurricane (Milliken, 1987), are unknown
therefore consensual uncertainty is high.
Response uncertainty is the third element of Milliken’s consensual uncertainty construct, and
again she uses the hurricane to illustrate the point. Under these circumstances the consensual
uncertainty lies either in not knowing the range of response options available, or in being
unable to predict the likely consequences of each choice.
Conrath (1967) conceptualised consensual uncertainty in much the same manner as Milliken’s
(1987) response uncertainty. Conrath argued that perceived uncertainty involves a lack of
knowledge concerning: the options available, the states of nature or outcomes likely to be
connected with each option; and the value associated with each alternative-state-of-nature
pair.
Evidently a high degree of consensual uncertainty exists where individuals or organisations
have: a significant lack of consensus pertaining to the state of the environment, or decision
context; an inability to predict the effect of any outcomes; and a lack of knowledge pertaining
to the options available and the ramifications associated with each alternative option.
4.3.12 An Information Perspective On Uncertainty
As the report identified earlier, in modernist thinking uncertainty was considered to be a
property of the environment resulting from two powerful forces: complexity, and the rate of
change (Hatch, 1997). Hatch went on to identify a problem with such an environmental
perspective on uncertainty because it assumed that conditions in the same context might be
perceived as certain by one set of managers and uncertain by another. She recognised that the
term ‘environmental uncertainty’ can be quite misleading because environments do not feel
uncertain, people do.
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Hatch’s argument suggested that it is not the conditions in the environment that affect
organisations so much as perceptions among strategists about how uncertain their environment
is. Consequently uncertainty lies not in the environment, but in the individuals who consider
the environment when they make organisational decisions. This viewpoint is associated with
the information perspective in organisation theory. Hatch explains that the information
perspective on uncertainty argues that managers feel uncertain when they perceive the
environment to be unpredictable, and this occurs when they lack the information they feel they
need to make decisions. This is illustrated in Figure 7 below. Perrow (1967) referred to this as
the strategist experiencing a lack of confidence in his or her knowledge of the organisational
content, the ‘lack of information’.
Figure 7 – Links Between Conditions In The Perceived Environment: Uncertainty & Information (Perrow, 1967)
Under such circumstances, strategists experience information needs that are directly correlated
to their perception of environmental conditions. When the environment is construed as stable,
then information is readily available and the ‘lack of information is low’. When the
environment is complex and fast-moving, strategists have a constant need for additional
information and may even experience an overwhelming amount of information. In this
scenario, constantly changing circumstances mean that strategists are unable to decide which
information is immediately relevant, consequently they experience high uncertainty.
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4.3.13 Enactment Theory And The Social Constructionist Perspective
Enactment theory puts a different interpretation on the information perspective. Weick (1979)
argues that the organisational context, or environment, cannot be separated from the
perceptions that strategists form of those conditions. The enactment view places both
uncertainty and the environment within the mind of the organisational decision-maker. Hatch
(1997, p.93) argues:
“that from this subjectivist point of view the need for information experienced by
managers causes them to search for and find more information so that the higher the level
of uncertainty they feel, the more complex and changing the environment will appear due
to the continually expanding search for more information and the growing database that
searching generates.”
This perspective maintains that it is the demands for more sophisticated information from
increasing numbers of uncertain decision-makers that constructs a complex and changing
environment. Subsequently strategists interpret their uncertainty as a lack of information and
then attribute their feelings and experience to environmental factors: complexity and change.
Enactment theory offers an interesting explanation of a radical shift towards greater
complexity and change in many of the organisations that have participated in the information
technology revolution. This stance also offers an explanation as to why strategists experience
ever-increasing degrees of uncertainty within environments that have such high levels of
accessible and available information.
Section 4.1.1 identified that the relationship between the organisation and its environment can
be complex and fast moving (Duncan, 1972); therefore organisations must make sense of their
environment. From a social constructionist perspective, Weick (2001, p.244) argues that
strategists achieve this through a process of ‘sense-making’:
“Managers literally must wade into the ocean of events that surround the organization and
actively try to make sense of them.”
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Weick asserts that managers make sense of their environments through interpretation which he
defined as a process of translating events, developing models for understanding, bringing out
meaning, and assembling conceptual schemes among key managers. He argued that
interpretation is organised into three stages: scanning (data collection); interpretation (data
given meaning); and learning (action taken).
Scanning is defined as the process of monitoring the environment and providing data to
strategists. Interpretation is defined as the process of translating events and developing
understanding. Learning is the process of developing knowledge about action–outcome
relationships between the organisation and the environment. Logically one can therefore
deduce that if strategists believe any, all or a combination of the above stages to be missing,
then the decision-maker experiences the fact or condition of not certainly knowing, defined in
Section 4.3.1 as uncertainty. In essence the strategist is unable to ‘make sense’ of the situation.
To conclude this section, it is evident that from a social constructionist perspective, Weick
recognised strategic decision-making as being a key element of an organisation’s process for
making sense of its environment. It therefore plays a major part in the information and
interpretation processes and consequently the process of strategy development and decision-
making.
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4.4 Literature Review: The Organisation And Its Environment
4.4.1 Organisation–Environment Relations: Multiple Perspectives
Chaffee (1985) argued that firms use strategy to deal with changing environments; therefore a
basic premise when considering strategy concerns the inseparability of the organisation and its
environment (Lenz, 1980; Biggadike, 1981). Chaffee went on to assert that strategic decisions
are related to the environment, and are also important to the overall welfare of the
organisation. This section looks at the nature of the organisation–environment relationship.
Classical and modernist management theories have typically conceptualised the organisational
environment as an entity that lies outside the boundaries of the organisation (Hatch, 1997); it
influences organisational outcomes by imposing constraints so that the strategic challenge lies
in being able to adapt in order to survive. Hatch developed her argument to assert that the
organisation faces uncertainty about what the environment demands when it experiences
dependence on the multiple and various elements that comprise its environment
Symbolic-interpretive theory views the environment as a social construction (Katz and Kahn,
1966; Weick, 1979). Through his enactment theory, Weick regarded the environment as a
theoretical construction, formed by beliefs among individuals about its existence, and
constituted by perceptions set in motion by those beliefs. From this interpretive perspective,
environments have material consequences but are primarily symbolic: their significance
within the organisation derives from the interpretations they are given (Hatch, 1997). Hatch
identified that, as with strategy earlier in the document, the post-modernist debate in this area
is still emerging; this perspective finds problems with the distinction between the organisation
and its environment, identifying a ‘boundaryless’ organisation. This leads post-modernists to
create new organisational forms such as the network model and the virtual firm.
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4.4.2 The Organisation–Environment Relations Debate
Classical management theory viewed organisations as closed systems, where management
regarded internal operations as their sole concern (Hatch, 1997); modernist theory brought the
introduction of the open-systems perspective (Katz and Kahn, 1966). Consequently interest in
the impact of the environment on organisational processes increased (Javidan, 1984).
Salancik and Pfeffer (1974) argued that understanding organisational behaviour requires an
examination of how the organisation relates to its environment. They defined the function of
management as discretion towards more favourable environments, identifying three roles:
symbolic, responsive and discretionary. The symbolic role argues that managers articulate
high-level responses to the environment, which act as symbols for individuals within the
organisation, very similar to Quinn’s incremental mode (1980) and Johnson’s cultural web
(Johnson and Scholes, 1999a). In the responsive role, managers heed the constraints of the
environment, sometimes referred to as opportunities and threats (Andrews, 1971). In the
discretionary role, managers attempt to heed demands imposed by the environment; Andrews
refers to these factors as strengths and weaknesses.
Bourgeois (1985) also identified as a central tenet in strategic management that a match
between environmental conditions and organisational capabilities is critical to performance,
and that it is the strategist’s job to find or create this match. Bourgeois identified two themes
within the literature antecedent to this field, strategic ‘fit’ and environmentally constrained.
Bourgeois argued that the first school of thought is aligned to the normative (or classical) view
(see Section 4.1.4) which propagates that success is subject to the degree of strategic ‘fit’
between trends in the environment, sometimes referred to as opportunities and threats
(Andrews, 1971; Johnson and Scholes, 1999b) and an organisation’s distinctive competences,
sometimes referred to as strengths and weaknesses (Porter, 1980; Porter and Montgomery,
1991). By definition the second school of thought, according to Bourgeois, argues that
industry structure constrains the conduct of the organisation, therefore it determines the
economic performance of the firm (Hannan and Freeman, 1977; Hatten, Schendel, and
Cooper, 1978; Aldrich, 1979).
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4.4.3 Defining Context For The Organisation–Environment Relationship
Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) recognised the importance of context in the understanding of
organisational behaviour and warned that it is not sufficient to talk about strategic context or
organisational environments in general terms. In order to address this, Pfeffer and Salancik
found it useful to distinguish between three levels of the environment: the entire system; direct
interactions; and the enacted environment.
Applying the work of Pfeffer and Salancik to this research offers a useful conceptualisation of
the organisational environment within which Barclays operates. The entire system includes all
interconnected individuals and organisations related to one another and to the focal
organisation, Barclays. To illustrate this category, the entire system includes all the other
institutions in the financial services industry, government, local communities, media, etc.
Direct interaction encompasses all the individuals and organisations with whom Barclays
directly interacts and with whom it transacts. This category would include corporate and retail
customers, employees, retired employees, the other main clearing banks, etc.
The final conceptualisation offered by Pfeffer and Salancik is the enacted environment which
is the perspective adopted by this research into the strategic management of uncertainty. The
enacted environment is the observation, attention and perception of individual actors within
the system, the level of the organisation’s perceptions of and representations of the
environment. This viewpoint offers a more radical interpretation of the organisation–
environment relationship where theorists argue that the environment cannot be separated from
perceptions of the environment. From this social constructionist viewpoint, the environment
for Barclays is composed of everyone who has a perception of the organisation and believes
they have, or have had, a relationship with the Bank.
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4.4.4 Resource Dependence Theory
Section 4.4.1 of this report identified that a basic premise when considering strategy
concerned the inseparability of the firm and its environment (Lenz, 1980); therefore the nature
of the relationship that exists between the organisation and its environment is central to the
study of uncertainty (Duncan, 1972). As the review identified, Chaffee (1985) argued that
firms use strategy to deal with changing environments; and Hatch (1997) referred to this as
strategic ‘fit’.
Hatch went on to recognise the modernist perspective on the strategy process, which
conceptualises the organisation as a living organism. Using this metaphor, theorists have
identified that just as a living organism would learn to adapt in its struggle to survive, an
organisation uses strategy to survive. Resource dependence theory identifies three dimensions
that can be used to study the nature of the relationship between the organisation and its
environment. The first assesses the abundance of resources within the environment; the
second identifies the level of dependence the organisation has on its environment for
resources; and the third seeks to identify the ability of the firm to adapt to change.
A significant body of research has recognised that the abundance of resources within the
competitive environment can contribute to the impact of uncertainty within organisations. The
literature refers to this characteristic as the hostility–munificence dimension (Starbuck, 1976;
Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Aldrich, 1979; Dess and Beard, 1984). Child (1972) refers to it as
illiberality. In terms of specific measures, Aldrich described this dimension merely as
environmental capacity; Dess and Beard develop this further, recognising that the key factor is
the rate of sales growth. Starbuck argues that it is the extent to which the environment can
support sustained growth. The literature appears to be predicated on the assumption that firms,
like living organisms, seek out environments that permit growth and stability.
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The second dimension of the research ascertains the level to which the organisation is
vulnerable to its environment for resources. Emery and Trist (1965) described four types of
environment, which differed according to the source and nature of the interdependence
between the organisation and the environment. Emery and Trist begin with the placid–
randomised environment, in which the resources required by the company are randomly
distributed throughout the environment. In such an environment, the organisation survives to
the extent that it can use different resources, can store a single resource or can use an abundant
resource, one that it is likely to encounter frequently.
The second type of environment identified by Emery and Trist is placid–clustered. This refers
to an environment in which the pattern of resources is sequentially predictable. Here
interdependence between the organisation and its environment shifts in sequential
probabilities, dependent on the availability of resources and the requirements of the firm.
Therefore organisations survive by accumulating enough resources to survive periods of
resource scarcity.
Emery and Trist’s third type of environment, disturbed–reactive, is manifestly different from
the two earlier examples. Under these circumstances the distribution of resources and the
probabilities of dependence are created by the behaviour of the organisations themselves;
members of the same organisational class transact with the same environment, compete for
resources and can transact with each other.
The final categorisation used by Emery and Trist to identify the nature of the dependence
between the organisation and its environment is described as turbulent. This situation differs
from the third type in that it involves the connection of sets of actors to other sets of actors;
consequently any one actor is connected to the set of actors on which he is immediately
dependent, and the environment itself is connected with other sets of interdependent actors.
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Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) build on the four typologies offered by Emery and Trist to
introduce concentration. In economics, concentration has been used to define the proportion of
an industry’s value-adding activities that is controlled by the largest five, ten or any number of
firms. According to Pfeffer and Salancik, in organisational theory concentration is more
closely associated with power and therefore uncertainty in the system; they recognise it as the
firm’s ability to achieve desired outcomes in its environment or social system.
By increasing concentration or reducing interconnectedness, Pfeffer and Salancik argue that
the firm can reduce resource dependence and therefore any uncertainty that arises from
managing a large number of separate entities. A lack of ability to co-ordinate interdependent
activities can result in conflict or disagreements about the ends or goals of the social system.
Evidently if there were no interdependence there would be no basis for conflict, which can
arise from resource scarcity, politics or loss of control of the social system.
The third dimension that can create uncertainty in the organisational–environmental
relationship is the ability of the firm to adapt to its environment, or deal with changing
environments (Chaffee, 1985). This is why one of the central tenets of strategy concerns the
inseparability of the organisation and its environment (Lenz, 1980; Biggadike, 1981).
Cyert and March (1963) observed that this dimension is closely linked to the first dimension,
the abundance or lack of resources. They argued that if an organisation is able to recognise an
environment offering growth and stability, it should be in a position to generate slack, which
can provide a buffer against uncertainty. Such abundance, or munificence, can then be used to
provide resources for innovation (Chakravarthy, 1982), maintain external relationships or
coalitions (Hirsch, 1975), and even serve as a means for resolving conflict within the
organisation–environment relationship (Bourgeois, 1981).
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Some theorists recognise that uncertainty is only problematic when it involves an
interdependence that is critical to the organisation (Milliken, 1987; Daft, Sormunen, and
Parks, 1988; Boyd and Fulk, 1996). Daft et al. (1988) argued that unless external events are
perceived as important to organisations, managers have little interest in them; Boyd and Fulk
referred to this as perceived importance. Pfeffer and Salancik (1978, p.68) confirm:
“Uncertainty itself is not problematic. It is a problem for organisations only when the
uncertainty involves important interactions with other environmental elements that are
important for the organisation.”
To conclude, it is evident that the nature of the relationship between the organisation and its
environment is central to the study of uncertainty. From a resource dependence perspective, it
is apparent that this interaction has three component parts: the abundance of resources in the
environment; the level of dependence the organisation has on its external surroundings; and its
ability to adapt to changes in the environment.
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4.5 Literature Review: Dealing With The Competitive Environment
4.5.1 Managing For Value: Understanding Value
During the introduction (see Section 2.1.5), the research recognised Barclays’ commitment to
putting value creation at the top of the management agenda (Barrett, 2000). This section takes
a look at the meaning of the term ‘value’, with a view to clarifying how value creation informs
the strategy development process at Barclays.
Similarly to the terms ‘strategy’ in Section 4.1.2 (Chaffee, 1985) and ‘uncertainty’ in Section
4.3.1 (Milliken, 1987), Bowman and Ambrosini (2003b) recognise some confusion
surrounding various aspects of what is meant by the term ‘value’ and the process of value
creation. As a starting point, Bowman and Ambrosini argue that the term ‘value’ means
different things to different stakeholders. In order to clarify the subject area, they make a clear
distinction between use value and exchange value, and between value creation and value
capture.
To illustrate the distinctions that are being made, Bowman and Ambrosini identify five types
of activity. They begin by recognising the process of value creation, which they argue can take
two forms: first, it can be concerned with the capture of exchange value from customers, for
example the interest charge on a mortgage product or credit card; second, it can be captured
through the use of value from suppliers, for example Barclays’ outsourcing service providers.
Bowman and Ambrosini then go on to identify two other types of activity: firstly, the
maintenance of the firm – in the case of Barclays, this could take the form of the protection of
business as usual or meeting the Group’s legal and regulatory commitments; and secondly the
maintenance of capital stock – in the case of Barclays, the effective management of
operational and credit risk. The final category is activity that destroys value – in the case of
Barclays this would include: any duplication of processes and functions; shortfalls in customer
service and complaint handling; or even failed projects. Under these circumstances Bowman
and Ambrosini argue the Bank has invested in unproductive activity that has destroyed value.
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4.5.2 Managing For Value Across A Portfolio Of Diverse Businesses
The introductory section of this report (see Section 2.1.4) identified the range of businesses
that exist within the Barclays Group. The challenge for this research is to investigate how the
Group manages to deliver value across such a diverse portfolio. Clearly these firms operate in
very different environments, typified by varying rates of change and levels of complexity, and
therefore each should encounter a different degree of perceived environmental uncertainty
(Duncan, 1972). Evidently this should have ramifications for the study of the relationship
between perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes (Bourgeois
and Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999).
Johnson and Scholes (1993) developed a portfolio analysis matrix for assessing strategic
capability across a portfolio of businesses. To illustrate the use of such a matrix, Figure 8
below plots six subsidiaries and the corporate centre, where the level of change can be
represented on the x-axis and the level of complexity can be plotted on the y-axis. The size of
the bubble can be driven by a financial measure, for example profits before tax, or value
(Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003b), contributed by each area of the business in a fiscal year.
Figure 8 – Portfolio Analysis Matrix (Johnson and Scholes, 1993): Plotting Change Against Complexity
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4.5.3 The Static–Dynamic Dimension: The Rate Of Change
Section 4.1 identified that Duncan (1972) is generally credited with initiating the study of
perceived environmental uncertainty. Through his research Duncan proposed that such
uncertainty could be described along two constructs: the static–dynamic dimension and the
simple–complex dimension. This section looks at the static–dynamic dimension, usually
referred to more simply as change, or the rate of change, which Duncan used to conceptualise
how rapidly the various elements of the competitive environment change.
Tushman, Newman and Romanelli (1986) found evidence to suggest that industries
experience a consistent pattern of evolution. They found that early phases of experimentation
and low growth give way to more rapid growth as products gain acceptance or dominant
designs emerge. As demand levels off – and declines as completely different products attract
attention – then the rate of change also declines.
Through the study of hundreds of companies in several industries over time, Tushman et al.
also found that within any industrial sector – in this research at Barclays, the financial services
industry – there are consistent patterns in the amount of change that occurs over time. They
assert that whole industries experience periods of relatively minor change, and these periods
are punctuated by intervals of major disturbance, or disequilibrium. Tushman and Romanelli
(1985) referred to this phenomenon as punctuated equilibrium. Recognising this process of
transformation, Tushman and Romanelli identified incremental and discontinuous change.
By way of explanation Tushman and Romanelli defined incremental change as the type of
change associated with those periods when an industry is in equilibrium – for example at
Barclays, the programme of branch closures and the introduction of telephone distribution. By
way of contrast discontinuous change occurs during periods of disequilibrium – at Barclays,
for example, deregulation of the banks in the 1990s and the emergence of electronic banking
in 2001.
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Toffler (1990) looked at the nature of change and developed the concept of future shock.
Adopting the modernist position Toffler argued that organisations of the future would need to
be able to meet the challenge of greater adaptability when faced with change in the
competitive environment. Toffler found future shock to be the product of three related trends:
transience, novelty and diversity.
Starting with transience, sometimes referred to as impermanence (Hayes, 2002), Toffler
argued that the accelerating rate of change affects people’s relationships with things, places,
people, organisations and ideas. Therefore as acceleration occurs, these relationships become
foreshortened or telescoped in time.
Hayes (2002) explains that technological advances have increased the obsolescence of
products, or things (Toffler, 1990), and falling manufacturing costs have changed the balance
against repairing things in favour of replacement. Moving on to places, Hayes recognises that
movement means improvement and is welcome, whereas in the past relocation has often been
associated with disruption. Applying this to Barclays, it now has access to a workforce that is
mobile and does not require the roots and stability of previous generations. In terms of people,
Hayes recognises that relationships are increasingly defined in functional terms and
involvement is limited because of an increase in the number, and decrease in duration, of
relationships. He also found that this impermanency of relationships is reflected in eroded
loyalties to one organisation, and the demand for innovation increases the rate at which
people must form new ideas and forget the assumptions that previously underpinned their
notions of reality.
The second major trend creating change for firms according to Toffler (1990) is the concept of
novelty. Here Toffler makes a distinction between organisations facing an accelerating rate of
change in familiar surroundings (for example at Barclays the increased demands of
customers), as opposed to the rate of change in unprecedented situations (for example the
emerging importance of the Bank’s regulatory obligations). The final trend identified by
Toffler is diversity, the demand for choice or movement away from standardised products or
managerial processes. Toffler argues that when diversity is aggregated with transience and
novelty it can have an ephemeral impact on the environment, or create future shock.
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4.5.4 The Simple–Complex Dimension: The Level Of Complexity
This section of the report addresses Duncan’s (1972) second construct in his conceptualisation
of perceived environmental uncertainty, the simple–complex dimension, usually referred to
more plainly as complexity. The earlier review (see Section 4.5.3) recognised the role of
change in the organisational environment and this observation is pivotal in the role of
complexity in levels of perceived environmental uncertainty and consequently its relationship
with the strategy development process.
Most rational models of strategy development are predicated on the assumption that the
process involves the following steps: collect the relevant information, analyse it in the most
appropriate way, develop a plan based on the analysis, implement that plan and then measure
the outcome (Chandler, 1962; Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971). However, complexity theorists
(Boulton and Allen, 2003) have taken issue with this ‘conventional wisdom’ on the basis that
when strategists develop strategies, they should take into account not only the existing
strategies of competitors, but also how each competitor will respond to the new strategy, and
how all the new strategies in the market place will interact and compete.
Boulton and Allen argue that complexity theory provides a lens on the social sciences from the
perspective of so-called ‘modern physics’ (Prigogine and Stengers, 1984). It is argued that this
perspective offers an integrative theory that gives a ‘scientific’ validation to certain
perspectives on strategy development. Boulton and Allen (2003, p.1) recognise that there are a
number of ‘schools’ of complexity and no entirely agreed body of knowledge; however they
stress its importance in studying complex systems, such as Barclays:
“Specifically, complexity theory may provide a ‘scientific’ rationale to explain
empirically-based conclusions when the focus of interest resides in ‘real’, unstable and
unpredictable conditions. Rather than when the ‘problem under investigation’ is
constrained to reside in simplified or ideal conditions”.
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Having recognised Barclays as a complex system it is useful to dwell, if only for a short time,
on what is meant by a complex system. Boulton and Allen posit that a complex system is the
most general description of a system, where a system is defined as a group of interdependent
elements forming a collective entity. They also identify a theoretical problem because
labelling a system as ‘complex’ places no simplifying assumptions on the attributes of a
naturally-occurring system in practice (2003, p.1):
“So a complex system comprises elements of different classes, although the elements
in a given class need not be regarded as absolutely identical. The elements interact and
are connected by forces that are non-linear and can incorporate feedback. The forces
themselves may change with time and the elements also may change individually
and/or form new classes. The system notionally will have a boundary but that
boundary may be permeable and may change with time. The system may not in general
terms be regarded as being at, or near, equilibrium.”
Clearly through the use of this definition, Barclays, the financial services industry and the
economy are all complex systems, which are themselves made up of complex systems.
Consequently complex systems, like Barclays, are ‘nested’ within their environments,
therefore defining their interfaces, or boundaries (Hatch, 1997), so that what the research
attributes to the environment is imprecise and, as in the case of this research, may depend on
the focus of the investigation itself (Boulton and Allen, 2003).
When considering strategy development processes within a complex system such as Barclays,
it is important to understand how the complex system operates, or should operate, in its
competitive environment, or setting. In order to do this Boulton and Allen identify the
attributes and significant behaviours of complex systems: first, a lack of predictability; second,
co-evolution and emergence; and finally, adaptability and diversity.
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Beginning with a lack of predictability, complexity theorists argue that the path a complex
system takes cannot, as a general rule, be known in advance. The system is highly
interconnected, while also being equally heterogeneous, therefore it is not possible to
understand cause and effect relationships that exist within the system – in this case Barclays –
and between the complex system and its environment.
As a comfort to strategists the organisation will follow a path that is largely predictable, as it
will for a significant part of the time be an extension of the past. However there will be points
at which the possible future path divides – so-called points of bifurcation (Boulton and Allen,
2003). The path that the organisation takes at these critical points may be determined, or
tipped (Gladwell, 2000), by a minor issue or by chance. The outcome may take the
organisation into radically new territory and radical new properties may emerge; under these
circumstances the system is said to have self-organised.
In terms of co-evolution and emergence, Boulton and Allen (2003) argue that something
entirely new may emerge. It will not have been possible to reliably predict the emergence of
this new entity, or novelty (Toffler, 1990). The impetus for this emergent new being may have
been driven by the environment, as with electronic banking, which the Bank would interpret
as an event to which it needs to react. Equally the new entity could be created through the
behaviour of the complex system itself, for example the launch of a new ‘joined-up’ mortgage
product such as OpenPlan. The new attributes are regarded as emergent rather than new
because they have the potential to radically transform both the environment and the complex
system.
The final attribute of the complex system, according to Boulton and Allen (2003), is the
creation of conditions for adaptability and diversity. Here it is argued that for there to be
effective learning, evolution and adaptability, then any natural diversity between elements in a
given class must be encouraged and embraced, rather than attempts being made to limit and
control such differences. In the case of Barclays, the Bank must expect these elements to learn
and change, both collectively and individually. Complexity theorists argue that the system is
more adaptable and flexible when its elements are strongly woven together and highly
interconnected.
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4.5.5 The Strategic Capability Of Individuals
4.5.5.1 The Individual Perspective On Strategy
In Section 4.3.9 of this paper the review recognised that managerial perception can form a key
part of the strategy development process, particularly in relation to assessments of the
competitive environment (Child, 1972). Clearly such an observation has ramifications for this
investigation.
In order to address the strategy development process some theorists (Bowman and Ambrosini,
2000) adopt an interpretivist perspective (Blaikie, 1993) and suggest that the individual
strategist’s perspective on the strategy process is predicated on the individual’s perceptions of
the organisation (in this case Barclays), its competitive environment, and even the strategy
process itself (Collier et al., 2004). Consequently strategy occurs when the decision-maker
executes a process differently and therefore engages in some non-routine activity; or
perpetuates past patterns of behaviour (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000).
Weick (2001) also proposed that strategists make sense of the organisation’s environment in a
very individual manner based on their perception, or interpretation (Blaikie, 1993), of past
learning, information, and experience. March (1994) also recognised the influence of
experience and learned routines on actions, or strategies. Tsoukas (1994) identified that
individuals make sense of what surrounds them in different ways, and their actions stem from
applying their unique interpretations to the particular situations confronting them.
Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) quoting Tsoukas (1994, p.13) conclude that the organisation
and its environment are therefore:
“subjectively constructed entities which may change once individuals’ understanding
and interpretations change: it is individuals within organisations that interpret
whatever they think their environment consists of and act upon their interpretations.”
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4.5.5.2 Additional Factors: Causal Ambiguity, Ignorance And Self-Confidence
Theorists argue that the observation of the strategy development process and the competitive
environment from the perspective of the individual (Bowman, 1998; Bowman and Ambrosini,
2002) introduces three additional factors into the equation: causal ambiguity, ignorance and
self-confidence.
According to Bowman and Ambrosini (2002), causal ambiguity stems from a basic ambiguity,
the possibility of having more than one possible interpretation, concerning the causal
connection between actions taken by strategists and the consequences arising from such
actions. Under these circumstances, causal ambiguity acts as an isolating mechanism which
limits imitation by competitors, protects revenue streams, and restrains the mobility of
organisational resources.
By way of contrast Bowman and Ambrosini defined ignorance as a factor entirely separate
from causal ambiguity. Under conditions of ignorance strategists simply do not know what is
happening within their organisation, either in terms of the appropriate strategic intervention or
the consequences arising from such interventions. They identify that particular managers’
ignorance of what is happening within their organisation is likely to have multiple
implications for strategy.
The final contributory factor is self-confidence (Bowman, 1998). Here Bowman identifies that
belief and confidence can be driven by the strategic context. For example a strategist may feel
far more confident intervening if the organisation is faced with a crisis, and the shared sense
of crisis enables individuals to take actions that would previously have been regarded as too
high-risk.
Bowman goes on to argue that self-confidence can lie in a deep understanding of strategic
detail, where the confidence to act strategically stems from successful experience of the recipe
or formula. Here the strategist gains confidence in the knowledge that they have successfully
implemented difficult strategies in the past, have achieved momentum and will not be
deflected from the imposing the strategic vision.
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4.5.5.3 The Role Of Strategic Leadership: Upper Echelon Theory
Another school of thought considers strategy as an aspect of leadership (Peters, 1988;
Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2000). Bowman and Ambrosini (2000) embrace this perspective
but argue that the individual perspective should be enlarged to include any individual member
of an ‘upper echelon’ grouping, in this research the Group Executive Committee at Barclays
(see Section 4.6.3.4).
Hambrick and Mason (1984) also addressed strategy from the perspective of top managers,
typified by the question ‘why do organisations act as they do?’. They found that organisational
outcomes – strategic choices and performance levels – are partially predicted by managerial
background characteristics. Therefore in order to understand the organisation’s strategy, it is
appropriate to place the emphasis on the dominant coalition of the organisation – in the case
of Barclays the Group Executive Committee.
Waldman, Ramirez, House and Puranam (2001) also investigated leadership and perceived
environmental uncertainty but in relation to the financial profitability of the organisation. They
found that leadership at the strategic level concerned the investigation of top-level managers
and their impact on the strategy development process. As a starting point for their study
Waldman et al. hypothesised that the relationship between leadership, or upper echelon
(Bowman and Ambrosini, 2000), attributes and future performance was dependent on degrees
of perceived environmental uncertainty (Duncan, 1972), as experienced by immediate
subordinates to the Chief Executive Officer – in this investigation, the Group Executive
Committee.
Consequently Waldman et al. (2001) were able to conclude that under conditions of perceived
environmental uncertainty, upper echelon attributes – in their investigation, transactional and
charismatic leadership – were key predictors of future financial performance. Through the
design of this research (see Section 4.6.8), this investigation examines empirically the link
between perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by the ‘upper echelon’ at Barclays,
and the strategy development process applied at the business unit level (Bailey et al., 2000).
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4.5.5.4 Managerial Consensus
Following the observation that managers’ perceptions form the foundation on which strategic
choices are based (Hambrick and Mason, 1984), then perceptions formed by managers have an
influence over behaviours, actions and therefore strategy, either deliberate or intended
(Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). Based on this recognition, Bowman and Ambrosini (2003a,
p.214) identified:
“Therefore, whether the manager is operating at corporate headquarters, or at the apex
of a strategic business unit, the manager’s perceptions of the extant corporate-level
strategy are likely to impact on the decisions being taken.”
Based on this observation, Bowman and Ambrosini were able to assert that perceptions of
corporate strategy probably have more influence on executive behaviour than formal
statements of strategic intent. Clearly, as identified in Section 4.5.5.1, these perceptions are
based on individual perspectives and therefore are open to variances in interpretation. Such
variances in interpretation can lead to a lack of consensus among strategists (Bourgeois, 1985)
or different perspectives on uncertainty, described by Huff (1978) as consensual uncertainty
(see Section 4.3.11).
A review of the literature shows that such disagreement among strategists is not unusual
(Bourgeois, 1985). Furthermore, research does not give a conclusive insight into whether any
such lack of consensus is dysfunctional to the performance of the organisation. Bourgeois
(1980a) initially found that a high degree of consensus facilitated better performance, whereas
in his later research he found that a ‘lack’ of consensus led to better performance (Bourgeois,
1985). West and Schwenk (1996) found that the degree of managerial consensus was not a
contributory factor in terms of better performance.
Clearly this research examines the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty (Duncan,
1972) being experienced by the ‘upper echelon’ at Barclays, and consequent implications for
the strategy development process (Bailey et al., 2000). Therefore the observation that a lack of
consensus is not unusual among managers is important for this investigation.
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4.5.5.5 Theories Of Action: Theory-In-Use And Espoused Theory
When considering the strategic capability of individuals some theorists argue that managers
develop mental maps which act as frames of reference with regard to how they act in certain
situations (Argyris and Schön, 1974). Argyris and Schön posit that it is these mental maps that
inform how managers design, plan, implement and review their actions and interventions.
Furthermore, they assert that it is not the theories they explicitly espouse that guide managers’
actions, but rather these maps. In his later work, Argyris (1978) went on to argue that few
people are aware of the maps or theories they apply, and in order to make sense of this Argyris
made a clear distinction between theory and action. However, Argyris and Schön (1974)
propose that there are two theories of action involved: theories-in-use and espoused theory.
It is important to note that a theory of action is itself a theory; Argyris and Schön (1974, p.4)
explain:
“its most general properties are properties that all theories share, and the most general
criteria that apply to it – such as generality, centrality and simplicity – are criteria
applied to all theories.”
The distinction made by Argyris and Schön in terms of the contrasting theories of action is
between those theories that are implicit in what practitioners and managers do, and those to
which the practitioner and manager refer when asked to explain their actions to others. Argyris
and Schön describe the former as theories-in-use because they actually govern behaviour and
often tend to be tacit structures. By comparison the words practitioners and managers use to
convey what they do, or what they would like others to think they do, are referred to as
espoused theory.
The observation that there can be a clear delineation between the theories-in-use and the
espoused theories of managers raises interesting questions for this study into the relationship
between perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes across
Barclays and is developed in much greater detail in both Project 2 (see Section 5) and Project
3 (see Section 6).
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4.5.6 The Strategic Capability Of Organisations
4.5.6.1 The Ability To Cope
As this review recognised in Section 4.4.1, Chaffee (1985) argued that firms use strategy to
deal with changing environments; so that a basic premise when considering strategy concerns
the inseparability of the organisation and its environment (Lenz, 1980; Biggadike, 1981).
Therefore a key issue when considering the strategic capability of an organisation must be an
assessment of the ability of an organisation, in this case Barclays Bank PLC, to cope with its
environment.
Adopting such a resource-based perspective (Hatch, 1997), and using the living organism as a
metaphor for the organisation, Hatch identifies three dimensions that can be used to study the
nature of the relationship between the organisation and its environment. The first assesses the
abundance of resources within the environment; the second identifies the level of dependence
the organisation has on its environment for resources; and the third seeks to identify the ability
of the firm to adapt to change. These are discussed in detail in Section 4.4.4 above.
Through the application of the resource-based perspective, this research examines the ability
of each strategic business unit within the Barclays portfolio to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty as defined by Duncan (1972) (see Section 4.3.10). Therefore, in
order to examine empirically the ability of each strategic business unit to cope with
uncertainty, change and complexity, each member of the Group Executive Committee at
Barclays, or the ‘upper echelon’ (Hambrick, 2001), was asked to make subjective assessments
across each dimension. The research then examines the relationship that exists, if any,
between the three dimensions and any consequent implications for the strategy development
process (Bailey et al., 2000).
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4.5.6.2 The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
From the starting point of a resource-based view (see Section 4.4.4), some theorists recognise
that uncertainty is only problematic when it involves an interdependence that is critical to the
organisation (Milliken, 1987; Daft et al., 1988; Boyd and Fulk, 1996). Daft et al. (1988)
argued that unless external events are perceived as important to organisations, managers have
little interest in them; Boyd and Fulk referred to this as perceived importance.
Through the application of the resource-based perspective, this research examines the
importance of each strategic business unit being able to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty as defined by Duncan (1972) (see Section 4.3.10). Therefore, in order to examine
empirically the importance of each strategic business unit being able to cope with uncertainty,
change and complexity, each member of the Group Executive Committee at Barclays, or the
‘upper echelon’ (Hambrick, 2001), was asked to make subjective assessments across each
dimension. The research then examines the relationship that exists, if any, between the three
dimensions and any consequent implications for the strategy development process (Bailey et
al., 2000).
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4.6 Research Methodology And Research Design
4.6.1 The Research Problem
The focus point for the observation lies in the research problem, described by Strauss and
Corbin (1997) as the determination of the general or substantive area or focus of the research.
Strauss and Corbin suggested that the research question is the specific query to be addressed
by the investigation. It sets the parameters for the research and suggests the methods for data
gathering and analysis.
The first element of the research, Project 2, lies in understanding the degree of perceived
environmental uncertainty that top strategists believe is faced by each strategic business unit,
together with an assessment of the unit’s ability to cope with uncertainty, and the importance
of it being able to do so. The second element of the research lies in understanding the
processes senior managers apply for developing strategies within the strategic business units at
Barclays. The third element of the research examines the argument that successful
organisations, like Barclays, are able to find congruence in the relationship that exists between
the perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by corporate strategists and the process
being applied by senior managers for making strategic decisions at the business unit level.
4.6.2 The Research Question
The research problem can be expressed in the form of a question, referred to as the research
question (Strauss and Corbin, 1998):
“What Are The Implications For Strategy Development Processes At The Strategic
Business Unit Level When Corporate Strategists Are Experiencing Varying Degrees
Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty?”
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4.6.3 The Unit Of Analysis
4.6.3.1 Defining The Unit Of Analysis
The data that will inform the research have been drawn from the unit of analysis, sometimes
referred to as the social setting (Lofland and Lofland, 1995). Lofland and Lofland (1995,
p.101) described the unit of analysis as:
“The scale, or scales, of social organisation at which the researcher is going to organise the
investigation.”
Lofland and Lofland went on to offer three basic dimensions of scale, which they believed to
be useful when defining the unit of analysis. These three aspects are: first the number of
people involved, second the period of time on which the research will focus, and finally the
physical size of the territory occupied by the setting.
Applying to the research the dimensions identified by Lofland and Lofland, there are two
groups of people within the unit of analysis: first, the Barclays Group Executive Committee,
who are the people responsible for developing corporate strategy at Barclays; and second, the
senior management teams across the nineteen strategic business units at Barclays, who are
responsible for developing business strategy (Ansoff, 1965). The period of time on which the
research focused was 2003. The physical boundary of the unit of analysis is set by the group of
people within the boundaries of the two decision-making groups (Hatch, 1997), which is
socially constructed (Weick, 1979) by the managerial grading system.
Members of the Group Executive Committee were asked to assess on a scale of 0–100 (0
representing no uncertainty and 100 being total uncertainty) the seventeen strategic business
units in terms of the degree of uncertainty they were deemed to face in their competitive
environment. Following this they were asked to plot on a numeric scale the ability of the
business unit to cope with uncertainty against the importance of it being able to cope (see
Section 5.5.2). The senior management team within each strategic business unit were asked to
complete the self-administered questionnaire developed by Bailey et al. (2000).
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4.6.3.2 The Structure Of The Barclays Group During 2003
The Barclays organisation during 2003 was composed of seventeen strategic business units,
four shared service units and twelve group functions. For the purposes of this research, it is
important to clarify the distinctions being made between these three areas because this has
ramifications for the research design. As detailed earlier in this section, this investigation is
only concerned with the seventeen strategic business units.
A strategic business unit is defined as a profit-and-loss accountable unit organised around
products or customer segments. The unit sets its own business strategy within the context of
the Group strategic direction, while financial targets are set by the Group. A shared service
unit is defined as a group function that adds value to the business by delivering a cost-
effective solution for administration and advice. Typically a shared service unit provides a
one-stop service for general questions and requests. Finally a group function is a core
professional service support unit responsible for providing support across the group. The
Group structure is set out in Table 14 below:
Table 14 – The Structure Of The Barclays Group During 2003
Strategic Business Units Shared Service Units Group Functions
Woolwich Group Property Services Barclays Solutions
UK Retail Bank Investment Management Communications
Caribbean Service Provision Corporate Secretariat
Europe Strategic Marketing & Distribution Finance
International Bank Human Resources
Private Bank Internal Audit
Premier Bank Investor Relations
Barclays Global Investors Legal
Business Bank Risk
Barclays Africa Strategy & Planning
Barclaycard Corporate Taxation
Barclaycard International Treasury
Barclaycard UK
Collateralised Financing
Global Financing
Global Markets
Private Equity
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4.6.3.3 The Seven Clusters And The Strategic Business Unit Heads During 2003
The strategic business units are logically grouped into seven clusters, each reporting into a
Chief Executive who in turn reports directly into the Group Executive Committee, through its
Managing Director. The structure of the seven clusters and their reporting lines are set out in
Table 15 below:
Table 15 – The Barclays Clusters And The Heads Of The Strategic Business Units During 2003
The Barclays Clusters Product Or Customer Segments Reporting Lines
The UK Retail Bank Chief Executive – David Roberts
The Woolwich Mortgages, Savings, IFAs & Woolwich
Branded Distribution
M.D. – Jayne Almond
UK Retail Bank Consumer Lending, Current Accounts M.D. – Robin Dickie
Barclays Private Clients Chief Executive – Bob Hunter
Investment Management Caribbean & Cayman Islands M.D. – Ray Greenshields
Europe France, Monaco, Iberia & Gibraltar M.D. – Eduardo Arbizu
International Bank Personal Offshore, Premier Offshore M.D. – Catherine McDowell
Private Bank Credit Products, Fiduciary Services M.D. – Mike Pederson
Premier Bank High Value Or Premier Clients M.D. – Mike Rogers
Barclays Global Investors Chief Executive – Naguib Kheraj
Barclays Global Investors Global Investment Management M.D. – Lindsey Tomlinson
Business Bank Chief Executive – Roger Davis
Business Bank Corporate Banking M.D.s – Alastair Camp / Mike
Rogers / Peter Harvey
Barclays Africa Chief Executive – Chris Lendrum
Barclays Africa Corporate & Merchant Banking (Africa) M.D. – Dominic Bruynseels
Barclaycard Chief Executive – Gary Hoffman
Barclaycard Corporate UK Merchant Acquiring Services M.D. – Mark Evans
Barclaycard International International Card Issuing M.D. – Peter Herbert
Barclaycard UK UK Card Issuing & Lending M.D. – Peter Crook
Barclays Capital Chief Executive – Bob Diamond
Collateralised Financing Futures, Securities Lending / Borrowing M.D. – Jerry del Missier
Global Financing Origination, Secondary Trading M.D. – Naguib Kheraj
Global Markets Government Bonds, Money Markets M.D. – Jerry del Missier
Private Equity Company Capitalisations M.D. – Naguib Kheraj
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4.6.3.4 The Group Executive Committee During 2003
Membership of the Barclays Group Executive Committee during 2003 is set out in Table 16
below:
Table 16 – Membership Of The Barclays Group Executive Committee During 2003
Group Executive Committee Member Role & Responsibility
Sir Peter Middleton Group Chairman, Barclays Bank PLC
Matthew Barrett Group Chief Executive, Barclays Bank PLC
John Stewart Deputy Group Chief Executive, Barclays Bank PLC
Bob Diamond Chief Executive, Barclays Capital
Naguib Kheraj Chief Executive, Barclays Global Investors
Bob Hunter Chief Executive, Barclays Private Clients
Chris Lendrum Chief Executive, Barclays Africa & Group Executive Director
Gary Hoffman Chief Executive, Barclaycard
David Roberts Chief Executive, UK Retail Bank
Roger Davis Chief Executive, Business Bank
Gary Dibb Group Chief Administration Officer, Barclays Bank PLC
Jeff Neiderkorn Consultant To Group Executive Committee
Robert Nimmo Group Risk Director, Barclays Bank PLC
John Varley Group Finance Director, Barclays Bank PLC
David Weymouth Chief Information Officer, Barclays Bank PLC
Peter Herbert Group Strategy & Planning Director & Secretariat To The
Group Executive Committee
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4.6.4 The Phenomenon Of Interest And The Research Condition
Strauss and Corbin (1998, p.130) described the phenomenon of interest for the research as:
“Repeated patterns or happenings, events or actions / interactions that represent what
people do or say, alone or together, in response to the problems and situations in which
they find themselves.”
Strauss and Corbin recognised that in simple terms ‘the phenomenon of interest’ is a term that
provides answers to the question ‘what is going on here?’. Consequently the phenomenon for
this research is the process for developing strategy at the strategic business unit level.
The second element of the definition for the phenomenon of interest pertains to the problems
and situations individuals face. Strauss and Corbin recognised this as the research condition,
defined as sets of events or happenings that create the situations, issues and problems that
individuals face. Evidently perceived environmental uncertainty is the research condition in
this investigation. The study seeks to identify implications arising from the research condition
for the phenomenon of interest, strategy development processes at the strategic business unit
level.
Strauss and Corbin recognised that research conditions, in this research perceived
environmental uncertainty, may have many different properties intersecting across many
dimensions. They asserted that paths of influence on the phenomenon could be direct or
indirect, linear or non-linear, macro or micro. Strauss and Corbin argued that, to be complete,
the explanation of the research (in this case the identification of implications arising from the
research condition on the phenomenon) must include all the properties of the research
condition, detailing how they intersect with all aspects of the phenomenon.
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4.6.5 The Adopted Approach
4.6.5.1 Polemics: The Adopted Approach
The research is founded on the basic premise of polemics, defined in the Concise Oxford
Dictionary (1999) as ‘the art or practice of dispute or argument’. The art of polemics is
demonstrated in the comprehensive review of the literature (see Sections 4.1–4.5) where a
host of strong opinions and arguments are offered on a wide range of subjects resident within
the research domain: perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development process.
The purpose of the literature review is therefore twofold: first to set out the body of
knowledge within which the research resides – the research domain; and second, to build
propositions based on the literature which the research will go on to examine. It is important
to note that because the literature review covers a subject area, or details a particular
perspective, the researcher does not necessarily agree with that particular viewpoint or
commend that way of thinking. Coverage in the literature review merely acknowledges a topic
that is important to the research domain and is therefore worthy of review.
4.6.5.2 Polemics: Development Of Propositions From The Literature Review
Through a comprehensive coverage of the literature and existing academic research, the author
has gained a detailed understanding of both perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy
development processes as a highly topical and fertile area for research. As the research is
concerned with theory-building the researcher has developed logical corollaries from the
literature to build a series of propositions for testing in the field at Barclays.
The researcher uses these literature-guided propositions to direct the assessment of theory,
which is a critical step in the ongoing process of theory development (Whetten, 1989). The
researcher then goes on to use the results obtained from testing these literature-guided
propositions to improve current theory. The theory is built by drawing on a broad base of
evidence to support proposed changes to current theoretical conceptions in the research
domain: perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes.
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4.6.5.3 The Emergent Nature Of The Research Process
During the period of the Executive Doctoral Research Programme (1999–2005) the author has
allowed the research process to follow an emergent path, as opposed to imposing it in its
totality at the outset of the programme. During the course of the investigation the research
process has emerged in three key areas: first, a comprehensive coverage and understanding of
existing literature and research in the field of perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy
development processes; second, the author developing his skills as a researcher through the
collection of both primary and secondary research data; and finally, the author developing a
deep understanding of strategy development processes at Barclays Bank PLC by working
within the organisation prior to and throughout the period of the research.
Developing the first point, through close supervision with Cranfield School of Management
the literature review has been allowed to develop from an initial exploration into multiple
perspectives on organisational theory into a comprehensive review of the existing body of
evidence within the research domain: perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy
development process. The core of the literature review is set out in Section 4 and underpins
the propositions tested through this programme of research.
The second key area that demonstrates the emergent nature of the research process is the
personal development of the author as a researcher. Through the completion of detailed pilots
for each project the researcher allowed the research design to iterate and gradually improved
his competence and capability as a researcher. Each research pilot was followed by a
supervisory panel session where both the research design and data were reviewed. The results
of these research pilots are set out in Sections 5.4 and 6.4, and the contribution of the
supervisory panel in the personal development of the researcher is acknowledged.
The final key area of the research process that was allowed to emerge was the researcher’s
understanding of strategy development processes at Barclays. Through executive sponsorship
the researcher worked closely with the Group Strategy & Planning Department throughout
2002–3. The support of the Executive Sponsor and the resources made available by other key
stakeholders across the Group is acknowledged.
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4.6.6 The Philosophical Approach To The Research
4.6.6.1 Philosophy In Social Science Research
This section of the paper addresses the philosophical perspective adopted for the research.
Derived from the Greek, philos, meaning loving, and sophia, meaning wisdom, philosophy is
sometimes defined as the love of wisdom. In academic disciplines, it is concerned with
‘making explicit the nature and significance of values, or beliefs, and investigating the
intelligibility of concepts by means of rational argument’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1999).
In social science research it is important to address philosophical issues because this reveals
assumptions made by the researcher in three key areas: the nature of the phenomenon being
investigated, referred to as ontology; the manner in which the researcher believes it is possible
to gain knowledge of this reality, epistemology; and moral questions which address what
researchers should or should not do, morality. Theorists recognise that epistemology, ontology
and morality are central to all the issues that concern researchers (Williams and May, 2000).
Williams and May go on to recognise that research may be characterised as methodological
investigation into a subject or problem. Therefore to ‘research’ is to seek answers that involve
understanding and explanation, where the credibility of research outcomes will rest heavily on
the conduct of the investigation. Consequently there should be a strong relationship between
the logic, sometimes referred to as strategy (Blaikie, 1993), of enquiry and the philosophical
stance being adopted by the researcher. Therefore the researcher must be able to justify the
chosen research methodology and method dependent on the philosophical choices that have
been made.
This section of the paper develops the philosophical paradigm for the research and details how
the adopted position has informed the selection of research methodology and subsequent
method.
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4.6.6.2 Two Basic Philosophical Concepts: Ontology And Epistemology
Two of the most central concepts in the philosophy of science are ontology and epistemology
(Blaikie, 1993). According to Blaikie, in social enquiry ontology refers to the claims or
assumptions that the research makes about the nature of social reality – claims about what
exists, what reality looks like, what units it comprises, and how these units interact with each
other.
For this study, the researcher must consider the nature of the phenomena being investigated,
strategy development processes and perceived environmental uncertainty, and adopt a
philosophical stance that reflects the researcher’s view and articulates what constitutes
‘reality’. The researcher designed the logic and strategy for the research in a manner consistent
with the ontological perspective (see Section 4.6.8).
Blaikie goes on to contend that epistemology refers to the claims or assumptions made about
the ways in which it is possible to gain knowledge of reality, whatever knowledge is
understood to be. Theorists create a construct with the objective, sometimes referred to as
scientific, at one end of the continuum and the subjective, sometimes referred to as
interpretive or constructivist, at the other. Again the researcher will design the logic and
strategy for the research in a manner consistent with the epistemological perspective.
For the purposes of illustration it is possible to take the philosophical position of a positivist to
introduce these two basic concepts (Blaikie, 1993). Positivism entails an ontology made up of
atomistic, discrete and observable events. Therefore only that which can be observed, that
which is experienced by the senses, can be regarded as real and consequently worthy of the
attention of science. Human activity – in the case of this research, strategy development
processes – is understood as observable behaviour taking place in observable, material
circumstances. Social reality is viewed as a complex network of cause and effect relationships
between events, which are depicted as an emerging patchwork of relationships between
dependent and independent variables. The causes of human behaviour are regarded as being
external to the individual and therefore also to the researcher.
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Moving on to its epistemology, positivist knowledge is derived from sensory experience by
means of experimental or comparative analysis; therefore concepts and any subsequent
generalisations are shorthand summaries of particular observations (Blaikie, 1993). A
correspondence, or similarity, is suggested as the factual basis for the argument between
sensory experiences and the objects of those experiences, and between observation statements
and theoretical statements. From this philosophical perspective, scientific laws are deemed to
be identical to observable empirical regularities.
4.6.6.3 Philosophical Issues When Dealing With Perceptions In Research
This research is an investigation into strategy development processes and managerial
perceptions of the competitive environment and the ability of the strategic business unit to
cope with its environment. Therefore the philosophical approach must be able to address
issues associated with perceptions. According to Magee (2000), the problem of perceptions
has always obsessed empiricist philosophers and their legatees, because on the basis of
empiricist assumptions the problem is insoluble. Magee (2000, p.115) formulates the problem
as follows:
“If the world consisting of all material objects apart from my own body exists
independently of whether I exist or not, and in dimensions of space and time that are
also independent of me; and if my knowledge of the world derives from the fact that
those objects impinge on my body’s senses in such ways as to cause effects in my
brain which might be described as mental states in which the objects are represented;
how can I ever know that the representations correspond to the objects, in other words
that my perceptions correspond to reality? The only way we can check the accuracy of
a copy is to compare it with the original, but in this case we have no independent
access to the original, and therefore cannot make the comparison. We have access to
the copy alone – indeed it is only from the copy that we infer the existence of the
original at all. The question is made sharper by the fact that we know that there are
times when our senses deceive us.”
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4.6.6.4 Realism: The Adopted Philosophical Perspective For The Research
This section details how the researcher philosophised during the research. As the paper
identified in Section 4.6.6.2 these philosophical positions are governed by ontology and
epistemology. For this study the researcher adopts a realist ontology, which is posited in the
contributions of philosophers such as Bhaskar (1978) and Harré (1986). Williams and May
(2000) describe realism as the view that theoretical, or hypothetical, entities characterised by a
true theory actually exist even though they cannot be directly observed. Therefore the evidence
that confirms a theory also serves to confirm any theoretical, or hypothetical, entities
characterised by that theory.
In realist ontology, the ultimate objects of scientific enquiry are considered to exist
independently of scientists and their activity (Blaikie, 1993); therefore a clear distinction is
made between the domains of the empirical, the actual and the real. Within the realist
approach, the empirical is made up of experiences or events understood through observation,
the actual includes events whether observed or not, and the real consists of the processes that
generate events. This reflects the objective of the realist ontology, which is to explain
observable phenomena with reference to these underlying structures and mechanisms.
Blaikie goes on to observe realism as the ontology of intransitive structures and mechanisms,
which are distinguished from transitive concepts, theories and laws designed to describe them.
Therefore, according to Blaikie, these laws are descriptions of the real essence of things that
exist in nature, such essences being their power or tendency to produce effects that can be
observed – in the case of this research, strategy development processes and perceived
environmental uncertainty.
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In realist ontology, social reality is viewed from the perspective of a socially constructed
world in which either social episodes are the products of the cognitive resources that social
actors bring to them (Harré, 1986); or social arrangements are the products of material but
unobservable relations (Bhaskar, 1978). Consequently the aim of realist science is to explain
observable phenomena with reference to underlying structures and mechanisms – in this
research, the relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and the processes
adopted for developing strategy. Perceptions formed by strategists are not observed as being
external to the strategy process but constitute an element of that reality; therefore the above
relationship cannot be adequately described without making reference to the degrees of
environmental uncertainty being perceived by strategists.
It is thus evident that realist epistemology is constructivist because it is based on the building
of models of such mechanisms that, if they were to exist and act in the postulated way, would
account for the phenomenon being examined (Blaikie, 1993). Blaikie goes on to explain that
from this realist epistemology, models constitute hypothetical descriptions which, it is hoped,
will reveal the underlying mechanisms of reality; these mechanisms of reality can only be
known by constructing ideas about them.
4.6.6.5 Applying The Principles Of Realist Science To The Research
This section of the paper applies the work of Harré (1986) and Bhaskar (1978) to justify the
choice of realism as the philosophical approach to the research. According to the principles of
Harré (1986), the first stage in the process of realist science involves the production of critical
descriptions of non-random patterns through ‘exploration’, to extend what is known by
common observation (Blaikie, 1993). The purpose of this phase is to appraise critically the
authenticity of what is understood or ‘thought to be known’. In this study the exploratory
research was completed through a review of literature and a series of semi-structured
interviews with senior managers across Barclays. The two key areas under observation in this
part of the research were managerial assessments of perceived environmental uncertainty and
strategy development processes.
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Utilising Harré’s (1986) process of realist science the critical descriptive phase, referred to as
empirical studies, is followed by theoretical studies, which are concerned with producing a
rational explanation of the non-random patterns found in empirical studies. Therefore in this
research, a rational explanation of increased degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty
could be an increase in the rate of change or in the levels of complexity faced by managers at
Barclays. The final stage of Harré’s process of realist science is to prove the theoretical
findings by identifying the causal or generative mechanisms that produce the patterns – in the
case of this research, the implications of a rise in the degree of perceived environmental
uncertainty for strategy development processes at Barclays. Bhaskar (1978) summarised
realism in much the same way as Harré; however his approach consists of five principles
(Outhwaite, 1987). These are applied to this research in Table 17 below:
Table 17 – Applying Bhaskar’s (1978) Five Principles Of Realist Science To The Research
Bhaskar’s Principle Of Realist Science Applicability To The Research
A distinction is made between transitive and intransitive
objects of science. Transitive objects are the concepts,
theories and models which are developed to understand
and explain some aspects of reality; intransitive objects are
the real entities and their relations that make up the natural
and social worlds.
Transitive Objects
 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Intransitive Objects
 Strategy Development Processes
 Strategy Development Forums
Reality is stratified into three levels or domains: the
empirical, the actual and the real. The empirical domain
consists of the events that can be observed, the actual
domain consists of events, whether they are observed or
not, and the real domain consists of the structures and
processes that make up reality and that produce events.
Empirical Domain
 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Actual Domain
 Strategy Development
Real Domain
 Strategy Development Processes
 Strategy Development Forums
Causal relations are regarded as powers or tendencies of
things which interact with other tendencies such that an
observable event may or may not be produced, and may or
may not be observed. Social laws need not be universal;
they need only represent recognised tendencies.
Tendencies
There is a causal relationship between the
processes used for making decisions at the
business unit level, and degrees of perceived
environmental uncertainty among corporate
strategists
In the domain of the real, definitions of concepts are
regarded as real definitions, i.e. statements about the basic
nature of some entity or structure. These are neither
summaries of what is observed nor stipulations that a term
should be used in a particular way.
Real Definitions
 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
 Strategy Development Processes
Explanatory mechanisms in the domain of the real are
postulated and the task of research is to try to demonstrate
their existence.
Mechanisms
Explaining the relationship that exists, if any,
between strategy development processes at the
strategic business unit level, and perceptions of
the environment held by corporate strategists
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4.6.7 The Methodological Approach
4.6.7.1 Realism: Informing The Choice Of Methodological Approach
As the document identified in Section 4.6.6.2, philosophers have developed a continuum
ranging from the objective to the subjective. Between these polarised philosophical positions
lies a myriad of alternative positions, one of which is realism. Blaikie (1993) recognised that
from a realist perspective, in order for research to be scientific it must be concerned with
developing methods most appropriate to the subject matter of the research, based on realist
principles.
At the same time Blaikie recognised that realism adopts the interpretive position, believing
that there are fundamental differences between natural and socially occurring phenomena.
Consequently, in its epistemology it does not prescribe a methodological approach.
4.6.7.2 Choosing The Appropriate Methodological Approach
A useful starting point when choosing the methodological approach is to understand the
difference between research methodologies and research methods. Blaikie (1993) makes the
distinction by defining the research methodology as the analysis of how research should
proceed, as opposed to research methods, which are the actual techniques or procedures used
to gather data.
As this document identified earlier, realist science is concerned with developing methods
appropriate to the particular subject matter; therefore in this investigation, the methodological
approach must be appropriate to an investigation into the relationship that exists between
varying degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty among corporate strategists and
strategy development processes at the business unit level, within the context of Barclays Bank
PLC.
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4.6.7.3 The Methodological Approach
This section of the report moves on to introduce the research methodology for the study and
begins by clarifying the classifications of research (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Lowe, 1997).
Easterby-Smith et al. identified three research classifications: pure, applied and action. They
argued that differences in the methodological approaches are distinguished by the outcomes
that are assumed to emerge, and recognised that such distinctions do not always hold together
in practice.
The first classification made is pure research; this is intended to lead to theoretical
developments, although there may be practical implications. The second classification is
applied research, intended to lead to the solution of specific problems, usually within a client–
researcher relationship. The third classification is action research, where the researcher joins
the unit of analysis and collaborates in an approach; this is more an educational process than a
research process (Easterby-Smith et al., 1997).
This investigation is intended to lead to the solution of a specific problem for Barclays. The
research seeks to understand the implications of perceived environmental uncertainty on
strategy development processes. Utilising the classifications offered by Easterby-Smith et al.
this study is applied research, within a sponsor–researcher relationship.
The next distinction in the research methodology is the basis of theoretical grounding (Gill
and Johnson, 1999). Gill and Johnson recognised that there is deductive, or a priori, research,
which begins with abstract conceptualisation and then moves on to testing through the
application of theory, subsequently creating new experiences or observations. In contrast Gill
and Johnson also identified inductive, or a posteriori, research where learning is based on
particular past experiences; through the formulation of abstract concepts, theories and
generalisations that explain the past, researchers can predict the future.
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Within the realist ontology, research is always deductive, or a posteriori, because the
investigation is based on knowledge derived from experience. It is hoped that through the
application of this investigation the researcher will enable Barclays to predict the future
(understand the implications of perceived environmental uncertainty), based on theories that
explain the past (strategy development processes). However, it is important to note that the
dichotomy between induction and deduction can be somewhat confusing and it is not
uncommon for research in this area to intertwine these two approaches (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Hart, 1992; Hart and Banbury, 1994).
The next methodological issue to address is researcher involvement. The choice stems from
the philosophical perspective: a dichotomy is created, with the researcher independent at one
end of the construct and involved at the other. Positions along the continuum are determined
by the extent to which it is possible for the observer to remain wholly independent of the unit
of analysis. The position adopted by the researcher for this investigation is independent of the
unit of analysis.
Another issue that needs to be addressed is sample size. In order to complete the data
collection, the researcher interviewed fifteen members of the Barclays Group Executive
Committee (see Table 16) – the researcher could not obtain access to Matthew Barrett the
Chief Executive of Barclays Bank PLC. At the same time the researcher gathered 731 strategy
development questionnaires from senior managers across the seventeen strategic business
units. For the purposes of statistical analysis, each strategic business unit returned more than
thirty questionnaires.
One more issue to resolve in the methodological approach design concerns which comes first,
the theory or the data. As one would expect from a realist epistemology, the data come first
and knowledge is derived from experience. Data were collected from strategists on their
experience of perceived environmental uncertainty, while data were being collected on the
strategy development processes applied in the business units. From the data, or experience, the
researcher was able to investigate the correlations that exist, if any, in the above relationship.
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As this paper identified earlier, realist epistemology is founded on the building of models that,
if they were to exist and act in the postulated way, would account for the phenomena under
investigation (Blaikie, 1993). Therefore the investigation is concerned with theory building as
opposed to theory testing. The theory being developed is based on the idea that there should be
a relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and the processes adopted for
developing strategy at the strategic business unit level.
A further issue to resolve in the research methodology is the distinction between verification
and falsification. Quoting Karl Popper (1959), Easterby-Smith et al. (1997) argue that instead
of looking only for confirmatory evidence, one should always look for evidence contradictory
to one’s hypothesis. This research formulates theories in a way that will make them most
easily exposed to verification. It achieves this by incorporating questions that seek to prove
and disprove that varying degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty impact on strategy
development processes at Barclays.
This report has shown that the research is using various techniques and procedures for
completing research which it is possible to classify into two categories: qualitative and
quantitative. As with the theoretical groundings, the distinction between the two is not always
clear. However it is possible to make comparisons dependent on the approach that has been
adopted in collecting and analysing the data.
Easterby-Smith et al. (1997, p.71) quoted van Maanen (1983) who defined qualitative
methods as:
“An array of interpretive techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and
otherwise come to terms with the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less
naturally occurring phenomena in the world.”
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Using this definition, Easterby-Smith et al. (1997) argued that data collection and analysis
tends to be a continuous and iterative process. Applying this technique, researchers collect
data and analyse them to uncover emerging patterns or concepts that inform the investigation.
As a result qualitative methods are techniques where the researcher can gain insights into
people and situations when they are close to the unit of analysis. This research used qualitative
research in this manner, as it observed perceptual measures of uncertainty, and perceptions
among strategists of the processes used for developing strategy at Barclays.
Another feature of qualitative research is that it is suited to observations that are not limited by
pre-established boundaries, so the researcher is at liberty to allow the level of detail, or even
the direction of the research, to emerge as the study develops. This feature was key to the early
exploratory findings in Project 2 where the researcher developed in the research field at
Barclays those concepts discovered in the literature; Project 2 used the method most
commonly associated with qualitative research, the interview, in a semi-structured format.
The second method identified by Easterby-Smith et al. is quantitative research. Here the
process of data collection becomes distinct from the analysis. In contrast to qualitative
research, quantitative research utilises formally structured techniques such as questionnaires
and surveys. The structure enables the research to focus the data on the central theme,
restricting deviations. Unlike qualitative research, it is unusual for quantitative research to
give the interviewee the opportunity to probe deeper into separate issues, in response to
particular questions. Quantitative research was used primarily in the data collection phase of
Project 3, through the application of the strategy development questionnaire offered by Bailey
et al. (2000).
Although this aspect of the research is labelled as quantitative, as is sometimes the case in this
form of research (Bourgeois and Brodwin, 1984), it uses those quantitative measures to
explain subjectivity. The method is governed by the objectives: where the need for subjectivity
or meaning is low and standardisation is high, then quantitative methods are more appropriate;
where the need for interpretation, inference and subjectivity is not limited then qualitative
research is usually more appropriate.
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4.6.7.4 A Conceptual Map Of The Methodological Approach
A conceptual map of the methodological approach being adopted for the doctorate offers a
useful illustration (Holt, 1998), as shown in Figure 9 below:
Figure 9 – A Conceptual Map Of The Methodological Approach To The Research
Positivist Ontology Interpretivist Ontology
Objectivist Epistemology Subjectivist Epistemology
Overlapping Concepts
Borrow Aspects From Borrow Aspects From
Plus Unique Aspects
Realism
Research Question
Research Methods
Qualitative Data
Quantitative Data
Multiple Levels Of Data
Multi-Variate Data Analysis
Supported in the literature as
appropriate approaches for
research into strategy
development processes
Matches The Type Of:
Questionnaires, Interviews
Which Allows For:
Consistent
With:
Theory Building
Leading
To:
Which should provide
the data to answer
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4.6.8 The Research Design
4.6.8.1 The Logical Separation Of The Research
The research design is described as a statement of focus of the research and the main questions
to be answered (Easterby-Smith et al., 1997). As this paper identified in Section 4.6.1, the
focus of the research lies in understanding the relationship between levels of perceived
environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes at Barclays Bank PLC. The
question that is being addressed is ‘what are the implications for strategy development
processes at the strategic business unit level when corporate strategists are experiencing
varying degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty?’.
In order to achieve this, the research is separated into three logical components: first, an
investigation into degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty being experienced by
corporate strategists; second, a study of the strategy development processes adopted at the
business unit level; and finally, an analysis of the relationship that exists between the logical
components above.
4.6.8.2 Research Methods
Research methods are the actual techniques, or procedures, used to gather and analyse data
(Blaikie, 1993). The doctorate utilised two techniques that have been applied successfully in
previous strategy process research: the self-administered questionnaire (Duncan, 1972;
Hickson et al., 1986; Hart and Banbury, 1994) and the semi-structured interview (Eisenhardt,
1989; Papadakis et al., 1998). Similar research in financial services has also used one, or both,
of these methods (Leblebici and Salancik, 1981; Javidan, 1984).
4.6.8.2.1 The Semi-Structured Interview
The research interview has a wide variety of forms and a multiplicity of uses (Denzin and
Lincoln, 1998); as a technique for collecting data it is most closely associated with qualitative
research and its most common form is the individual, face-to-face verbal interchange.
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Denzin and Lincoln recognised that structured interviewing refers to a situation in which an
interviewer asks each respondent a series of pre-established questions with a limited set of
response categories; the interview is designed with little room for variation in responses with
the open-ended question infrequent. Denzin and Lincoln asserted that the interchange is very
much controlled by the interviewer, who treats the questionnaire as a script but remains in a
neutral role throughout. Results that are gathered are standardised as each respondent receives
the same set of questions under a stimulus–response format, which should create a minimal
number of errors. Evidently this form is most suited to quantitative research, although it could
be applied to qualitative research uses (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998).
The approach used in this research was the semi-structured interview, which according to
Denzin and Lincoln gives much greater breadth than the structured type given its qualitative
nature. The unstructured interview can take many forms ranging from an in-depth
configuration, sometimes referred to as an ‘ethnographic’, to participant observation. The
research used some set questions, hence the use of the prefix ‘semi-’. However it attempted to
understand perceptual measures of uncertainty among individuals, without imposing a priori
categorisation that may have limited the field of enquiry.
The study is concerned with investigating the relationship between degrees of perceived
environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes, therefore a semi-structured
interview was used for data collection. This method is particularly suitable, because from the
realist ontology the research adopts an interpretive or phenomenological approach to the
research, where uncertainty is perceived through sensation and intuition. It is important to
recognise that the researcher needed to address some common problems with the semi-
structured interview; these ranged from the use of language, scene setting, face validity of the
process and the obtaining of trust.
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4.6.8.2.2 The Self-Administered Questionnaire
The self-administered questionnaire is the research method adopted by Bailey et al. (2000) in
their model for identifying strategy development processes, which is covered in detail in
Section 4.2.3. As a research method it is quite simply a series of questions that the respondent
completes on his or her own (Bryman, 1995). An example of the questionnaire is set out in
Appendix A.
The self-administered questionnaire developed by Bailey et al. (2000) is a highly structured
approach to data gathering; it uses a seven-point Likert scale (Black, 1999), which is a well-
proven method of data collection in this subject area (Duncan, 1972). The use of a Likert scale
ensures: that each person uses the same instrument; that responses are as comparable as
possible; and that questions are completed in the same order. Furthermore results are already
codified and questions are standardised, which allows the researcher to identify variations in
responses.
4.6.8.3 The Choice Of Methods For Data Analysis
As the report identified in Section 4.6.1, this research investigates the relationship that exists
between degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty among strategists and the processes
used for developing strategy at the business unit level. The study involved data collection
across seventeen strategic business units, which enabled the researcher to ascertain the
dimensions that are adopted to develop strategy. The research used a semi-structured interview
to collect data on the degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty being experienced by the
fifteen members of the Group Executive Committee.
During the semi-structured interviews respondents were asked to describe their perceptions of
environmental uncertainty; these interviews were recorded and transcribed. The research data
were analysed through a system of coding, defined by Strauss and Corbin (1997) as the
analytic processes through which data are fractured, conceptualised, and integrated to form
theory.
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The researcher analysed the interview transcripts line by line, referred to as microanalysis by
Strauss and Corbin, to generate initial categories and to discover relationships among
concepts. For example, respondents referred to developing technology as a source of
uncertainty; the researcher coded this and then placed it in a category, such as the rate of
change or level of complexity. This line-by-line analysis enabled the researcher to recognise
properties for perceived environmental uncertainty, and refer properties back to the theory
identified in the literature.
The key contribution of the study is to investigate the relationship that exists between
perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes. In order to achieve
this, the researcher applied multivariate data analysis. Hair, Anderson, Tatham and Black
(1998, p.6) offered a definition for multivariate analysis:
“All statistical methods that simultaneously analyse multiple measurements on each
individual or object under investigation.”
The key component of multivariate analysis utilised in this research is principal components
analysis and factor analysis. Hair explains that principal components analysis is used to
identify patterns in the research data, and to express the research data in such a way as to
highlight any similarities or differences that exist in the data. Hair goes on to suggest the
application of factor analysis for two primary purposes: first, to reduce the number of
variables in the data; and second, to detect structure in the relationships between variables.
This research uses factor analysis to describe and explore the structure of categorical variables,
in this case strategy development processes and perceived environmental uncertainty,
sometimes referred to as correspondence analysis. Factor analysis is also used to confirm
specific hypotheses about the factor structure for a set of variables, for example the
relationship between the two independent variables (rate of change and level of complexity) in
Duncan’s (1972) conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty.
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5. PROJECT 2: Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
5.1 Project 2: Abstract And Overview
5.1.1 Project 2 Abstract
Project 2 of the Executive Doctorate is the exploration of perceived environmental uncertainty
across the portfolio of businesses within Barclays PLC, by collecting data from the Group
Executive Committee. The purpose is twofold: first, a qualitative exploration into the factors
that create perceived environmental uncertainty, enable strategic business units to cope, and
determine the importance of their being able to cope; and second, a quantitative investigation
into the modernist perspective of perceived environmental uncertainty, the degree (or lack) of
consensus between strategists during the development of corporate strategy, and the
managerial implications arising from perceived environmental uncertainty across Barclays.
There are five key qualitative findings: first, the term ‘uncertainty’ is a nebulous concept and
not within the managerial lexicon at Barclays; second, there is a high level of consensus
regarding the factors that create uncertainty, enable business units to cope, and determine the
importance of being able to cope; third, it is not the degree of uncertainty that concerns
strategists but the ability of the business unit to cope and the importance of it being able to
cope; fourth, the ability to cope is invariably determined by the resilient and highly successful
business model not by the actions of strategists; and finally, the importance of a business unit
being able to cope is determined by the value it creates or is expected to create in the future,
not by the degree of uncertainty, change or complexity experienced in its environment.
There are three key quantitative findings: first, research needs to develop a far more
sophisticated conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty than the one proposed
by the modernist perspective; second, strategists develop individual perspectives on perceived
environmental uncertainty and there is a lack of consensus as to its impact across Barclays;
and finally, the Bank actively avoids the eradication of consensus from the strategy process,
with part of its success based on the Group’s ability to embrace diversity and debate.
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5.1.2 Project 2 Overview
5.1.2.1 Structure Of The Executive Doctorate
This research examines the implications of perceived environmental uncertainty on strategy
development processes across Barclays PLC. There are two components to the managerial
issue: perceived environmental uncertainty, and strategy development processes. Project 2
represents the exploration of perceived environmental uncertainty and is undertaken with
fifteen members of the Group Executive Committee at Barclays and ten members of Group
Strategy & Planning. Project 3 is an examination of implications for strategy development
processes and is carried out across the senior management teams of the seventeen strategic
business units in the Barclays portfolio. Project 3 was piloted in Barclays Solutions.
5.1.2.2 Project 2: An Exploration Into Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
In order to explore the phenomenon of perceived environmental uncertainty, Project 2 is also
divided into two components: first, a qualitative exploration of perceived environmental
uncertainty; and second, a quantitative investigation of a series of propositions discovered in
the literature review in Project 1 (see Sections 4.3–4.5).
Beginning with the qualitative exploration, Project 2 identifies the qualitative factors that:
first, create perceived environmental uncertainty; second, enable a strategic business unit to
cope with perceived environmental uncertainty; and finally, determine the importance of the
strategic business unit being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
The quantitative investigation in Project 2 then goes on to examine: the relationship that exists
between the rate of change and the level of complexity as independent variables in the
modernist perspective of perceived environmental uncertainty; the degree (or lack) of
consensus between managers concerning the degree of uncertainty being experienced by
individual strategic business units; and finally, the managerial implications arising out of the
relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty, the ability of the organisation to
cope with perceived environmental uncertainty, and the importance of the strategic business
unit being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
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5.1.2.3 Project 2 Overview: Key Findings From The Qualitative Exploration
The first key finding from the qualitative exploration carried out in Project 2 is that the term
‘uncertainty’ does not appear to be commonly used in the managerial lexicon at Barclays and
therefore strategists on the Group Executive Committee manage the organisation without even
considering an abstract concept such as perceived environmental uncertainty. The second key
finding is that when strategists at Barclays are asked to consider the degree of uncertainty, the
rate of change, and the level of complexity being faced across the Group, a level of managerial
logic is applied. This logic dictates that it is not the level of uncertainty, change and
complexity that is significant but the ability of the strategic business units to cope and the
importance of the various businesses being able to cope.
The research also finds that the ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity is not
achieved by creating a ‘match’ or strategic ‘fit’ between the organisation and its competitive
environment but through the protection of a highly successful and resilient business model,
banking. For more than 300 years, banking in the UK has proved a successful business model
and an organisation such as Barclays cannot fail to create shareholder value in favourable
economic conditions such as those experienced during 2003.
The fourth key finding is that the importance of being able to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty at Barclays is driven by the strategic objective to maximise
shareholder value, that is either the current creation of value or the expectation of value
creation some time in the future. The importance of being able to cope is not a function of the
degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, or the level of complexity assumed to be present in
the Group’s competitive environment.
Project 2 also finds that although there is a high degree of synergy between the qualitative
factors that create uncertainty (for example, technology), enable business units to cope (for
example, talented leaders), and make it important that businesses are able to cope (for
example, value creation), nevertheless there is a high level of difference in perspectives among
corporate strategists at Barclays as to how the various strategic business units are impacted by
uncertainty, change, and complexity. This lack of consensus is covered in further detail in the
quantitative investigation (see Section 5.1.2.4).
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A sixth key finding from Project 2 is that there appears to be a substantive difference between
the qualitative factors that contribute to the rate of change being experienced across the
Barclays portfolio, and the qualitative factors that contribute to the level of complexity being
perceived across the Group. The crucial difference is that the factors that create change are
very externally focused, for example competition, regulations and customer requirements. By
way of contrast, the factors that create complexity appear to be very internally focused, for
example managing and developing people, internal politics, effective cross-Group integration,
and the lack of high quality management information.
The seventh key finding from Project 2 is that the perceptual assessments of the degree of
perceived environmental uncertainty, the ability to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty, and the importance of being able to cope fluctuate over time. Such fluctuations
can be driven by events or by experience and knowledge. An example of a fluctuation in the
degree of perceived environmental uncertainty could be the ‘dot-com revolution’ of 2001;
examples of event-driven fluctuations in the ability to cope could be the survival of a crisis
such as the large Russian debt write-offs by Barclays Capital in 1998, or the successful
acquisition and merger with the Woolwich by the UK Retail Bank in the late 1990s. An
example of a fluctuation over time would be where strategists claim to develop a level of
‘immunity’ to uncertainty as their career develops and they feel better able to cope with higher
levels of uncertainty, or they increase their ability to cope by gaining more experience.
Finally Project 2 finds that diversity and debate is actively encouraged in the development of
corporate strategy, therefore the ability to develop one’s own perspective on the competitive
environment and the Group’s strategy and be able to effectively contribute to the strategy
process is actively encouraged. The Group has developed forums and focus groups where
corporate strategists present the Bank’s strategy and members of the organisation are invited
to engage in the debate. The findings show that the Group goes to great lengths to ensure that
a diverse range of individuals, irrespective of gender or ethnic background, is able to
contribute to the strategy process. The research also finds that under certain circumstances,
strategists deliberately create uncertainty and change, but not complexity. Uncertainty is
created to ensure managers are able to think creatively and be challenged, change is created to
ensure the Group is able to transform itself and continue to meet ambitious value targets.
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5.1.2.4 Project 2 Overview: Key Findings From The Quantitative Investigation
The key findings from the quantitative investigation into perceived environmental uncertainty
carried out in Project 2 fall into three categories: first, the investigation into the modernist
perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty; second, the examination of the lack of
managerial consensus, concerning degrees of uncertainty being experienced in different
strategic business units; and finally, the identification of key managerial implications arising
out of the quantitative investigation into perceived environmental uncertainty.
Beginning with the investigation into the modernist perspective on perceived environmental
uncertainty, Project 2 finds that academic research needs to develop a far more sophisticated
model for conceptualising perceived environmental uncertainty than the modernist notion that
the degree of uncertainty is merely a product of the rate of change and the level of complexity.
This research also finds that the rate of change and the level of complexity cannot be regarded
as independent variables with the degree of uncertainty being measured as the dependent
variable. Project 2 has uncovered a statistically significant relationship between the rate of
change and the level of complexity at Barclays, leading to the conclusion that an increase in
the rate of change is reflected in an increase in the level of complexity and vice versa.
Moving on to the examination of the lack of managerial consensus or individual perspectives
concerning degrees of uncertainty, Project 2 finds that there is a high degree of variance, or
lack of consensus, in the perceptual assessments made by corporate strategists at Barclays on
the level of perceived environmental uncertainty being encountered across the Group, the
ability to cope with such uncertainty, and the importance of the business units being able to
cope. This finding suggests that corporate strategists on the same Executive Committee in the
same organisation have developed very different perspectives on the competitive
environments within which the various business units operate, the ability of these latter to
cope, and the importance of being able to cope. This finding is evidenced in the use of
nebulous terms such as ‘uncertainty’, ‘strategy’ and ‘complexity’, which appear to have very
different meanings for different members of the Group Executive Committee. It is an
important finding for strategists to be aware that the terms that they use in the development of
strategy may not be the terms that are heard by colleagues in the same organisation.
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Finally this section moves on to look at the identification of key managerial implications
arising out of the quantitative investigation. First Project 2 finds that when strategists begin to
think about the managerial implications of perceived environmental uncertainty, then a
managerial logic becomes evident in their assessments, which appears to be missing in some
cases when they are asked to assess uncertainty, change and complexity as abstract concepts.
This is evidenced in the strong correlation between the ability to cope with uncertainty and the
ability to cope with change and complexity, and the strong reciprocal relationship between the
importance of being able to cope with uncertainty and the importance of being able to cope
with change and complexity.
Interestingly this managerial logic extends across the section of the research concerned with
the managerial implications and is evidenced by some logical and fairly predictable reciprocal
relationships. Illustrations of such relationships are the strong relationship between the degree
of uncertainty and the rate of change being faced, and between the ability to cope with
uncertainty and the ability to cope with change. From a managerial perspective, however, the
key finding here is the lack of correlation between the ability to cope and the importance of
being able to cope.
This finding suggests that the Bank does not send its most talented strategists into the areas
where it is deemed most important for the Group to be able to cope with uncertainty, change
or complexity. The finding suggests that the Group uses other factors to determine where it
sends these strategists. The results of Project 2 appear to suggest that the strategists most
capable of coping with uncertainty, change and complexity are sent to the areas of the Group
that create the highest shareholder value, or where the most shareholder value is at stake.
This finding also suggests that successful strategy development cannot merely be regarded as
reducing levels of perceived environmental uncertainty in order to maximise the match or ‘fit’
(Hatch, 1997) between the organisation and its competitive environment. It would appear that
strategy development in an organisation like Barclays involves effectively protecting and
defending the areas of the business that create the most shareholder value, and acting as
responsible stewards of a resilient and highly successful business model or ‘money-printing
machine’.
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5.1.2.5 Project 2 Overview: Key Conclusions
Based on the findings of Project 2 the research draws four key conclusions counter to the
literature review set out in Project 1 (see Sections 4.1–4.5):
1. Academic research needs to develop a far more sophisticated conceptualisation of
perceived environmental uncertainty than the one offered by the modernist perspective
(Duncan, 1972). Project 2 concludes that the rate of change and the level of complexity
cannot be regarded merely as independent variables with perceived environmental
uncertainty measured as the dependent variable. The research also concludes that the
effect of these two variables on perceived environmental uncertainty is not equally
weighted and that the rate of change actually contributes to the level of complexity for
strategic business units within the Barclays portfolio.
2. The research also challenges the modernist perspective on strategy and concludes that
strategy at Barclays cannot be described simply as creating a ‘match’ (Chaffee, 1985)
or a ‘fit’ (Hatch, 1997) between the Bank and its competitive environment. Strategy at
Barclays is a process of identifying the areas of the Group that create shareholder value
and then protecting, defending and growing them by acting as effective stewards of a
resilient and highly successful business model that, in favourable economic conditions,
cannot fail. There is a presumption that the resilience of the business model enables the
Group to cope with the challenges presented in its competitive environment.
3. The notion of ‘consensual uncertainty’ (Huff, 1978) is entirely inappropriate for the
strategy development process at Barclays because the Group consistently seeks to
encourage diversity and debate in the strategy process. The research therefore
concludes that strategists seek to minimise consensus, and indeed there is actually
evidence that too much consensus can cause uncertainty in the process.
9. There is a high degree of variance, or lack of consensus (Bowman and Ambrosini,
2000), in the perceptual assessments of strategists as to the impact of uncertainty,
change and complexity on the various business units in the Barclays portfolio
(Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003a). This research concludes that the wide range of
diversity, debate and multiple perspectives on the strategy development process on the
Group Executive Committee and across the organisation as a whole makes an
invaluable contribution to the overall and ongoing success of the Group.
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5.2 Introduction
5.2.1 Background
As outlined in the introduction earlier in this report (see Section 3.2), the managerial issue
addressed in this research can be broken down into two component parts: perceived
environmental uncertainty, and strategy development processes. This element of the report
presents the examination of perceived environmental uncertainty, as defined by Duncan
(1972), and discussed in detail in Section 4.3.10.
In order to examine the phenomenon of perceived environmental uncertainty, this part of the
research is also divided into two component parts: first, a qualitative exploration of the factors
that create perceived environmental uncertainty, the ability to cope with such uncertainty and
the importance of being able to cope; and second, the investigation of a series of propositions
discovered in the literature review. The structure of Project 2 is set out in Figure 10 below:
Figure 10 – Breaking Project 2 Down Into Its Component Parts
Exploring The Phenomenon Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Qualitative Exploration Testing Propositions
Factors Creating Importance Of Modernist PerspectiveAbility To Cope Consensus Managerial
Implications
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5.2.2 Rationale For Project 2
This investigation is concerned with examining the relationship between perceived
environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes across Barclays Bank PLC,
therefore the rationale for Project 2 lies in developing a detailed understanding of perceived
environmental uncertainty.
In order to achieve the objectives of the research, Project 2 begins with an exploratory
investigation into the factors that create perceived environmental uncertainty for strategists at
Barclays. Strategists are then asked to assess the ability of each strategic business unit to cope
with perceived environmental uncertainty – being a product of change and complexity
(Duncan, 1972) – and the importance of each strategic business unit being able to cope with
perceived environmental uncertainty.
Therefore the rationale for Project 2 (see Section 5.2.1) lies in the researcher obtaining a
detailed understanding of the phenomenon described by Duncan as perceived environmental
uncertainty. This understanding is critical in order to examine any implications that perceived
environmental uncertainty may have for strategy development processes across the portfolio of
businesses owned by Barclays Bank PLC (see Figure 11 below):
Figure 11 – Examining The Implications Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty For Strategy Development
Strategy
Development
Processes
Perceived
Environmental
Uncertainty
Perceived Environm ental Uncertainty:
Examining The Implications For
Strategy Development Processes
Across Barclays Bank PLC
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5.3 Theoretical Overview: Synthesis Of The Literature Review
5.3.1 The Linking Of Theoretical Concepts
As detailed in Section 3.2.1, the Executive Doctorate creates a link between two theoretical
concepts: strategy development processes at the strategic business unit level; and degrees of
perceived environmental uncertainty evaluated by strategists on the Group Executive
Committee at Barclays Bank PLC (see Figure 11 above).
Based on the literature review (see Section 4.3–4.5), Project 2 links theoretical concepts
together at two levels. Initially Project 2 identifies the qualitative factors that: first, create
perceived environmental uncertainty; second, enable a strategic business unit to cope with
perceived environmental uncertainty; and finally, determine the importance of the strategic
business unit being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
Project 2 of the Executive Doctorate then goes on to examine: the relationship that exists
between change and complexity as independent variables in the modernist perspective of
perceived environmental uncertainty (Duncan, 1972; Hatch, 1997); the degree (or lack) of
consensus between managers during strategy development (Huff, 1978; Bowman and
Ambrosini, 2003a); and finally, the relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty,
the ability of the organisation to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty (Chaffee,
1985), and the importance of the strategic business unit being able to cope with such
uncertainty (Daft et al., 1988).
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5.3.2 Summarising Key Theoretical Arguments Informing Project 2
Through a comprehensive review of the literature (see Section 4.3–5), this part of the report
summarises key theoretical arguments that inform Project 2. The first is that there is a high
degree of inconsistency and confusion in both the literature and academic research about how
an uncertainty construct should be defined and applied (Chaffee, 1985; Milliken, 1987).
The second theoretical argument recognises that from an organisational theorist perspective,
the term ‘environmental uncertainty’ should be used to describe the state of mind of an
individual, as opposed to the state of the competitive environment, as environments have no
cognitive ability, so cannot feel uncertain (Hatch, 1997). The next theoretical argument is that
perceived environmental uncertainty should be described in terms of two constructs: the
static–dynamic dimension and the simple–complex dimension. Therefore the independent
variables using this conceptualisation of uncertainty are the rate of change and the level of
complexity (Duncan, 1972; Hatch, 1997).
Project 2 goes on to examine the theoretical argument that strategists adopt an individual
perspective on the organisation and its environment, therefore it is not uncommon for
managers to disagree about strategy (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003a) or about the degree of
perceived environmental uncertainty being faced by the organisation (Huff, 1978).
Project 2 then goes on to investigate whether the critical managerial factor in the
conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty is the organisation’s ability to cope,
or whether the critical factor is the subjective assessment of degrees of such uncertainty
(Hatch, 1997). Finally this element of the research examines the notion that managers only
deal with an issue, such as perceived environmental uncertainty, when they perceive it to be
important (Daft et al., 1988). Consequently Project 2 examines whether there is a relationship
between the degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty faced, the ability of the
organisation to cope with such uncertainty, and the importance of it being able to cope.
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5.3.3 Linking Theoretical Arguments To Frame The Research Question
Based on the theoretical arguments set out in Section 5.3.1, it is possible to link them together
to show how the research question for Project 2 (see Figure 12 below) is framed by the
literature:
1. What are the qualitative factors that: create perceived environmental uncertainty;
enable organisations across Barclays to cope with such uncertainty; and make it
important that strategic business units across Barclays are able to cope?
2. What is the nature of the relationship between change and complexity within the
modernist perspective of perceived environmental uncertainty offered by Duncan
(1972) and conceptualised by Hatch (1997), set out in Section 4.3.10?
3. Have strategists at Barclays developed individual perspectives on the organisation and
its environment that have ramifications for strategy (Bowman and Ambrosini, 2003a),
and does this create a lack of consensus (Huff, 1978) among managers?
4. What is the nature of the relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty,
the ability of the organisation to cope with such uncertainty, and the importance of the
organisation being able to cope?
Figure 12 – Linking Theoretical Arguments To Frame The Research Question For Project 2
In c o n s is te n c y A ro u n d
U n c e rta in ty C o n s tru c t
1 .
O rg a n isa t io n a l T h e o ris t
P e rsp e c tiv e o n U n c e rta in ty
2 .
3 . R e la tio n sh ip O f
C h a n g e & C o m p le x ity
L a c k O f
M a n a g e r ia l C o n se n su s
4 .
5 .
T h e A b ility O f T h e
O rg a n isa tio n to C o p e
6 .
T h e Im p o rta n c e O f
B e in g A b le T o C o p e
“ W h a t a re th e q u a li ta t iv e fa c to r s th a t c re a te
p e rc e ive d e n v iro n m e n ta l u n c e r ta in ty ? W h a t ro le
d o c h a n g e & co m p le x ity p la y ? Is th e re g e n e ra l
c o n se n su s re g a rd in g th e d e g re e o f u n c e r ta in ty
fa c e d ? H o w a b le a re w e to c o p e? H o w im p o r ta n t
is i t th a t w e a re a b le to c o p e ? ”
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5.4 The Research Pilot
5.4.1 The Development Of The Pilot For Project 2
5.4.1.1 The Structure Of The Pilot
The pilot for Project 2 was split into two parts: first, a series of sixteen exploratory interviews
with senior managers across Barclays Bank PLC; and second, a presentation to the Group
Strategy & Planning Department leading to nine semi-structured ‘follow-up’ interviews.
5.4.1.2 Project 2 Pilot – Phase 1: The Series Of Exploratory Interviews
The first element of the pilot for Project 2 involved a series of unstructured exploratory
interviews with sixteen senior managers selected from among the researcher’s immediate
colleagues at Barclays. Adopting a very ‘open-ended’ (Easterby-Smith et al., 1997) approach
to the interviews, the researcher asked each respondent to talk through an experience of
strategy development where they had experienced uncertainty.
As a starting point to the conversation the researcher explained that uncertainty was being
defined as ‘the condition of not certainly knowing’ (Concise Oxford Dictionary, 1999). As the
conversation developed the researcher asked the respondent to consider the role of change and
complexity in their experience of uncertainty and expand on how these two factors contributed
to their ‘condition of not certainly knowing’.
Using the format of an exploratory interview (Gill and Johnson, 1999), the interaction was
relatively informal and typically lasted forty-five minutes. Each interview was recorded. The
researcher subsequently transcribed the interviews, creating categories for uncertainty, change
and complexity. Through the transcriptions the researcher developed a further category of
factors that create uncertainty, change and complexity. After seven interviews the researcher
introduced a further category detailing factors that enable the organisation to cope with
uncertainty, change and complexity.
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5.4.1.3 Project 2 Pilot – The Development Of Categorical Or Qualitative Variables
The categorical or qualitative variables were developed through a four-stage process (Strauss
and Corbin, 1998): first, the recognition of the phenomenon of interest; second, the
identification of concepts – both theoretical and practical; third, the formal development of the
qualitative categories; and finally, the population of the categories with the research data.
The first stage of this process was the recognition of the phenomena of interest for Project 2.
Here the researcher used the literature review in Project 1 to distinguish the phenomenon of
interest, in this case perceived environmental uncertainty. Through an exhaustive review of
the literature (see Section 4.3–4.5), the researcher covered the subject of uncertainty from its
roots in economic science through to its adoption in decision theory and latterly in
organisational behaviour. The purpose of Project 2 is to explore the notion of perceived
environmental uncertainty with a view to identifying its relationship with strategy
development processes in Project 3.
The second stage of this process was the identification of concepts. Here the researcher used
the literature review to identify the theoretical concepts that act as the building blocks of
perceived environmental uncertainty – in the case of Project 2: the degree of uncertainty; the
rate of change; and the level of complexity. Through a development of the literature review,
the series of exploratory interviews completed as the pilot for Project 2, and the researcher’s
detailed knowledge of practice having worked full-time in Barclays for the period of the
research, two further managerial concepts were developed: the ability to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty and the importance of being able to cope with such uncertainty. The
research was carried out within the context of a further managerial concept, the maximisation
of shareholder value.
The next stage was the formal development of the qualitative categories. During this phase the
qualitative categories were built from: the detailed understanding of the literature, the results
of the pilot and the in-depth knowledge of practice across Barclays. The data on the
maximisation of shareholder value across Barclays were gathered from the published accounts
for the tax year ending on the 31st December 2003.
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The five qualitative categories that were built for Project 2 are set out below in Table 18.
Following the pilot, four additional categories were added to allow a deeper investigation into
the ability to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty, and the importance of coping
with such uncertainty. These additional categories are highlighted in red in Table 18 below:
Table 18 – Project 2 Pilot: Developing The Qualitative Categories
Category The Qualitative Categories
1. Qualitative factors that create the degree of uncertainty in the competitive environment for
strategic business units across the Barclays portfolio.
2. Qualitative factors that contribute to the rate of change in the competitive environment for
strategic business units across the Barclays portfolio.
3. Qualitative factors that contribute to the level of complexity in the competitive environment
for strategic business units across the Barclays portfolio.
4. Qualitative factors that enable strategic business units across the Barclays portfolio to cope
with the degree of uncertainty.
5. Qualitative factors that enable strategic business units across the Barclays portfolio to cope
with the rate of change.
6. Qualitative factors that enable strategic business units across the Barclays portfolio to cope
with the level of complexity.
7. Qualitative factors that make it important for strategic business units across the Barclays
portfolio to be able to cope with the degree of uncertainty.
8. Qualitative factors that make it important for strategic business units across the Barclays
portfolio to be able to cope with the rate of change.
9. Qualitative factors that make it important for strategic business units across the Barclays
portfolio to be able to cope with the level of complexity.
The final stage of the process was the population of the categories with the research data.
Here the transcripts of the interviews were microanalysed and the words or phrases used by
individual respondents were coded (Strauss and Corbin, 1998), for example technology,
competition and customer requirements. The data were then labelled and placed into their
appropriate category. An example of the coding completed on a part of a transcript (see
Section 5.5.2.1) is illustrated below:
“We can no longer rely [change] on high levels of inertia [ability to cope] among our
client base and continue to ignore [not coping] the increasing demands [customers] of
more sophisticated [complexity] customers [customers]. If we are to continue to meet
ambitious performance targets [continue to cope] we must find ways [be able to cope]
of delighting our customers [customers] in ways that the financial services industry has
failed to do [not coping] in the past [importance of being able to cope].”
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5.4.1.4 Project 2 Pilot – Phase 2: The Engagement Of Group Strategy & Planning
The second phase of the pilot for Project 2 adopted a very different approach. Here the
researcher was invited to present his research objectives to the Barclays Group Strategy &
Planning Director, Peter Herbert. During that interview the Group Strategy & Planning
Director made the observation that a fundamental element in his conceptualisation of
perceived environmental uncertainty was the ability to cope with uncertainty, change and
complexity together with the importance attached to being able to cope with these three
phenomena. Consequently, these categories were inserted into the research design.
As a result of this presentation, the researcher was invited to attend the Leadership Team
Meeting of the Group Strategy Development Directors. The team comprised nine Group
Strategy Development Directors of whom seven held responsibility for the strategy
development process in each of the seven clusters (see Section 4.6.3.3), and the other two
were responsible for the strategy development process in the shared-service units, which are
outside the scope of this research.
In preparation for the meeting, the researcher developed a matrix where each respondent was
asked a series of five questions (see Table 19 below):
Table 19 – Project 2 Pilot: The Questions For The Group Strategy & Planning Leadership Team To Consider
No. The Pilot Research Questions For Project 2
1. On a scale of 1–100 (1 representing no uncertainty and 100 representing total uncertainty) please give
an assessment of the degree of uncertainty faced by each of the strategic business units.
2. On a scale of 1–10 (1 representing no change and 10 representing a high rate of change) please give
an assessment of the rate of change faced by each of the strategic business units.
3. On a scale of 1–10 (1 representing no complexity and 10 representing a high level of complexity)
please give an assessment of the level of complexity faced by each of the strategic business units.
4. On a scale of 1–10 (1 representing no ability to cope and 10 representing a total ability to cope)
please give an assessment of the ability of each strategic business unit to cope with uncertainty.
5. On a scale of 1–10 (1 representing no importance to being able to cope and 10 representing the total
importance of being able to cope) please give an assessment of the importance of each strategic
business unit being able to cope with uncertainty.
The researcher gave a ten-minute presentation on the research objectives and then asked each
respondent to complete the matrix.
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In order to assist the respondents, the researcher gave a definition of uncertainty, again aligned
to the dictionary definition, ‘the condition of not certainly knowing’ (Concise Oxford
Dictionary, 1999); and offered examples of an organisation facing a considerable rate of
change, and an organisation facing a high level of complexity.
The researcher offered Butterworth-Heinemann in the UK publishing industry as an example
of a firm facing a considerable rate of change, following the establishment of the CD-ROM in
the market, the introduction of electronic delivery and the emergence of new low-cost service
providers such as Amazon.com. In order to illustrate high levels of complexity, the researcher
offered the National Health Service as an illustrative example owing to: its complicated
funding model; the highly interconnected nature of health service delivery; the politically
sensitive nature of the health industry itself; and the myriad of stakeholders it is designed to
serve.
Completion of the matrix was followed up by a one-to-one semi-structured interview during
which the respondent would be given the opportunity to discuss the results. One week prior to
the interview, each interviewee was furnished with a copy of their own results alongside the
mean response for each question, for discussion at the interview.
Again, each ‘follow-up’ semi-structured interview was recorded, transcribed and coded (see
Section 4.6.8.3). The respondents were asked to expand their results in the following areas:
1. What qualitative criteria did you apply when you made your assessment of the: degrees
of uncertainty, rates of change, and levels of complexity?
2. What factors make some strategic business units more able to cope with uncertainty
than others?
3. From a managerial perspective what factors make it important that some strategic
business units are more able to cope with uncertainty than others?
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5.4.1.5 Project 2 Pilot – Statistical Method
Principal components analysis is a statistical approach used to examine the interrelationships
between a series of variables and to explain such variables in terms of their common
underlying dimensions, or factors (Hair et al., 1998). The primary objective of this type of
statistical analysis is to condense the information contained in a number of original variables
(for example, perceived environmental uncertainty) into a set of smaller variates (for example,
change and complexity), incurring the minimum loss of information.
Through principal components analysis, the researcher can build an empirical estimate of the
‘structure’ of the variables, or factors (Hair et al., 1998), being examined. Consequently, the
outcome of the process is to produce summated scales and tables for examination. An
illustration of such a summated scale is set out in Section 5.4.2.2.3 (see Table 25).
5.4.1.6 Project 2 Pilot – Multiple Regression Analysis
In this research, multiple regression analysis is used to account for, or predict (Hair et al.,
1998), the variance in an interval dependent. Therefore, multiple regression analysis is used to
establish whether a set of independent variables (for example, the rate of change and the level
of complexity) explains a proportion of the variance in the dependent variable (for example,
the degree of uncertainty).
It is important that the proportion of variance in the dependent variable is identified at a
significant level, usually referred to as the significance test of R². Multiple regression analysis
can then be used to establish the relative predictive importance of the independent variables.
The researcher can then go on to test the significance of differences between two or more
regression results (again see Table 20) to determine the impact of adding a further independent
variable. The researcher can then go on to calculate R² itself, that is, the percentage of variance
in the dependent variable (the degree of uncertainty), which is explained collectively by all of
the independent variables – in the case of Project 2, the rate of change and the level of
complexity.
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Hair et al. identify that multiple regression analysis shares all the common assumptions of
correlation: the linearity of relationships; the same level of relationship throughout the range
of the independent variable; interval or near-interval data; and data where the range is not
truncated. Therefore, it is extremely important that the model being tested – in this case,
perceived environmental uncertainty – is correctly specified. Evidently, the omission of
important causal variables (for example confusion over the term ‘rate of change’ as opposed to
Duncan’s (1972) ‘speed of change’) can have a significant impact on the calculation of the
beta weights and therefore the interpretation of the importance of the independent variables.
5.4.1.7 Project 2 Pilot – Variables, Dependent Variables & Independent Variables
In research, a variable is any measured charateristic or attribute that differs depending on the
subject (Hair et al., 1998). In order to illustrate variables, the Project 2 Pilot is examining the
perceptual assessments of ten members of Group Strategy & Planning on nineteen strategic
business units. In this example, it is the perceptual assessments that are described as the
variable, rather than the number of respondents or the number of strategic business units.
Variables can be described as either quantitative or qualitative (sometimes referred to as
categorical variables – see Section 5.4.1.3). Quantitative variables are measured on an ordinal,
interval or ratio scale; by comparison, qualitative variables are measured on a nominal scale.
To illustrate the point, when the Group Executive Committee Members were asked to identify
the factors that create the greatest degree of uncertainty for strategic business units, then the
variable was qualitative. If they were asked to measure the value created by a business unit
during 2003, then the variable would be quantitative.
During Project 2, an exploration has been undertaken into perceived environment uncertainty
and the relationship between its component parts. During the investigation, some variables
(for example the rate of change and the level of complexity) have been manipulated. On the
other hand, the degree of uncertainty has been measured from the subjects. In this example the
first set of variables are called ‘independent variables’, the latter is called the ‘dependent
variable’.
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5.4.2 The Pilot Findings: Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
5.4.2.1 Project 2 Pilot Findings – Phase 1: The Series Of Exploratory Interviews
5.4.2.1.1 The Four Key Findings
There are four key findings from the series of exploratory interviews forming Phase 1 of the
pilot for Project 2:
1. The concept of perceived environmental uncertainty is a very complex and nebulous
area for research. In order to illustrate this point, the data from the interviews show
that respondents clearly adopted very different models for conceptualising: the degree
of perceived environmental uncertainty; the rate of change in the competitive
environment; and the level of complexity being faced by the various strategic business
units within the Barclays Group. Consequently the concept of uncertainty needed to be
framed more effectively for the respondent in the research question.
2. Respondents develop a set of qualitative factors that underpin their assessments of the
degree of uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity being faced by the
portfolio of businesses within the Barclays Group. It is apparent from the pilot that
there is a high degree of synergy between the factors that create uncertainty, change
and complexity.
3. The relationship between the rate of change and the level of complexity, as
contributory factors to the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty experienced
by strategists (Duncan, 1972), is far more sophisticated than that represented by Hatch
(1997) in her conceptualisation of Duncan’s (1972) model (see Section 4.3.10).
4. The key issue for strategists at Barclays is not the degree of perceived environmental
uncertainty being faced by the strategic business units, irrespective of whether it is a
function of the rate of change or the level of complexity. The key issue for strategists
at Barclays is whether the strategic business units are able to cope with such
uncertainty and the importance of their being able to cope. Again there is a high degree
of synergy in the data between the factors that enable strategic business units to cope
with perceived environmental uncertainty and the importance of their being able to
cope with such uncertainty.
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 174 of 444
5.4.2.2 Project 2 Pilot Findings – Phase 2: The Use Of Group Strategy & Planning
5.4.2.2.1 The Three Key Findings
There are three key findings from the research pilot data collected through the engagement of
the Group Strategy & Planning Department at Barclays:
1. When asked to make assessments of the degree of uncertainty faced by the strategic
business units, their ability to cope, and the importance of their being able to cope
there was a high level of variation, or lack of consensus, in the data. Again extremely
consistent with Phase 1, the Phase 2 research pilot data showed evidence of strategists
adopting individual perspectives on the competitive environment and the relative
capabilities of the businesses within the Barclays portfolio.
2. Consistent with the exploratory interviews in Phase 1 of the pilot, the data from Phase
2 showed that the relationship between the rate of change and the level of complexity
as contributory factors to the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty
experienced by strategists (Duncan, 1972) is far more sophisticated than that
represented by Hatch (1997) in her conceptualisation of Duncan’s (1972) model (see
Section 4.3.10).
3. There are three key relationships in the conceptualisation of perceived environmental
uncertainty: first, the relationship between the degree of perceived environmental
uncertainty and the ability of the strategic business unit to cope (this did not prove
significant from the pilot); second, the relationship between the level of perceived
environmental uncertainty and the importance of the strategic business unit being able
to cope (the pilot proved this to be a statistically significant relationship); and finally,
the relationship between the ability of the strategic business unit being able to cope
with uncertainty and the importance of it being able to cope (this was not confirmed
from the results of the pilot for Project 2).
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5.4.2.2.2 Identifying Individual Perspectives Or The Lack Of Managerial Consensus
As this report identified in the previous section, the first finding from the research pilot was
that managers develop very individual perspectives on the environment. To illustrate this
point, the assessment of the uncertainty faced by one of the Barclays strategic business units,
the UK Retail Bank, ranged from 15 to 75 on the scale of 1–100 (see Table 20 below). By the
same token the assessment of the uncertainty faced by another of the business units, the
Business Bank, ranged from 35 through to 85 on the same scale.
This lack of managerial consensus is also evident in the standard deviations, again set out in
Table 20 below. Here the standard deviation for the UK Retail Bank (17.920) and the
Business Bank (17.865) exemplified a lack of managerial consensus pertaining to the degree
of uncertainty being faced. When the standard deviation was compared to the mean standard
deviation, the UK Retail Bank had a standard deviation that was 128.40% of the mean and the
Business Bank standard deviation was 128.01% of the mean. By way of comparison, the
assessment of the Private Bank ranged from 45 through to 60 on a scale of 1–100, with a
standard deviation that was 41.37% of the mean standard deviation. This indicates a higher
degree of managerial consensus regarding the degree of uncertainty faced by the Private Bank.
Table 20 – Project 2 Pilot: The Degree Of Uncertainty Faced By The Various Strategic Business Units
Strategic Business Unit Mean Rank SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 43.30 19 17.639 16 40.74 126.39 68 10
UK Retail Bank 49.00 17 17.920 19 36.57 128.40 75 15
Caribbean 57.10 11 12.635 7 22.13 90.54 75 40
Europe 56.50 12 12.030 5 21.29 86.20 80 40
International Bank 50.50 15= 9.265 2 18.35 66.39 60 30
Private Bank 55.00 13 5.774 1 10.50 41.37 60 45
Premier Bank 47.50 18 15.679 12 33.01 112.35 70 20
Barclays Global Investors 61.50 8 12.921 8 21.01 92.58 80 40
Barclaysb2b.com 78.00 2 17.670 17 22.65 126.61 100 40
Business Bank 59.50 10 17.865 18 30.03 128.01 85 35
Barclays Africa 69.50 4 16.575 13 23.85 118.77 90 40
Barclaycard Corporate 50.50 15= 16.907 15 33.48 121.14 75 30
Barclaycard International 61.00 9 13.703 9 22.46 98.19 75 35
Barclaycard UK 53.50 14 16.675 14 31.17 119.48 85 30
Barclaycard New Ventures 81.82 1 14.543 10 17.77 104.21 100 50
Collateralised Financing 63.00 7 9.487 3 15.06 67.98 80 50
Global Financing 67.00 5 15.129 11 22.58 108.41 90 40
Global Markets 70.50 3 12.349 6 17.52 88.49 85 50
Private Equity 65.50 6 10.395 4 15.87 74.49 80 50
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These individual perspectives, or the lack of managerial consensus, regarding the competitive
environment are also reflected in the assessments for the rate of change being faced by the
various strategic business units (see Table 21 below). Here the UK Retail Bank had a range of
2 through to 9 on a scale of 1–10, the Woolwich had a range of 2 through to 8 and Global
Financing had a range of 4 to 10 on the same scale.
By way of comparison, although Barclaycard New Ventures was deemed to face the highest
rate of change with a mean score of 8.8 on a scale of 1–10, the degree of consensus was also
highest with the lowest standard deviation of 0.978. Interestingly Barclaysb2b.com was also
deemed to face the highest rate of change with a mean score of 8.8 on a scale of 1–10, but had
a standard deviation that was 122.64% of the mean indicating a lack of managerial consensus.
Comparison of the standard deviation to the mean standard deviation also illustrates a lack of
consensus pertaining to the rate of change faced by the UK Retail Bank (159.65%), the
Woolwich (153.06%) and Europe (121.19%).
Table 21 – Project 2 Pilot: The Rate Of Change Faced By The Various Strategic Business Units
Strategic Business Unit Mean Rank SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 4.70 18 2.623 18 48.15 153.06 8 2
UK Retail Bank 5.30 11= 2.359 19 44.52 159.56 9 2
Caribbean 4.40 19 1.430 10 32.50 96.70 6 2
Europe 5.90 9= 1.792 16 30.37 121.19 8 4
International Bank 4.90 17 1.524 12 31.10 103.06 8 3
Private Bank 5.20 14= 1.317 8 25.32 89.04 7 3
Premier Bank 5.30 11= 1.567 14 29.57 105.97 8 3
Barclays Global Investors 6.10 6= 1.287 7 21.09 87.02 9 5
Barclaysb2b.com 8.80 1= 1.814 17 20.61 122.64 10 4
Business Bank 5.30 11= 1.703 15 32.13 115.17 8 3
Barclays Africa 5.20 14= 1.135 4 21.83 76.78 7 3
Barclaycard Corporate 5.00 16 1.054 2 21.08 71.29 6 3
Barclaycard International 6.10 6= 1.101 3 18.04 74.42 8 4
Barclaycard UK 5.90 9= 1.524 11 25.83 103.06 8 4
Barclaycard New Ventures 8.80 1= 0.978 1 11.11 66.11 10 7
Collateralised Financing 7.00 3= 1.333 9 19.05 90.17 9 4
Global Financing 7.00 3= 1.563 13 22.34 105.73 10 4
Global Markets 7.00 3= 1.155 5 16.50 78.09 8 4
Private Equity 6.10 6= 1.197 6 19.63 80.97 8 4
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The assessments for the levels of complexity faced by the various strategic business units
within the Barclays Group also illustrate a lack of managerial consensus in the interpretation
of the competitive environment (see Table 22 below). The data for Barclaysb2b.com ranged
from 2 through to 10 on a scale of 1–10, a pattern also reflected in the data for the Business
Bank, which ranged from 3 through to 10 on the same scale. There was also a wide range in
the responses obtained for: the Woolwich (2–8), UK Retail Bank (4–10), Barclays Global
Investors (3–9), Barclays Africa (3–9) and Barclaycard UK (3–9).
Comparison of the standard deviations to the mean standard deviation also supports the
evidence for the lack of managerial consensus when considering the levels of complexity
faced by the various strategic business units. Barclaysb2b.com deviated furthest from the
mean standard deviation at 154.51%. This deviation was also reflected by: the Woolwich
(135.55%), the Business Bank (127.26%), and Barclays Global Investors (123.61%).
Interestingly the strategic business units that were deemed to face the most complexity,
Barclaycard New Ventures (7.0) and Global Financing (6.8), also experienced a considerable
range of responses, with both having a range from 5 through to 9 on a scale of 1–10.
Table 22 – Project 2 Pilot: The Level Of Complexity Faced By The Various Strategic Business Units
Strategic Business Unit Mean Rank SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 4.30 19 2.312 18 53.76 135.55 8 2
UK Retail Bank 6.50 3= 1.716 11 26.40 100.61 10 4
Caribbean 4.70 16 1.337 4 28.46 78.42 6 3
Europe 6.00 8= 1.563 7 26.06 91.67 8 3
International Bank 5.10 15 1.663 10 32.61 97.53 8 3
Private Bank 5.90 10 1.595 8 27.04 93.53 8 3
Premier Bank 6.20 7 1.751 12 28.25 102.68 8 3
Barclays Global Investors 6.00 8= 2.108 16 35.14 123.61 9 3
Barclaysb2b.com 6.50 3= 2.635 19 40.54 154.51 10 2
Business Bank 5.40 12= 2.171 17 40.19 127.26 10 3
Barclays Africa 4.60 17 1.776 15 38.62 104.16 9 3
Barclaycard Corporate 4.56 18 1.257 1 27.57 73.71 7 3
Barclaycard International 5.40 12= 1.647 9 30.49 96.54 8 3
Barclaycard UK 5.30 14 1.767 13= 33.34 103.60 9 3
Barclaycard New Ventures 7.00 1 1.333 3 19.05 78.18 9 5
Collateralised Financing 6.30 6 1.767 13= 28.05 103.60 8 3
Global Financing 6.80 2 1.398 6 20.56 81.99 9 5
Global Markets 6.50 3= 1.269 2 19.53 74.42 8 5
Private Equity 5.70 11 1.337 5 23.46 78.42 8 4
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The next question in the pilot moved the focus of attention from the evaluation of the
competitive environment to an assessment of the ability of the strategic business units to cope
with uncertainty (see Table 23 below). Consistent with the earlier evidence these results also
illustrated a lack of consensus among strategists at Barclays. The largest ranges in the
responses were for: the UK Retail Bank (2–10), Barclaysb2b.com (2–9), the Woolwich (1–7),
and the Private Bank (2–8). Again this evidence is supported through a comparison of the
standard deviation with the mean standard deviation. Using this measure the UK Retail Bank
had a standard deviation that stood at 153.93% of the mean standard deviation,
Barclaysb2b.com a standard deviation at 164.43% of the mean and the Woolwich a standard
deviation at 137.21% of the mean.
Interestingly the four strategic business units within the Barclays Capital cluster (see Section
4.6.3.3), Collateralised Financing, Global Financing, Global Markets, and Private Equity,
were ranked the highest in terms of their ability to cope with uncertainty. The assessments of
these four businesses displayed the smallest range (6–9), which indicates there was a greater
degree of consensus regarding the ability of these organisations to cope with uncertainty.
Table 23 – Project 2 Pilot: The Ability Of The Various Strategic Business Units To Cope With Uncertainty
Strategic Business Unit Mean Rank SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 4.70 14= 1.889 17 40.18 137.21 7 1
UK Retail Bank 5.40 12= 2.119 18 39.24 153.93 10 2
Caribbean 5.40 12= 0.966 2= 17.89 70.19 7 4
Europe 4.40 17= 1.265 10 28.75 91.90 7 3
International Bank 6.30 11 1.829 16 29.03 132.86 9 4
Private Bank 4.40 17= 1.776 15 40.37 129.06 8 2
Premier Bank 4.70 14= 1.418 12 30.17 103.03 7 2
Barclays Global Investors 7.10 5 1.449 13 20.41 105.28 9 4
Barclaysb2b.com 4.70 14= 2.263 19 48.15 164.43 9 2
Business Bank 6.90 6= 1.287 11 18.65 93.48 9 5
Barclays Africa 6.70 8= 1.494 14 22.30 108.57 9 4
Barclaycard Corporate 6.90 6= 1.197 8 17.35 86.98 9 5
Barclaycard International 6.40 10 0.966 2= 15.10 70.19 8 5
Barclaycard UK 6.70 8= 1.252 9 18.68 90.94 9 5
Barclaycard New Ventures 3.00 19 0.816 1 27.22 59.32 5 2
Collateralised Financing 7.30 3= 1.059 5= 14.51 76.96 9 6
Global Financing 7.30 3= 1.059 5= 14.51 76.96 9 6
Global Markets 7.40 2 1.075 7 14.53 78.10 9 6
Private Equity 7.50 1 0.972 4 12.96 70.61 9 6
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The final element of this part of the research pilot examines the importance of each strategic
business unit being able to cope with uncertainty. In line with the earlier analysis, the data
were again highly dispersed with business units obtaining a wide range of responses (see
Table 24 below). Again the point is illustrated strongly with Barclaysb2b.com having a range
of 1 through to 10, on a scale of 1–10, the Woolwich having a range of 2 to 8, and both
Barclays Global Investors and Barclays Africa having a range of 3 through to 9 on the same
scale.
Also in line with the earlier analysis (that of the ability of the strategic business units to cope
with uncertainty), the four strategic business units within the Barclays Capital cluster (see
Section 4.6.3.3), Collateralised Financing, Global Financing, Global Markets, and Private
Equity, were also ranked very highly in terms of the importance of their being able to cope
with uncertainty. The business units with the smallest ranges were: Global Financing, 7–9;
Global Markets, 7–9; and Barclaycard International, 6–8; followed by Collateralised
Financing, 6–9; and Barclaycard Corporate, 4–7. These results indicate there is a greater
degree of consensus regarding the importance of these organisations being able to cope with
uncertainty.
Table 24 – Project 2 Pilot: The Importance Of The Various Strategic Business Units Being Able To Cope
Strategic Business Unit Mean Rank SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 4.90 19 1.687 11 35.14 108.76 8 2
UK Retail Bank 5.50 14 1.900 14 34.55 122.55 10 3
Caribbean 5.20 17 1.317 7 25.32 84.90 7 3
Europe 6.00 11 1.700 12 28.33 109.61 8 3
International Bank 4.90 18 1.524 10 31.10 98.27 7 2
Private Bank 5.30 16 1.947 15 36.73 125.53 8 3
Premier Bank 5.90 12= 1.792 13 30.37 115.56 8 3
Barclays Global Investors 6.40 9= 1.955 16= 30.55 126.08 9 3
Barclaysb2b.com 6.80 7 3.084 19 45.35 198.88 10 1
Business Bank 6.40 9= 1.955 16= 30.55 126.08 9 4
Barclays Africa 5.90 12= 2.183 18 37.00 140.80 9 3
Barclaycard Corporate 5.40 15 1.075 5 19.91 69.32 7 4
Barclaycard International 7.00 6 0.816 3 11.66 52.66 8 6
Barclaycard UK 6.70 8 1.337 8 19.96 86.25 9 5
Barclaycard New Ventures 7.69 4 1.186 6 15.43 76.51 10 5
Collateralised Financing 7.70 3 1.059 4 13.76 68.32 9 6
Global Financing 7.80 2 0.789 2 10.11 50.87 9 7
Global Markets 7.90 1 0.738 1 9.34 47.58 9 7
Private Equity 7.30 5 1.418 9 19.43 91.45 9 5
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5.4.2.2.3 The Relationship Between The Rate Of Change And The Level Of Complexity
The literature review recognised (see Section 4.1.1) that Duncan (1972) is generally credited
with initiating the study of perceived environmental uncertainty. In his conceptualisation of
this phenomenon, Duncan proposed that perceived environmental uncertainty could be
described in terms of two constructs: the simple–complex dimension and the static–dynamic
dimension. Duncan argued that when both of these factors are present then the degree of
perceived environmental uncertainty being experienced by strategists rises.
Hatch (1997) developed Duncan’s conceptualisation into a two-by-two matrix (see Figure 13
below) and suggested that the rate of change and the level of complexity could be regarded as
independent variables with perceived environmental uncertainty as the dependent variable.
Through her conceptualisation of Duncan’s work, Hatch argued that when the strategist deems
both the rate of change and the level of complexity to be high then they experience high
degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty.
Figure 13 – Uncertainty: A Product Of The Level Of Complexity And The Rate Of Change (Hatch, 1997)
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This section of the research uses the pilot data to investigate four key relationships in the
conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty offered by Duncan (1972) and Hatch
(1997): first, the relationship between the combined rate of change and level of complexity as
contributory factors in the creation of perceived environmental uncertainty; second, the
relationship between the degree of uncertainty and the rate of change; third, the relationship
between the degree of uncertainty and the level of complexity; and finally, the relationship
between the rate of change and the level of complexity.
The first element of the pilot looks at the relationship between the degree of uncertainty (Y1)
and the two independent variables offered by Duncan (1972): the rate of change (X1), and the
level of complexity (X2). As the report identified earlier (see Section 5.4.1.5–6), multiple
regression analysis is the statistical technique being applied to examine the relationship
between the single dependent variable and the independent variables. Its basic formulation is
(Hair et al., 1998):
Y1 = X1 + X2 + ……. + Xn
(metric) (metric)
Applying the mean of the scores given by the ten respondents to produce a value for every
variable for each of the nineteen strategic business units, the resulting regression equation16 is:
Y1 = 26.86 + 8.38 (X1) + -2.99 (X2)
t values (2.75) (5.07) (-1.18)
R² = 0.72 (1% significance with n=19)
Standard Error Of Estimate = 5.77 F = 20.76
16 All two-variable regression equations are calculated in this form and the F-test is used to test overall significance, though only the R² is
quoted in most cases.
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It is evident from the pilot that where uncertainty exists then 72% of such uncertainty is
accounted for by the combined rate of change and level of complexity faced (see Table 25
below). This would seem to substantiate the assertion made by Duncan (1972) that perceived
environmental uncertainty is in fact a product of the rate of change and the level of complexity
faced. However, the results of the pilot for Project 2 conclude that it is the rate of change that
is the dominant force (or stronger relationship) in the production of perceived environmental
uncertainty, rather than the level of complexity.
Table 25 – Project 2 Pilot: Multiple Regression Statistics: Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Test 1st Variable 2nd Variable(s) R-Squared (R²) Significance
1. Uncertainty Rate Of Change & Level Of Complexity 0.722 <1%
2. Uncertainty Rate Of Change 0.698 <1%
3. Uncertainty Level Of Complexity 0.275 <5%
4. Rate Of Change Level Of Complexity 0.563 <1%
The next element of the pilot looks at the relationship between uncertainty and the rate of
change being faced by the various strategic business units. Interestingly the findings show that
70% of the uncertainty that exists is associated with the rate of change (see also Table 25
above). When the investigation moves on to look at the relationship between uncertainty and
the level of complexity, the findings show that only 27% of uncertainty is accounted for by the
level of complexity. As stated in Table 25, this relationship is significant at the 5% level.
Finally, the pilot looked at the relationship between the rate of change and the level of
complexity. Here, the analysis showed 56% of the level of complexity being associated with
the rate of change. It is important to note that the pilot only consisted of 10 responses, where 9
had change as the more important variable, represented by a higher t-value, and one had
complexity as more significant. The pilot has therefore identified the rate of change and level
of complexity as being closely associated phenomena (R²=0.563). Again this observation is set
out in more detail in Table 25 above.
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5.4.2.2.4 Ability To Cope With Uncertainty And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
The literature review recognised the strategic capability of organisations (see Section 4.5.6)
and that when faced with uncertainty this capability manifests itself in the ability to cope with
uncertainty (see Section 4.5.6.1) and the importance of the business unit being able to cope
with such uncertainty (see Section 4.5.6.2). Based on the literature review, the final
component of the research pilot looks at the relationship between these independent variables
and any impact on the dependent variable, uncertainty. This section also looks at the
relationship between the ability to cope with uncertainty and the importance of being able to
cope.
Table 26 – Project 2 Pilot: Regression: The Ability To Cope And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
Test 1st Variable 2nd Variable R-Squared (r²) r² (%)
1. Uncertainty Ability To Cope With Uncertainty 0.00009 0.01%
2. Uncertainty The Importance Of Being Able To Cope 0.545 54.51%
3. Ability To Cope The Importance Of Being Able To Cope 0.101 10.09%
The mean responses obtained through the pilot study indicate that there was no significant
relationship between the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty and the perceived
ability to cope with such uncertainty (see Table 26 above) – a finding that would seem to
contradict aspects of resource dependence theory on perceived environmental uncertainty
(Milliken, 1987), see Section 4.5.6.2.
Not unexpectedly, the pilot suggests there is significant correlation between managerial
perceptions of the degree of uncertainty faced by the strategic business units and the
importance of their being able to cope. This finding is consistent with the notion of ‘perceived
importance’ (Boyd and Fulk, 1996) also identified in the literature review (see Section 4.4.4).
The third regression equation identified through the pilot study is consistent with the other
two: there appears to be no significant relationship between managerial perceptions on the
ability of the various strategic business units to cope and the importance of the various
strategic business units being able to cope. Clearly, the absence of such a relationship could
have potentially serious implications for managers. This relationship is examined in greater
detail later in Project 2 (see Section 5.6.4).
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5.4.3 The Pilot Test Conclusions
There are five key conclusions drawn from the Project 2 research pilot:
1. The concept of perceived environmental uncertainty is a highly topical and relevant
area for research at Barclays. It is also a multi-faceted and complicated concept. In
order to deal with the difficulties associated with researching such a multi-faceted
concept, several improvements were made to the research design, based on the Project
2 Pilot – these enhancements are set out in detail in Section 5.4.4.
2. There is a high degree of synergy among strategists at Barclays regarding the
qualitative factors that contribute towards: the degree of uncertainty, the rate of
change, and the level of complexity for strategic business units within Barclays.
3. The relationship between the rate of change and the level of complexity as contributory
factors in the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by strategists
(Duncan, 1972) is far more sophisticated than that represented by Hatch (1997) in her
conceptualisation of Duncan’s (1972) model (see Section 4.3.10). It is evident that the
rate of change and the level of complexity cannot be regarded merely as independent
variables with perceived environmental uncertainty as the dependent variable. The
research pilot concludes that the effect of these two variables on perceived
environmental uncertainty is not equally weighted and that the rate of change actually
contributes to the level of complexity for strategic business units within the Barclays
portfolio.
4. Strategists develop very different conceptual models of perceived environmental
uncertainty, which manifest themselves in a lack of managerial consensus in the
subjective assessments of the competitive environment. However, there is a high
degree of synergy between the factors that create the degree of uncertainty (the rate of
change and the level of complexity) for strategic business units within Barclays.
5. In terms of the managerial implications, the pilot concluded that there is also a lack of
managerial consensus pertaining to the assessment of the ability of the strategic
business unit to cope with uncertainty, and the importance of the unit being able to
cope. Also there is a high degree of synergy between the factors that enable a business
unit to cope with uncertainty, and the importance of the unit being able to cope.
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5.4.4 Enhancements To The Research Design Based On Project 2 Pilot Test
Based on the pilot for Project 2 the researcher introduced three key enhancements to the
research design:
1. The formal presentation of the research objectives to the Group Executive Committee
prior to the completion of the research matrix was dropped from the research design,
owing to onerous demands on the Group Executive Committee Agenda. Instead,
respondents were asked to complete the research matrix (see Appendix B) prior to the
semi-structured interview, and it was therefore issued ten days in advance.
2. The research matrix was extended from five questions to nine. The first two additional
questions asked the respondents to give subjective assessments of the ability of the
strategic business units to cope with change, and of their ability to cope with
complexity. The second two additional questions asked the respondents to give
subjective assessments of the importance of the strategic business units being able to
cope with change and the importance of their being able to cope with complexity. The
full research matrix is presented in Appendix B.
3. The questions were altered in two ways: first, the construct for uncertainty was
amended to offer a scale of 0–100, thereby giving respondents the opportunity to
award a score of 0 for no uncertainty or 100 for total certainty; second, the scale for
each question was extended to 0–100 (some had previously been 0–10) to ensure a
more sensitive and uniform data set.
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5.5 Qualitative Exploration: Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
5.5.1 Introduction
The qualitative exploration of perceived environment uncertainty with the Group Executive
Committee represents a key component of Project 2 (see Table 27 below). Ten working days
prior to the scheduled meeting, each member was issued with the research matrix (see
Appendix B). At the semi-structured interview, the researcher began by giving a presentation
of the research objectives and respondents were then taken through the research matrix and
asked to set out the qualitative criteria used when making their subjective assessments.
The first set of questions investigated the competitive environment within which the strategic
business unit operates, asking respondents to consider the degree of uncertainty, rate of change
and level of complexity currently being faced. The next three questions moved the focus of
attention away from the competitive environment to the capability of the organisation – here
respondents were asked to consider the ability of each business unit to cope with uncertainty,
change and complexity. The final three questions assessed the importance to the Group of
each business unit being able to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity
Table 27 – Membership Of The Barclays Group Executive Committee During 2003
Group Executive Committee Member Role & Responsibility
Sir Peter Middleton Group Chairman, Barclays Bank PLC
Matthew Barrett Group Chief Executive, Barclays Bank PLC
John Stewart Deputy Group Chief Executive, Barclays Bank PLC
Bob Diamond Chief Executive, Barclays Capital
Naguib Kheraj Chief Executive, Barclays Global Investors
Bob Hunter Chief Executive, Barclays Private Clients
Chris Lendrum Chief Executive, Barclays Africa & Group Executive Director
Gary Hoffman Chief Executive, Barclaycard
David Roberts Chief Executive, UK Retail Bank
Roger Davis Chief Executive, Business Bank
Gary Dibb Group Chief Administration Officer, Barclays Bank PLC
Jeff Neiderkorn Consultant To Group Executive Committee
Robert Nimmo Group Risk Director, Barclays Bank PLC
John Varley Group Finance Director, Barclays Bank PLC
David Weymouth Chief Information Officer, Barclays Bank PLC
Peter Herbert Group Strategy & Planning Director & Secretariat To The
Group Executive Committee
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5.5.2 Exploring Perceptions Of The Competitive Environment
5.5.2.1 Degrees Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty Across Barclays PLC
The first question investigates the degrees of uncertainty within the competitive environments
of the various strategic business units. The respondents were asked the following question (see
Appendix B):
“On a scale of 0 to 100 (0 representing no uncertainty and 100 representing total
uncertainty), please give an assessment of the degree of uncertainty currently faced by
each strategic business unit.”
The exploratory interviews discovered four key findings from this area of research: first, that
some strategists at Barclays do not interpret the world within which the strategic business unit
operates as ‘uncertain’; second, that the increasing demands of more sophisticated customers
increases the degree of uncertainty for some business units; third, that degrees of uncertainty
change for business units over time; and finally that the degree of uncertainty experienced by
strategists is impacted by the nature of the business model utilised by the particular strategic
business unit.
Beginning with the first observation, there is evidence in the data that some strategists at
Barclays do not interpret the competitive environment as being ‘uncertain’ or representing a
problem to be addressed. The results showed that the term ‘uncertainty’ has negative
connotations at Barclays and is therefore at variance with how strategists prefer to make sense
of the competitive environment. This preference to observe the competitive environment from
a positive perspective is explained by Naguib Kheraj,17 Chairman, Barclays Global Investors:
“I do not think it is useful to consider the competitive environment as inherently
‘certain’ or ‘uncertain’. I tend to view the marketplace as offering our various strategic
business units a whole range of exciting opportunities and interesting challenges.”
17 Group Executive Committee Interview With Naguib Kheraj, Wednesday 9th July 2003
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 188 of 444
The second common theme that creates uncertainty for strategists at Barclays is the ever-
increasing demands of customers. Many of the strategists recognise the increasing propensity
of customers to leave the Barclays Group as a very real cause of uncertainty. Jeff Neiderkorn,18
Consultant to the Group Executive Committee, explains:
“We can no longer rely on high levels of inertia among our client base and continue to
ignore the increasing demands of more sophisticated customers. If we are to continue
to meet ambitious performance targets we must find ways of delighting our customers
in ways that the financial services industry has failed to do in the past.”
The next key observation from the study of degrees of uncertainty is that these perceptions
fluctuate over time for both the Barclays Group and the strategic business units as events in
their competitive environments unfold. Chris Lendrum,19 Group Executive Director, explains:
“During my thirty five years at Barclays it is my experience that levels of uncertainty
fluctuate over time. The record losses made by the Group in 1992, de-regulation in the
mid 1990s and the ‘dot-com’ revolution of 2001 would all be good examples of events
that caused levels of uncertainty to rise across the Barclays Group.”
The final observation is that degrees of uncertainty faced by a business unit can be determined
by the nature of the business model. John Varley,20 Group Finance Director, explains:
“The nature of the business model determines the level of uncertainty faced by
particular business units. Where we have a well-proven business model operating in a
traditional marketplace, for example the Woolwich, then uncertainty is typically quite
low. When a business unit is operating a fee-based business model in a complicated
and volatile marketplace, for example Barclays Capital or Barclays Global Investors,
then one would expect levels of uncertainty to be considerably higher.”
18 Group Executive Committee Interview With Jeff Neiderkorn, Wednesday 18th June 2003
19 Group Executive Committee Interview With Chris Lendrum, Wednesday 6th August 2003
20 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Varley, Thursday 13th November 2003
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5.5.2.2 Rates Of Change Across The Barclays Portfolio
The second question also investigates the competitive environment, but this time focusing on
the rate of change experienced by the various strategic business units. In order to study the rate
of change, respondents were asked the following question (see Appendix B):
“On a scale of 0 to 100 (0 representing no change and 100 representing a very high rate
of change), please give an assessment of the rate of change currently faced by each
strategic business unit.”
This element of the exploration uncovered five qualitative factors that create differing rates of
change for strategic business units within the Barclays Group: first, the level of competition
that exists in the different market places – particularly new entrants; second, the emergence of
new technologies; third, the speed with which Barclays is forced to respond to change; fourth,
the demands on the various business units to deliver successful outcomes; and finally,
customers demanding price leadership and the City insisting on stringent cost management
which is creating cost pressures across the UK retail banking and financial services industry.
Starting with the first factor, there is a common theme in the data that increased competition
boosts the rate of change in the competitive environments within which the various strategic
business units operate. Again Chris Lendrum,21 Group Executive Director, explains:
“The emergence of new entrants setting new high standards of customer service from a
relatively low cost base, for example Direct Line, First Direct and Egg, was the catalyst
for considerable change in retail banking over the last ten years.”
These new entrants have also been able to successfully exploit new technologies for
distributing financial services that also increased the rate of change in the competitive
environment. Direct Line and First Direct successfully pioneered telephone delivery during the
1990s and in 2000 Egg and Smile.co.uk were able to create an advantage for themselves by
successfully adopting electronic distribution and establishing themselves in the market place.
21 Group Executive Committee Interview With Chris Lendrum, Wednesday 6th August 2003
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The third qualitative factor that creates an increase in the perceived rate of change for strategic
business units within the Barclays Group is the demand for more effective responses to
strategic change. Gary Hoffman,22 Chief Executive, Barclaycard, illustrates the point:
“The market place demands that we are able to respond increasingly quickly and more
efficiently with new products, new services and new delivery mechanisms. The
problem we have at Barclays is that we have to turn round our supertanker in the same
time it takes our competitors to turn around their speedboats.”
The fourth qualitative factor that increases the rate of change for strategic business units
within the Group is the Executive Committee’s desire for top quartile performance in the
sector (see Section 2.1.7). In order to achieve this level of performance, considerable strategic
investment has been made across the portfolio of business units, each of which is now being
targeted for realisable benefits. The data suggest that this demand for higher performance or
continuous transformation of the business model increases the rate of change across Barclays.
The final qualitative factor that causes the rate of change to increase across the portfolio of
strategic business units is the emergence of cost pressures and the impact of these pressures
across the Group. Jeff Neiderkorn,23 Consultant to Group Executive Committee, identifies that
changes to the Group’s legal and regulatory obligations have created cost pressures:
“There are two key regulatory developments that have emanated from the Monopolies
and Mergers Commission over the last two years that will radically change the way we
operate in both the Business Bank and the three business units within the Barclaycard
Cluster. The review of bank charges in corporate banking has effectively presented the
whole industry with annual bills of up to £150m each; by the same token the
introduction of new fee structures on interchange charges will cause real profit and
loss challenges for the credit card industry. These challenges force strategic business
units to make strategic choices or re-set priorities which invariably creates change.”
22 Group Executive Committee Interview With Gary Hoffman, Wednesday 19th March 2003
23 Group Executive Committee Interview With Jeff Neiderkorn, Wednesday 18th June 2003
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5.5.2.3 Levels Of Complexity Across The Barclays Portfolio
The third question also investigates the competitive environment but here the focus of
attention is on the levels of complexity being experienced by the various strategic business
units. In order to study this aspect of the competitive environment, respondents were asked the
following question (see Appendix B):
“On a scale of 0 to 100 (0 representing no complexity and 100 representing very high
levels of complexity), please give an assessment of the level of complexity currently
faced by each strategic business unit.”
This element of the exploration uncovered seven qualitative factors that create different levels
of complexity for the various strategic business units within the Barclays Group: first, the
sheer scale required of a strategic business unit to serve the market; second, the geographical
dispersion of the market served by the various business units; third, the number and nature of
key stakeholder relationships the business unit has to satisfy; fourth, the level of legal and
regulatory obligations that exist within a particular industry; fifth, the maturity of the industry
within which the business unit operates; sixth, the level of information required to operate
effectively within a particular industry; and finally, the increasing expectations of multiple
customer – multiple product relationships across the Barclays Group.
The first qualitative factor uncovered in the exploration is the scale of the business unit
required to serve its market. Gary Dibb,24 the Group Chief Administration Officer, explains:
“In order for a business unit like the UK Retail Bank to effectively serve its market it
must have a complex distribution network: 1,500 branches, 12 call centres and an
internet offering. To service this network it employs nearly 25,000 people. The simple
logistics of this operation and the number of people within the unit increases the
complexity the organisation faces. By comparison Barclays Global Investors is able to
serve its market out of two sites with a team of less than 600 employees.”
24 Group Executive Committee Interview With Gary Dibb, Thursday 19th June 2003
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The second qualitative factor that creates different levels of complexity for the strategic
business units across Barclays is the geographical dispersion of the strategic business unit
itself. Again Gary Dibb,25 the Group Chief Administration Officer, explains:
“Clearly when a strategic business unit is able to operate from a single site like
Barclaycard UK in Northampton, then it is simpler to manage, as communications,
decision-making and performance are so much easier to manage. When the unit is
dispersed across a country (for example, the Retail Bank in the UK), a continent (like
Barclays Africa), or even the globe (for example, Barclays Global Investors), then the
whole business is so much more complex.”
The third qualitative factor that creates different levels of complexity is the number and nature
of key stakeholders the business unit has to serve. Jeff Neiderkorn,26 Consultant to the Group
Executive Committee, uses the UK Retail Bank to illustrate his point:
“In the UK politicians comment on how the Retail Bank distributes its products and
services. Should we decide to close down part of the branch network as we did in 2001
then it becomes a sensitive political issue. I can’t think of any other firm in the private
sector where distribution is an issue for politicians.”
The next qualitative factor that creates different levels of complexity for the portfolio of
strategic business units within the Barclays Group is the emergence of onerous legal and
regulatory obligations. Bob Hunter,27 Chief Executive, Barclays Private Clients, explains:
“Due to the way we create value at Barclays Private Clients, meeting onerous legal and
regulatory obligations creates a level of complexity in our competitive environment
that we are just not used to. Interpreting these requirements and understanding what
they mean for our business will continue to increase the level of complexity we face.”
25 Group Executive Committee Interview With Gary Dibb, Thursday 19th June 2003
26 Group Executive Committee Interview With Jeff Neiderkorn, Wednesday 18th June 2003
27 Group Executive Committee Interview With Bob Hunter, Thursday 12th June 2003
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The fifth qualitative factor that creates different levels of complexity is the maturity of the
industry the business unit serves. Chris Lendrum,28 Group Executive Director, explains:
“Where a strategic business unit is operating in a mature market that is well
understood, for example the Woolwich in the UK mortgage market, then the level of
complexity experienced is quite low as our expertise is high. Where we are moving
into less mature or emerging markets, like Barclaycard International’s current organic
growth into Ireland, Iberia and Australasia, then our expertise and experience is low –
consequently the level of complexity experienced by the business unit is much higher.”
The sixth qualitative factor that creates different levels of complexity for businesses across the
Barclays Group is the level of information required to operate effectively within a particular
industry. It was clear from the data that the information requirements of both Barclays Capital
and Barclays Global Investors were very high and therefore more complex. By comparison the
information required to manage other business such as Barclaycard, Europe and Barclays
Africa were much lower and therefore represent a lower level of complexity.
The final qualitative factor that creates different levels of complexity for business units across
the Barclays Group is the increasing expectations of multiple customer – multiple product
relationships. John Varley,29 Group Finance Director, explains:
“At Barclays we have some very complex customer relationships as it is not unusual
for a single individual to be a customer of the Business Bank, the Premier Bank, the
Woolwich, Barclaycard and Barclays Stockbrokers. Where customers hold multiple
products they expect a truly ‘joined-up’ customer proposition, and some value to them
for loyalty and multiple product relationships. Such high expectations can create real
complexity for our businesses as they try to respond in a ‘joined-up’ fashion. By
comparison relationships with the International Bank, Europe, Barclays Capital and
Barclays Global Investors tend to be ‘solus’ and therefore much simpler to service.”
28 Group Executive Committee Interview With Chris Lendrum, Wednesday 6th August 2003
29 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Varley, Thursday 13th November 2003
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 194 of 444
5.5.3 Assessing The Ability Of Each Strategic Business Unit To Cope
5.5.3.1 The Ability Of Each Strategic Business Unit To Cope With Uncertainty
This section of the investigation moves the focus of attention away from the competitive
environment, to the ability of the business unit to cope with its competitive environment. As a
starting point respondents were asked the following question (see Appendix B):
“On a scale of 0 to 100 (0 representing no ability to cope with uncertainty and 100
representing a complete ability to cope with uncertainty), please give an assessment of
the ability of each strategic business unit to cope with uncertainty.”
This element of the exploration into perceived environmental uncertainty discovered three key
qualitative factors that differentiate between the ability of a strategic business unit to cope
with uncertainty: first, the resilience of the business model itself; second, a dominant position
in the market and the financial ‘muscle’ associated with holding such a position; and finally,
the experience of having been through a period of high uncertainty in the past.
The first qualitative factor that differentiates a strategic business unit in its ability to cope with
uncertainty is the resilience of the business model itself. Section 2.1.5 sets out how Barclays
managed to meet its targets for the creation of shareholder value through 2003. There is
evidence in the research data that the Barclays business model is so resilient that, under
favourable economic conditions, it cannot fail to create shareholder value.
To illustrate this point, during 2003 Barclaycard was buying money at 4.79% and selling it at
16.9%, therefore value creation was a matter of simply growing or protecting market share and
managing costs. During the same period, the UK Retail Bank were also selling funds at 9.7%;
the Business Bank enjoyed large corporate credit balances on non-interest paying current
accounts; and the Woolwich had a large element of its mortgage stock on highly profitable
standard variable rates. The data show that the Barclays business model could be described as
a ‘money-printing machine’, therefore the challenge for strategists lies not in how able they
are to cope with uncertainty but how they can act as responsible stewards of a resilient
business model.
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The second qualitative factor that differentiates perceptions of a strategic business unit’s
ability to cope with uncertainty is its dominant market position and the financial ‘muscle’
associated with such a position. Therefore businesses that dominate their markets (for example
the Business Bank, Barclaycard, Barclays Stockbrokers and Barclays Capital) are perceived as
more able to cope with uncertainty. Gary Hoffman,30 Chief Executive Barclaycard, explains:
“Our position as market leaders enables us to have significant influence over our
market place and this increases our ability to cope with uncertainty. If we take the
strategic decision to develop our processing capability we buy a credit card processor –
for example our acquisition of Providian in 2002. If we need to promote our brand we
sign up to a large sponsorship deal – for example our agreement with the F.A. Premier
League in 2001. And if we need to grow our business organically we have the financial
resources to expand across Europe and further afield if we wish. Strategically being the
biggest and the best gives us the ability not only to cope with uncertainty more
effectively but to create higher levels of uncertainty for our competitors.”
The final qualitative factor that differentiates perceptions of a strategic business unit in its
ability to cope with uncertainty is the perceived strength of the business unit’s brand. Chris
Lendrum,31 Group Executive Director, explains:
“At Barclays we have a wonderful brand which is closely associated with everything
you would want in a large financial institution: security, stability, safety, integrity and
compliance. As you can imagine our brand stretches across a whole myriad of
businesses serving a wide range of customer needs. Being under the ‘umbrella’ of such
a powerful brand gives all our strategic business units a greater ability to cope with
uncertainty. Moreover, when one of our business units has a powerful ‘brand within a
brand’ (for example Barclaycard, Barclays Global Investors and Barclays Capital),
then I believe they are uniquely well placed to cope with uncertainty today and in the
future.”
30 Group Executive Committee Interview With Gary Hoffman, Wednesday 19th March 2003
31 Group Executive Committee Interview With Chris Lendrum, Wednesday 6th August 2003
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5.5.3.2 The Ability Of Each Strategic Business Unit To Cope With Change
This section of the investigation also assesses the ability of the various strategic business units
to cope with the competitive environment but this time the ability of the business unit to cope
with change. Here respondents were asked the following question (see Appendix B):
“On a scale of 0 to 100 (0 representing no ability to cope with change and 100
representing a complete ability to cope with change), please give an assessment of the
ability of each strategic business unit to cope with change.”
This element of the exploration into perceived environmental uncertainty discovered four key
qualitative factors that differentiate a strategic business unit in its ability to cope with change:
first, the agility or speed of response the strategic business unit is able to achieve; second, the
flexibility of the organisation; third, the quality of the business unit’s people; and finally, the
ability of the organisation to reward its people for coping with change.
The first qualitative factor that differentiates a strategic business unit in its ability to cope with
change is the agility of the strategic business unit. The research data define agility as speed of
response or more simply ‘getting things done around the organisation’. The research data
identify three key components to ‘strategic agility’: first, the development and reinforcement
of a culture for change within certain areas of Barclays, sometimes referred to as ‘change as
usual’; second, the systematic breaking down of any resistance to change; and finally, the
ability to respond effectively to crises. John Varley,32 Group Finance Director, explains:
“Across Barclays we have developed an incredible strategic agility that enables us to
respond quickly and efficiently to the challenges of our various markets. Over the last
15 years we have systematically broken down many of the barriers to change. Through
the development of a ‘culture for change’ some of our businesses (for example,
Barclaycard, the Business Bank and Barclays Capital), are role models in their ability
to respond effectively to both strategic opportunities and threats.”
32 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Varley, Thursday 13th November 2003
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The second qualitative factor that differentiates a strategic business unit in its ability to cope
with change is the flexibility of the unit itself. The research distinguishes between flexibility
and agility, as flexibility is concerned not merely with the ability to adapt to changing
circumstances quickly but also with the ability to bend without breaking. The research shows
that the businesses that developed flexibility in their core systems, core processes and working
practices are more able to cope with change than those that have not. Therefore units such as
Barclays Capital and Barclays Global Investors that have developed flexible information
systems, flexible processes and flexible working practices have much more ability to cope
with change than the UK Retail Bank, the Private Bank and the Woolwich.
The third qualitative factor that differentiates a business unit in its ability to cope with change
is the quality of its people. This category also breaks down into three: first, the ability of the
business unit’s people to work effectively in teams; second, the experience of having delivered
large-scale change in the past or having ‘been down this road before’; and finally, the desire of
the business unit’s people to ‘do a good job’ and the desire of the organisation to succeed.
The final qualitative factor that differentiates a business unit in its ability to cope with change
is its facility to reward its people for successful implementation and benefits realisation. There
is evidence in the research data that some business units within the Barclays Group (for
example, the UK Retail Bank and the Woolwich) are governed by remuneration and grade
structures, and that these structures can limit the way the organisation rewards the
extraordinary effort and expertise associated with delivering large-scale strategic change. By
comparison, other areas of the Barclays (for example, Barclays Global Investors and Barclays
Capital) are not limited by remuneration structures and can recognise extraordinary
performance through the payment of attractive bonuses and other incentives. Naguib Kheraj,33
Chairman, Barclays Global Investors, explains the significance of rewarding people:
“It is imperative that all our strategic business units are given the freedom to reward
their people for the successful delivery of change and the realisation of benefits”.
33 Group Executive Committee Interview With Naguib Kheraj, Wednesday 9th July 2003
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5.5.3.3 The Ability Of Each Strategic Business Unit To Cope With Complexity
The final question in this section of the investigation asked the respondents to make
assessments on the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with complexity. For
this part of the research, respondents were asked the following question (see Appendix B):
“On a scale of 0 to 100 (0 representing no ability to cope with complexity and 100
representing a complete ability to cope with complexity), please give an assessment of
the ability of each strategic business unit to cope with complexity.”
This element of the exploration discovered five key qualitative factors that differentiate a
business unit in terms of its ability to cope with complexity: first, its ability to recruit top
talent into the senior management team; second, the pan-Group experience of the senior team;
third, its willingness to trust other business units to deliver and communicate effectively;
fourth, its ability to forge good relationships with key stakeholders; and finally, its ability to
manage internal competition and conflict while eradicating dysfunctional internal politics.
Taking these factors in turn, the first qualitative factor that differentiates a business unit in its
ability to cope with complexity is its ability to recruit top talent. The research suggests there is
considerable variance in the ability of the various businesses to recruit talent, owing to four
key differentiators: first, reward; second, an intellectually stimulating role; third, career
prospects; and finally, job location. John Stewart,34 Deputy Group Chief Executive, explains:
“Some of our strategic business units find it much easier to attract top talent into their
senior management teams than others. Take Barclays Capital for an example; as an
investment bank based in Canary Wharf in London, it offers intellectually demanding
roles with highly competitive remuneration packages and great career prospects. If you
compare the career prospects at Barclays Capital with those in Barclays Africa, our
European operations or the Woolwich then you will see that it is not always possible to
distribute our top senior management talent evenly across our portfolio of businesses.”
34 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Stewart, Wednesday 7th May 2003
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The second qualitative factor that differentiates a strategic business unit in its ability to cope
with complexity is the capability and experience of its senior management team. Beginning
with capability, Gary Dibb,35 the Group Chief Administration Officer, explains:
“In order to cope with the complexity of its marketplace Barclays Global Investors
employs more than 90 PhDs. This gives the organisation an incredible amount of
‘intellectual horsepower’ and a clear competitive advantage through its ability to deal
with complexity. Interestingly the demands facing other areas of the Group bring
different leadership challenges – like effective change management at Barclays Private
Clients, and customer service leadership in the UK Retail Bank. Consequently
different skill sets are represented in different senior teams across the Barclays Group.”
Robert Nimmo,36 Group Risk Director, identifies the pan-Group experience of the senior
management team as the crucial factor in the business unit’s ability to cope with complexity:
“If we are going to offer a truly ‘joined-up’ customer proposition through a core UK
Bank, it is important that the top teams in our various strategic business units have the
experience of working across the Group. The capability of business units to think
strategically across the organisation will be critical to its ability to cope with the
complexity that ‘joining up’ from a customer perspective will bring.”
The third qualitative factor that differentiates a business unit in its ability to cope with
complexity is its ability to trust other businesses to deliver and be effective in its own
communications. Jeff Neiderkorn,37 Consultant to the Group Executive Committee, explains:
“There are two important dynamics at play when business units are coping with
complexity across the portfolio: firstly, the left hand must know what the right hand is
doing; and secondly, the left hand must not try to control the right hand.”
35 Group Executive Committee Interview With Gary Dibb, Thursday 19th June 2003
36 Group Executive Committee Interview With Robert Nimmo, Thursday 19th June 2003
37 Group Executive Committee Interview With Jeff Neiderkorn, Wednesday 18th June 2003
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The fourth qualitative factor that differentiates a business unit in its ability to cope with
complexity is its capacity to forge and maintain excellent working relationships with key
stakeholders. David Roberts,38 Chief Executive, the UK Retail Bank, highlights the
importance of key relationships:
“One of the key causes of increased complexity for myself, my senior team and I guess
the financial services industry as a whole is the continuous stream of new and
emerging legal and regulatory obligations. One of the key ways in which we can
manage this new level of complexity is by forging excellent working relationships with
key stakeholders like the regulators and government itself. Such relationships give us a
platform upon which we can ‘comply or explain’ rather than merely being forced to
comply to timescales that are not strategically expedient for us.”
The final qualitative factor that differentiates a business unit in its ability to cope with
complexity is the organisation’s skill at managing internal competition and conflict
effectively, while eradicating dysfunctional internal politics. Jeff Neiderkorn,39 Consultant to
the Group Executive Committee, explains the importance of this attribute to the organisation:
“One of the most impressive achievements made by Matt Barrett as Chief Executive at
Barclays has been his ability to bring together his Group Executive Committee to work
together as a team. We now have a high-performing team leading a high-performing
organisation towards a single goal of value maximisation.
Matt saw an opportunity to break down some of the barriers that lead to in-house
competition, conflict and value-destroying internal politics. The next challenge will be
to ensure that the business units are also able to act together as a team, because those
most effective at ‘joining up’, sharing knowledge and offering a truly world-class
customer proposition will be those most able to cope with the complexity created by
the needs of ever-more demanding and increasingly sophisticated customers.”
38 Group Executive Committee Interview With David Roberts, Thursday 26th June 2003
39 Group Executive Committee Interview With Jeff Neiderkorn, Wednesday 18th June 2003
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5.5.4 Assessing The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
5.5.4.1 The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty
This section asked respondents to make assessments as to the importance of the various
business units being able to cope with the degree of uncertainty in their competitive
environments. Here, respondents were asked the following question (see Appendix B):
“On a scale of 0 to 100 (0 representing nil importance of being able to cope with
uncertainty and 100 representing maximum importance), please give an assessment of
how important it is for each strategic business unit to cope with uncertainty.”
This element of the exploration discovered four key qualitative criteria that differentiate the
various strategic business units in terms of the importance of their being able to cope with
uncertainty: first, the long-term pressure across the Group to continue increasing shareholder
value; second, regulations continuing to break down barriers that have previously blocked
entry into Barclays’ core markets; third, the emergence of international competition; and
finally, a fall in the levels of inertia and loyalty that exist among the customer base.
Taking these factors in turn, the first qualitative factor that differentiates the business units in
terms of the importance of their being able to cope with uncertainty is the level of value each
one creates and the likelihood of it being able to sustain and improve its value contribution to
the Group over the long term. John Varley,40 Group Finance Director, explains:
“All our strategic business units are not equally important; they are either central to
how we create value at present – ‘jam today’ – or they will be central to how we create
value at some time in the future – ‘jam tomorrow’. Therefore the key factor that drives
strategic importance is the level of value contribution forecasted by each of the
business units. Clearly it is important that the business units that make the most value
contribution are the ones most able to cope with uncertainty.”
40 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Varley, Thursday 13th November 2003
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The second qualitative factor that differentiates the business units in terms of the importance
of their being able to cope with uncertainty is the emergence of new regulations, which are
breaking down barriers that have previously protected some of the Group’s core markets.
David Roberts,41 Chief Executive, the UK Retail Bank, recognises that:
“A number of our businesses have to some extent been protected from competition in
the past. To compete with the UK Retail Bank you need a distribution network of
1,500 branches; to compete with the Business Bank and Barclays Stockbrokers you
need market share to create the necessary economies of scale. However, some of our
businesses (for example, Barclaycard, the Private Bank and the International Bank)
now face regulatory changes that make entry into their markets far easier for
competitors, and it is imperative that they learn to cope with this new uncertainty.”
The third factor that differentiates businesses in terms of the importance of their being able to
cope with uncertainty is the emergence of international competition. Again, in the past some
businesses have been protected by barriers to entry where others, for example Barclaycard, are
facing a new degree of uncertainty. Gary Hoffman,42 Chief Executive, Barclaycard, explains:
“The arrival of capital-rich American mono-lines creates a real threat to Barclaycard’s
market share and it is important we are able to cope with the uncertainty that brings.”
The final factor that differentiates the importance of a business being able to cope with
uncertainty is inertia and a decline in the level of customer loyalty. John Stewart,43 Deputy
Group Chief Executive, explains:
“Businesses like the UK Retail Bank, the Woolwich and the Business Bank can no
longer rely on customer loyalty and inertia to protect them against poor service. It is
important that they are able to cope with the uncertainty this brings.”
41 Group Executive Committee Interview With David Roberts, Thursday 26th June 2003
42 Group Executive Committee Interview With Gary Hoffman, Wednesday 19th March 2003
43 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Stewart, Wednesday 7th May 2003
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5.5.4.2 The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Change
The second question in this section asked the respondents to make assessments as to the
criteria that differentiate the various strategic business units in terms of the importance of their
being able to cope with the rate of change in their competitive environments. For this section
of the research, respondents were asked the following question (see Appendix B):
“On a scale of 0 to 100 (0 representing nil importance of being able to cope with
change and 100 representing maximum importance), please give an assessment of how
important it is for each strategic business unit to be able to cope with change.”
This element of the exploration discovered three key qualitative criteria that differentiate the
various strategic business units in terms of the importance of their being able to cope with
change: first, centrality of the business unit to the Group strategy; second, the degree to which
they will be relied on to deliver benefits derived from implementing the Group strategy; and
finally, the ability of the business unit to build its change capability in a way that embeds
flexibility in its infrastructure in order to facilitate effective change management in the future.
The first qualitative criterion that makes it more important for some strategic business units to
be able to cope with change than others is their centrality to the Group strategy. John Varley,44
Group Finance Director, explains:
“During 2003 we made a commitment to build a UK Bank which offers a world-class
proposition that is truly ‘joined-up’ from the perspective of the customer. This Bank
will include the UK Retail Bank, the Woolwich, the Premier Bank, the Business Bank,
Barclaycard and elements of Barclays Private Clients. These businesses are therefore
central to our strategy and it is therefore more important that they are capable of
coping with significant rates of change. Where a business is less central to the strategy,
for example the Private Bank, the International Bank and Barclays Africa, then the
importance of them being able to cope with change is diminished.”
44 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Varley, Thursday 13th November 2003
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The second qualitative factor that makes it more important for some strategic business units to
be able to cope with change than others is the degree to which they will be relied on to deliver
the benefits derived from implementing the Group strategy. Peter Herbert,45 Group Strategy &
Planning Director, explains:
“In terms of their contribution to the successful delivery of the Group strategy the
business units’ ability to cope with change assumes differing importance. There are
business units like Barclaycard that will be involved in delivering strategic capability
through the development of shared infrastructure, data warehouses and the
manufacture of world-class products. There will be other businesses like the UK Retail
Bank, the Woolwich and the Premier Bank responsible for the distribution of products
and the servicing of customers. However, some businesses will be involved in both the
building of strategic capability and the delivery of the strategy, for example the
Business Bank and Barclays Private Clients. Clearly it is important strategically that
these businesses are most able to cope with strategic change.”
The final qualitative factor that makes it more important for some strategic business units to
cope with change is that, for some businesses, strategic change will become an ongoing
occurrence. It is therefore important that those business units build their strategic change
capabilities in a way that embeds flexibility into their organisation and facilitates change
management well into the future. John Varley,46 Group Finance Director, explains:
“For many of our strategic business unit the demands of strategic change are here to
stay – it is therefore important that businesses like the UK Retail Bank, the Woolwich,
Barclays Private Clients and the Business Bank build flexibility into their
organisational designs. Such flexibility and adaptability will ensure that they can cope
with change today and give them the capability and capacity to cope with the demands
of strategic transformation well into the future.”
45 Group Executive Committee Interview With Peter Herbert, Thursday 20th November 2003
46 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Varley, Thursday 13th November 2003
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5.5.4.3 The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity
The final question in this section asked respondents to make assessments as to the relative
importance of the various strategic business units being able to cope with complexity in their
competitive environment. For this component of the research, respondents were asked the
following question (see Appendix B):
“On a scale of 0 to 100 (0 representing nil importance of being able to cope with
complexity and 100 representing maximum importance), please give an assessment of
how important it is for each strategic business unit to be able to cope with
complexity.”
This element of the exploration discovered four qualitative criteria that differentiate the
various strategic business units in terms of the importance of their being able to cope with
complexity: first, the relative complexity of the business model; second, globalisation; third,
emerging distribution channels; and finally, onerous legal and regulatory obligations.
The first qualitative factor that makes it more important for some strategic business units to be
able to cope with complexity than others is the level of complexity inherent within their
business model. David Roberts,47 Chief Executive, the UK Retail Bank, explains:
“There is a wide range of complexity across the portfolio. There are some quite simple
businesses like the Woolwich and Barclays Africa, while others are really quite
complex like Barclays Global Investors and Barclays Capital. The key differentiator in
terms of the importance of each business coping with complexity is its ability to
understand the complexity of its business model – in essence, how it creates and
destroys value. Clearly it is more important for some businesses to be able to cope with
complexity than others because some businesses face far more complexity than
others.”
47 Group Executive Committee Interview With David Roberts, Thursday 26th June 2003
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The second qualitative factor that makes it more important for some strategic business units to
be able to cope with complexity than others is globalisation and making Barclays a global
financial services provider. Sir Peter Middleton,48 Group Chairman, explains:
“As business units like Barclays Private Clients become truly international
organisations, they will have to learn to cope with levels of complexity they have not
encountered before – for example, international merger and acquisition programmes. It
is therefore more important that businesses like Barclays Private Clients are able to
cope with this ‘international complexity’ than those who continue to concentrate their
activities in the UK, for example Barclays Stockbrokers and the Woolwich.”
The third qualitative factor that makes it more important for some strategic business units to
be able to cope with complexity than others is the emergence of new distribution channels.
John Stewart,49 Deputy Group Chief Executive, explains:
“The dot-com revolution brought distribution to the top of the strategic agenda. The
next key issue will be how we distribute financial services ‘on-demand’, which will
mean distributing through non-traditional routes, for example joint ventures and
strategic alliances. Consequently it is more important that ‘customer-facing’ businesses
like the UK Retail Bank are able to cope with complex distribution issues.”
The final qualitative factor that makes it more important for some strategic business units to
be able to cope with complexity than others is the impact of onerous legal and regulatory
requirements. Robert Nimmo,50 Group Risk Director, explains:
“Regulation, regulation, regulation – it is more important that some business units like
Barclays Private Clients are able to cope with the complexity of regulation because
they encounter much more of it than, say, for example Barclays Capital.”
48 Group Executive Committee Interview With Sir Peter Middleton, Wednesday 31st March 2004
49 Group Executive Committee Interview With John Stewart, Wednesday 7th May 2003
50 Group Executive Committee Interview With Robert Nimmo, Thursday 19th June 2003
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5.5.5 General Observations From The Qualitative Exploration
5.5.5.1 Uncovering Four General Observations
Through the series of semi-structured interviews in Project 2, the qualitative exploration
uncovered four interesting general observations: first, that there are basic differences in the
factors that contribute to the rate of change and those which create the level of complexity;
second, that perceptions of uncertainty differ among individuals and fluctuate over time; third
that diversity and debate is actively encouraged and invited among the Group Executive
Committee; and finally, that individuals deliberately create or actively seek uncertainty.
This section sets out these observations in detail. For the purposes of confidentiality direct
references are presented anonymously.
5.5.5.2 Differences In The Factors That Create Change And Complexity
The first observation is that when strategists on the Group Executive Committee set out the
qualitative factors that create change, then there is a focus on external issues such as
competition, technology, and interest rates. However, when the corporate strategists are asked
to describe the qualitative factors that create complexity, there is a clear focus on internal
issues such as integration, delivery of change programmes and obtaining strategic investment
budget. One of the members of the Group Executive Committee51 explains:
“When we as a senior team consider our strategic response to the rate of change, the
agenda tends to be dominated by external issues, for example customers or interest
rates – and let me tell you we have a great track record in being able to cope with such
strategic issues. However, when it comes to levels of complexity we have a history of
‘doing things to ourselves’. As you can imagine Barclays becomes a pretty complex
organisation when the left hand does not know what the right hand is doing. Be
assured that the level of complexity really goes through the roof, and the fun and
games really start, when the left hand tries to control the right hand.”
51 Group Executive Committee Interview, Summer 2003
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5.5.5.3 Differences In Perspectives Across The Group Executive Committee
The qualitative exploration in Project 2 uncovered very different perspectives on the
experience of uncertainty on the Group Executive Committee. One of the members of the
Group Executive Committee52 explains:
“Developing strategy at Barclays is not uncertain and certainly not complex; we have a
terrific business model, a wonderful brand, great people and the most sophisticated
management information. Our people are so good that we on Group Executive
Committee could probably go to sleep for a year and still make £3 billion.”
Another member of the Group Executive Committee53 takes a very different view:
“Leading Barclays is uncertain and complex but it’s the rate of change that keeps me
awake at night and gets me jumping out of bed in the morning.”
5.5.5.4 Perceptions Fluctuating Over Time
The qualitative exploration in Project 2 uncovered evidence of perceptions on uncertainty
fluctuating over time. One of the members of the Group Executive Committee54 explains:
“My experience of uncertainty is that it fluctuates over time. I remember having
sleepless nights in the 1980s about whether or not we should buy the Trustees Savings
Bank. During the 1990s the break up of BZW and the purchase of the Woolwich
created great uncertainty. With the advent of the new millennium we worried about the
dot.com revolution or whether to buy the Bradford & Bingley. Our current sources of
uncertainty are our regulation obligations, competition, and whether or not we will
acquire or be acquired. Yes, I think it is safe to say that the degree of uncertainty we
have experienced on Group Executive Committee over the years has fluctuated greatly
over time.”
52 Group Executive Committee Interview, Summer 2003
53 Group Executive Committee Interview, Spring 2003
54 Group Executive Committee Interview, Summer 2003
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5.5.5.5 Diversity & Debate Actively Encouraged On Group Executive Committee
The qualitative exploration in Project 2 also discovered that the Group Executive Committee
deliberately avoid high levels of managerial consensus; diversity and debate, referred to in the
literature as ‘consensual uncertainty’ (Huff, 1978) (see Section 4.3.11), are actively
encouraged. One of the members of the Group Executive Committee55 highlights the
importance of diversity and debate in the strategy development process:
“Under Matt Barrett’s leadership we have built a Group Executive Committee made
up of very different personalities and backgrounds, and over the last five years Matt
has worked very hard to build an environment of trust, empathy, commitment and
teamwork. We don’t feel ‘consensually uncertain’ if one of our colleagues interprets
the competitive environment differently or proposes a different strategic course.
Personally, I enjoy having my views and assumptions challenged by highly
experienced and knowledgeable colleagues – invariably it informs and develops my
own strategic thinking. A diversity of views expressed within a mature debate is the
sign of a high-performing team and this is a very important aspect of the strategy
development process at Barclays.”
5.5.5.6 Evidence Of Members Deliberately Creating Or Seeking Uncertainty
Finally the study discovered the Group Executive Committee sometimes deliberately create
uncertainty at Barclays. One of the members of the Group Executive Committee56 explains:
“At Barclays we have great people who thrive on ambitious challenges and
opportunities, and it never ceases to amaze me how our people respond so positively to
uncertainty, complexity and change. As strategists it is our responsibility to ensure that
the Group is faced with the apposite degree of uncertainty in order to leverage the
greatest value from our resources. Consequently there are times when it is appropriate
to deliberately create, or actively seek, uncertainty, change and complexity.”
55 Group Executive Committee Interview, Spring 2003
56 Group Executive Committee Interview, Summer 2003
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5.6 Quantitative Exploration: Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
5.6.1 A Statement Of Propositions
This section of the document details the quantitative exploration into the concept of perceived
environmental uncertainty through the semi-structured interviews with the Group Executive
Committee. Section 4.6.5.2 explains how the researcher has developed logical corollaries from
the literature to build a series of propositions for testing in the field at Barclays. The researcher
used these literature-guided propositions to direct the assessment of theory, with a view to
using the results to improve current theory.
The three literature-guided propositions that are tested in this section are:
1. The role of managerial consensus, or the lack of such consensus, in the assessments
strategists make of the competitive environment, their perceptions of the ability of the
organisation to cope, and their evaluation of the importance of the organisation being
able to cope, sometimes referred to as the individual perspective on corporate strategy
(see Section 4.5.5.1).
2. The relationship between the rate of change and the level of complexity as independent
variables in the modernist conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty
(see Section 4.3.10).
3. The relationship between those elements of perceived environmental uncertainty that
have managerial implications. The research examines the relationship that exists
between the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty, the rate of change and the
level of complexity with the organisation’s ability to cope with these three phenomena
(see Section 4.5.6.1) and the importance of the organisation being able to cope with
these three phenomena (see Section 4.5.6.2).
It is important to note that the sample consisted of fifteen members of the Group Executive
Committee making nine assessments on the seventeen strategic business units within the
Barclays Group (see Section 4.6.3.3).
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5.6.2 The Role Of Managerial Consensus
5.6.2.1 Investigating The Level Of Managerial Consensus
This section investigates the level of consensus across the Group Executive Committee
regarding the degree of uncertainty faced by the various business units (see Table 28 below).
Observation of the standard deviations identifies a high level of disagreement as to the degree
of uncertainty faced by Barclays Global Investors (21.349), the Business Bank (19.254), and
the Premier Bank (18.342). This dispersion is also evident in the ranges: Barclays Global
Investors, 75 (10–85); Business Bank, 65 (10–75); and the Premier Bank, 65 (10–75). By
comparison, the lowest standard deviations were for the Woolwich (15.271) and Barclaycard
Corporate (15.453).
Global Markets ranked the highest in terms of the uncertainty they face, with a mean score of
62.0, with Private Equity ranked second with a mean of 58.6. Interestingly, Global Markets
had a range of 70 (20–90), and Private Equity a range of 50 (30–80) – another illustration of
the low level of managerial consensus. Barclays Global Investors and the Business Bank both
had a range of 75 (10–85). The UK Retail Bank and Private Equity had the lowest range of
scores (20–70, and 30–80), but even this represents a range of 50 on a construct of 0–100.
Table 28 – The Degree Of Uncertainty Faced By The Various Strategic Business Units
Strategic Business Unit Mean Mean
Rank
SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 44.73 15 15.271 1 34.14 89.75 70 15
UK Retail Bank 46.40 13 15.838 7 34.13 93.08 70 20
Caribbean 46.67 11= 15.774 5 33.80 92.70 75 20
Europe 55.67 5 15.453 3 27.76 90.82 90 30
International Bank 46.67 11= 18.190 14 39.19 107.49 80 20
Private Bank 51.73 6 16.607 9 32.10 97.60 75 20
Premier Bank 46.00 14 18.342 15 39.87 107.80 75 10
Barclays Global Investors 50.07 8 21.349 17 42.64 125.47 85 10
Business Bank 42.00 16 19.254 16 45.84 113.16 85 10
Barclays Africa 49.00 9 15.721 4 32.08 92.39 75 15
Barclaycard Corporate 37.67 17 15.453 2 41.03 90.82 70 10
Barclaycard International 58.33 3 15.774 6 27.04 92.70 80 25
Barclaycard UK 48.40 10 16.513 8 34.12 97.05 70 10
Collateralised Financing 50.38 7 17.775 13 35.28 104.46 80 20
Global Financing 55.77 4 17.097 10 30.66 100.48 80 20
Global Markets 62.00 1 17.595 12 28.38 103.40 90 20
Private Equity 58.57 2 17.158 11 29.29 100.84 80 30
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The next part of the research observes the level of managerial consensus regarding the rate of
change faced by the various strategic business units (see Table 29 below). Again observation
of the standard deviation identifies a low level of consensus regarding the Caribbean (26.163),
Barclays Global Investors (20.517), and Barclays Africa (19.982). This dispersion is also
evident in the range of responses: the Caribbean 90 (10–100), Global Markets 75 (15–90),
Barclays Global Investors 65 (15–80), and Barclays Africa 65 (15–80). At the other end of the
scale, the lowest standard deviations identified are for the Private Bank (13.076) and
Barclaycard Corporate (14.100).
Table 29 – The Rate Of Change Faced By The Various Strategic Business Units
Strategic Business Unit Mean Mean
Rank
SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 44.40 12 18.871 11 42.50 105.43 80 20
UK Retail Bank 54.00 4= 19.475 13 36.07 108.81 80 20
Caribbean 48.33 8 26.163 17 54.13 146.17 100 10
Europe 53.00 6 16.669 7 31.45 93.13 80 30
International Bank 47.67 9 16.021 4 33.61 89.51 75 20
Private Bank 55.40 3 13.076 1 23.60 73.05 75 25
Premier Bank 54.00 4= 17.849 10 33.05 99.72 80 25
Barclays Global Investors 44.33 13 20.517 16 46.28 114.63 80 15
Business Bank 42.33 14 16.352 5 38.63 91.35 70 20
Barclays Africa 42.00 15 19.982 15 47.58 111.64 80 15
Barclaycard Corporate 41.67 16 14.100 2 33.84 78.77 65 10
Barclaycard International 56.67 1 16.655 6 29.39 93.05 80 20
Barclaycard UK 56.00 2 16.818 8 30.03 93.96 90 30
Collateralised Financing 44.62 11 17.265 9 38.70 96.46 70 15
Global Financing 46.54 10 15.513 3 33.33 86.67 70 15
Global Markets 50.77 7 19.165 12 37.75 107.07 90 15
Private Equity 37.14 17 19.795 14 53.29 110.59 70 10
Observation of the mean scores shows Barclaycard International (56.7) and Barclaycard UK
(56.0) faced the highest rates of change in their competitive environments. Interestingly
Barclaycard Corporate (41.7), who operate in a very similar competitive environment, were
deemed to have faced one of the lowest rates of change. The lack of managerial consensus
within a single cluster is also apparent as Barclaycard International (20–80) and Barclaycard
UK (30–90) both had a range of 60, and Barclaycard Corporate (10–65) a range of 55. The
highest level of consensus was observed at Europe (30–80), the Private Bank (25–75) and the
Business Bank (20–70); again, however this represented half of the 0–100 scale offered to
respondents.
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The study now moves on to observe the managerial consensus that existed at the Group
Executive Committee regarding the level of complexity faced by the various business units
(see Table 29 below). Again observation of the standard deviation identifies a high level of
managerial disagreement regarding the level of complexity faced by Barclays Africa (23.335),
the Caribbean (22.652) and Private Equity (21.738). The level of dispersion in the data is also
evident in the range of responses: the Caribbean 80 (10–90), the Woolwich 70 (10–80),
Barclays Africa 70 (10–80), Collateralised Financing 70 (10–80), and Private Equity 70 (10–
80). At the opposite end of the scale, the lowest standard deviations were identified at the
Premier Bank (12.714), Barclaycard International (12.790) and the Business Bank (14.368).
Table 29 – The Level Of Complexity Faced By The Various Strategic Business Units
Strategic Business Unit Mean Mean
Rank
SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 41.33 17 20.307 14 49.13 114.96 80 10
UK Retail Bank 66.33 1 19.130 13 28.84 108.30 90 40
Caribbean 48.33 8 22.652 16 46.87 128.24 90 10
Europe 57.00 2 16.669 7 29.24 94.37 80 30
International Bank 47.73 10 18.763 11 39.31 106.22 80 20
Private Bank 47.67 11 16.132 6 33.84 91.33 70 20
Premier Bank 55.73 3 12.714 1 22.81 71.97 80 40
Barclays Global Investors 43.67 15 18.270 10 41.84 103.43 70 10
Business Bank 48.00 9 14.368 3 29.93 81.34 70 20
Barclays Africa 44.67 14 23.335 17 52.24 132.10 80 10
Barclaycard Corporate 42.00 16 14.856 4 35.37 84.11 60 20
Barclaycard International 53.00 5 12.790 2 24.13 72.40 70 20
Barclaycard UK 52.33 6 17.512 9 33.46 99.14 80 20
Collateralised Financing 46.54 12 19.081 12 41.00 108.02 80 10
Global Financing 54.62 4 15.064 5 27.58 85.28 80 30
Global Markets 52.31 7 16.909 8 32.33 95.72 80 20
Private Equity 45.71 13 21.738 15 47.55 123.06 80 10
From this observation the UK Retail Bank was deemed to rank the highest in terms of the
complexity it faced with a mean score of 66.3, Europe were ranked second with a mean score
of 57.0. However one observer gave the UK Retail Bank a score of 40 giving them a range of
50, and one observer gave Europe a score of 30 giving them a range of 50 – more evidence of
the low level of managerial consensus. The lowest range (40) was identified at Barclaycard
Corporate (20–60) and the Premier Bank (40–80). Interestingly the Caribbean had a range of
80 with scores ranging from 10 through to 90 – further evidence of the lack of managerial
consensus at Group Executive Committee.
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The research now moves on to observe the level of managerial consensus that existed at the
Group Executive Committee regarding the ability of the various strategic business units to
cope with uncertainty (see Table 31 below). Observation of the standard deviations again
identifies a high level of disagreement. This lack of consensus is most apparent through the
standard deviations for the UK Retail Bank (21.751), Barclays Africa (21.531) and
Barclaycard International (18.879). This dispersion is also evident in the range of responses:
UK Retail Bank 70 (20–90), Barclays Global Investors 70 (20–90), and Barclaycard
International 65 (20–85). At the opposite end of the scale, the lowest standard deviations
identified were for the Private Bank (11.211), Global Financing (11.254) and Collateralised
Financing (12.514).
Table 31 – The Ability Of The Various Strategic Business Units To Cope With Uncertainty
Strategic Business Unit Mean Mean
Rank
SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 44.67 17 15.864 8 35.52 99.12 70 25
UK Retail Bank 51.33 14 21.751 17 42.37 135.90 90 20
Caribbean 50.33 15 16.633 12 33.05 103.93 80 25
Europe 46.67 16 16.439 11 35.23 102.71 75 20
International Bank 58.67 9 18.074 13 30.81 112.93 80 20
Private Bank 57.40 12 11.211 1 19.53 70.05 70 30
Premier Bank 53.00 13 15.446 7 29.14 96.51 75 25
Barclays Global Investors 67.00 8 18.400 14 27.46 114.97 90 20
Business Bank 71.00 5 14.541 6 20.48 90.85 90 40
Barclays Africa 58.00 10= 21.531 16 37.12 134.53 90 30
Barclaycard Corporate 67.40 7 14.242 5 21.13 88.99 85 40
Barclaycard International 58.00 10= 18.879 15 32.55 117.96 85 20
Barclaycard UK 69.64 6 15.976 9 22.94 99.82 90 30
Collateralised Financing 74.23 3 12.514 3 16.86 78.19 90 50
Global Financing 74.62 1= 11.254 2 15.08 70.32 90 60
Global Markets 74.62 1= 13.019 4 17.45 81.35 90 50
Private Equity 71.43 4 16.304 10 22.83 101.87 90 40
Global Financing and Global Markets ranked the highest in terms of their ability to cope with
uncertainty with a mean score of 74.62; their fellow business units in the Barclays Capital
cluster, Collateralised Financing and Private Equity, were third and fourth respectively. There
were also some relatively low ranges in the responses: Global Financing (30), Global Markets
(40), Collateralised Financing (40), and the Private Bank (40) – this suggests a higher level of
consensus regarding the ability of these business units to cope with uncertainty.
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It is now possible to move on to observe the level of managerial consensus that existed at the
Group Executive Committee regarding the ability of the various strategic business units to
cope with change (see Table 32 below). Observation of the standard deviations again
identifies a high level of disagreement, or a lack of managerial consensus. This is most
apparent through the results for: Barclays Africa (21.996), Barclaycard International (20.569),
and the UK Retail Bank (19.242). Again such dispersion is also evident in the range of
responses: Barclays Africa 65 (25–90), Barclaycard International 65 (20–85), and the UK
Retail Bank 70 (20–90). At the opposite end of the scale, the lowest standard deviations were
identified for the Private Bank (12.081), Global Financing (12.415) and the Business Bank
(12.892).
Table 32 – The Ability Of The Various Strategic Business Units To Cope With Change
Strategic Business Unit Mean Mean
Rank
SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 48.40 16 14.681 7 30.33 92.68 70 20
UK Retail Bank 51.67 13 19.242 15 37.24 121.47 90 20
Caribbean 51.33 14= 17.975 12= 35.02 113.48 80 20
Europe 46.33 17 14.695 8 31.72 92.77 75 20
International Bank 53.73 11 15.229 10 28.34 96.14 80 20
Private Bank 52.33 12 12.081 1 23.08 76.27 70 30
Premier Bank 51.33 14= 17.975 12= 35.02 113.48 80 20
Barclays Global Investors 66.53 6 18.446 14 27.72 116.45 90 30
Business Bank 72.07 4 12.892 3 17.89 81.39 90 40
Barclays Africa 59.67 9 21.996 17 36.86 138.86 90 25
Barclaycard Corporate 66.40 7 13.814 5 20.80 87.21 90 40
Barclaycard International 55.33 10 20.569 16 37.17 129.85 85 20
Barclaycard UK 72.33 3 13.870 6 19.18 87.56 90 50
Collateralised Financing 71.15 5 13.114 4 18.43 82.79 90 50
Global Financing 73.85 1 12.415 2 16.81 78.37 90 50
Global Markets 72.69 2 14.954 9 20.57 94.41 100 50
Private Equity 65.71 8 15.336 11 23.34 96.82 90 40
Interestingly Global Financing (73.85) and Global Markets (72.69) also ranked the highest in
terms of their ability to cope with change. Barclaycard UK was ranked third across the
portfolio in this capability with a mean score of 72.33. Again there were some relatively low
ranges in the responses: Barclaycard UK (40), Collateralised Financing (40), Global Financing
(40), and the Private Bank (40) – this suggests a higher level of consensus regarding the ability
of these business units to cope with change.
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The research now moves on to examine the level of managerial consensus that existed at the
Group Executive Committee regarding the ability of the various strategic business units to
cope with complexity (see Table 33 below). Observation of the standard deviations again
identifies a high level of disagreement, or a lack of managerial consensus. Similarly to the last
section the most disagreement was for Barclaycard International (20.166), the UK Retail Bank
(18.803), and Barclays Africa (18.344). Again this dispersion is evident in the range of
responses for these three business units: Barclaycard International 65 (20–85), the UK Retail
Bank 60 (20–80), and Barclays Africa 55 (35–90). The Caribbean and Barclays Global
Investors had the largest range (70), each with responses ranging from 20 through to 90. Again
the Private Bank (11.979) was at opposite end of the scale, accompanied this time by
Barclaycard UK (12.421) and Global Markets (12.796).
Table 33 – The Ability Of The Various Strategic Business Units To Cope With Complexity
Strategic Business Unit Mean Mean
Rank
SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 40.67 17 16.994 12 41.79 108.95 65 10
UK Retail Bank 50.00 15 18.803 16 37.61 120.55 80 20
Caribbean 51.33 14 17.369 13 33.83 111.35 90 20
Europe 49.33 16 14.500 7 29.39 92.95 75 20
International Bank 56.00 12 16.497 11 29.46 105.76 80 20
Private Bank 57.73 10 11.979 1 20.75 76.79 75 30
Premier Bank 53.33 13 13.048 4 24.46 83.64 80 30
Barclays Global Investors 75.67 5 17.512 14 23.14 112.26 90 20
Business Bank 71.73 7 13.941 6 19.43 89.37 90 40
Barclays Africa 60.07 9 18.344 15 30.54 117.60 90 35
Barclaycard Corporate 67.33 8 14.984 8 22.25 96.06 85 40
Barclaycard International 57.67 11 20.166 17 34.97 129.28 85 20
Barclaycard UK 74.00 6 12.421 2 17.67 79.63 90 50
Collateralised Financing 77.00 4 16.266 9 21.12 104.28 100 40
Global Financing 78.08 3 16.425 10 21.04 105.30 100 40
Global Markets 79.23 2 12.796 3 16.15 82.03 100 50
Private Equity 79.36 1 13.135 5 16.55 84.20 100 50
Again the strategic business units within the Barclays Capital cluster dominated the highest
ranks in terms of the ability of strategic business units to cope, this time with complexity,
with: Private Equity 79.36 (first), Global Markets 79.23 (second), Global Financing 78.08
(third), and Collateralised Financing 77.00 (fourth). Again there were some significant ranges
in the responses: the lowest ranges were Barclaycard UK 50–90 (40), Barclaycard Corporate
40–85 (45), and the Private Bank 30–75 (45).
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The next element examines the level of managerial consensus at the Group Executive
Committee regarding the importance of the various strategic business units being able to cope
with uncertainty (see Table 34 below). Again the standard deviations illustrate a high level of
disagreement, or a lack of managerial consensus in the data. The most disagreement
surrounded Private Equity (26.774), the UK Retail Bank (25.598), and the International Bank
(24.088). Again this dispersion is evident in the range of responses for these three business
units: Private Equity 80 (10–90), the UK Retail Bank 80 (20–100), and the International Bank
70 (20–90). Again the Caribbean had the largest range (85) with responses ranging from 0
through to 85. This time Global Financing (13.301) was at the opposite end of the scale
accompanied by Barclaycard International (13.947), Barclaycard UK (17.715) and the
Woolwich (17.809).
Table 34 – The Importance Of The Various Strategic Business Units Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty
Strategic Business Unit Mean Mean
Rank
SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 48.00 13 17.809 4 37.10 85.86 80 20
UK Retail Bank 71.33 5 25.598 16 35.88 123.41 100 20
Caribbean 37.67 17 23.135 13 61.42 111.54 85 0
Europe 55.33 9 22.398 10 40.48 107.99 90 20
International Bank 54.67 10 24.088 15 44.06 116.14 90 20
Private Bank 44.67 14= 20.914 8 46.82 100.83 75 20
Premier Bank 61.00 8 23.006 12 37.72 110.92 100 20
Barclays Global Investors 53.67 11 21.833 9 40.68 105.26 80 20
Business Bank 73.00 2 22.662 11 31.04 109.26 100 20
Barclays Africa 40.33 16 23.335 14 57.86 112.51 80 10
Barclaycard Corporate 44.67 14= 18.942 7 42.41 91.33 75 20
Barclaycard International 65.33 6 13.947 2 21.35 67.24 90 40
Barclaycard UK 74.33 1 17.715 3 23.83 85.41 100 30
Collateralised Financing 62.31 7 18.479 5 29.66 89.09 90 30
Global Financing 71.92 3= 13.301 1 18.49 64.13 90 40
Global Markets 71.92 3= 18.664 6 25.95 89.99 100 20
Private Equity 52.86 12 26.774 17 50.65 129.09 90 10
Barclaycard UK (74.33) and the Business Bank (73.00) ranked the highest in terms of the
importance of their ability to cope with uncertainty. There were also some high ranges in the
responses: Caribbean (85), followed by five business units with a range of 80: the UK Retail
Bank, the Premier Bank, the Business Bank, Global Markets, and Private Equity – this also
indicates a lower level of consensus regarding the importance of these business units’ ability
to cope with uncertainty.
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The next part of the research moves on to examine the level of managerial consensus at the
Group Executive Committee regarding the importance of the various strategic business units
being able to cope with change (see Table 35 below). Again the standard deviations illustrate a
high level of disagreement, or a lack of managerial consensus, in the data. The most
disagreement surrounded the UK Retail Bank (23.197), the Caribbean (23.053), and Barclays
Africa (21.833). Again this dispersion was evident in the range of responses for these three
businesses: the UK Retail Bank 70 (30–100), the Caribbean 80 (5–85), and Barclays Africa 70
(10–80). Outside these three businesses, the International Bank 80 (20–100) had the largest
range of responses. Again Global Financing (11.774) was at the opposite end of the scale,
accompanied by Global Markets (12.558), Barclays Global Investors (14.936) and Barclaycard
Corporate (16.235).
Table 35 – The Importance Of The Various Strategic Business Units Being Able To Cope With Change
Strategic Business Unit Mean Mean
Rank
SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 54.00 13 18.048 8 33.42 98.60 80 30
UK Retail Bank 76.67 2 23.197 17 30.26 126.73 100 30
Caribbean 43.00 17 23.053 16 53.61 125.94 85 5
Europe 59.07 11 18.942 11 32.07 103.48 90 20
International Bank 64.40 8 21.037 13 32.67 114.93 100 20
Private Bank 55.67 12 18.886 10 33.93 103.18 80 20
Premier Bank 70.33 5 16.847 6 23.95 92.04 100 40
Barclays Global Investors 60.33 9 14.936 3 24.76 81.60 80 30
Business Bank 75.67 3 21.286 14 28.13 116.29 100 30
Barclays Africa 45.33 16 21.833 15 48.16 119.28 80 10
Barclaycard Corporate 48.00 15 16.235 4 33.82 88.70 75 20
Barclaycard International 70.00 7 18.516 9 26.45 101.16 90 30
Barclaycard UK 80.67 1 16.783 5 20.81 91.69 100 40
Collateralised Financing 59.23 10 19.351 12 32.67 105.72 85 20
Global Financing 70.08 6 11.774 1 16.80 64.33 90 50
Global Markets 71.15 4 12.558 2 17.65 68.61 90 50
Private Equity 51.79 14 17.889 7 34.54 97.73 80 20
Interestingly, Barclaycard UK (75.67), the UK Retail Bank (76.67) and the Business Bank
(75.67) ranked the highest in terms of the importance of their ability to cope with change. In
this data there was a series of relatively high ranges in the responses, with Caribbean and the
International Bank both having a range of 80, and four business units with a range of 70: UK
Retail Bank, Europe, the Business Bank, and Barclays Africa – this also suggests a lower level
of consensus regarding the importance of these business units’ ability to cope with change.
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This final part of this section examines the level of managerial consensus at the Group
Executive Committee regarding the importance of the various business units being able to
cope with complexity (see Table 36 below). Again the standard deviations illustrate a high
level of disagreement, or a lack of managerial consensus, in the data. The most disagreement
surrounded: the International Bank (22.350), Barclays Global Investors (22.345), and the UK
Retail Bank (22.023). Again this dispersion was evident in the range of responses for these
three units: the Barclays Global Investors 75 (10–85), the International Bank 70 (20–90), and
the UK Retail Bank 70 (30–100). Again Global Financing (13.708) was at the other end of the
scale, accompanied by Global Markets (14.639) and Barclaycard Corporate (15.407).
Table 36 – The Importance Of The Various Strategic Business Units Being Able To Cope With Complexity
Strategic Business Unit Mean Mean
Rank
SD SD
Rank
SD (%
Mean)
% Mean
SD
Max Min
Woolwich 45.67 16 18.980 6 41.56 97.89 75 10
UK Retail Bank 73.00 4 22.023 15 30.17 113.58 100 30
Caribbean 43.33 17 19.791 9 45.67 102.07 70 10
Europe 55.33 12 21.420 13 38.71 110.47 90 10
International Bank 62.33 10 22.350 17 35.86 115.27 90 20
Private Bank 54.33 13 21.118 12 38.87 108.91 90 10
Premier Bank 66.00 8 19.198 7 29.09 99.02 100 30
Barclays Global Investors 62.00 11 22.345 16 36.04 115.24 85 10
Business Bank 72.00 5 20.160 10 28.00 103.98 100 30
Barclays Africa 48.33 15 21.685 14 44.87 111.84 90 10
Barclaycard Corporate 50.33 14 15.407 3 30.61 79.46 80 30
Barclaycard International 67.67 7 19.445 8 28.74 100.29 90 10
Barclaycard UK 75.00 3 18.516 5 24.69 95.50 100 30
Collateralised Financing 68.46 6 18.066 4 26.39 93.17 90 40
Global Financing 77.69 2 13.708 1 17.64 70.70 100 40
Global Markets 80.00 1 14.639 2 18.30 75.50 100 40
Private Equity 62.50 9 20.767 11 33.23 107.10 90 30
From the observation Global Markets (80.00), Global Financing (77.69) and Barclaycard UK
(75.00) ranked the highest in terms of the importance of their ability to cope with complexity.
Again there was a series of relatively high ranges in the responses: Europe (80), the Private
Bank (80), Barclays Africa (80), and Barclaycard International (80) – this also indicates a
lower level of consensus regarding the importance of these business units’ ability to cope with
complexity. The lowest range of responses, signifying the highest level of consensus, relating
to the importance of the business units being able to cope with complexity, was evident at
Barclaycard Corporate (50) and Collateralised Financing (50), on a scale of 0–100.
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5.6.2.2 Summarising The Level Of Managerial Consensus
A summary table of the responses (see Table 37 below) shows the degree of consensus in the
responses made by members of the Group Executive Committee to each of the nine questions:
Table 37 – Summarising The Level Of Managerial Consensus
Questions Mean Standard Deviation Consensus Rank
Identifying Perceived Levels Of:
Uncertainty 17.0 4
Change 17.9 6
Complexity 17.7 5
Ability To Cope With:
The Degree Of Uncertainty 16.0 3
The Rate Of Change 15.8 2
The Level Of Complexity 15.6 1
Importance Of Being Able To Cope With:
The Degree Of Uncertainty 20.7 9
The Rate Of Change 18.3 7
The Level Of Complexity 19.4 8
This analysis shows that the lack of managerial consensus not only affects perceptions of the
degree of uncertainty, change and complexity in the competitive environment but also
assessments of the ability of the various strategic business units to cope and evaluations of the
importance of the business units being able to cope.
Interestingly the responses can be categorised into three groups with the responses for the
importance of being able to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity showing the highest
mean standard deviations, or the lowest level of managerial consensus. The questions relating
to assessments of the levels of uncertainty, change and complexity have the next highest mean
standard deviations, or the next lowest level of managerial consensus. Finally the questions
relating to assessments of the ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity have the
lowest mean standard deviations, or the highest level of managerial consensus. This
observation is further developed later in the document (see Section 5.8.1.2, Table 75).
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The next part of this investigation analyses the mean standard deviations assigned to the
assessments of the degree of uncertainty, rate of change and level of complexity being faced
by the various strategic business units. A mean standard deviation is produced from the mean
standard deviations to identify the dispersion in the data for this section of the research. The
various strategic business units are then ranked according to their overall mean standard
deviation; the business unit with the highest mean standard deviation (or highest dispersion) is
the one deemed to be subject to the lowest level of managerial consensus (see Table 38
below):
Table 38 – Summarising Managerial Consensus: Assessing The Levels Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Strategic Business Unit Uncertainty Change Complexity Mean SD Rank
Caribbean 15.774 26.163 22.652 21.530 1
Barclays Global Investors 21.349 20.517 18.270 20.045 2
Barclays Africa 15.721 19.982 23.335 19.679 3
Private Equity 17.158 19.795 21.738 19.564 4
Woolwich 15.271 18.871 20.307 18.150 5
UK Retail Bank 15.838 19.475 19.130 18.148 6
Collateralised Financing 17.775 17.265 19.081 18.040 7
Global Markets 17.595 19.165 16.909 17.890 8
International Bank 18.19 16.021 18.763 17.658 9
Barclaycard UK 16.513 16.818 17.512 16.948 10
Business Bank 19.254 16.352 14.368 16.658 11
Premier Bank 18.342 17.849 12.714 16.302 12
Europe 15.453 16.669 16.669 16.264 13
Global Financing 17.097 15.513 15.064 15.891 14
Private Bank 16.607 13.076 16.132 15.272 15
Barclaycard International 15.774 16.655 12.790 15.073 16
Barclaycard Corporate 15.453 14.100 14.856 14.803 17
When ranked in terms of their overall mean standard deviations, it is possible to identify the
lowest level of consensus for: Caribbean (21.530), Barclays Global Investors (20.045),
Barclays Africa (19.679) and Private Equity (19.564). It is important to note that the scale of
assessment was 0–100 therefore such mean standard deviations show significant dispersion in
the data and a considerable lack of managerial consensus. At the opposite end of the scale,
there is most consensus regarding Barclaycard International (15.073) and Barclaycard
Corporate (14.803); however a mean standard deviation of approximately 15 also shows
significant dispersion. The overall Group mean standard deviation is 17.524, which represents
a significant lack of managerial consensus regarding the assessments of degrees of uncertainty,
change and complexity across the entire portfolio of businesses within the Barclays Group.
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Using the same discipline, it is possible to analyse the mean standard deviations assigned to
the assessments for the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with: the degree
of uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity in their competitive
environments. The results are set out in Table 39 below:
Table 39 – Summarising Managerial Consensus: Assessing The Ability To Cope
Strategic Business Unit Uncertainty Change Complexity Mean SD Rank
Barclays Africa 21.531 21.996 18.344 20.624 1
UK Retail Bank 21.751 19.242 18.803 19.932 2
Barclaycard International 18.879 20.569 20.166 19.871 3
Barclays Global Investors 18.400 18.446 17.512 18.119 4
Caribbean 16.633 17.975 17.369 17.326 5
International Bank 18.074 15.229 16.497 16.600 6
Woolwich 15.864 14.681 16.994 15.846 7
Premier Bank 15.446 17.975 13.048 15.490 8
Europe 16.439 14.695 14.500 15.211 9
Private Equity 16.304 15.336 13.135 14.925 10
Barclaycard Corporate 14.242 13.814 14.984 14.347 11
Barclaycard UK 15.976 13.870 12.421 14.089 12
Collateralised Financing 12.514 13.114 16.266 13.965 13
Business Bank 14.541 12.892 13.941 13.791 14
Global Markets 13.019 14.954 12.796 13.590 15
Global Financing 11.254 12.415 16.425 13.365 16
Private Bank 11.211 12.081 11.979 11.757 17
When ranked in terms of their overall mean standard deviations, it is possible to identify the
lowest level of consensus for: Barclays Africa (20.624), the UK Retail Bank (19.932),
Barclaycard International (19.871) and Barclays Global Investors (18.119). Similarly to the
earlier analysis, it is again important to remember that the scale of assessment was 0–100,
therefore such mean standard deviations again show significant dispersion in the data and a
considerable lack of managerial consensus.
At the opposite end of the scale, there is most managerial consensus regarding: the Private
Bank (11.757), Global Financing (13.365) and Global Markets (13.590); however mean
standard deviations of this size again show significant dispersion. The overall Group mean
standard deviation is 15.815, which represents a significant lack of managerial consensus
regarding the assessments of the ability of the various strategic business units within the
Barclays Group to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity.
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The study now goes on to use the same discipline again, this time to analyse the mean
standard deviations assigned to the evaluations of the importance of the various strategic
business units being able to cope with: the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change and the
level of complexity in their competitive environments. The results are set out in Table 40
below:
Table 40 – Summarising Managerial Consensus: Evaluating The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
Strategic Business Unit Uncertainty Change Complexity Mean SD Rank
UK Retail Bank 25.598 23.197 22.023 23.606 1
International Bank 24.088 21.037 22.35 22.492 2
Barclays Africa 23.335 21.833 21.685 22.284 3
Caribbean 23.135 23.053 19.791 21.993 4
Private Equity 26.774 17.889 20.767 21.810 5
Business Bank 22.662 21.286 20.16 21.369 6
Europe 22.398 18.942 21.42 20.920 7
Private Bank 20.914 18.886 21.118 20.306 8
Barclays Global Investors 21.833 14.936 22.345 19.705 9
Premier Bank 23.006 16.847 19.198 19.684 10
Collateralised Financing 18.479 19.351 18.066 18.632 11
Woolwich 17.809 18.048 18.98 18.279 12
Barclaycard UK 17.715 16.783 18.516 17.671 13
Barclaycard International 13.947 18.516 19.445 17.303 14
Barclaycard Corporate 18.942 16.235 15.407 16.861 15
Global Markets 18.664 12.558 14.639 15.287 16
Global Financing 13.301 11.774 13.708 12.928 17
When ranked in this way it is possible to identify the lowest level of consensus for: the UK
Retail Bank (23.606), the International Bank (22.492), Barclays Africa (22.284) and
Caribbean (21.993). Once more it is important to remember that the scale of assessment was
0–100, therefore such mean standard deviations show significant dispersion in the data and a
considerable lack of managerial consensus.
At the opposite end of the scale, there is most managerial consensus regarding Global
Financing (12.928), Global Markets (15.287), and Barclaycard Corporate (16.861); however
mean standard deviations of this range also show significant dispersion in the data. The
overall Group mean standard deviation is 19.478, which represents a significant lack of
consensus regarding the evaluations of the importance of the various strategic business units
within the Barclays Group being able to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity.
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The next piece of analysis looks at the relative rankings that have been assigned to the various
strategic business units. The purpose is to identify whether the lack of managerial consensus
relates to certain business units in the Group or whether there is a general lack of consensus
across the entire portfolio. Here the strategic business units have been ranked according to
their mean standard deviations across all nine questions. The results are set out in Table 41
below:
Table 41 – Summarising Managerial Consensus: Comparing The Rankings Of The Strategic Business Units
Levels Of Ability To Cope Importance Of
Strategic Business Unit Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com
Woolwich 17 7 4 10 11 6 14 10 12
UK Retail Bank 11 5 5 1 3 2 2 1 3
Caribbean 12= 1 2 6 5= 5 5 2 9
Europe 15= 11 11 7 10 11 8 7 5
International Bank 4 14 7 5 8 7 3 5 1
Private Bank 9 17 12 17 17 17 10 8 6
Premier Bank 3 8 17 11 5= 14 6 12 11
Barclays Global Investors 1 2 8 4 4 4 9 15 2
Business Bank 2 13 15 12 15 12 7 4 8
Barclays Africa 14 3 1 2 1 3 4 3 4
Barclaycard Corporate 15= 16 14 13 13 10 11 14 15
Barclaycard International 12= 12 16 3 2 1 16 9 10
Barclaycard UK 10 10 9 9 12 16 15 13 13
Collateralised Financing 5 9 6 15 14 9 13 6 14
Global Financing 8 15 13 16 16 8 17 17 17
Global Markets 6 6 10 14 9 15 12 16 16
Private Equity 7 4 3 8 7 13 1 11 7
The analysis shows that there is some consensus regarding the assessments obtained for the
UK Retail Bank, the Caribbean, Barclays Africa and Barclays Global Investors which are all
frequently within the top five rankings when it comes to making assessments for the degrees
of perceived environmental uncertainty, their ability to cope, and the importance of their being
able to cope with such uncertainty. Equally consistent, but at the opposite end of the scale,
Global Financing and Barclaycard Corporate are frequently outside the top ten and are not
ever within the top five. Barclaycard International produces interesting results with the highest
lack of consensus in its ability to cope with complexity and the second lowest lack of
consensus in the importance of it being able to deal with uncertainty.
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When considering the lack of managerial consensus it is useful to rank the strategic business
units in order of the dispersion in the data. This ranking is represented in Table 42 below:
Table 42 – Summarising Managerial Consensus: Comparing The Mean Rankings Of The Business Units
Strategic Business Unit Mean Ranking Consensus Rank
UK Retail Bank 3.67 1
Barclays Africa 3.89 2
Caribbean 5.22 3
Barclays Global Investors 5.44 4
International Bank 6.00 5
Private Equity 6.78 6
Barclaycard International 9.00 7
Europe 9.44 8
Premier Bank 9.67 9
Business Bank 9.78 10
Collateralised Financing 10.11 11
Woolwich 10.11 11
Barclaycard UK 10.56 13
Private Bank 11.22 14
Global Markets 11.56 15
Barclaycard Corporate 13.44 16
Global Financing 14.11 17
One of the explanations for the apparent lack of consensus on the degree of perceived
environmental uncertainty could relate to how respondents respond to a scale of 0–100. In
order to illustrate this, Table 43 below ranks the fifteen respondents in terms of the average
score they awarded for each of the nine questions.
Table 43 – Summarising Managerial Consensus: Comparing The Mean Scores Given By The Respondents
Respondent Levels Of Ability Importance Mean Score Rank
B 59.706 71.275 71.765 67.582 1
I 57.059 70.980 67.843 65.294 2
L 60.784 54.118 68.824 61.242 3
J 43.590 65.107 70.385 59.694 4
N 29.706 74.412 74.412 59.510 5
F 55.490 56.863 65.294 59.216 6
C 52.143 62.857 62.143 59.048 7
D 56.667 51.961 67.059 58.562 8
A 46.667 67.647 56.471 56.928 9
K 45.882 65.980 58.431 56.765 10
H 40.000 72.157 54.706 55.621 11
O 50.686 56.157 54.569 53.804 12
E 48.235 54.902 54.314 52.484 13
G 49.706 51.569 44.902 48.725 14
M 42.157 48.235 40.784 43.725 15
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Table 43 shows that Respondent B (67.582), Respondent I (65.294) and Respondent L
(61.242) tended towards the higher end of the 0–100 scale when making their perceptual
assessments. By comparison Respondent G (48.725) and Respondent M (43.725) displayed a
propensity for the lower end of the 0–100 scale when making their perceptual assessments.
The lack of managerial consensus is also apparent when the perceptual assessments are
observed relative to the rankings of their peers on the Group Executive Committee. Here the
assessments made by Respondent B and Respondent I are consistently in the top six of the
rankings for each question. This analysis is set out in Table 44 below.
Table 44 – Summarising Managerial Consensus: Comparing The Rankings Of The Mean Responses
Levels Of Ability To Cope Importance Of Coping
Respondents Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com
B 1 4 2 4 3 3 3 4 1
I 4 3 3 3 2 5= 2 6 6
L 7 1 1 13 15 8 5= 2 5
J 13 12 10 7 8 4 4 3 3
N 15 15 14 2 1 1= 1 1 2
F 5 5 5 10 9 10 5= 7 7
C 8 7 4 8 7 9 8 9 9
D 3 2 7 14 13 12 7 5 4
A 9 13 8 5 6 5= 10 12 10
K 12 6 13 6 4 7 13 8 8
H 14 14 9 1 5 1= 9 13 12
O 2 9 12 9 11 11 11 11 11
E 6 10 11 11 10 13 12 10 14
G 10 8 6 12 12 15 15 14 13
M 11 11 15 15 14 14 14 15 15
By way of comparison, the assessments made by Respondents E, G and M were constantly at
the lower end of the 0–100 scale with very few of their rankings being in the top ten.
Interestingly Respondents F and C gravitated around the centre of the scale, where all of their
scores were ranked between 6 and 10. Respondent N showed a propensity to deal at both
extremes of the scale with responses that were either in the top two of the rankings or the
bottom four. It is therefore clear that there is a considerable lack of consensus regarding
perceived environmental uncertainty across the Group Executive Committee. However, it is
important to note that this could be compounded by the way in which the respondents have
interpreted the 0–100 scale. As a check, the data was standardised. Through this analysis it
was found that the raw data were so closely correlated that standardisation was unnecessary.
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5.6.3 Challenging The Modernist Perspective
5.6.3.1 The Relationship Between Uncertainty, Change And Complexity
This section of the research tests, this time through the responses of the Group Executive
Committee, the conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty given by the
modernist perspective (Duncan, 1972), where the phenomenon is described in terms of two
constructs: the simple–complex dimension and the static–dynamic dimension. Through the
application of this conceptualisation, the independent variables are the rate of change and the
level of complexity. In Hatch’s (1997) conceptualisation of perceived environmental
uncertainty, she proposes that the impact of these two independent variables is equally
weighted, Hatch’s conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty is set out in detail
in Section 5.4.2.2.3., illustrated in Figure 13.
Table 45 – Examining The Relationship Between Uncertainty, Change And Complexity
Uncertainty Change Complexity
r r² (%) r r² (%) r r² (%)
Uncertainty 1 – – – –
Change 0.437 19.10 1 – –
Complexity 0.175 3.07 0.435 18.92 1
Note: Table 45 is based on the analysis of all data (248 observations)
In contrast to the analysis carried out during the pilot study, the mean scores of the perceptual
assessments made by members of the Group Executive Committee as to the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity faced by the business units reveal
no significant relationships between these variables.
To maximise the possibility of identifying such relationships, individual responses were
included in a pool of data, yielding 248 observations (not all responses were completed). The
coefficients derived from the pooled data are set out above in Table 45. The results that are
significantly different from zero are indicated in bold.
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The results show that only 19.10% of perceived environmental uncertainty is associated with
the perceived rate of change. Interestingly the results also suggest that there is no statistically
significant relationship between the level of complexity perceived by members of the Group
Executive Committee and the degree of environmental uncertainty they observe. The
relationship between the rate of change and the level of complexity (see Table 45 above) is
discussed in detail in Section 5.6.3.4.
The data in Table 46 below display R-squared values for an equation where the assessment for
uncertainty is determined by a linear combination of the assessments for change and
complexity. R-squared, sometimes referred to as the coefficient of determination, shows the
proportion of the variation of the dependent variable (in this case uncertainty) that can be
explained by the regression equation – or in simpler terms, the explained variation in the
dependent variable (again uncertainty) divided by the total variance.
Table 46 – Examining The Relationship Between Uncertainty, Change And Complexity
Respondent R-squared (R²) R-squared (R²) As % Significant Values
1. 0.173 17.3% Not Significant
2. 0.300 30.0% Not Significant
3. 0.395 39.5% Not Significant
4. 0.083 8.3% Not Significant
5. 0.589 58.9% <1%
6. 0.613 61.3% <1%
7. 0.419 41.9% <5%
8. 0.619 61.9% <1%
9. 0.197 19.7% Not Significant
10. 0.146 14.6% Not Significant
11. 0.154 15.4% Not Significant
12. 0.409 40.9% <5%
13. 0.699 69.9% <1%
14. 0.419 41.9% <2%
15. 0.114 11.4% Not Significant
AVERAGES 0.071 7.1% Not Significant
ALL DATA 0.192 19.2% <1%
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Clearly the coefficient of determination set out in Table 46 offers only limited support to the
modernist perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty (Duncan, 1972) because for
eight of the fifteen members of the Group Executive Committee, the equation provided no
significant results. This was also the case when the averages were used as the basis for
comparison.
Interestingly only seven of the responses were significant at the 5% level (see Table 46
above), one of which was significant at the 2% level and four of which were significant at the
1% level. Consequently there are only four responses where the results show more than 99%
certainty that perceived environmental uncertainty is influenced by the combination of the rate
of change and the level of complexity.
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5.6.3.2 The Relationship Between Uncertainty And Change
This section looks at the relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and the
rate of change in the competitive environment. Again the R-squared combination (set out in
Table 45 above) shows the proportion of the variance in perceived environmental uncertainty
that is explained by the rate of change. As identified in the previous section, the results show
that only 19.20% of perceived environmental uncertainty is accounted for by the rate of
change taking place in the competitive environment.
Again it is possible to analyse whether the observed relationship between perceived
environmental uncertainty and the rate of change occurred purely by chance. Through
observation of the statistical significance, the results show that nine of the fifteen members of
the Group Executive Committee provided no significant results (see Table 47 below). This
was also the case when the averages were used as the basis for comparison. Interestingly only
six of the responses were significant at the 5% level, one of which was significant at the 2%
level and five of which were significant at the 1% level. Consequently there are only five
responses where the results show there is less than 1% probability, or 99% certainty, that
perceived environmental uncertainty is a product of the rate of change in the competitive
environment.
Table 47 – Examining The Relationship Between Uncertainty And Change
Respondent r-squared (r²) r-squared (r²) As % Significant Values
1. 0.106 10.6% Not Significant
2. 0.063 6.3% Not Significant
3. 0.366 36.6% <2%
4. 0.049 4.9% Not Significant
5. 0.436 43.6% <1%
6. 0.611 61.1% <1%
7. 0.004 0.4% Not Significant
8. 0.544 54.4% <1%
9. 0.184 18.4% Not Significant
10. 0.015 1.5% Not Significant
11. 0.002 0.2% Not Significant
12. 0.168 16.8% Not Significant
13. 0.521 52.1% <1%
14. 0.416 41.6% <1%
15. 0.018 1.8% Not Significant
AVERAGES 0.048 4.8% Not Significant
ALL DATA 0.192 19.2% <1%
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5.6.3.3 The Relationship Between Uncertainty And Complexity
This section looks at the relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and the
level of complexity in the competitive environment. Again the R-squared combination (set out
in Table 45 above) shows the proportion of the variance in perceived environmental
uncertainty that is explained by the level of complexity. As identified in Section 5.6.3.1, the
results show that only 3.07% of perceived environmental uncertainty is accounted for by the
level of complexity experienced in the competitive environment. The relationship between
these two variables is therefore deemed not to be statistically significant.
Again it is possible to analyse whether the results showing the absence of a statistically
significant relationship between uncertainty and the level of complexity occurred purely by
chance. Through observation of the statistical significance, the results show that ten of the
fifteen members of the Group Executive Committee provided no significant results (see Table
48 below). This was also the case when the averages were used as the basis for comparison.
Interestingly only five of the responses were significant at the 5% level, three of which were
significant at the 1% level. Consequently there are only three responses where the results show
there is less than 1% probability, or 99% certainty, that uncertainty is a product of the level of
complexity being experienced by strategists in the competitive environment.
Table 48 – Examining The Relationship Between Uncertainty And Complexity
Respondent r-squared (r²) r-squared (r²) As % Significant Values
1. 0.019 1.9% Not Significant
2. 0.240 24.0% <5%
3. 0.001 0.1% Not Significant
4. 0.029 2.9% Not Significant
5. 0.572 57.2% <1%
6. 0.253 25.3% <5%
7. 0.391 39.1% <1%
8. 0.049 4.9% Not Significant
9. 0.178 17.8% Not Significant
10. 0.096 9.6% Not Significant
11. 0.119 11.9% Not Significant
12. 0.388 38.8% <1%
13. 0.189 18.9% Not Significant
14. 0.136 13.6% Not Significant
15. 0.110 11.0% Not Significant
AVERAGES 0.068 6.8% Not Significant
ALL DATA 0.031 3.1% Not Significant
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5.6.3.4 The Relationship Between Change And Complexity
This section investigates the relationship between the rate of change and the level of
complexity in the competitive environment. Through the observation of the collinearity r-
squared (set out in Table 49 below), the results show that there is a statistically significant
relationship (0.666) between the rate of change in the competitive environment and the level
of complexity. Therefore the results suggest that any variance in the rate of change
experienced by strategists on the Group Executive Committee at Barclays is reflected in the
level of complexity they encounter.
Table 49 – Examining The Relationship Between Change And Complexity
Respondent r-squared (r²) r-squared (r²) As % Significant Values
1. 0.173 17.3% Not Significant
2. 0.300 30.0% <5%
3. 0.395 39.5% Not Significant
4. 0.083 8.3% Not Significant
5. 0.589 58.9% <1%
6. 0.613 61.3% <2%
7. 0.419 41.9% Not Significant
8. 0.619 61.9% Not Significant
9. 0.197 19.7% <1%
10. 0.146 14.6% <1%
11. 0.154 15.4% <5%
12. 0.409 40.9% Not Significant
13. 0.699 69.9% Not Significant
14. 0.419 41.9% <2%
15. 0.114 11.4% <5%
AVERAGES 0.071 7.1% <1%
ALL DATA 0.192 19.2% <5%
Taken together, these results show that the rate of change in the competitive environment is a
much stronger independent variable than the level of complexity. Although this finding is
consistent with the qualitative exploration of perceived environmental uncertainty (see Section
5.5), it challenges the modernist conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty
presented in the literature review (see Section 4.3–5). To illustrate this point, the findings
show that the relationship between uncertainty versus change and complexity is 0.192 (see
Table 49 above), the relationship between uncertainty and change is also 0.192 (see Table 47),
and the relationship between uncertainty and complexity is 0.031 (see Table 48).
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5.6.4 Investigating The Managerial Implications
5.6.4.1 Managerial Implications: The Ability To Cope
This section of the research looks at the relationship between the ability of the various
strategic business units within the Barclays Group to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty, change and complexity and the perceived levels of these three variables. The
qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5) and the literature review (see Section 4.3–4.5) found
that there should be a relationship between the ability to cope and the level of perceived
environmental uncertainty.
Table 50 – Examining The Relationship Between Perceived Environmental Uncertainty And The Ability To Cope
Levels Of
Uncertainty Change Complexity
r r² (%) r r² (%) R r² (%)
Ability To Cope With Uncertainty -0.110 1.21% -0.178 3.17% -0.067 0.45%
Ability To Cope With Change -0.137 1.88% -0.173 2.99% -0.143 2.04%
Ability To Cope With Complexity -0.108 1.17% -0.162 2.62% -0.055 0.30%
Note: Table 50 is based on the analysis of all data (248 observations)
From a managerial perspective one would logically expect that in a successful organisation
like Barclays Bank PLC, with a proven capacity to create value (see Section 2.1.5), there
would be congruence in the relationship between, on the one hand, the degree of uncertainty,
the rate of change and the level of complexity being experienced, and on the other hand, the
ability of the various strategic business units to cope with these three phenomena.
Interestingly the results from the research derived from the pooled data (see Table 50 above)
show no statistical relationship between the ability of the various strategic business units to
cope with the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity in their
competitive environment; or in the level of uncertainty, change and complexity being
experienced. This finding is significant because it indicates that strategists do not create a link
between the level of perceived environmental uncertainty being experienced and the ability to
cope, but rather a relationship between other factors, for example the ability to cope and the
level of value created; or the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty being experienced
and a qualitative factor such as the quality of the senior management team (see Section 5.5).
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Moving on, this section examines the relationship between the ability of the various strategic
business units within the Barclays Group to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty,
change and complexity. The r-squared values (see Table 51 below) show the proportion of
variance in the ability of the strategic business units to cope with the degree of uncertainty, the
rate of change and the level of complexity being experienced by strategists. The results show
that the interrelationships between the ability of the business units to cope with the degree of
perceived environmental uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity are all
statistically significant.
Table 51 – Examining The Managerial Implications: The Ability Of The Strategic Business Units To Cope
Ability Of The Strategic Business Unit To Cope With
Uncertainty Change Complexity
r r² (%) r r² (%) R r² (%)
Ability To Cope With Uncertainty 1 – – – –
Ability To Cope With Change 0.834 69.56% 1 – –
Ability To Cope With Complexity 0.703 49.42% 0.714 50.97% 1
Note: Table 51 is based on the analysis of all data (248 observations)
Beginning with the relationship between the ability to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty and the ability to cope with change, this research found that 69.56% of the
variance in the ability to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty is related to the
business unit’s ability to cope with change. In simpler terms, the results show that where the
strategic business unit is deemed more able to cope with the degree of perceived
environmental uncertainty in its competitive environment, then the Group Executive
Committee perception of its ability to cope with change also increases and vice versa.
This result fits the findings of the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5) where strategists
logically conclude that when they have seen a strategic business unit cope during a period of
environmental uncertainty that is perceived to be high, then their perception of the ability of
the strategic business unit to cope with change increases – the logical opposite being that
when strategists have not witnessed a strategic business unit being forced to cope with
increased levels of perceived environmental uncertainty then their perception of the strategic
business unit’s ability to cope with change does not increase.
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Moving on to the relationship between the ability to cope with complexity and the ability to
cope with perceived environmental uncertainty, a similar pattern emerges. The research found
that 49.4% of the variance in the ability to cope with complexity is related to the ability to
cope with perceived environmental uncertainty. In simpler terms the results show that where
the ability of the strategic business unit to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty
increases, the Group Executive Committee’s perception of the ability of the strategic business
unit to cope with complexity also increases.
Again this result fits the findings of the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5), where
strategists logically concluded that when they have seen a strategic business unit cope during a
period where environmental uncertainty is perceived to be high, then their perception of the
ability of the strategic business unit to cope with complexity is also high – the logical opposite
being that when strategists have not witnessed a strategic business unit being forced to cope
with increased levels of perceived environmental uncertainty then their perception of the
strategic business unit’s ability to cope with complexity does not increase.
The final element of this section of the report examines the relationship between the ability of
the various strategic business units within the Barclays Group to cope with change and their
ability to cope with complexity. The research finds that 50.97% of the variance in the ability
to cope with complexity is related to the ability to cope with change. In simpler terms, the
results show that where the ability of the strategic business unit to cope with change increases,
the Group Executive Committee also perceives an increase in the ability of the strategic
business unit to cope with complexity.
Again this result fits the findings of the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5), where
strategists logically concluded that when they have seen a strategic business unit cope during a
period where the rate of change is perceived to be high, then their perception of the ability of
the strategic business unit to cope with complexity is also perceived to be high – the logical
opposite being that when strategists have not witnessed a strategic business unit being forced
to cope with increased levels of change, then their perception of the strategic business unit’s
ability to cope with complexity does not increase.
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Again it is possible to analyse whether the results showing a statistically significant
relationship between the ability of the business units to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty and their ability to cope with change and complexity occurred purely by chance.
Through observation of the statistical significance of the equation with two independent
variables, the results show that fourteen of the fifteen members of the Group Executive
Committee provided statistically significant results (see Table 52 below). This was also the
case when the averages were used as the basis for comparison.
Interestingly all of the fourteen responses were significant at the 3.5% level, and thirteen of
these responses were significant at the 1% level. Consequently there is only one response
where the results show there is less than 1% probability, or 99% certainty, that the ability to
cope with perceived environmental uncertainty is moderated by the ability of the various
strategic business units to cope with change and complexity. Again these findings are
consistent with the results of the qualitative exploration into perceived environmental
uncertainty, set out in Section 5.5.
Table 52 – The Relationship Between The Ability To Cope With Uncertainty Versus Change And Complexity
Respondent R² Combination R-squared (R²) As % Significant Values
1. 0.227 22.7% Not Significant
2. 1.000 100.0% *
3. 1.000 100.0% *
4. 0.798 79.8% <1%
5. 0.832 83.2% <1%
6. 0.895 89.5% <1%
7. 0.371 37.1% <3.50%
8. 0.742 74.2% <1%
9. 0.879 87.9% <1%
10. 0.143 14.3% <1%
11. 0.825 82.5% <1%
12. 0.893 89.3% <1%
13. 0.847 84.7% <1%
14. 0.989 98.9% <1%
15. 0.679 67.9% <1%
AVERAGES 0.948 94.8% <1%
ALL DATA 0.720 72.0% <1%
* These respondents gave identical scores for the uncertainty and change variables
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Finally it is possible to analyse whether the results show a statistically significant relationship
between the ability of the business units to cope with change and their ability to cope with
complexity. Through observation of the collinearity r-squared (see Table 53 below), the
results show that there is a statistically significant relationship (0.942) between the ability of
the various strategic business units to cope with change and their ability to cope with
complexity. These findings are consistent with the results of the qualitative exploration into
perceived environmental uncertainty, set out in Section 5.5.
Table 53 – Examining The Relationship Between The Ability To Cope With Change And With Complexity
Respondent Collinearity r² (r²) Collinearity r² (r²%) Significant Values
1. 0.612 61.2% <1%
2. 0.887 88.7% <1%
3. 0.476 47.6% <1%
4. 0.591 59.1% <1%
5. 0.750 75.0% <1%
6. 0.314 31.4% <5%
7. 0.169 16.9% Not Significant
8. 0.490 49.0% <1%
9. 0.933 93.3% <1%
10. 0.792 79.2% <1%
11. 0.353 35.3% <2%
12. 0.602 60.2% <1%
13. 0.564 56.4% <1%
14. 0.741 74.1% <1%
15. 0.005 0.5% Not Significant
AVERAGES 0.942 94.2% <1%
ALL DATA 0.714 71.4% <1%
Similarly to the relationship between the rate of change and the level of complexity as
contributory factors in the creation of increased levels of perceived environmental uncertainty
(see Section 5.6.3.4), the ability to cope with change is identified as being the much stronger
independent variable than the ability to cope with complexity.
To illustrate this point, the findings show that the relationship between the ability to cope with
uncertainty versus the ability to cope with change and complexity is 0.714 (see Table 53
above); the relationship between the ability to cope with uncertainty versus the ability to cope
with change is 0.696; and the relationship between the ability to cope with uncertainty and the
ability to cope with complexity is 0.494. The r-squared between the two independent
variables, the ability to cope with change versus the ability to cope with complexity, is 0.509.
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5.6.4.2 Managerial Implications: The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
This section of the research examines the relationship between the importance of the various
strategic business units within the Barclays Group being able to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity and the perceived
levels of these three variables. The qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5) and the literature
review (see Section 4.3–4.5) found that there should be a relationship between the importance
of being able to cope and the levels of perceived environmental uncertainty (see Table 54
below).
Table 54 – The Relationship Between Levels Of Uncertainty And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
Levels Of
Uncertainty Change Complexity
r R² (%) r r² (%) r r² (%)
Importance Of Coping With Uncertainty 0.130 1.69% 0.128 1.64% 0.335 11.22%
Importance Of Coping With Change 0.119 1.42% 0.293 8.58% 0.334 11.16%
Importance Of Coping With Complexity 0.109 1.19% 0.174 3.03% 0.415 17.22%
Note: Table 54 is based on the analysis of all data (248 observations)
From a managerial perspective again one would logically expect that in a successful
organisation such as Barclays, with a proven track record in the creation of value (see Section
2.1.5), there would be congruence in the relationship between: the degree of uncertainty, the
rate of change and the level of complexity being experienced; and the importance of the
various strategic business units being able to cope with these three phenomena. Or in
managerial terms, when there is an increase in the perceived levels of uncertainty, change or
complexity, then the importance of the various strategic business units being able to cope
should also increase.
Analysis of the responses of individual members of the Group Executive Committee shows
that some members do perceive a match between the levels of uncertainty and the importance
of coping in individual business units. Some members created a close match, particularly with
respect to the level of complexity and the importance of being able to cope with complexity,
but these respondents remained in the minority.
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The results illustrating the correlations from the individual members of the Group Executive
Committee are illustrated in Table 55 below. As in the earlier section on managerial
implications (see Section 5.6.2.2), such variation could be a consequence of the way in which
the individual respondents interpreted the 0–100 scale.
Table 55 – Levels Of Uncertainty Versus The Importance Of Coping: Correlations From Individual Responses
Not Significant At:
Number Of Coefficients (r) Significant 5% 1%
Degree Of Uncertainty 11 2 2
Rate Of Change 10 3 2
Level Of Complexity 9 0 6
Interestingly, as Table 54 shows, the results from the research show no statistical relationship
between the importance of the strategic business units being able to cope with: the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity in their competitive environment;
and the degree of uncertainty being experienced. This finding is significant because it
indicates that strategists do not create a link between the level of perceived environmental
uncertainty being experienced and the importance of being able to cope; rather the link is
made between other factors, for example the importance of the business unit being able to
cope and the value it creates, or even its centrality to the core proposition or the Group
strategy (see Section 5.5).
Moving on the research now examines the relationship between the importance of the strategic
business units being able to cope with: the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change and the
level of complexity in their competitive environment; and the rate of change being
experienced. Interestingly the results show no statistical relationship between, on the one
hand, the importance of the strategic business units being able to cope with the degree of
uncertainty or the level of complexity, and on the other hand, the rate of change in its
competitive environment (see Table 54 above).
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However, the results do identify a statistically significant relationship (0.293) between the
importance of the business unit being able to cope with change and the rate of change being
experienced in its competitive environment. Again this observation is significant as it
identifies that when change is a factor of the competitive environment, then it is important that
the various strategic business units within the Barclays Group are able to cope. This finding
fits with the results of the qualitative exploration into perceived environmental uncertainty
(see Section 5.5).
Finally this section looks at the relationship between the importance of the strategic business
units being able to cope with: the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of
complexity in their competitive environment; and the level of complexity being experienced.
Here the findings are very interesting because the results show a statistically significant
relationship between: first, the importance of being able to cope with uncertainty and the level
of complexity being experienced (0.335); second, the importance of being able to cope with
change and the level of complexity being experienced (0.334); and finally the importance of
being able to cope with complexity and the level of complexity being experienced (0.415)
Consequently the findings show that where there is any variance in the level of complexity in
the competitive environment, strategists believe this variance is reflected in the importance of
the strategic business unit being able to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity. This
finding is consistent with the findings of the qualitative exploration into perceived
environmental uncertainty (see Section 5.5) and the literature review (see Section 4.3–4.5).
Developing the research further, this section examines the relationship between the
importance of the various business units within the Group being able to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty, with change and with complexity. The correlations (again derived
from the pooled data) show that the relationships between the importance of the various
business units being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty, the rate of change
and the level of complexity are all statistically significant.
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Beginning with the relationship between the importance of being able to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty and the importance of being able to cope with change, this research
finds that 61.94% of the variance in the importance of coping with change is accounted for by
the importance of coping with perceived environmental uncertainty. In simpler terms the
results show that where it is deemed more important that the strategic business unit is able to
cope with the degree of uncertainty in its competitive environment, then the Group Executive
Committee also believes that it is important that the business unit is able to cope with change.
Table 56 – Examining The Managerial Implications: The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With
Uncertainty Change Complexity
r R² (%) r r² (%) R r² (%)
Importance Of Coping With Uncertainty 1 – – – –
Importance Of Coping With Change 0.787 61.94% 1 – –
Importance Of Coping With Complexity 0.722 52.13% 0.788 62.09% 1
Note: Table 56 is based on the analysis of all data (248 observations)
This result fits the findings of the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5) where strategists
logically concluded that when it is important that a strategic business unit is able to cope
during a period of high perceived environmental uncertainty, then their expectation is that it is
more important that the strategic business unit is able to cope with change – the logical
opposite being that when strategists believe it is increasingly important that a strategic
business unit is able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty then it is less important
that they are able to cope with change, a conclusion that would also be inconsistent with both
the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5) and the literature review (see Section 4.3–4.5).
Moving on to the relationship between the importance of being able to cope with complexity
and the importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty, a similar
pattern emerges. The research found that 52.13% of the variance in the importance of coping
with complexity is accounted for by the importance of coping with perceived environmental
uncertainty. In managerial terms, the results show that where it is deemed important that the
business unit is able to cope with complexity, the Group Executive Committee perceives that
it is important that the business unit is able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
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Again this result fits the findings of the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5), where
strategists logically concluded that when it is important that a strategic business unit is able to
cope during a period of high perceived environmental uncertainty, then their expectation is
that it is more important that the strategic business unit is able to cope with complexity – the
logical opposite being that when strategists believe it is increasingly important that a strategic
business unit is able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty then it is less important
that they are able to cope with complexity, a conclusion that would also be inconsistent with
both the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5) and the literature review (see Section 4.3–
4.5).
The next element of this section of the report examines the relationship between the
importance of the various strategic business units within the Barclays Group being able to
cope with change and the importance of the business units being able to cope with complexity.
The research finds that 62.09% of the variance in the importance of being able to cope with
complexity is associated with the importance of the business units being able to cope with
change.
In managerial terms the results show that where it is deemed important that the strategic
business unit is able to cope with change, the Group Executive Committee believes that it is
important that the strategic business unit is able to cope with complexity. The logical opposite
of this finding would be that when strategists believe it is increasingly important a strategic
business unit is able to cope with change then it is less important that they are able to cope
with complexity. Again if this was a conclusion drawn from the research, it would be
inconsistent with both the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5) and the literature review
(see Section 4.3–4.5).
Again it is possible to analyse through multiple regression analysis whether the results
showing a statistically significant relationship between the importance of the business units
being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty and the importance of their being
able to cope with change and complexity occurred purely by chance.
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Through observation of the statistical significance, the results show that eleven of the fifteen
members of the Group Executive Committee provided statistically significant results (see
Table 57 below); this was also the case when the averages were used as the basis for
comparison.
One of the responses gave results significant at the 2% level, and ten at the 1% level; in one
case the R-squared was 100% and one respondent gave identical scores for all three variables.
Consequently there are only three responses out of fifteen where the results show there is less
than 99% certainty that the importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty is determined by the importance of the various strategic business units being able
to cope with change and complexity. Again these findings are consistent with the results of the
qualitative exploration into perceived environmental uncertainty, set out in Section 5.5.
Table 57 – Importance Of Coping With Uncertainty Versus Importance Of Coping With Change And Complexity
Respondent R² Combination R-squared (R²) As % Significant Values
1. Identical Values Given For All Three Variables
2. 1.000 100.0% *
3. 0.608 60.8% <1%
4. 0.732 73.2% <1%
5. 0.859 85.9% <1%
6. 0.903 90.3% <1%
7. 0.095 9.5% Not Significant
8. 0.532 53.2% <1%
9. 0.752 75.2% <1%
10. 0.604 60.4% <1%
11. 0.423 42.3% <2%
12. 0.054 5.4% Not Significant
13. 0.895 89.5% <1%
14. 0.928 92.8% <1%
15. 0.845 84.5% <1%
AVERAGES 0.953 95.3% <1%
ALL DATA 0.647 64.7% <1%
* This respondent gave identical scores for the change and complexity variables
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Finally it is possible to analyse whether the results show a statistically significant relationship
between the importance of the business units being able to cope with change and the
importance of their being able to cope with complexity. Through observation of the
collinearity r-squared (see Table 58 below), the results show a statistically significant
relationship (0.766) between the importance of the various business units being able to cope
with change and the importance of their being able to cope with complexity. These findings
are consistent with the results of the qualitative exploration, set out in Section 5.5.
Table 58 – The Relationship Between The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Change And Complexity
Respondent Collinearity r² (r²) Collinearity r² (r²%) Significant Values
1. Identical Values Given For All Three Variables Not Significant
2. 0.588 58.8% <1%
3. 0.714 71.4% <1%
4. 0.924 92.4% <1%
5. 0.743 74.3% <1%
6. 0.889 88.9% <1%
7. 0.792 79.2% <1%
8. 0.540 54.0% <1%
9. 0.493 49.3% <1%
10. 0.719 71.9% <1%
11. 0.523 52.3% <1%
12. 0.516 51.6% <1%
13. 0.799 79.9% <1%
14. 0.897 89.7% <1%
15. 0.549 54.9% <1%
AVERAGES 0.766 76.6% <1%
ALL DATA 0.621 62.1% <1%
Again in this relationship the importance of being able to cope with change is identified as
being a much stronger independent variable than the importance of being able to cope with
complexity. To illustrate this point, the findings show the relationship (r-squared) between the
importance of being able to cope with uncertainty versus the importance of being able to cope
with change and complexity is 0.621 (see Table 58 above); the relationship between the
importance of being able to cope with uncertainty versus the importance of being able to cope
with change alone is 0.620 (see Table 56 above); and the relationship between the importance
of being able to cope with uncertainty versus the importance of being able to cope with
complexity is 0.521 (also Table 56). The r-squared between the two independent variables, the
importance of being able to cope with change versus the importance of being able to cope with
complexity, is 0.620 (also Table 54).
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5.6.4.3 Managerial Implications: The Ability To Cope And Its Importance
This section of the research examines the relationship between, on the one hand, the ability of
the various strategic business units within the Barclays Group to cope with the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity; and on the other hand, the
importance of the business units being able to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity.
The qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5) and the literature review (see Section 4.3–4.5)
found that there should be a relationship between the ability of the business units to cope with
perceived environmental uncertainty and the importance of their being able to cope.
Table 59 – Examining The Relationship Between The Ability To Cope And Its Importance
Ability To Cope With
Uncertainty Change Complexity
r R² (%) r r² (%) R r² (%)
Importance Of Coping With Uncertainty 0.263 6.92% 0.261 6.81% 0.239 5.71%
Importance Of Coping With Change 0.143 2.04% 0.179 3.20% 0.158 2.50
Importance Of Coping With Complexity 0.251 6.30% 0.253 6.40% 0.344 11.83%
Note: Table 59 is based on the analysis of all data (248 observations)
From a managerial perspective, again one would logically expect that in a successful
organisation such as Barclays, with a proven track record in the creation of value, there would
be congruence in the relationship between, on the one hand, the ability of the business units to
cope with the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity being
experienced; and on the other hand, the importance of the business units being able to cope
with these three phenomena. Or in managerial terms, when it is important that the business
units are able to cope with uncertainty, change or complexity, then the units are able to cope.
Beginning with the importance of coping with uncertainty, the results show a statistically
significant (but weak) relationship between this, and the ability to cope with uncertainty and
complexity (see Table 59 above). The research finds that 6.92% of the variance in the ability
to cope with uncertainty is associated with the importance of being able to cope with
uncertainty. By the same measure 6.81% of the variance in the ability to cope with change is
associated with the importance of being able to cope with uncertainty; and 5.71% of the
variance in the ability to cope with complexity is associated with the importance of being able
to cope with uncertainty.
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This finding indicates that strategists create a link between the importance of the business
units being able to cope and their ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity. The
findings show that where there is variance in the importance of the being able to cope then
such variance is reflected to a significant degree in the ability of the various business units to
cope, however, this degree is very small. For example, the r² between the importance of
coping with uncertainty and the ability to do so implies that 93.1% of the variance in the
importance of being able to cope is not associated with the ability to cope.
The research now moves on to examine the relationship between the importance of business
units being able to cope with change and their ability to cope with: the degree of uncertainty,
the rate of change and the level of complexity in their competitive environments. Interestingly
the results show no statistical relationship between the importance of the business units being
able to cope with change and their ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity
(see Table 59 above). Again this is significant as the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5)
suggests there should be a relationship between the importance of coping with change and the
ability of the business units to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity.
The research then moves on to examine the relationship between the importance of being able
to cope with complexity, and the ability of the strategic business units to cope with
uncertainty, change, and complexity. Here the results show a statistically significant (but again
weak) relationship with the ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity (see Table
59 above). The research finds that 6.30% of the variance in the importance of being able to
cope with complexity is reflected in the ability to cope with uncertainty. By the same measure
6.40% of the variance in the ability to cope with change is associated with the importance of
being able to cope with complexity; and 11.83% of the variance in the ability to cope with
complexity is accounted for by the importance of being able to cope with complexity.
This finding is significant because it indicates that strategists create a link between the
importance of being able to cope with complexity and the ability of the business units to cope
with uncertainty, change and complexity. Therefore the findings show that where there is any
variance in the importance of the business units being able to cope with complexity, then such
variance is reflected in their ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity.
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 247 of 444
5.7 Summary Of Key Research Findings
5.7.1 Key Findings: Qualitative Exploration
5.7.1.1 General Key Findings
The general key findings from the exploration into perceived environmental uncertainty across
the Barclays portfolio of strategic business units are set out in Table 60 below:
Table 60 – Qualitative Exploration: General Key Findings
Ref: General Key Findings
1. Strategists at Barclays tend to avoid using terms such as ‘uncertainty’ owing to their negative connotations.
2. Levels of perceived environmental uncertainty vary over time.
3. There is a high degree of synergy between the factors that create uncertainty, change and complexity.
4. There is a low degree of consensus regarding specific levels of uncertainty, change and complexity.
5. Strategists at Barclays accept a degree of uncertainty as the ‘norm’ in the UK financial services industry.
6. As strategists gain more experience and knowledge they become more ‘immune’ to uncertainty, change and
complexity.
7. As strategists become more senior at Barclays they develop a higher ‘tolerance’ of degrees of uncertainty,
rates of change and levels of complexity.
8. Factors that contribute to the rate of change are generally externally focused whereas factors that contribute
to the level of complexity tend to be internally focused.
5.7.1.2 Factors That Increase The Degree Of Uncertainty Across Barclays
The key findings from the exploration into the factors that increase the perceived degree of
uncertainty in the competitive environment across the Barclays portfolio of strategic business
units are set out in Table 61 below:
Table 61 – Key Factors That Increase The Perceived Degree Of Uncertainty
Ref: Key Factors
1. The increased demands of a higher number of customers and not knowing how customers will behave.
2. The recruitment and servicing of more sophisticated and knowledgeable customers.
3. Much lower levels of inertia within the customer base and the emergence of proactive ‘switchers’ in the
customer base, e.g. fixed-rate mortgage customers.
4. Development of new or immature business models, e.g. Barclaycard New Ventures in 2001.
5. New entrants in the market place operating from lower cost bases, reducing prices and therefore
challenging profit margins.
6. Lack of stability in the domestic or international economic environment, e.g. increased interest rates and
the threat of a fall in house prices.
7. Lack of stability in the domestic or international political environment, e.g. the war in Iraq, the Middle East
Peace Process, and the US Presidential Elections.
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5.7.1.3 Factors That Increase The Rate Of Change Across Barclays
The key findings from the exploration into the factors that increase the perceived rate of
change in the competitive environment across the Barclays portfolio are set out in Table 62
below:
Table 62 –Key Factors That Increase The Perceived Rate Of Change
Ref: Key Factors
1. Escalating levels of supply in an over-supplied market, leading to increasing competition in the market
place, and competing at higher new levels of customer service standards.
2. Development and adoption of new technologies, e.g. in Customer Relationship Management.
3. The emergence of new delivery channels, e.g. telephone and electronic delivery or mobile branches.
4. The demands from the market place to respond quickly to customer requirements through the successful
delivery of change initiatives, e.g. new product development or channel management.
5. The increased demands from key stakeholders for successful outcomes from change initiatives or
business transformation programmes.
6. The emergence of cost pressures within the retail financial services industry.
7. Increased consolidation in the UK retail financial service industry, creating merger and acquisition
activity.
8. Increased globalisation in the retail financial services industry creating international merger and
acquisition activity particularly in Europe.
9. Increased legal and regulatory obligations creating large change initiatives, e.g. International Accounting
Standards, Basel II, Sarbanes Oxley, European Savings Directive.
10. The need to introduce Equality and Diversity into the business units’ processes of recruitment, personnel
management, reward and retention.
5.7.1.4 Factors That Increase The Level Of Complexity Across Barclays
The key findings from the exploration into the factors that increase the perceived level of
complexity in the competitive environment across the Barclays portfolio are set out in Table
63 below:
Table 63 – Key Factors That Increase The Perceived Level Of Complexity
Ref: Key Factors
1. The sheer size of the strategic business unit required to serve the market place, e.g. the Retail Bank in the
UK with 1,500 branches and 25,000 employees.
2. The global geographical dispersion of the various strategic business units within the Barclays Group.
3. The number and nature of the key stakeholders that the various strategic business units have to serve.
4. The level of legal and regulatory obligations that exist within particular industries.
5. The lack of maturity of the market place within which the business unit operates, e.g. Barclaycard
International.
6. The level of information required to operate effectively within a particular industry, e.g. Barclays Capital
and Barclays Global Investors.
7. The increasing expectations of multiple customer – multiple product relationships across the Group.
8. The need to recruit, manage, reward and retain talented individuals within the senior management teams
of the various strategic business units across the Barclays Group.
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5.7.1.5 Factors That Enable Strategic Business Units To Cope With Uncertainty
The key findings from the exploration into the factors that enable strategic business units
within the Barclays portfolio to cope with uncertainty are set out in Table 64 below:
Table 64 –Key Factors That Enable Strategic Business Units To Cope With Uncertainty
Ref: Key Factors
1. The resilience of the business model itself, described in the data as efficient and effective stewardship of
the ‘money-printing machine’.
2. The dominant position of the strategic business unit in its particular position, e.g. Barclaycard UK, and
the financial ‘muscle’ associated with holding such a position.
3. The experience of having been through a period of high uncertainty in the past, e.g. Barclays Capital in
1999.
4. The strength and breadth of the Barclays brand, described in the data as ‘brand muscle’.
5.7.1.6 Factors That Enable Strategic Business Units To Cope With Change
The key findings from the exploration into the factors that enable strategic business units
within the Barclays portfolio to cope with change are set out in Table 65 below:
Table 65 – Key Factors That Enable Strategic Business Units To Cope With Change
Ref: Key Factors
1. The strategic agility, or the speed of response, the strategic business unit is able to achieve.
2. The strategic flexibility of the strategic business unit, e.g. Barclays Capital.
3. The quality of the people within the strategic business unit, e.g. Barclays Global Investors.
4. The ability of the organisation to recognise and reward its people for coping with change.
5.7.1.7 Factors That Enable Strategic Business Units To Cope With Complexity
The key findings from the exploration into the factors that enable strategic business units
within the Barclays portfolio to cope with complexity are set out in Table 66 below:
Table 66 – Key Factors That Enable Strategic Business Units To Cope With Complexity
Ref: Key Factors
1. The ability of the strategic business unit to recruit top talent into the senior management team.
2. The pan-Group experience of the senior management team, e.g. the Business Bank.
3. The willingness of the strategic business unit to trust other areas of the Group to deliver value and
communicate effectively.
4. The ability of the strategic business unit to forge good working relationships with key stakeholders, e.g.
the City, Government and the various regulatory bodies.
5. The ability to manage internal competition and conflict, eradicating dysfunctional internal politics.
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5.7.1.8 Factors Driving The Importance Of Being Able To Cope: Uncertainty
The key factors that make it important for strategic business units within the Barclays
portfolio to be able to cope with uncertainty are set out in Table 67 below:
Table 67 – Key Factors That Make It Important Business Units Are Able To Cope With Uncertainty
Ref: Key Factors
1. The long-term pressure across the Group to continually maximise long-term shareholder value.
2. Regulation continuing to break down the barriers that have previously blocked entry into Barclays’ core
markets.
3. The emergence of lean, international competition, e.g. American mono-lines in the credit card industry.
4. A continuing decline in the levels of inertia and loyalty that exist among the customer base.
5.7.1.9 Factors Driving The Importance Of Being Able To Cope: Change
The key factors that make it important for strategic business units within the Barclays
portfolio to be able to cope with change are set out in Table 68 below:
Table 68 – Key Factors That Make It Important Business Units Are Able To Cope With Change
Ref: Key Factors
1. The ‘centrality’ of the strategic business unit to the Group Strategy.
2. The degree to which they will be relied on to deliver the benefits derived from implementation of the
Group Strategy.
3. The ability of the strategic business unit to build its change capability in a way that embeds flexibility
into its infrastructure to facilitate effective change management in the future.
5.7.1.10 Factors Driving The Importance Of Being Able To Cope: Complexity
The key factors that make it important for strategic business units within the Barclays
portfolio to be able to cope with complexity are set out in Table 69 below:
Table 69 – Key Factors That Make It Important Business Units Are Able To Cope With Complexity
Ref: Key Factors
1. Some strategic business units within the Barclays Group operate in complex systems and it is important
that the business unit is able to cope with such complexity in order to defend and grow the core business.
2. The strategic aim of the Barclays Group is to become a world-class, global, financial services provider,
which introduces complexity and increases the importance of being able to cope with such complexity.
3. Emerging distribution channels will continue to create complexity for all the strategic business units.
4. Onerous legal and regulatory obligations will continue to create complexity across the Barclays Group.
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5.7.2 Key Findings: Quantitative Exploration
5.7.2.1 Examining The Role Of Managerial Consensus
In the Statement of Propositions (see Section 5.6.1), Project 2 of the research set out to
establish the role of managerial consensus (or the lack of such consensus) in the strategy
development process across Barclays. The literature review (see Section 4.5.5.) referred to the
lack of managerial consensus as the individual perspective on corporate strategy.
The results of Project 2 illustrate the range of responses given by the Group Executive
Committee on: the levels of uncertainty, change and complexity in the competitive
environment; the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with uncertainty,
change and complexity; and the importance of the strategic business units within the Barclays
portfolio being able to cope with these three phenomena. With a mean range of 59.47 on a
scale of 0–100, the results (see Table 70 below) show the wide range of responses, or the lack
of managerial consensus, that exists at the Group Executive Committee on how perceived
environmental uncertainty impacts the various business units within the Barclays Group.
Table 70 – Identifying The Range Of Responses Across The Barclays Portfolio
Levels Of Ability To Cope Importance Of Coping
Strategic Business Unit Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com
Woolwich 55 60 70 45 50 55 60 50 65
UK Retail Bank 50 60 50 70 70 60 80 70 70
Caribbean 55 90 80 55 60 70 85 80 60
Europe 60 50 50 55 55 55 70 70 80
International Bank 60 55 60 60 60 60 70 80 70
Private Bank 55 50 50 40 40 45 55 60 80
Premier Bank 65 55 40 50 60 50 80 60 70
Barclays Global Investors 75 65 60 70 60 70 60 50 75
Business Bank 75 50 50 50 50 50 80 70 70
Barclays Africa 60 65 70 60 65 55 70 70 80
Barclaycard Corporate 60 55 40 45 50 45 55 55 50
Barclaycard International 55 60 50 65 65 65 50 60 80
Barclaycard UK 60 60 60 60 40 40 70 60 70
Collateralised Financing 60 55 70 40 40 60 60 65 50
Global Financing 60 55 50 30 40 60 50 40 60
Global Markets 70 75 60 40 50 50 80 40 60
Private Equity 50 60 70 50 50 50 80 60 60
MEAN RANGE 60.29 60.00 57.65 52.06 53.24 55.29 67.94 61.18 67.65
RANKING OF RANGE 4 5 6 9 8 7 1 3 2
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 252 of 444
Developing this type of analysis, it is possible to rank the standard deviations for the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity. This analysis is set out below in
Table 71. The strategic business units are ordered in terms of their mean ranking across each
of these dimensions.
Through this analysis, it is clear that Barclays Global Investors (3.67), Private Equity (4.67)
and the Caribbean (5.00) are the subject of the greatest lack of managerial consensus when
considering the degree of uncertainty, change and complexity in their competitive
environments.
Table 71 – Concluding Managerial Consensus: Assessing The Levels Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Strategic Business Unit Unc Rank Cha Rank Com Rank Mean
Rank
Barclays Global Investors 21.349 1 20.517 2 18.27 8 3.67
Private Equity 17.158 7 19.795 4 21.738 3 4.67
Caribbean 15.774 12= 26.163 1 22.652 2 5.00
Barclays Africa 15.721 14 19.982 3 23.335 1 6.00
Collateralised Financing 17.775 5 17.265 9 19.081 6 6.67
UK Retail Bank 15.838 11 19.475 5 19.13 5 7.00
Global Markets 17.595 6 19.165 6 16.909 10 7.33
International Bank 18.19 4 16.021 14 18.763 7 8.33
Woolwich 15.271 17 18.871 7 20.307 4 9.33
Premier Bank 18.342 3 17.849 8 12.714 17 9.33
Barclaycard UK 16.513 10 16.818 10 17.512 9 9.67
Business Bank 19.254 2 16.352 13 14.368 15 10.00
Global Financing 17.097 8 15.513 15 15.064 13 12.00
Europe 15.453 15= 16.669 11 16.669 11 12.33
Private Bank 16.607 9 13.076 17 16.132 12 12.67
Barclaycard International 15.774 12= 16.655 12 12.79 16 13.33
Barclaycard Corporate 15.453 15= 14.100 16 14.856 14 15.00
By way of contrast, the lowest standard deviations (or the highest managerial consensus) are
evident in the mean rankings for Barclaycard Corporate (15.00) and Barclaycard International
(13.33). Interestingly the rankings for Barclaycard UK (10, 10, 9) were consistently grouped
around the centre of the rankings. Both Barclays Africa (14, 3, 1) and the Premier Bank (3, 8,
17) had evidence of extreme standard deviations (and therefore extreme mean rankings) across
the three dimensions. This would also suggest a significant lack of managerial consensus
regarding these two strategic business units.
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Moving on, it is also possible to rank the standard deviations for the perceptual assessments of
the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with the degree of uncertainty, the
rate of change, and the level of complexity. This analysis is set out below in Table 72. The
strategic business units have again been ordered in terms of their mean ranking across each of
these dimensions.
Through this examination of the data, it is apparent that Barclays Africa, the UK Retail Bank
and Barclaycard International (with mean rankings of 2.00) are the subject of the greatest lack
of managerial consensus when considering their ability to cope with the degree of uncertainty,
change and complexity in their competitive environments.
Table 72 – Concluding Managerial Consensus: Assessing The Ability To Cope
Strategic Business Unit Unc Rank Cha Rank Com Rank Mean
Rank
Barclays Africa 21.531 2 21.996 1 18.344 3 2.00
UK Retail Bank 21.751 1 19.242 3 18.803 2 2.00
Barclaycard International 18.879 3 20.569 2 20.166 1 2.00
Barclays Global Investors 18.4 4 18.446 4 17.512 4 4.00
Caribbean 16.633 6 17.975 5= 17.369 5 5.33
International Bank 18.074 5 15.229 8 16.497 7 6.67
Woolwich 15.864 10 14.681 11 16.994 6 9.00
Europe 16.439 7 14.695 10 14.5 11 9.33
Private Equity 16.304 8 15.336 7 13.135 13 9.33
Premier Bank 15.446 11 17.975 5= 13.048 14 10.00
Barclaycard Corporate 14.242 13 13.814 13 14.984 10 12.00
Barclaycard UK 15.976 9 13.87 12 12.421 16 12.33
Collateralised Financing 12.514 15 13.114 14 16.266 9 12.67
Global Markets 13.019 14 14.954 9 12.796 15 12.67
Business Bank 14.541 12 12.892 15 13.941 12 13.00
Global Financing 11.254 16 12.415 16 16.425 8 13.33
Private Bank 11.211 17 12.081 17 11.979 17 17.00
The lowest standard deviation (or the highest managerial consensus) is evident in the mean
ranking for the Private Bank (17.00) as it had the highest consensus across every dimension.
In this section Barclaycard Corporate (13, 13, 10) were consistently grouped around the centre
of the rankings. Interestingly there was little evidence of extreme standard deviations (and
therefore extreme mean rankings) across the three dimensions. This would also suggest a
higher level of managerial consensus regarding the ability of the various strategic business
units to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity.
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The final part of this section ranks the standard deviations for the subjective evaluations of the
importance of the various strategic business units being able to cope with the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity. This analysis is set out below in
Table 73. Once again the strategic business units have been ordered in terms of their mean
ranking across each of these dimensions.
Through a close examination of the data, again Barclays Africa (3.67) and the UK Retail Bank
(2.00) have a high mean ranking, this time accompanied by the International Bank (3.00). This
evidence indicates that these business units are subject to the greatest lack of managerial
consensus when considering the importance of their being able to cope with uncertainty,
change and complexity.
Table 73 – Concluding Managerial Consensus: Evaluating The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
Strategic Business Unit Unc Rank Cha Rank Com Rank Mean
Rank
UK Retail Bank 25.598 2 23.197 1 22.023 3 2.00
International Bank 24.088 3 21.037 5 22.350 1 3.00
Barclays Africa 23.335 4 21.833 3 21.685 4 3.67
Caribbean 23.135 5 23.053 2 19.791 9 5.33
Private Equity 26.774 1 17.889 11 20.767 7 6.33
Business Bank 22.662 7 21.286 4 20.160 8 6.33
Europe 22.398 8 18.942 7 21.420 5 6.67
Private Bank 20.914 10 18.886 8 21.118 6 8.00
Barclays Global Investors 21.833 9 14.936 15 22.345 2 8.67
Premier Bank 23.006 6 16.847 12 19.198 11 9.67
Collateralised Financing 18.479 13 19.351 6 18.066 14 11.00
Woolwich 17.809 14 18.048 10 18.980 12 12.00
Barclaycard UK 17.715 15 16.783 13 18.516 13 13.67
Barclaycard International 13.947 16 18.516 9 19.445 10 11.67
Barclaycard Corporate 18.942 11 16.235 14 15.407 15 13.33
Global Markets 18.664 12 12.558 16 14.639 16 14.67
Global Financing 13.301 17 11.774 17 13.708 17 17.00
The lowest standard deviation (or the highest managerial consensus) is evident in the mean
ranking for Global Financing (17.00) as it had the highest consensus across every dimension.
In this section the Woolwich (14, 10, 12) were consistently clustered around the centre. Again
there was little evidence of extreme standard deviations across the three dimensions,
suggesting a higher level of managerial consensus regarding the importance of the various
strategic business units being able to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity.
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5.7.2.2 Challenging The Modernist Perspective
The Statement of Propositions (see Section 5.6.1) also sets out the objective of Project 2 to
investigate the modernist perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty. Covered in
detail in the earlier literature review (see Section 4.3–4.5), the modernist perspective
conceptualises perceived environmental uncertainty as the dependent variable, with two
independent variables: the rate of change and the level of complexity.
The findings of Project 2 (see Table 74 below) are at variance with the modernist perspective
because they show that the rate of change is a far stronger variable than the level of
complexity in the creation of perceived environmental uncertainty across Barclays.
Table 74 – Examining The Relationship Between Uncertainty, Change And Complexity
Uncertainty Change Complexity
r r² (%) R r² (%) r r² (%)
Uncertainty 1 – – – –
Change 0.437 19.10 1 – –
Complexity 0.175 3.07 0.435 18.92 1
The results also show that the rate of change and level of complexity cannot be regarded
simply as independent variables because there is a statistically significant relationship (0.435)
between the two variables. Therefore the findings of Project 2 show that the rate of change in
the competitive environment increases the level of complexity experienced by strategists at
Barclays. This means that the rate of change and the level of complexity cannot be
conceptualised as independent variables as proposed by the modernist perspective on
perceived environmental uncertainty.
The evidence collected through Project 2 also finds that the role of the senior management
team is a pivotal factor in the degree of uncertainty faced by organisations. The modernist
perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty is predicated on the assumption that all
variables in the competitive environment can be reduced to the rate of change and the level of
complexity. The evidence suggests that the role of the senior management team, for example
leadership, internal politics and stakeholder management, cannot be reduced simply to the rate
of change and the level of complexity as postulated through the modernist perspective.
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A useful way of analysing the modernist perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty
is to examine the relationship between: a) the degree of uncertainty and the rate of change; b)
the degree of uncertainty and the level of complexity; and c) the rate of change and the level of
complexity.
Beginning with the relationship between the degree of uncertainty and the rate of change, it is
possible to organise the seventeen business units within the Barclays Group in their seven
clusters (see Section 4.6.3.3) and plot the assessments for the degree of uncertainty (y-axis)
against the assessments for the rate of change (x-axis), as illustrated in Figure 14 below:
Figure 14 – The Relationship Between The Degree Of Uncertainty And The Rate Of Change
If one accepts the modernist perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty then one
would expect to find that when the degree of uncertainty is found to be high, then the rate of
change would also be high, and vice versa. Through the illustration in Figure 14 above, it is
clear that this is not the case for Barclays Capital, which obtained a relatively high assessment
for uncertainty (56.68) and a relatively low score for change (44.77). A similar pattern was
found with the assessments for Barclays Global Investors (50.07:44.33) and Barclays Africa
(49.00:42.00).
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However, the modernist perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty was supported in
the assessments made for the Business Bank, which obtained a relatively low assessment for
uncertainty (45.57) and a relatively low score for change (49.20). Interestingly a similar (but
weaker) pattern was found in the assessments for: the UK Retail Bank (45.57:49.20),
Barclaycard (48.13:51.44) and Barclays Private Clients (49.35:51.65).
Moving on to the relationship between the degree of uncertainty and the level of complexity, it
is possible to organise the seventeen business units into their seven clusters and plot the
assessments for uncertainty against the assessments for complexity (see Figure 15 below):
Figure 15 – The Relationship Between The Degree Of Uncertainty And The Level Of Complexity
Again if one accepts the modernist perspective, one would expect to find that when the degree
of uncertainty is high, then the level of complexity would also be high, and vice versa. The
illustration in Figure 15 shows clearly that this is not the case for Barclays Global Investors,
which obtained a relatively high assessment for uncertainty (50.07) and a relatively low score
for change (43.67). A similar pattern is found through the assessments for Barclays Africa
(49.00:44.76) and Barclays Capital (56.68:49.79). The modernist perspective is also refuted in
the assessments for the UK Retail Bank, which obtained a relatively low assessment for
uncertainty (45.57) and the highest score for change (53.83).
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Once again there is support for the modernist perspective in the assessments made for the
Business Bank, which obtained a relatively low assessment for uncertainty (42.00) and a
relatively low score for change (48.00). A similar (but weaker) relationship is found in the
assessments for Barclaycard (48.13:49.11) and Barclays Private Clients (49.35:51.29).
The final relationship to examine is that between the rate of change and the level of
complexity. Again, it is possible to identify the seven clusters and plot the assessments for
change against those made for complexity (see Figure 16 below):
Figure 16 – The Relationship Between The Rate Of Change And The Level Of Complexity
Under the modernist perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty, one would expect
no relationship between the rate of change and the level of complexity, as they are
conceptualised as independent variables. Figure 16 shows that this is clearly not the case for
the UK Retail Bank, Barclays Private Clients and Barclaycard, which obtained a relatively
high assessment for change and complexity. A similar pattern is found through the
assessments for Barclays Global Investors and Barclays Africa, which received relatively low
assessments for both complexity and change. A similar (but weaker) relationship is found in
the assessments for the Business Bank and Barclays Capital.
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5.7.2.3 Investigating The Managerial Implications
5.7.2.3.1 Identifying The Key Relationships From A Managerial Perspective
One of the key objectives of the Executive Doctorate is to ascertain the managerial
implications arising from the investigation into perceived environmental uncertainty. In order
to achieve this, the research examines the relationship between a) the degree of perceived
environmental uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity and the
organisation’s ability to cope with these three phenomena (see Section 4.5.6.1); b) the degree
of perceived environmental uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity and the
importance of the various strategic business units being able to cope with these three
phenomena; and c) the organisation’s ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity
and the importance of it being able to cope with these three phenomena (see Section 4.5.6.2).
Through the investigation into the managerial implications of perceived environmental
uncertainty, the correlation co-efficients derived from the pooled responses of board members
are set out in Table 75 below:
Table 75 – Conclusions: Identifying The Key Relationships
Levels Of Ability To Cope Importance Of
Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com
Degree Of Uncertainty 1
Rate Of Change 0.437 1
Level Of Complexity 0.175 0.435 1
Ability To Cope With The
Degree Of Uncertainty -0.110 -0.178 -0.067 1
Ability To Cope With The
Rate Of Change -0.137 -0.173 -0.143 0.834 1
Ability To Cope With The
Level Of Complexity -0.108 -0.162 -0.055 0.703 0.714 1
Importance Of Coping With
The Degree Of Uncertainty 0.130 0.128 0.335 0.263 0.261 0.239 1
Importance Of Coping With
The Rate Of Change 0.119 0.293 0.334 0.143 0.179 0.158 0.787 1
Importance Of Coping With
The Level Of Complexity 0.109 0.174 0.415 0.251 0.253 0.344 0.722 0.788 1
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This document identified earlier that the overriding strategic objective across Barclays is the
maximisation of stakeholder value (see Section 2.1.5). This section looks at the concept of
perceived environmental uncertainty, the ability to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty, and the importance of being able to cope with such uncertainty, within the context
of the maximisation of stakeholder value.
The literature review (see Section 4.5.6) identified that perceived environmental uncertainty is
only significant from a managerial perspective if the organisation is not able to cope. Within
the context of value creation, the inability to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty
assumes a much greater degree of importance at Barclays if it acts as a barrier to the creation
of shareholder value.
Consequently, from a managerial perspective there are twelve key relationships investigated in
this element of the research. These relationships, together with details of the first and second
variables, are set out in detail in Table 76 below:
Table 76 – Conclusions: Setting Out The Twelve Key Relationships
1st Variable 2nd Variable r r² (%)
Degree Of Uncertainty Rate Of Change 0.437 19.10%
Degree Of Uncertainty Level Of Complexity 0.175 3.07%
Rate Of Change Level Of Complexity 0.435 18.92%
Degree Of Uncertainty Ability To Cope With Uncertainty -0.110 1.21%
Rate Of Change Ability To Cope With Change -0.173 2.99%
Level Of Complexity Ability To Cope With Complexity -0.055 0.30%
Degree Of Uncertainty Importance Of Coping With Uncertainty 0.130 1.69%
Rate Of Change Importance Of Coping With Change 0.293 8.58%
Level Of Complexity Importance Of Coping With Complexity 0.415 17.22%
Ability To Cope With Uncertainty Importance Of Coping With Uncertainty 0.263 6.92%
Ability To Cope With Change Importance Of Coping With Change 0.179 3.20%
Ability To Cope With Complexity Importance Of Coping With Complexity 0.344 11.83%
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5.7.2.3.2 The Degree Of Uncertainty, Change And Complexity
This stage of the analysis looks at the three elements within the modernist perspective on
perceived environmental uncertainty – the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the
level of complexity – within the context of the key strategic objective at Barclays, namely the
maximisation of shareholder value. Here the seventeen business units have been arranged
within their clusters (see Section 4.6.3.3) and plotted as bubbles on a graph, with the size of
the bubble representing the level of economic profit during 2003 (see Figure 17 below):
Figure 17 – The Relationship Between The Degree Of Uncertainty And The Rate Of Change
From a managerial perspective, one would hope that the clusters making the most contribution
to the Group, or creating the most value, in 2003 the Business Bank (£623m) and the UK
Retail Bank (£460m), are not experiencing the greatest uncertainty or change. Through this
analysis, it appears that the next two largest creators of value, Barclays Capital (£320m) and
Barclaycard (£319m), are deemed to be facing a higher rate of change. The lowest creators of
value, Barclays Private Clients (£163m), Barclays Global Investors (£112m) and Barclays
Africa (£36m), are placed around the middle of the uncertainty scale. Barclays Private Clients
is deemed to be facing the highest rate of change (51.68), which may not necessarily be a
problem as it may reflect a level of strategic change necessary to address its value contribution
relative to its performance in 2002 (£328m), a fall of 49.70% (see Table 128).
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The next piece of this section develops this analysis further to look at the relationship between
the degree of uncertainty and the level of complexity being experienced by the seven clusters
within the Barclays Group. Once again the seven clusters have been plotted on a graph, with
the size of the bubble representing the level of economic profit (or value created) during 2003
(see Figure 18 below):
Figure 18 – The Relationship Between The Degree Of Uncertainty And The Level Of Complexity
Once more from a managerial perspective, one would hope that the clusters making the most
contribution to the Group, or creating the most value, again the Business Bank (£623m) and
the UK Retail Bank (£460m), are not experiencing the greatest uncertainty or complexity.
However, it appears from this analysis that the UK Retail Bank (£460m) are facing a relatively
high level of complexity, as are Barclays Capital (£320m) who are another large creator of
value. This evidence needs to be reviewed in the light of the qualitative exploration (see
Section 5.5.5.2), which acknowledges that the industry within which Barclays Capital operates
is by nature relatively complex. However, the level of complexity faced by the UK Retail
Bank could create a strategic issue for the Group. By way of contrast, an encouraging sign for
Barclays is that the largest creator of value, the Business Bank (£623m), is not facing a
relatively high level of complexity (48.00).
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The final element of this section examines the relationship between the rate of change and the
level of complexity being experienced by the seven clusters within the Barclays Group. Once
more the seven clusters have been plotted on a graph, with the size of the bubble representing
the level of economic profit (or value created) during 2003 (see Figure 19 below):
Figure 19 – The Relationship Between The Rate Of Change And The Level Of Complexity
Once more from a managerial perspective, one would hope that the clusters making the most
contribution to the Group, or creating the most value, the Business Bank (£623m) and the UK
Retail Bank (£460m), are not experiencing the highest rate of change or greatest level of
complexity. However, it appears from this analysis that the UK Retail Bank (£460m) are
facing a relatively high rate of change and a relatively high level of complexity. Once again
the position of the UK Retail Bank across these two dimensions could be a strategic issue for
the Group.
The poor performance of Barclays Private Clients during 2003 (-49.70%) may be explained by
the relatively high rate of change (51.68) and high level of complexity (51.29) it faces. Once
again an encouraging sign for the Group is that the largest creator of value, the Business Bank
(£623m), is not facing a relatively high level of change (42.33) or complexity (48.00).
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5.7.2.3.3 The Degree Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty And The Ability To Cope
This section of the analysis looks at the relationship between the degree of uncertainty the
organisation is deemed to be facing, and its ability cope. Once more this analysis is undertaken
within the context of the key strategic objective at Barclays – the maximisation of shareholder
value. Here the seventeen strategic business units have been arranged within their clusters (see
Section 4.6.3.3) and plotted as bubbles on a graph, with the size of the bubble representing the
level of economic profit (or value created) during 2003 (see Figure 20 below):
Figure 20 – The Relationship Between The Degree Of Uncertainty And The Ability To Cope With Uncertainty
From a managerial perspective, one would hope that the clusters facing the most uncertainty
are the ones most able to cope. Within the context of value creation one would also hope that
the clusters making the most contribution to the Group, or creating the most value, are most
able to cope. The results from this analysis are very encouraging, as Barclays Capital is
deemed to be facing the greatest degree of uncertainty (56.68) but is also the cluster deemed
most able to cope (73.72). the Business Bank, the largest creator of value (£623m), is deemed
to face the smallest degree of uncertainty (42.00) but is also deemed highly able to cope
(71.00). Similarly, the UK Retail Bank is deemed to be the least able to cope (45.57) but also
encouragingly faces a relatively small degree of uncertainty (48.00).
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This next part of the analysis looks at the relationship between the rate of change the
organisation is deemed to be facing, and its ability cope with change, within the context of the
maximisation of shareholder value. Again the strategic business units are arranged within their
clusters and plotted as bubbles on a graph, with the size of the bubble representing the level of
economic profit (or value created) during 2003 (see Figure 21 below).
Figure 21 – The Relationship Between The Rate Of Change And The Ability To Cope With Change
From a managerial perspective, one would hope that the clusters facing the highest rate of
change are the ones most able to cope with change. Strategically one would also hope that the
clusters making the most contribution to the Group, or creating the most value, are the most
able to cope. Again the results from this analysis are very encouraging as two of the largest
creators of value, Barclays Capital and the Business Bank, are deemed to be facing very low
rates of change but are assessed as being the most able to cope. Similarly Barclaycard, another
large creator of value (£319m), is deemed to face a high degree of change (51.44) but is also
considered as highly able to cope (64.69). From a managerial perspective, the position of the
UK Retail Bank (£460m) and Barclays Private Clients (£163m) could be a cause for concern.
The assessments show the UK Retail Bank (49.20) and Barclays Private Clients (51.68) to be
facing the most change but, with assessments of 50.03 and 51.01 respectively, these clusters
are also considered to be the least able to cope with change.
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The final part of this section looks at the relationship between the level of complexity the
organisation is deemed to face, and its ability cope with complexity, again within the context
of the maximisation of shareholder value. Again the strategic business units are displayed
within their clusters and plotted as bubbles on a graph, with the size of the bubble representing
the level of economic profit during 2003 (see Figure 22 below):
Figure 22 – The Relationship Between The Level Of Complexity And The Ability To Cope With Complexity
Strategists would hope that the clusters facing the highest level of complexity are the ones
most able to cope. Furthermore, the strategic expectation would be that the clusters creating
the most shareholder value for the Group are the ones most able to cope with complexity.
Here the results are less encouraging as the UK Retail Bank, a large creator of value (£460m),
is considered to be facing the highest level of complexity (53.83) and is deemed to be the least
able to cope with such complexity (45.33). Barclays Private Clients (51.29:53.55) is also in a
similar position. On a more positive note, three of the largest creators of value, Barclays
Capital (£320m), the Business Bank (£623m) and Barclaycard (£319m), are deemed to be
facing a moderate level of complexity but are considered as being the most able to cope.
Barclays Global Investors appear to be strategically very well placed, deemed to be facing the
lowest level of complexity (43.67) and also being considered highly able to cope (75.67).
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5.7.2.3.4 The Degree Of Uncertainty And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
This next component of the analysis also adopts a managerial perspective by examining the
relationship between: the degree of uncertainty faced by a cluster; the level of value created
(or economic profit produced) by the cluster; and the importance of the cluster being able to
cope with uncertainty. Once again the seventeen strategic business units have been arranged in
clusters (see Section 4.6.3.3) and plotted as bubbles on a graph, with the size of the bubble
representing the level of economic profit during 2003 (see Figure 23 below):
Figure 23 – The Degree Of Uncertainty And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty
The results from this analysis are very interesting, as it would appear that the importance of
coping with uncertainty is driven by the level of economic profits (or value) created during
2003. To illustrate this point, the results show that respondents consider it is most important
that the Business Bank (£623m), Barclays Capital (£320m), Barclaycard (£319m) and the UK
Retail Bank (£460m) – the four largest creators of shareholder value – are able to cope with
uncertainty. This raises an interesting point for management and academic research, as one
would logically assume from the uncertainty literature (see Section 4.5) that it is the degree of
uncertainty faced by organisations that drives the importance of the business being able to
cope.
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This next element of the analysis follows a similar logic to the previous observation by
examining the relationship between: the rate of change faced by a cluster; the level of value
created (or economic profit produced) by the cluster; and the importance of the cluster being
able to cope with change. Once again the seventeen strategic business units have been
arranged in clusters and plotted as bubbles on a graph, with the size of the bubble representing
the level of economic profit during 2003 (see Figure 24 below):
Figure 24 – The Rate Of Change And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Change
The results from this analysis follow a similar pattern to the importance of coping with
uncertainty, as again it would appear that the importance of coping with change is also driven
by the level of economic profit, or value created, for the Group. To illustrate this point, the
results show that respondents again consider it is most important that the four largest creators
of shareholder value are able to cope with change. By the same token, Barclays Africa (£36m)
the lowest creator of value, is at the opposite end of the scale. Furthermore, this observation
raises an interesting point for management and academic research, as one would logically
assume from the literature (see Section 4.5) that it is the degree of change faced by
organisations that drives the importance of the business being able to cope with change.
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Developing this line of analysis further, this next component of the report examines the
relationship between: the level of complexity faced by a cluster; the level of value created (or
economic profit produced) by the cluster; and the importance of the cluster being able to cope
with complexity. Once again the seventeen strategic business units have been arranged in
clusters and plotted as bubbles on a graph, with the size of the bubble representing the level of
economic profit (or value created) during 2003 (see Figure 25 below):
Figure 25 – The Level Of Complexity And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity
The results follow a similar pattern to the earlier analyses, as it also appears that the
importance of coping with complexity is driven by the economic profit created for the Group.
To illustrate this point, the results show that respondents again consider it is highly important
that the four largest creators of shareholder value ere able to cope with complexity. Barclays
Global Investors (62.00) also scores highly on this dimension, probably as a consequence of
the level of complexity identified in its business model, and explained in more detail in the
qualitative exploration (see Section 5.4.3.3). Barclays Africa – the lowest creator of
shareholder value – is once again at the bottom end of the scale. Again this observation raises
interesting points for management and academic research, as one would logically assume from
the literature (see Section 4.5) that it is the level of complexity faced by organisations that
drives the importance of the business being able to cope with complexity.
42
47
52
47 52 57 62 67 72
Importance Of Coping With Complexity
Le
ve
lO
fC
om
pl
ex
ity
UK Retail Bank Barclays Private Clients Barclays Global Investors Business Banking
Barclays Africa Barclaycard Barclays Capital
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 270 of 444
5.7.2.3.5 The Ability To Cope And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
This component of the analysis also adopts a managerial perspective by examining the
relationship between: the ability of the cluster to cope with uncertainty; the level of value
created (or economic profit produced) by the cluster; and the importance of the cluster being
able to cope with uncertainty. From a strategic perspective, one would expect it to be a matter
of concern if it is deemed that a cluster is low in its ability to cope with uncertainty, yet
important that they are able to cope, particularly if there is a high level of shareholder value at
stake. Once again the clusters are plotted as bubbles on a graph, with the size of the bubble
representing the level of economic profit during 2003 (see Figure 26 below):
Figure 26 – The Ability To Cope With Uncertainty & The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty
These results are encouraging for Barclays as it would appear that three of the largest creators
of value, the Business Bank (£623m), Barclays Capital (£320m), and Barclaycard (£319m),
are well placed in their ability to cope with uncertainty and the importance of their being able
to cope. By the same token, Barclays Global Investors, Barclays Private Clients and Barclays
Africa are also well placed, relative to the level of value at stake. The managerial issue would
appear to be at the UK Retail Bank, who create a large amount of shareholder value (£460m),
but are considered the lowest in terms of their ability to cope with uncertainty (48.00), despite
the fact that the ability to cope is deemed to be important (59.67).
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This next element of the analysis follows a similar logic to the previous observation by
examining the relationship between: the ability of the cluster to cope with change; the level of
value created (or economic profit produced) by the cluster; and the importance of the cluster
being able to cope with change. Once again the seventeen strategic business units have been
arranged into their clusters and plotted as bubbles on a graph, with the size of the bubble
representing the level of economic profit during 2003 (see Figure 27 below):
Figure 27 – The Ability To Cope With Change And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Change
These results are very similar to the earlier analysis and are again encouraging for Barclays as
it would appear that three of the largest creators of value, the Business Bank (£623m),
Barclays Capital (£320m), and Barclaycard (£319m), are well placed in their ability to cope
with change and the importance of their being able to cope with change. By the same token,
Barclays Global Investors and Barclays Africa are also well placed, relative to the level of
shareholder value at stake. Again the managerial issue would appear to be at the UK Retail
Bank, who create a large amount of value (£460m), but are considered lowest in terms of their
ability to cope with change (50.03), despite the fact that their ability to cope with change is
deemed important (65.33). The problems in the economic profit performance during 2003 at
Barclays Private Clients (-49.70%) may be reflected in the Group Executive Committee’s lack
of confidence in their ability to cope with change (51.01).
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
44 49 54 59 64 69 74
Importance Of Coping With Change
A
bi
lit
y
To
C
op
e
W
ith
C
ha
ng
e
UK Retail Bank Barclays Private Clients Barclays Global Investors Business Banking
Barclays Africa Barclaycard Barclays Capital
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 272 of 444
The final element of this section of the report examines the relationship between: the ability of
the cluster to cope with complexity; the level of value created (or economic profit produced)
by the cluster; and the importance of the cluster being able to cope with complexity. Once
again the seventeen strategic business units have been arranged in clusters and plotted as
bubbles on a graph, with the size of the bubble representing the level of economic profit
during 2003 (see Figure 28 below):
Figure 28 – The Ability To Cope With Complexity And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity
Once again these results are very similar to the earlier analysis and on the whole are again
encouraging for Barclays as it would appear that three of the largest creators of value, the
Business Bank (£623m), Barclays Capital (£320m), and Barclaycard (£319m), are again well
placed in their ability to cope with complexity and the importance of their being able to cope
with complexity. By the same token, Barclays Global Investors and Barclays Africa are also
well placed, relative to the level of shareholder value at stake. Again the managerial issue
would appear to be at the UK Retail Bank, who create a large amount of value (£460m), but
are considered the lowest in terms of their ability to cope with complexity (45.33), despite the
fact that their ability to cope with complexity is deemed to be important (59.33). Again the
poor performance of Barclays Private Clients (-49.70%) may be reflected in the respondents’
lack of confidence in their ability to cope with complexity (53.55).
40
45
50
55
60
65
70
75
80
85
47 52 57 62 67 72
Importance Of Coping With Complexity
A
bi
lit
y
To
C
op
e
W
ith
C
om
pl
ex
ity
UK Retail Bank Barclays Private Clients Barclays Global Investors Business Banking
Barclays Africa Barclaycard Barclays Capital
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 273 of 444
5.7.3 Serendipitous Findings
Through the research undertaken during Project 2, the study identified a series of
serendipitous findings, some of which could provide the starting point for other areas of
research. These serendipitous findings are set out below:
1. There is evidence in the data that historically Barclays has recognised and rewarded
strategists who have proved most able at coping with change whereas those who
specialise in complexity, for example in-house solicitors, tax specialists and
accountants, have not been recognised in the same way.
2. Evidence in the data suggests that the successful strategists of the future will be those
who have the ability to cope with a high level of complexity in the competitive
environment whereas recent history has recognised and rewarded strategists that are
able to cope with a high rate of change.
3. Strategists on the Group Executive Committee at Barclays are very rational in the way
they conceptualise uncertainty, change and complexity although the data suggest they
are less rational and therefore more intuitive in the processes they use to cope with
these three phenomena.
4. Strategists on the Group Executive Committee at Barclays feel they are required to
deliberately adopt rational processes for coping with uncertainty, change and
complexity although they freely admit to not being compelled to adopt such rational
processes in their personal and private lives.
5. The importance of being able to cope with the rate of change and the level of
complexity fluctuates as strategists progress through their careers at Barclays.
Evidence suggests that middle managers at the strategic business unit level have a
greater need to be able to cope with change whereas corporate strategists at the Group
Executive Committee level have a greater need to be able to cope with complexity.
6. When asked to attribute their individual career success to their ability to cope with the
degree of uncertainty, the rate of change or the level of complexity experienced, the
strategists believed their success was a product of their ability to cope with uncertainty
and complexity. However they believed that colleagues would probably take a
different view and put more emphasis on their ability to cope with change.
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5.8 Conclusions And Comparisons With The Literature Review
5.8.1 The Qualitative Exploration
5.8.1.1 Identifying The Qualitative Factors
Project 2 of the Executive Doctorate explored the qualitative factors that create the degree of
perceived environmental uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity
experienced by strategic business units across the Barclays Group (see Section 5.5). This
section draws conclusions based on the findings of Project 2 (see Section 5.7.1) and makes
comparisons with the literature review (see Section 4.3–4.5).
Beginning with the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty, the analysis carried out
during Project revealed no significant differences in the mean levels of perceptual assessments
made by the Group Executive Committee on the degree of uncertainty; rate of change; and
level of complexity across the Barclays Group (see Section 5.6.3). This conclusion is at
variance with the modernist perspective in the literature. This research concludes that
strategists tend to dismiss the term ‘uncertainty’ altogether, as they feel it is not a helpful way
of conceptualising the environment during the strategy process, and is not even within the
managerial lexicon of some of the most senior strategists at Barclays. The research concludes
that the use of the term ‘uncertainty’ is not entirely appropriate at Barclays where strategists
prefer to use terms such as ‘challenges’ and ‘opportunities’ for meeting the demands of the
competitive environment.
Moving on to the rate of change, the research concludes that there is a high degree of synergy
between the qualitative factors that create change in the competitive environment across
Barclays and those uncovered in the literature review. To illustrate such synergies, the
qualitative factors uncovered at Barclays include the role of competition, technology,
customers and regulation as key contributory factors to the rate of change at Barclays. These
factors are well covered in the literature. An interesting conclusion at Barclays is that when
strategists describe qualitative factors that create change, there is a heavy emphasis on factors
that are external to either the Barclays Group or the strategic business unit under investigation.
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A similar conclusion is made with the exploration into the qualitative factors that create the
level of complexity in the competitive environment across Barclays. Here again there is a high
degree of synergy with the factors uncovered in the literature review. Such synergies include
the size of the organisation, the integration of products and services, the delivery of long-term
value, managing people, and legacy IT systems and distribution networks. As contributory
factors in the level of complexity, these issues are well covered in the literature. An interesting
conclusion at Barclays is that when strategists describe qualitative factors that create
complexity, there is a heavy emphasis on factors that are internal to either the Barclays Group
or the strategic business unit under investigation.
The next part of the exploration looked at the qualitative factors that give the various strategic
business units the ability to cope with the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change and the
level of complexity in their competitive environments. Here again there is a high level of
synergy with the conclusions of the literature review. The key qualitative factors that enable a
strategic business unit to cope are: a resilient business model, market dominance, strategic
agility, strategic flexibility, talented people in the senior management team, and good working
relationships with key stakeholders.
The final element of the exploration looked at qualitative factors that make it important that
the various business units within the Barclays Group are able to cope with the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity in their competitive environments.
Interestingly, again there is a high level of synergy with the conclusions of the literature
review. The key qualitative factors that drive the importance of being able to cope are: the
creation of shareholder value, new entrants to the marketplace, the ‘centrality’ of the business
unit to the Group Strategy, the importance of defending and growing the core business, and
the strategic goal for each business unit to be a world-class financial services provider.
To summarise, although there was some variance in the emphasis attached to the various
qualitative factors that a) create uncertainty, change and complexity, b) enable a business unit
to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity, and c) make it important that business units
are able to cope with these three phenomena, the conclusions of Project 2 and the literature
review in this area are substantively the same.
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5.8.1.2 Examining The Subjective Assessments
Although the findings of Project 2 show a high degree of consistency among the strategists on
the Group Executive Committee regarding the qualitative factors that a) create uncertainty,
change and complexity, b) enable a business unit to cope with uncertainty, change and
complexity, and c) make it important that business units are able to cope with these three
phenomena, through its findings (see Table 77 below) the research concludes that there is a
considerable lack of consensus regarding how the various strategic business units are impacted
by uncertainty, change and complexity and, most importantly, the managerial implications of
such impact.
Table 77 – Identifying The Lack Of Managerial Consensus Across The Group Executive Committee
Levels Of Ability To Cope Importance Of Coping
Barclays Portfolio Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com Unc Cha Com
MEAN RANGE 60.29 60.00 57.65 52.06 53.24 55.29 67.94 61.18 67.65
RANKING OF RANGE 4 5 6 9 8 7 1 3 2
Through observation of the rankings of the ranges, it is interesting to recognise that the range
of rankings can be categorised into three groupings: first, the levels (of uncertainty, change
and complexity); second, the ability to cope; and finally, the importance of coping. With a
mean range for responses of 53.53, the findings show there to be the highest degree of
consensus regarding the ability of the various business units to cope; followed by the level of
uncertainty, change and complexity being experienced, which had a mean of 59.31; and the
lowest degree of consensus, or highest mean range (65.59), was found in the range of
responses for the importance of being able to cope.
It is therefore safe to conclude that there is a high degree of variance in the subjective
assessments made by strategists on the Group Executive relating to: the degree of uncertainty,
rate of change and level of complexity being faced by the various business units; the ability of
the various business units to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity; and finally, the
importance attached to the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with these
three phenomena. This conclusion is consistent with the individual perspectives on corporate
strategy identified in the literature review (see Section 4.5.5.).
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5.8.2 The Quantitative Exploration
5.8.2.1 Examining The Role Of Managerial Consensus
This section of the conclusions looks at the role of managerial consensus, or in the case of
Project 2 the lack of consensus, evident in the findings (see Sections 5.7.2.1 and 5.8.1.2). The
literature review presented two perspectives on the role of consensus in corporate strategy: the
modernist perspective (see Section 4.3.10), and the individual perspective (see Section 4.5.5).
From a modernist perspective the organisation is viewed through the metaphor of a machine
(see Section 4.1.4); therefore any lack of managerial consensus can only be dysfunctional to
organisational effectiveness. Consequently the role of the strategist is to minimise any lack of
consensus, and facilitate a single or co-ordinated response to the competitive environment as a
basis for obtaining a ‘match’ between the organisation and the environment within which it
operates. Through the individual perspective, strategists make sense of the organisation’s
environment in a very individual manner, based on their perception or interpretation of past
learning, information and experience. Therefore strategists on the Group Executive
Committee make sense of the competitive environments within which the various strategic
business units operate and their actions stem from their unique interpretations.
The research from Project 2 concludes that the Group Executive Committee adopt the
individual perspective on corporate strategy. The findings show a lack of managerial
consensus, with evidence that a diversity of views on the strategy process is encouraged and
invited and therefore considered a ‘healthy’ part of the strategy process, not dysfunctional. The
research data and interview process uncovered a wide range of personalities and backgrounds
on the Group Executive Committee, with evidence of a deliberate intention to avoid creating a
senior executive team of like-minded individuals.
This research concludes that any lack of consensus or disagreement among strategists at
Barclays is not unusual or dysfunctional to the performance of the organisation – quite the
reverse. The diversity of views and maturity of the debate gives the organisation self-
confidence and the ability to observe the strategy development process and the competitive
environment from the perspective of both the organisation and the individual.
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5.8.2.2 Challenging The Modernist Perspective
Based on the findings set out in Table 75 (see Section 5.7.2.3.1), this section concludes that
the modernist perspective on perceived environmental uncertainty is not an appropriate
conceptualisation for Barclays. Presented in the literature review (see Section 4.3.10), the
modernist perspective proposes that perceived environmental uncertainty can be described in
terms of two constructs: the simple–complex dimension and the static–dynamic dimension.
This conceptualisation postulates therefore that perceived environmental uncertainty is the
dependent variable, with rate of change and level of complexity as the independent variables.
In developing this perspective, Hatch (1997) proposed that the two independent variables were
equally weighted in their contribution to perceived environmental uncertainty.
Table 78 – Examining The Relationship Between Uncertainty, Change And Complexity
Uncertainty Change Complexity
r r² (%) R r² (%) r r² (%)
Uncertainty 1 – – – –
Change 0.437 19.10 1 – –
Complexity 0.175 3.07 0.435 18.92 1
Project 2 concludes that the rate of change and the level of complexity are not independent
variables (see Table 78 above), as there is a statistically significant relationship between the
rate of change and the level of complexity (0.435), which suggests that change creates
complexity at Barclays. Allied to this observation, Project 2 concludes that the rate of change
is a far stronger variable (0.437) than the level of complexity (0.175) in the creation of
perceived environmental uncertainty at Barclays. Project 2 therefore concludes that research
must develop a far more sophisticated understanding of the relationship between the rate of
change and the level of complexity as contributory factors of perceived environmental
uncertainty than that proposed through the modernist perspective.
In line with the literature review (see Section 4.5.6), Project 2 concludes that the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change and the level of complexity are not the key issues for top
management at Barclays; rather, the key issues are the importance of the business units being
able to cope with these three phenomena, and their ability to cope.
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5.8.2.3 Investigating The Managerial Implications
5.8.2.3.1 Levels Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty, Change And Complexity
Through its exploration into perceived environmental uncertainty, Project 2 has been able to
discern statistically significant relationships that have managerial implications for strategists at
Barclays. As the analysis showed in Section 5.6, some of these relationships are strong while
others are evidently quite weak – the varying strengths of these relationships are set out in
detail in Tables 75 and 76 (see Section 5.7.2.3.1). This section of the report draws conclusions
from a managerial perspective on the key relationships that exist when considering the varying
implications for managers associated with the level of uncertainty, change and complexity.
5.8.2.3.1.1 Degree Of Uncertainty And Rate Of Change
The research discovered a reciprocal relationship between the degree of uncertainty and the
rate of change (r = 0.437). This suggests that any increase in the rate of change experienced by
strategists is significantly reflected in a similar rise in the uncertainty being experienced.
Clearly, this observation has implications for strategists who may want to be more proactive in
how they manage uncertainty when they are implementing change, thereby causing the rate of
change to rise. Such interventions could take the form, for example, of clearer
communications to people in the business unit or to customers who may be impacted by
change.
5.8.2.3.1.2 Rate Of Change And Level Of Complexity
The research also discovered a reciprocal relationship between the rate of change and the level
of complexity (r = 0.435). This observation suggests that any variance in the rate of change
experienced by strategists is also reflected in their perceptions of the degree of uncertainty
faced by the business. Under these circumstances managers may need to be aware that when
they initiate strategic change programmes, for example merger and acquisitions, then people
may need more support in managing through the complexity associated with large change.
This support may take the form of additional resources, for example consultants or ensuring
that large change teams have the appropriate level of experience and expertise to manage both
the change programme itself, and the complexity associated with such change.
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5.8.2.3.1.3 Rate Of Change And Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Change
The investigation in Project 2 also discovered a relationship between the rate of change and
the importance of being able to cope with change (r = 0.293). It is recognised, however, that
the strength of this relationship is a much weaker relationship comparative to the two
relationships identified earlier in this section. The weakness of this relationship is interesting
from the perspective of a manager because logic would dictate that where there is any variance
in the rate of change, such variance is reflected in the importance of the business unit being
able to cope with change. Or couched in simpler terms, logic would suggest that when a
strategic business unit is faced with an increase in the rate of change in its competitive
environment, then it becomes increasingly important that it is able to cope with such change.
The weakness of this relationship could be explained through the observation that although the
rate of change continues to rise across Barclays through, for example, technological advance,
then the importance of being able to cope with such change does not grow at the same rate
because of the resilience of the business model, which continues to create value irrespective of
any increase in the rate of change within its competitive environment.
5.8.2.3.1.4 Level Of Complexity And Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty
The next observation also raises interesting managerial implications. Here the research
identifies a reciprocal (but again weak) relationship between the level of complexity being
faced by a strategic business unit and the importance of the business being able to cope with
uncertainty (r = 0.335). As a consequence of this relationship, any variance in the level of
complexity being faced is reflected in the importance of being able to cope with uncertainty.
Managerial logic suggests that this relationship should be stronger because as the level of
complexity rises, then the importance of being able to cope with uncertainty should also rise.
The issue here is that individuals may have adopted different conceptualisations, or models, of
‘uncertainty’ and ‘complexity’. Therefore, although logic suggests life should be more tenable
as a consequence of a reduction in the level of complexity, this is not reflected in the
importance of coping with uncertainty because managers are describing a very different
concept to ‘levels of complexity’ when they make reference to ‘uncertainty’.
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5.8.2.3.1.5 Level Of Complexity And Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Change
This research then goes on to identify a reciprocal, but again relatively weak, relationship
between the level of complexity being faced by a business unit and the importance of being
able to cope with change (r = 0.334). This part of the study recognises that any variance in the
level of complexity is reflected in the importance of being able to cope with change.
Here the managerial implications follow the predictable logic that as the level of complexity in
the environment increases, it becomes more important that the business unit is able to cope
with change. The managerial logic here is that as the competitive environment increases in
complexity, then the organisation needs to adapt in order to survive and it is therefore
imperative that the business is able to cope with change. It is interesting that the relationship is
so weak, as managerial logic would suggest that the relationship between the level of
complexity and the importance of being able to cope with change would be much stronger.
5.8.2.3.1.6 Level Of Complexity And Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity
The final relationship examined in this section of the report is the one between the level of
complexity and the importance of being able to cope with complexity. Here the research
identified a reciprocal relationship (r = 0.415). Consequently, this relationship follows a
predictable managerial logic that any variance in the level of complexity being experienced in
the competitive environment is reflected in the importance of the strategic business unit being
able to cope with complexity.
Once more the identification of such a weak relationship defies a degree of managerial logic,
as one would expect the relationship between the level of complexity and the importance of
coping with complexity to be strong. From a managerial perspective, an increase in the level
of complexity should logically result in the importance of being able to cope also rising as the
environment becomes more interconnected and therefore less predictable. To illustrate this
point, such an increase in the level of interconnectedness would increase complexity by
making processes such as strategic decision-making far more difficult to manage, as it
becomes more and more difficult to anticipate cause-and-effect relationships.
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5.8.2.3.2 Ability To Cope With Uncertainty, Change And Complexity
The literature review (see Section 4.5.6.1) recognised that the key managerial issue associated
with perceived environmental uncertainty is not necessarily the degree of uncertainty, change
and complexity being experienced by the organisation, but the ability of the business unit to
cope with these three phenomena. This section of the report draws conclusions from a
managerial perspective on the key relationships that exist when considering the ability of the
business units within the Barclays portfolio to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity.
Again these relationships vary in strength and the specific measurements are set out in detail
in Tables 75 and 76 (see Section 5.7.2.3.1).
5.8.2.3.2.1 Ability To Cope With Uncertainty And Ability To Cope With Change
The first observation is that there is a relatively strong reciprocal relationship between the
ability of a strategic business unit to cope with uncertainty and its ability to cope with change
(r = 0.834). Consequently, any variance in the ability to cope with uncertainty is reflected in
the business’s ability to cope with change. Presented in simpler managerial terms, the results
show that when a member of the Group Executive Committee deems a business unit to be able
to cope with uncertainty, they also deemed the business unit to be able to cope with change.
From a managerial perspective, this conclusion is entirely logical because the capabilities that
enable the business units to cope with uncertainty, for example a resilient business model and
a dominant market position (see Section 5.5.3.1), also enable the business units to cope with
change. Consequently, if an organisation increases its ability to cope with uncertainty, as a
manager one would logically expect an improvement in the ability of the strategic business
unit to cope with change.
5.8.2.3.2.2 Ability To Cope With Uncertainty And Ability To Cope With Complexity
Following the same logic as the earlier section the research identified a strong reciprocal
relationship between the ability of the organisation to cope with uncertainty and its ability to
cope with complexity (r = 0.703). Consequently, any variance in the organisation’s ability to
cope with uncertainty is reflected in its ability to cope with complexity.
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This observation can also be presented in simpler managerial terms, because the results show
that when a member of the Group Executive Committee deems a business unit to be able to
cope with uncertainty, they also deemed the business unit to be well placed to cope with
complexity. From a managerial perspective, this conclusion is also entirely logical because the
capabilities that enable the business units to cope with uncertainty, for example the experience
of having successfully encountered uncertainty in the past (see Section 5.5.3.1), is very similar
to some of the factors that enable a business unit to cope with complexity, for example the
pan-Group experience of the senior management team (see Section 5.5.3.3). As a result, if an
organisation increases its ability to cope with uncertainty, a manager would logically expect an
improvement in the ability of the strategic business unit to cope with complexity.
5.8.2.3.2.3 Ability To Cope With Uncertainty And Importance Of Coping With Uncertainty
The research now moves on to identify a reciprocal (but far weaker) relationship between the
ability of the strategic business unit to cope with uncertainty and the importance of its being
able to cope with uncertainty (r = 0.263). Therefore, any variance in the ability to cope with
uncertainty is mirrored in the importance of coping with uncertainty. Presented in simpler
terms, when a respondent believed a business unit to be able to cope with uncertainty they also
believed it was important that the business unit was able to cope with uncertainty.
From the perspective of a manager, this result is again entirely logical because one would
expect that for an organisation to build a specific capability such as the ability to cope
effectively with uncertainty, then building this capability would be strategically important. The
weakness of the relationship between the ability to cope with uncertainty and the importance
of being able to cope with uncertainty is a little surprising, as managerial logic would suggest
a much stronger association.
The weakness of this association may be explained in the cause and effect relationship. To
illustrate this point, respondents may have taken the view that the benefits of an attribute that
enables the business to cope effectively with uncertainty, for example a dominant market
position (see Section 5.5.3.1), could also reduce the importance of the business unit having to
cope with uncertainty because the organisation has a dominant market position.
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5.8.2.3.2.4 Ability To Cope With Uncertainty And Importance Of Coping With Complexity
The next relationship investigated in this section of the research is the relationship between
the ability to cope with uncertainty and the importance of coping with complexity. Through its
investigations, the research identified a correlation (r = 0.251) between these two phenomena.
Here the study draws a rather interesting conclusion, namely that any variance in the ability to
cope with uncertainty is reflected in the importance of coping with complexity. Or in simpler
terms, when a respondent felt a business unit was able to cope with uncertainty, they also
believed it important that the business unit was able to cope with complexity.
The logical corollary in this relationship is again relatively straightforward: first, in order for a
business unit to be deemed able to cope with uncertainty, it must be able to cope with
complexity (see Section 5.8.2.3.2.2); second, if the business unit has built the capability to
cope with complexity, the managerial logic would follow that it is strategically important that
the business is able to cope. To illustrate the managerial logic, in order for a business unit to
be deemed able to cope with uncertainty, it must be able to cope with complexity; it achieves
this by recruiting top talent into its senior management team and forging good working
relationships with key stakeholders (see Section 5.5.3.3). If the business unit makes these
types of investments in order to cope with complexity, then from a ‘value-based’ perspective
one would envisage that it is important that the business unit is able to cope with complexity.
5.8.2.3.2.5 Ability To Cope With Change And Ability To Cope With Complexity
The research now moves on to investigate the relationship between the ability to cope with
change and the ability to cope with complexity, and concludes that there is a strong reciprocal
relationship between these two phenomena (r = 0.714). In simple managerial terms, when a
member of the Group Executive Committee believed a strategic business unit was able to cope
with change they also believed it to be able to cope with complexity. Similarly to the
conclusions regarding the ability to cope with uncertainty and the ability to cope with
complexity (see Section 5.8.2.3.2.2), this relationship is also underpinned by a strong
managerial logic because of the similarity between the attributes that make a business unit
able to cope with change and those that make it able to cope with complexity.
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In order to illustrate this point, the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5.3.2) found that
strategic agility, flexibility and highly talented people make a strategic business unit able to
cope with change. Evidently such attributes – together with experience, highly effective
working relationships with stakeholders, and world-class communications – also make a
business unit highly capable of coping with high levels of complexity (see Section 5.5.3.3).
5.8.2.3.2.6 Ability To Cope With Change And Importance Of Coping With Uncertainty
The research now moves on to identify a reciprocal relationship (r = 0.261) between the ability
of a strategic business to cope with change and the importance of its being able to cope with
uncertainty. Presented in managerial terms the logical corollary is again quite straightforward,
that is, when respondents believe a business unit to be able to cope with change they also
believe it is important for that particular business unit to be able to cope with uncertainty, and
vice versa.
To illustrate this relationship, it is useful to start with the conditions that make it important for
a strategic business unit to be able to cope with uncertainty. The qualitative exploration (see
Section 5.5.4.1) identified these conditions as: the pressure to create long-term value;
regulations breaking down barriers to entry; the emergence of international competition; and
the reduction of inertia among the customer base. Clearly when these factors are present in the
competitive environment, they act as catalysts for strategic change. Evidently within a fast
moving competitive environment it is important that strategic business units have strategic
agility, flexibility and highly talented people, the attributes that enable business units to be
able to cope with change (see Section 5.5.3.2).
5.8.2.3.2.7 Ability To Cope With Change And Importance Of Coping With Complexity
The research also concludes that there is a reciprocal relationship between the ability of a
business unit to cope with change and the importance of its being able to cope with
complexity (r = 0.253). Therefore any variance in the ability to cope with change is reflected
in the importance of being able to cope with complexity, or vice versa. In managerial terms,
when it is important to cope with complexity the business is deemed able to cope with change.
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Again it is useful to examine the factors that make it important for a strategic business unit to
cope with complexity: first, the complexity of the business model; second, globalisation
within the financial services industry; and finally, onerous legal and regulatory obligations
(see Section 5.5.4.3). As in the previous section, when these factors are present in the
competitive environment they also act as catalysts for strategic change. Clearly in order to
cope with these competitive issues, it is once again important that strategic business units have
strategic agility, flexibility and highly talented people, the attributes that enable business units
to be able to cope with change (see Section 5.5.3.2).
5.8.2.3.2.8 Ability To Cope With Change And Importance Of Coping With Change
The research now moves on to conclude that there is a reciprocal (but weak) relationship
between the ability of a strategic business to cope with change and the importance of its being
able to cope with change (r = 0.179). Therefore, any variance in the importance of coping with
change is reflected in the ability to cope with change. Or in simple managerial terms, when a
respondent believes a strategic business unit is able to cope with change they also believe it is
important that the business unit is able to cope with change.
This relationship follows the same sound managerial logic as the conclusions drawn between
the ability of a business unit to cope with uncertainty and the importance of it coping with
uncertainty (see Section 5.8.2.3.2.3). Here the research concludes that where the business unit
has made the investment in building its ability to cope with change by developing strategic
agility, building flexibility and recruiting talented people (see Section 5.5.3.2), then within the
context of a ‘value-based’ approach to management it is important that the business builds this
capability and is therefore able to cope with change.
5.8.2.3.2.9 Ability To Cope With Complexity And Importance Of Coping With Uncertainty
This section of the research concludes that there is also a relatively weak relationship between
the ability of strategic business units to cope with complexity and the importance of their
being able to cope with uncertainty (r = 0.239). In this relationship, any variance in the ability
to cope with complexity is mirrored only weakly in the importance of being able to cope with
uncertainty.
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The explanation of the weakness in this relationship from a managerial perspective probably
lies in the very ‘external’ nature of the factors that make it important that business units are
able to cope with uncertainty, and the very ‘internal’ nature of the attributes that enable a
business to cope with complexity. In order to illustrate this point, the qualitative exploration
(see Section 5.5.3.3) discovered that factors such as the ability to recruit top talent, the pan-
Group experience of the senior team, and effective cross-Group communications enabled
business units to cope effectively with complexity. By comparison, the importance of coping
with uncertainty was driven by forces outside of the organisation, for example, regulation
breaking down barriers to entry and changes in customer behaviour (see Section 5.5.4.1).
5.8.2.3.2.10 Ability To Cope With Complexity And Importance Of Coping With Complexity
The final relationship examined in this section concludes that there is an association between
the ability of a business unit to cope with complexity and the importance of its being able to
cope with such complexity (r = 0.344). Therefore, when respondents deemed a strategic
business unit to be able to cope with complexity then they also believed it to be important that
the business unit was able to cope with such complexity, and vice versa.
As in the earlier study of the relationship between the ability to cope with uncertainty and the
importance of being able to cope with uncertainty (see Section 5.8.2.3.2.3), this result is again
entirely logical from a managerial perspective because one would expect that for an
organisation to build a specific capability such as the ability to cope effectively with
complexity, then building this capability would be strategically important. The weakness in
this relationship is somewhat surprising, as logic would suggest a much stronger association.
The weakness of this association may again be explained in the experiential nature of being
able to cope with complexity. To illustrate this point, respondents may have taken the view
that when a business unit has proved itself able to cope with complexity in the past, by
recruiting top talent, working across the Group effectively, building high levels of trust and
communicating effectively (see Section 5.5.3.3), then this may reduce the perceived
importance of the business having to cope with complexity going forward, because the
organisation has proved its ability to cope in the past.
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5.8.2.3.3 Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty, Change And Complexity
This section looks at the importance of the various strategic business units in the Barclays
portfolio being able to cope with the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty, the rate
of change and the level of complexity. The detailed findings are set out in Table 75 (see
Section 5.7.2.3.1). Through its findings, Project 2 concludes that there are three statistically
significant relationships when considering the importance of being able to cope: first, the
importance of being able to cope with uncertainty and the importance of being able to cope
with change; second, the importance of being able to cope with uncertainty and the importance
of being able to cope with complexity; and finally, the importance of being able to cope with
change and the importance of being able to cope with complexity.
5.8.2.3.3.1 Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty And Change
This report concludes that there is a reciprocal relationship between the importance of the
business unit being able to cope with uncertainty and the importance of its being able to cope
with change (r = 0.787). Consequently, any variance in the importance of being able to cope
with uncertainty is reflected in the importance of being able to cope with change. Or in simple
managerial terms, when a respondent deemed it important that a strategic business unit was
able to cope with uncertainty, they also believed it to be important that the business unit was
able to cope with change.
From a managerial perspective this conclusion is entirely logical, owing primarily to the close
association between the qualitative factors that make it important to cope with uncertainty (see
Section 5.5.4.1) and the qualitative factors that make it important to cope with change (see
Section 5.5.4.2). To illustrate this point, the key factor that drives the importance of being able
to cope with uncertainty is the pressure to create long-term value for shareholders, and the two
key factors that drive the importance of being able to cope with change are: the centrality to
the Group strategy; and the degree to which the business unit will be relied on to deliver
benefits. This report therefore concludes that the high degree of synergy between these
qualitative factors accounts for the strong reciprocal relationship between the importance of
coping with uncertainty and the importance of coping with change.
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5.8.2.3.3.2 Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty And Complexity
This report now moves on to conclude that there is also a strong reciprocal relationship
between the importance of the business unit being able to cope with uncertainty and the
importance of its being able to cope with complexity (r = 0.722). Therefore, once again any
variance in the importance of being able to cope with uncertainty is reflected in the importance
of being able to cope with complexity. Or in simple managerial terms, when a respondent
deemed it important that a strategic business unit was able to cope with uncertainty they also
believed it to be important that the business was able to cope with complexity.
This conclusion is entirely logical from a managerial perspective, and the explanation for the
strong relationship can again be found in the close association between the qualitative factors
that make it important to cope with uncertainty (see Section 5.5.4.1) and the qualitative factors
that make it important to cope with complexity (see Section 5.5.4.3). To illustrate this point,
the role of regulation is a key factor in driving both the importance of being able to cope with
uncertainty and the importance of being able to cope with complexity.
5.8.2.3.3.3 Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Change And Complexity
This final part of this section concludes that there is also a strong reciprocal relationship
between the importance of the business unit being able to cope with change and the
importance of its being able to cope with complexity (r = 0.788). Therefore, when a
respondent deemed it important that a strategic business unit was able to cope with change,
they also believed it to be important that the business was able to cope with complexity.
This report concludes that this close relationship is entirely logical from a managerial
perspective, and is accounted for by the close association between the rate of change and the
level of complexity in the conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty (see Table
78). Although not as strong as suggested by the modernist perspective (see Section 5.8.2.2),
the relationship does account for this close association, as this report concludes that
respondents believe the rate of change contributes to the level of complexity across Barclays,
and this conclusion has ramifications when considering the importance of business units being
able to cope with these two phenomena.
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5.8.2.3.4 Managerial Implications: Key Conclusion
Reflection on the regression results uncovers a rather significant conclusion from a managerial
perspective. As identified in Section 5.6.3.1 (see Table 46), while the regression results from
the pooled data (R² = 0.192) between the degree of uncertainty versus the rate of change and
the level of complexity (also in Table 79 below), appear to confirm (albeit weakly) the
modernist conceptualisation of perceived environmental uncertainty, this may be challenged
by the strong correlation between complexity and change. The incremental influence of
complexity alone is barely significant.
Table 79 – Multiple Regression Statistics: Key Observations From Research Conclusions
1st Variable 2nd Variable(s) R Squared (R²) Significance
Degree Of Uncertainty Rate Of Change & Level Of
Complexity
0.192 <1%
Ability To Cope With Uncertainty Ability To Cope With Change &
Ability To Cope With Complexity
0.720 <1%
Importance Of Coping With
Uncertainty
Importance Of Coping With
Change & Importance Of Coping
With Complexity
0.647 <1%
However, the report also concludes that the strong regression result from the pooled responses
(R² = 0.720) between the ability to cope with uncertainty versus the ability to cope with
change and the ability to cope with complexity (see Table 79 above), coupled with the equally
strong regression result (R² all data = 0.647) between the importance of coping with
uncertainty versus the importance of coping with change and the importance of coping with
complexity, gives indirect support to the modernist conceptualisation of perceived
environmental uncertainty.
These results lead to two conclusions that have very interesting implications from a
managerial perspective: first, the emergence of managerial logic within the responses as the
respondents go through the data collection process; and second, the relationship between the
ability to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty and the importance of being able to
cope with such uncertainty.
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Beginning with the first conclusion it is clear from the data that managerial logic becomes
evident in the results as the respondents make their responses. To illustrate this, during the
first stage of the data collection the respondent is asked to consider the level of perceived
environmental uncertainty. This outcome is achieved by assessing the degree of uncertainty,
the rate of change, and the level of complexity. Here it appears that respondents are dealing
with these three phenomena as abstract or theoretical concepts; this is evidenced through the
relationship between the degree of uncertainty versus the rate of change and the level of
complexity (R² = 0.192). This conclusion offers a clear challenge to the modernist perspective
that perceived environmental uncertainty is a product of the rate of change and the level of
complexity because the rate of change appears to contribute to the level of complexity (see
Section 5.6.3.1).
During the next stage of the data collection, respondents move on to consider the relationship
between the ability to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty and the importance of
being able to cope with such uncertainty. These results show that when considering the
managerial implications of perceived environmental uncertainty, a level of managerial logic
becomes evident in the results. This logic is evident in the strong regression results regarding
the ability to cope and the importance of coping with perceived environmental uncertainty (see
Table 79 above). This conclusion shows support for the modernist perspective on perceived
environmental uncertainty, where the degree of uncertainty is conceptualised as a product of
the rate of change and the level of complexity.
The managerial implication from these observations is that strategists at Barclays do not
appear to create a match between the ability of a business unit to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty and the importance of its being able to cope. Or in simpler terms,
the Bank does not appear to send its most able strategists to the business units where it is most
important that they are able to cope. It appears that other factors such as the level of value at
stake; opportunities for career development; and job location, reward and recognition also
influence where the Bank places its most able strategists. Clearly this conclusion has
ramifications for the modernist literature, which is predicated on the assumption that an
organisation sends its most able strategists into the most difficult environments, where it is
most important that the business unit is able to cope.
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6. PROJECT 3: Strategy Development Processes
6.1 Project 3: Abstract And Overview
6.1.1 Project 3 Abstract
Project 3 is the investigation of strategy development processes across Barclays, and the
examination of the relationship between these processes and the assessments of perceived
environmental uncertainty collected during Project 2. The purpose of Project 3 is fourfold:
first, to identify strategy development processes across the Barclays Group; second, to analyse
these processes against existing academic research; third, to investigate the relationship
between these processes and perceived environmental uncertainty; and finally, to consider the
managerial implications arising from such a relationship.
There are two key methodological findings: first, the research instrument built by Bailey
(2000), further enhanced by Bailey et al. (2000) is an effective instrument for discerning
strategy development processes at Barclays (i.e. it produces results consistent with previous
research); and second, important modifications have been made to the strategy process
questionnaire (Bailey, 2000; Bailey et al., 2000) through its application across Barclays.
There are four key empirical findings: first, the strategy development process at Barclays is
characterised by the incremental and planning approach; second, the results are consistent with
the literature review and existing academic research, third, there are significant differences in
the use of strategy development processes across Barclays; and finally, across Barclays, there
are statistically significant differences in degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty, the
ability to cope and the perceived importance of being able to cope.
Two key inductive findings emerged from Project 3: first, there is a correlation between
strategy development process and organisational performance; and second, there are key
relationships between perceived environmental uncertainty and organisational performance.
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6.1.2 Project 3 Overview
6.1.2.1 Structure Of The Executive Doctorate
This research examines the implications of perceived environmental uncertainty for strategy
development processes across Barclays. There are two components to the managerial issue:
perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes. Project 2
represented the exploration of perceived environmental uncertainty and was undertaken with
fifteen members of the Group Executive Committee and ten members of the Group Strategy &
Planning Department. Project 3 is an examination of the implications for strategy development
process and was carried out across the senior management teams of the seventeen strategic
business units in the Barclays Group. Project 3 was successfully piloted in Barclays Solutions.
6.1.2.2 Project 3: An Investigation Of Strategy Development Processes
In order to achieve its objectives, Project 3 consists of two key components: first, a
quantitative exploration of strategy development processes across Barclays; and second, an
investigation of the relationship between strategy development and perceived environmental
uncertainty through testing a series of propositions discovered in the literature and developed
in Project 2. The starting point for Project 3 is the testing and modification in the field at
Barclays of the strategy process questionnaire originally built by Bailey (2000), and further
enhanced by Bailey et al. (2000).
The investigation then utilises this amended research instrument to identify perceptions of the
strategy development process across Barclays. Subsequently, the study moves on to analyse
correlations in strategy development processes within the context of the literature review and
conclusions drawn from existing academic research. Based on these findings and the
conclusions of Project 2, the research examines the relationship between strategy development
processes and perceptions of the environment held by the Group Executive Committee. The
final element of Project 3 investigates the managerial implications arising from the
relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by corporate
strategists, and the processes for developing strategy at the strategic business unit level.
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6.1.2.3 Project 3 Overview: Key Findings
6.1.2.3.1 Key Methodological Findings
The research carried out in Project 3 discovered two key methodological findings: first, that
the self-administered strategy process questionnaire (Bailey, 2000) is an effective instrument
for identifying strategy development processes at Barclays; second, in order for the research
instrument to produce the required results at Barclays, changes needed to be made to the
questionnaire. Allied to this adaptation of the questionnaire to the organisational context at
Barclays, it was necessary to test and validate the research instrument in the research field and
to undertake a comprehensive analysis of the data prior to finalising the method for statistical
analysis.
6.1.2.3.2 Key Empirical Findings
The investigation in Project 3 produced empirical findings in four key areas: the identification
of strategy development processes across Barclays PLC; consistency of the Barclays results
with the literature review and existing academic research; the identification of significant
differences in strategy development processes across the Barclays portfolio; and the discovery
of significant differences across the Barclays Group in degrees of perceived environmental
uncertainty, the ability to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty and the perceived
importance of being able to cope with such uncertainty.
Beginning with the identification of strategy development processes across Barclays PLC, the
first key empirical finding from Project 3 is that the strategy development process at Barclays
is typified by the incremental and planning approaches to strategy development. The results
also produced significantly low scores on the political and enforced choice dimensions.
Moving on to a comparison of the Barclays results with the literature review and existing
academic research, the research found that the Barclays results were highly consistent with
both the literature review and existing research – most notably the work of Bailey et al. (2000)
and Collier et al. (2004).
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The third key empirical finding is the discovery of significant differences in strategy
development processes across the Barclays portfolio. In keeping with the Group results, there
is a predominance of incrementalism and planning across the portfolio. However, some areas
showed statistically significant evidence of other dimensions, for example the enforced choice
dimension at Investment Management. Others showed a statistically significant move away
from certain dimensions, for example the lack of the command dimension at Barclaycard, and
the significantly low presence of the enforced choice dimension within Barclays Capital.
The final key empirical finding is the discovery of significant differences in degrees of
perceived environmental uncertainty across Barclays. In Project 3, the data on perceived
environmental uncertainty have been revisited to identify significant differences between
business units and determine whether these differences are related to strategy development
process. Here, Project 3 identifies significant differences in the degree of uncertainty and the
level of complexity being experienced across Barclays. However, the findings show no
significant differences in the rate of change being perceived across the Group. Interestingly,
there were significant differences in the ability of the various businesses to cope with
perceived environmental uncertainty, and the importance of their being able to cope.
6.1.2.3.3 Key Inductive Findings
Two key inductive findings emerged from Project 3. The first is the correlation between
organisational performance and strategy processes; here the research found that the
organisations that create the most value at Barclays are more likely to adopt the incremental or
planning approach to strategy development. By way of comparison, the less successful
organisations are more likely to adopt the political or the enforced choice dimensions.
The next key inductive finding is a significant correlation between perceived environmental
uncertainty and organisational performance. The research found a significant positive
correlation between the importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty and the level of value created. The study was unable to prove a negative
correlation between organisational performance and the degree of perceived environmental
uncertainty, or between performance and the ability to cope with such uncertainty.
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6.1.2.4 Project 3 Overview: Key Conclusions
There are nine key conclusions from the research in Project 3:
1. The strategy process questionnaire built by Bailey (2000), and enhanced by Bailey et
al. (2000), with minor modifications, has proved robust in its application in the
research field at Barclays.
2. The strategy development process across Barclays is multi-dimensional and processes
transpire in combination, most notably the incremental approach to strategy
development and the planning dimension.
3. A relationship between the command and enforced choice dimensions emerges at
Barclays, which appears to be peculiar to the organisational structure of the Group.
4. The emergence of a relationship between the command and culture dimensions at
Barclays highlights that the research instrument may not be entirely applicable to every
organisation.
5. There are significant differences in the processes that are applied for developing
strategy across the strategic business units within the Barclays Group.
6. There are also significant differences in the degree of uncertainty and the level of
complexity being experienced by strategic business units across the Barclays Group.
However, none of the strategic business units is deemed to face a significantly higher
or lower rate of change than elsewhere across the Group.
7. There is a significant positive correlation between organisational performance and the
incremental and planning dimensions to strategy development. There is also a
significant negative correlation between organisational performance and the political
and enforced choice dimensions to strategy development. These conclusions are
consistent with the conclusions drawn by Bailey et al. (2000).
8. There is a significant positive correlation between organisational performance and the
importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
9. The importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty is
juxtaposed with the level of value contributed, when strategists at Barclays consider
the relative perceived importance of strategic business units being able to cope with
perceived environmental uncertainty.
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6.2 Introduction
6.2.1 Background
As outlined in the introduction (see Section 3.2), the managerial issue addressed in this
research can be broken down into two component parts: perceived environmental uncertainty
and strategy development processes. This element of the report presents the investigation of
strategy development processes and their relationship with perceived environmental
uncertainty, as defined by Duncan (1972), and discussed in detail in Section 4.3.10.
In order to examine strategy development processes across Barclays Bank PLC, this part of the
research is also divided into two component parts: first, a quantitative exploration of strategy
development processes across Barclays Bank PLC; and second, a quantitative investigation
into the relationship between strategy development and perceived environmental uncertainty.
This is achieved by testing a series of propositions discovered in the literature review and
explored earlier in Project 2. The structure of Project 3 is set out in Figure 29 below:
Figure 29 – Breaking Project 3 Down Into Its Component Parts
Investigating Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays Bank PLC
Strategy Development Processes Testing Propositions
The Relationship
With Perceived
Environmental
Uncertainty
The Ability To Cope
With Perceived
Environmental
Uncertainty
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With Perceived
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Development Process
Questionnaire
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Development
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6.2.2 Rationale For Project 3
This research investigates the relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty and
strategy development processes across Barclays Bank PLC. Consequently the rationale for
Project 3 lies in developing two key aspects: first, to identify differences in the strategy
development processes across the various businesses within the Barclays Group; and second
to identify the relationship that exists between these processes and degrees of environmental
uncertainty being perceived by the Group Executive Committee (see Project 2).
In order to achieve its objectives, Project 3 begins by using the self-administered questionnaire
developed by Bailey et al. (2000) to identify perceptions of the strategy development process
across Barclays. The research then moves on to analyse correlations in strategy development
processes across the Barclays portfolio. The third element of Project 3 investigates the
relationship between strategy development processes and perceptions of the environment held
by the Group Executive Committee. The final element investigates the managerial
implications arising from the relationship between perceived environmental uncertainty
experienced by corporate strategists, and the process for strategy development at the strategic
business unit level (see Figure 30 below):
Figure 30 – Examining The Implications Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty For Strategy Development
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6.3 Theoretical Overview: Synthesis Of The Literature Review
6.3.1 The Linking Of Theoretical Concepts
As detailed in Section 3.2.1 (developed through Project 2 – and set out in detail in Section 5),
the Executive Doctorate investigates the relationship between two theoretical concepts:
strategy development processes at the strategic business unit level, and degrees of perceived
environmental uncertainty experienced by strategists on the Group Executive Committee at
Barclays Bank PLC (see Figure 30 above).
Based on the literature review (see Section 4.1–4.2), Project 3 links theoretical concepts
together at two levels. In order to achieve this, Project 3 first identifies perceptions of the
strategy development process across the various strategic business units, analysing
correlations between the various processes and exploring key differences that may exist across
the portfolio; second, it investigates the relationship between strategy development processes
and the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty experienced by members of the Group
Executive Committee, pursuing the managerial implications of any such relationship.
6.3.2 Summarising Key Theoretical Arguments Informing Project 3
Through a comprehensive review of the literature (see Section 4.1–4.2), and the examination
of perceived environmental uncertainty in Project 2 (see Section 5), this part of the report
summarises key theoretical arguments that underpin Project 3.
The first theoretical argument is that there is a reciprocal relationship between an organisation
and the environment within which it operates (Mintzberg, 1973). Therefore, an organisation’s
strategy reflects the extent of match or alignment between the organisation’s external
environment and its internal structure and processes. Consequently the challenge for
strategists is to adapt to their external environment in order for their organisation to remain
viable and survive (Lenz, 1980) – see Section 4.1 (Chaffee, 1985).
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The second theoretical argument informing Project 3 is that such an alignment, or ‘fit’ (Hatch,
1997), is achieved via a process of strategy development (Bailey et al., 2000). Through a
comprehensive search of the literature, reviewed in Section 4.2, and an analysis of other
models of strategy development, most notably the work of Hart (1992), Bailey et al. (2000)
discovered six discrete dimensions of strategy development within three broad approaches to
the strategy process (see Section 4.2). This research utilises the self-administered
questionnaire developed by Bailey et al. to identify the strategy development processes
adopted by Barclays at the strategic business unit level. The research instrument is set out in
Appendix A.
This research also adopts the work of Bailey et al. to investigate the third theoretical argument
that is probed in Project 3 – here the research analyses the results from the self-administered
questionnaire to identify correlations in strategy development processes and examine whether
there are any key differences in these processes across the Barclays portfolio.
The fourth theoretical argument that is investigated has three components: first, the
relationship between a business unit’s strategy development process and the level of perceived
environmental uncertainty being experienced by strategists (Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988;
Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992; Brown and Eisenhardt, 1998); second, whether executives at
Barclays use strategy to maintain effectiveness in the above relationship (Javidan, 1984;
Chaffee, 1985); and finally, whether strategic business units modify their decision processes in
response to varying degrees of perceived environmental uncertainty (Duncan, 1972; Hatch,
1997).
Project 3 then moves on to examine the managerial implications arising from the relationship
between perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development. To achieve this,
Project 3 investigates whether the ability of a business unit to cope with its competitive
environment is a product of its ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity (Hatch,
1997). And finally, it investigates whether the importance of the business unit being able to
cope with perceived environmental uncertainty is a function of the importance of it being able
to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity (Milliken, 1987), or whether such importance
is driven by other factors, for example value creation (see Section 4.5.1–4.5.2).
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6.3.3 Linking Theoretical Arguments To Frame The Research Question
Taking as a starting point the arguments set out in Section 6.3.1 it is possible to link them to
show how the research issue for Project 3 (see Figure 31 below) is framed by the literature:
1. Through the application of the Bailey et al. (2000) strategy development questionnaire,
what are the dominant processes for developing strategy across Barclays?
2. Are the correlations between the various dimensions consistent with previous research,
and are there any key differences in strategy development processes across the
Barclays Group?
3. What is the nature of the relationship between strategy development processes at the
strategic business unit level and the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty
experienced by strategists on the Group Executive Committee?
4. From a managerial perspective, do variances in strategy development process make
some strategic business units more able to cope with uncertainty, change and
complexity than others?
5. How do such variations relate to the importance of the various strategic business units
being able to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity?
Figure 31 – Linking Theoretical Arguments To Frame The Research Question For Project 3
O rg an isa tio n a l T h eoris t
P ersp ec tive O n S tra teg y
1.
Iden tify in g S trateg y
D ev elo p m en t P ro cesses
2 .
3 . In vestig a ting K ey
D iffe ren ces In P rocesses
D eg rees O f P erce iv ed
E n v iro n m en ta l U ncerta in ty
4 .
5 .
T h e A b ility O f T h e
O rg an isa tio n to C o p e
6 .
T h e Im p o rtance O f
B ein g A b le T o C o p e
“ W ha t are the predom inan t processes fo r
deve lop ing s tra te gy across B arc lays? A re there
any key d ifferences in stra tegy de velopm e nt
proce sse s across the portfo lio? W hat is the n a ture
o f the re la tionsh ip betw een s trategy dev elopm en t
proce ss and perc e ived environm en ta l
uncer ta in ty? W ha t are the m anager ia l
im p lic ations aris ing from tha t re la tionsh ip?
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 302 of 444
6.3.4 Development Of The Strategy Process Questionnaire
6.3.4.1 The Original Research (Bailey, 2000)
The strategy process questionnaire used for collecting data in Project 3 of this Executive
Doctorate was originally developed by Bailey (2000). Bailey identified that numerous
management and academic researchers have investigated strategy development and
acknowledged a multitude of theories that sought to explain the precise nature of the strategy
development process. The literature on strategy development processes is covered earlier in
this report (see Section 4.2).
Through his research, Bailey developed a multi-dimensional framework to explain strategy
development. The framework incorporates a number of perspectives on the strategy
development process including: planning, incrementalism, cultural and political processes,
command (the influence of a commanding leader), and enforced choice (the restrictions placed
on an organisation by forces beyond its boundaries). Bailey’s research included a large-scale
survey of approximately 2,000 managers in over 300 different organisations, and found that
the theoretical perspectives on the process of strategy development that informed his study
corresponded well to managerial and academic understanding of the process.
The original strategy process questionnaire developed by Bailey took the form of a self-
administered questionnaire comprising 72 items and was issued in a paper-based format. Of
these items, 21 were used to collect information regarding the organisational context, for
example the size of the firm, length of service and profitability. The remaining 48 items
related to perceptions of strategy development process; Bailey allocated eight questions to
each of the six processes.
Based on the original research by Bailey, Project 3 of this Executive Doctorate utilises the
latest development of Bailey’s strategy process questionnaire (see Appendix A) tailored to the
organisational context at Barclays. Illustrations of such amendments include the replacement
of the term ‘chief executive’ with ‘managing director’, and the use of the term ‘managerial
grade’ instead of ‘managerial level’.
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6.3.4.2 Adaptation Of The Original Research (Bailey et al., 2000)
Building on the original research, Bailey et al. (2000) used the strategy process questionnaire
at Cranfield School of Management and collected 5,332 observations from 937 organisations.
In order to establish the face validity of the instrument and to ensure content validity, Bailey et
al. appointed an expert panel of ten strategy academics to represent the characteristics
singularly attributable to each of the six dimensions. Based on the identification of the
characteristics, five practising managers were asked to work through the item pool and
indicate items they believed to be unrelated to or inappropriate in explaining strategy
development. Such items were either removed or modified, leaving a final selection of 39
items or statements.
Of the 49 items in the questionnaire originally designed by Bailey (2000), two (numbers 26
and 49) were found not to be statements designed to support dimensions of the strategy
development process. Of the remaining 47 items, eight were deemed inappropriate (numbers
4, 12, 21, 30, 31, 37, 44 and 47) by the panel of experts commissioned by Bailey et al. (2000),
and were therefore omitted from the questionnaire. A detailed breakdown of the remaining 39
items, and the dimensions of strategy development process they were designed to characterise,
is set out in Table 80 below:
Table 80 – Breakdown Of The 39 Items In The Original Design By Bailey (2000)
Dimensions Of Strategy Development Process Item Numbers Items Per Dimension
Planning Dimension (see Section 4.2.5) 1, 3, 9, 14, 17, 34, 38, 42 8
Incremental Dimension (see Section 4.2.6) 2, 20, 24, 36, 40, 45 6
Cultural Dimension (see Section 4.2.8) 5, 8, 13, 25, 33, 39, 46 7
Political Dimension (see Section 4.2.7) 10, 19, 23, 29, 35, 48 6
Command Dimension (see Section 4.2.4) 6, 11, 16, 27, 41 5
Enforced Choice Dimension (see Section 4.2.9) 7, 15, 18, 22, 28, 32, 43 7
Clearly the decision to move away from the original design of the strategy process
questionnaire (Bailey, 2000) had ramifications for the method of statistical analysis completed
by Bailey et al. (2000) and further studies completed using this instrument (Fishwick,
Johnson, and Collier, 2000; Collier et al., 2004). These implications are set out in detail later
in this report (see Section 6.5.2).
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6.4 Project 3: Research Pilot
6.4.1 Development Of The Pilot For Project 3
6.4.1.1 The Nature Of The Pilot
The pilot for the strategy development process element comprised the completion of 93 of the
Bailey et al. (2000) self-administered questionnaires across Barclays Solutions, the internal
consultancy of Barclays Bank. Each respondent was employed at a senior managerial grade,
the same level as the respondents in the main research. Barclays Solutions was chosen for two
key reasons: first, it was independent of the seventeen strategic business units that would be
used in Project 3; and second, it was the area of Barclays within which the researcher was
working at the time; therefore the pilot could be effectively managed, controlled and co-
ordinated.
In preparation for the pilot, each respondent received a memo from the Managing Director of
Barclays Solutions explaining that the organisation had agreed to support the research, and
requesting co-operation and support in completing the questionnaire. Following the circulation
of this note, each respondent was issued with a paper-based version of the Bailey et al. (2000)
self-administered strategy process questionnaire (see Appendix A). For the pilot, respondents
were not asked to complete the additional management information, for example length of
service and managerial grade. In an attempt to encourage participation, a chocolate bar and a
Barclays Solutions pen were enclosed with the questionnaire. A pre-addressed internal
envelope was provided for returning the completed questionnaire.
For the pilot study, each respondent was given four weeks to complete the questionnaire. After
two weeks had elapsed each non-respondent was issued a reminder to complete the
questionnaire; copy questionnaires were issued if appropriate. After a further week, each non-
respondent was again issued with a reminder by electronic mail. At the end of the four-week
period, each non-respondent received a voice-mail message issuing a reminder to complete the
questionnaire. At the end of the pilot, 67 of the 93 questionnaires had been completed and
returned, representing a response rate of 72%.
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6.4.1.2 The Purpose Of The Pilot
There were ten key purposes to the pilot test for Project 3:
1. To test the process for positioning the research within the organisation, through a note
from the Managing Director of Barclays Solutions.
2. To trial the process for the physical distribution and return of the paper-based strategy
process questionnaires, including feedback on the covering letter, the complimentary
chocolate bar and the free pen.
3. To test the distribution and response to an electronic version of the questionnaire.
4. To ensure the wording of individual items, or statements, was appropriately tailored to
the organisational context at Barclays. For example, the questionnaire for the pilot
replaced the terms ‘we’ and ‘our’ (Bailey et al., 2000) with the term ‘this business
unit’. To illustrate, statement 3 was amended from ‘when we formulate a strategy it is
planned in detail’ to ‘when this business unit formulates a strategy it is planned in
detail’. The point here is that it was important that the respondents considered their
own business area rather than Barclays as a whole when assessing the process for
developing strategy.
5. To gauge the flow of responses effectively. To illustrate this point, the majority of
responses were received in either the first week or the fourth week. Therefore, the
electronic mail reminder was developed to ensure a consistent flow of completed
questionnaires.
6. To assess the amount of time required to input data from the paper-based strategy
process questionnaire into the electronic database.
7. To build and populate the electronic database and ensure the dimensions of strategy
development could be reconciled to the work of Bailey et al. (2000).
8. To test (in the field) enhancements to the electronic database that were omitted by
Bailey et al. (2000), for example the application of the arithmetic mean rather than the
centre of the seven-point Likert scale (number 4) for unanswered questions.
9. To construct radar graphs within the electronic database to replicate the work of Bailey
et al. (2000).
10. To gauge organisational feedback on the findings.
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6.4.2 Pilot Findings: Strategy Development Processes
6.4.2.1 Project 3 Pilot Findings
6.4.2.1.1 Obtaining Executive Sponsorship
The pilot test found that it was imperative to obtain managerial commitment and this was
achieved through an introductory meeting with the Managing Director of Barclays Solutions
and his formal sponsorship of the research. At the meeting, the Managing Director was asked
to circulate a memo to those of his direct or indirect reports who would be participating in the
study, introducing the research, advising them of his commitment to achieving a successful
outcome and requesting their support. This approach proved very successful and was pivotal
to the high response rate.
6.4.2.1.2 Distributing The Research Packs
A key component of the pilot test was to trial the research packs. The paper-based strategy
development process questionnaire was well received and the time requested for completion
(15–20 minutes) was accurate. The complimentary chocolate bar and free pen received
excellent feedback, as did the pre-addressed return envelope. Some concern was expressed
over the respondent’s name being on the questionnaire but this was resolved and retained for
the main research.
6.4.2.1.3 Electronic Version Of The Strategy Process Questionnaire
As the majority of correspondence at Barclays takes place through electronic mail, the
researcher built an electronic version of the strategy process questionnaire in Microsoft Excel
(v5.0). As some senior managers no longer respond to paper-based mail, the plan was to
circulate this file with the electronic mails designed to chase up responses. Unfortunately, the
size of the file (1.17Mb) caused problems for respondents either because their electronic
mailbox was full or downloading the file was slow. The file also contained a series of
executable macros, which caused problems for virus checking software in the Group firewalls
and at the network gateways. As a result of the pilot test, the electronic version of the file was
dispensed with.
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6.4.2.1.4 Amendments To The Wording Of Particular Items Or Statements
During the pilot test, careful attention was paid to the wording of each individual item or
statement. As explained earlier (see Section 6.4.1.2), the terms ‘we’ and ‘our’ were replaced.
More substantive changes were made to some items to ensure that the Barclays Group was
being perceived as external to the strategic business unit. To illustrate this point, statement 15
of the Bailey et al. (2000) questionnaire asks whether strategy is imposed from outside the
organisation, for example government. For this research, statement 15 asks whether strategy is
imposed from outside the organisation, for example the Barclays Group Strategy & Planning
Department. All amendments to the 49 items were well received; there was some confusion in
the additional information section but these data were not used in the final analysis.
6.4.2.1.5 Managing The Flow Of Responses
Owing to the amount of effort required to input the data from paper-based questionnaires into
the research database, it was important that the researcher received a steady flow of responses.
This was achieved by targeting missing responses on a regular basis with a reminder by
electronic mail. This did result in some additional work as many respondents claimed not to
have received the questionnaire or secretaries admitted to destroying it. However, each batch
of reminders resulted in a fresh influx of questionnaires and this proved a highly successful
way of managing the study. Owing to the broad and international coverage of the main
research, this proved an inexpensive and effective method of managing the flow of responses.
6.4.2.1.6 Assessing The Time Required For Data Input
Moving the responses from the paper-based questionnaire into the electronic database proved
relatively straightforward for the pilot test. This was due to two factors: first, the relatively low
number of responses (67); and second, the fact that respondents were not asked to complete
the thirteen additional questions relating to length of service, managerial grade, etc. By
engaging the support of family and friends to read out the respondent’s name and the 49
responses, the researcher was able to input one full questionnaire in three minutes and
therefore this method was retained for the main research. For the main research, the time
required for inputting data increased by a factor of three (9–10 minutes).
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6.4.2.1.7 Building The Research Database
The building of the electronic research database in Microsoft Excel (v5.0) for the pilot test
was relatively straightforward. The researcher built the database, and then validated the build
of the pilot test version against the database at Cranfield School of Management and the work
of Bailey et al. (2000). The research database was retained for the main research.
6.4.2.1.8 Testing Enhancements To The Research Database
Two key enhancements were made to the research database. First, where respondents had not
answered a question, the database applied the arithmetic mean as the response rather than the
mid-point of the seven-point Likert scale (4) used by Bailey et al. (2000), which normally
skews the mean. Second, three additional questions were put into the questionnaire asking the
respondent to assess their business unit’s ability to cope with: uncertainty, change, and
complexity. The use of the arithmetic mean was retained from the pilot test. However, the
three additional questions were dropped from the main research, as respondents could not
make a relative assessment of the ability of their business unit to cope against the ability of
other business units within the Barclays Group.
6.4.2.1.9 Constructing The Radar Graphs
The construction of the radar graphs to replicate the illustrations used by Bailey et al. (2000)
was relatively straightforward. These were also built in Microsoft Excel (v5.0). The final
versions of the radar graphs were reconciled to the database at Cranfield School of
Management. These radar graphs are illustrated in Section 6.5.3.
6.4.2.1.10 Gauging Feedback On The Pilot Findings
Feedback on the results of the pilot test was issued to the Managing Director of Barclays
Solutions who expressed the desire to see the results of the main research. No specific
managerial action was taken on the basis of the pilot test results. The pilot findings were also
issued to the Strategic Management Group at Cranfield School of Management for inclusion
in their database.
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6.4.3 Pilot Test Conclusions
6.4.3.1 General Conclusions
There were five key conclusions drawn from the pilot test for Project 3:
1. That subject to minor amendments, the research design was robust and suitable for
roll-out across the seven clusters, or seventeen strategic business units, within the
Barclays Group.
2. That the research for Project 3 would benefit significantly from executive sponsorship.
Based on this conclusion, Peter Herbert, the Director of Group Strategy & Planning,
was invited to act as the executive sponsor, a position he accepted and tackled with
tremendous energy and enthusiasm. He was hugely effective and influential in this
role, making a key contribution to the overall success of the research programme. The
contribution made by Peter Herbert in his role as executive sponsor is recognised in the
acknowledgements.
3. Owing to the scale of the research in Project 3, which involved the distribution of more
than 1,500 research packs, it was decided to adopt a phased approach to rolling out the
distribution and collection of the strategy process questionnaires across Barclays.
Based on this conclusion it was decided to adopt a four-phase approach to the research
programme: first, Barclays Private Clients and Barclays Africa; second, Barclaycard;
third, the Business Bank and the UK Retail Bank; and finally, Barclays Global
Investors and Barclays Capital.
4. To ensure that the data collection for Project 3 was completed at the same time as the
data collection for Project 2. The rationale behind this conclusion was based on the
fact that both Projects were dealing with perceptions and it was clear that events, for
example the disaster at the World Trade Centre in New York on September 11th 2001,
could have a considerable impact on perceptions of uncertainty. The decision was
therefore taken to run both projects concurrently.
5. That both Projects 2 and 3 would be completed within a single calendar year (2003), to
enable the research to draw parallels with the performance of the Barclays Group
during the same period.
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6.4.3.2 The Strategy Development Process At Barclays Solutions
As detailed in Section 6.4.1.2, it was not one of the primary purposes to identify the strategy
development process at Barclays Solutions. However, through the pilot test it is possible to
discern that there is an emphasis on the political dimension of strategy development.
Interestingly, there was evidence that the organisation does not rely on the planning process
nor does it perceive strategy to be developed from outside the unit (enforced choice). The
results from the pilot are set out in Table 81 below:
Table 81 – Project 3 Pilot: The Results From Barclays Solutions
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Centre Of Scale 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
Barclays Solutions 4.146 4.142 4.105 3.429 4.322 3.701
Result 0.146 0.142 0.105 -0.571 0.322 -0.299
One of the primary purposes of the pilot test was to develop the electronic database to display
the results in the form of a radar graph. The radar graph from the pilot test is displayed in
Figure 32 below:
Figure 32 – Project 3 Pilot: The Strategy Development Process At Barclays Solutions
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6.5 Empirical Study
6.5.1 Introduction To The Empirical Study
6.5.1.1 Issuing The Strategy Process Questionnaire Across Barclays Bank PLC
The questionnaires were issued in paper format (see Appendix A). The packs were issued in
the internal post and included: a letter detailing executive sponsorship, a complimentary
chocolate bar, a free pen, and a pre-addressed return envelope. The address for the respondent
was taken from the central staff database. Two address labels were produced: one for the
envelope, the other attached to the questionnaire to identify the respondent.
The research packs were issued in four phases during 2003: Barclays Private Clients and
Barclays Africa in the first quarter (547 packs); Barclaycard in the second quarter (280 packs);
the Business Bank and the UK Retail Bank during the third quarter (331 packs); and finally,
Barclays Global Investors and Barclays Capital in the fourth quarter (364 packs). The
breakdown of the distribution of research packs across the Group is set out in Table 82 below:
Table 82 – Strategy Process Questionnaires Issued Across Barclays
Cluster Strategic Business Unit Issued Cluster Totals
Barclaycard
Barclaycard UK 156
280Barclaycard Corporate 67
Barclaycard International 57
Barclays Africa Barclays Africa 88 88
Barclays Global Investors Barclays Global Investors 72 72
Barclays Capital
Collateralised Financing 68
292
Global Financing 71
Global Markets 74
Private Equity 79
Barclays Private Clients
Europe 122
459
International Bank 83
Investment Management 85
Private Bank 87
Premier Bank 82
UK Retail Bank Personal Financial Services 120 229Woolwich 109
Business Bank Business Bank 102 102
TOTALS 1522 1522
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6.5.1.2 Collating The Responses And The Response Rate
Following the example of the pilot (see Sections 6.4.1–6.4.3), respondents were given four
weeks to complete and return the questionnaires. Each non-respondent received a chase up
reminder by electronic mail after the second and third weeks of the allotted period.
Where the response rate was particularly good and a high level of responses had been
received, for example Barclaycard UK, then reminders ceased after the second week. Where
the population was lower, for example Barclays Capital, all reminders were sent and some
respondents were sent reminders by voice-mail message. In order to address the standard error
of a sample it was decided that a minimum of thirty responses should be obtained from each
of the strategic business units within Barclays Capital. Once this target had been reached the
researcher stopped chasing responses. The overall response rate for Project 3 was 48%. The
detailed response rate across the Barclays Group is set out in Table 83 below:
Table 83 – Responses And Response Rates
Cluster Strategic Business Unit Responses (%) Cluster Totals (%)
Barclaycard
Barclaycard UK 84 (54%)
159 (57%)Barclaycard Corporate 39 (58%)
Barclaycard International 36 (63%)
Barclays Africa Barclays Africa 37 (42%) 37 (42%)
Barclays Global Investors Barclays Global Investors 36 (50%) 36 (50%)
Barclays Capital
Collateralised Financing 30 (44%)
123 (42%)
Global Financing 31 (44%)
Global Markets 31 (42%)
Private Equity 31 (39%)
Barclays Private Clients
Europe 53 (43%)
221 (48%)
International Bank 44 (53%)
Investment Management 43 (51%)
Private Bank 42 (48%)
Premier Bank 39 (48%)
UK Retail Bank Personal Financial Services 46 (38%) 98 (43%)Woolwich 52 (47%)
Business Bank Business Bank 57 (56%) 57 (56%)
TOTALS 731 (48%) 731 (48%)
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6.5.2 The Method For Statistical Analysis
6.5.2.1 Using The Strategy Process Questionnaire In Research
Clearly, Project 3 of the Executive Doctorate involved the large-scale distribution, collection
and analysis across Barclays of the strategy process questionnaire developed by Bailey (2000),
and further enhanced by Bailey et al. (2000). As identified in Section 6.4.2.1.4, minor
modifications were applied to the wording of particular items in order to make the
questionnaire more appropriate to the organisational context at Barclays. Before commencing
the statistical analysis of the data collected through the strategy process questionnaire, there
were three key issues to consider: first, how to deal with unanswered questions; second,
detailing the method for applying principal components analysis; and finally, reconciling the
version of the questionnaire used in Project 3 to the work of Bailey et al. (2000).
6.5.2.2 Dealing With Unanswered Questions
One of the key characteristics of Bailey’s original research (2000) is the use of the seven-point
Likert scale (see Table 84 below). This seven-point scale is a proven instrument for this type
of research and creates a construct between ‘strongly agree’ and ‘strongly disagree’, anchored
at the centre. In their research, Bailey (2000) and Bailey et al. (2000) applied the centre point
(4) as the response where respondents had failed to provide a response.
Table 84 – Dealing With Unanswered Questions
Item No. Statement StronglyAgree
Strongly
Disagree
16 A senior figure’s vision is our strategy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
The problem with the approach adopted by Bailey (2000) and Bailey et al. (2000), is that it
almost invariably skews the arithmetic mean. When using the strategy process questionnaire
for this research, the arithmetic mean response for that item was applied as the response where
respondents had failed to provide a response. Clearly, this approach ensures that the mean
score on an item is not affected by non-responses.
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6.5.2.3 Principal Components Analysis
The second key issue to consider in the method for statistical analysis for Project 3 is detailing
the method for applying principal components analysis57. Rather than building on Bailey’s
(2000) original thesis, in which the statistical analysis was based on only the first tranche of
responses to the original survey, it was decided to draw on Bailey et al. (2000), where 5,332
observations were analysed, and on Collier et al. (2004), which repeated the analysis with a
total population of 6,394.
Of the 49 items or statements in the original questionnaire designed by Bailey (2000), two
(numbers 26 and 49) were found not to be statements designed to support dimensions of the
strategy development process (see Appendix A). Section 6.3.4.2 describes how Bailey et al.
(2000) used a panel of experts to reduce to 39 the number of items for input into factor
analysis. The items omitted were numbers: 4, 12, 21, 30, 31, 37, 44 and 47 (see Table 80). The
reason given for omitting these eight statements is that they were deemed inappropriate by the
panel. A detailed discussion of the criteria applied for reaching the decision to drop these
statements is not provided in the report published by Bailey et al.
Collier et al. (2004) report a factor analysis (both principal components analysis and alpha
factoring, which produced identical results) of responses to 47 items (only items 26 and 49
were omitted). In the unrestrained principal components analysis, which is the preferred
method for exploratory research (Hair et al., 1998; Comrey and Lee H.B., 1992), items 12 and
31 did not load significantly into any component, which supports their omission by Bailey et
al. (2000). Item 4 was very marginally significant as an influence on strategy formation
(reported eigen value58 1.03 – criterion significance 1.00) but it did not combine with any other
item. As a consequence of this observation, Collier et al. (2004) concluded that it cannot be
viewed as a dimension of the strategy development process. Whereas items 12 and 31 may be
considered ambiguous, possibly linked with two or more dimensions, item 4 may be regarded
as a tautology.
57 Acknowledgement: Frank Fishwick, Cranfield School of Management
58 The constant multiple associated with a particular linear transformation and eigen function, that is the constant (c) such that T(f) = cf
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While Collier et al. reached the same conclusion as Bailey et al. (2000) on items 4, 12 and 31,
their principal components analysis showed that items 21, 30, 37, 44 and 47 formed a
significant principal component with an eigen value of 1.22. They describe this component as
‘collective vision’. The development of this separate dimension can be questioned, given that
scores on it were highly correlated with those on the planning dimension (r = 0.675), but these
authors were particularly interested in the relationships between involvement in strategy
formation and managerial perceptions of the strategy process, in which ‘collective vision’ was
potentially important. In retrospect it may have been this correlation that persuaded Bailey et
al. (2000) to drop the five ‘collective vision’ statements.
Since managerial perceptions of strategy development processes within Barclays might form
dimensions different from those of a population drawn from 601 diverse organisations, it was
decided to undertake a new exploratory factor analysis of the 731 observations. The first run
was an unrestrained principal components analysis. Items 4, 12 and 31 were omitted because
both Bailey et al. (2000) and Collier et al. (2004) had found them to be unsatisfactory
discriminators. The five ‘vision’ items were included. Like those of Collier et al. (2004), the
results showed a significant separate dimension consisting of these five items. Otherwise, the
only variation from Bailey et al (2000) was the transfer of item 20 from the Incremental
Dimension to the Political Dimension. The wording for item 20 is:
“within this business unit we keep early commitment to a strategy tentative and subject
to review”
The transfer of item 20 may seem counter-intuitive, but the aim of running an exploratory
analysis was to identify how the statements were perceived and interpreted within Barclays.
The significant loading with the other items in the Political Dimension and the lack of loading
with the Incremental Dimension reflects the way statements are linked in the mind of the
various respondents.
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Scores on the ‘Vision Dimension’ were found to be even more highly correlated with the
scores on the Planning Dimension than those in the computations made by Collier et al (2004)
with r = 0.710. Since, unlike that research, there is no primary focus on ‘collective vision’, it
was decided to repeat the principal components analysis but this time with a restriction to six
dimensions. The key issue to address here was whether the association between ‘vision’ and
planning was strong enough for them to combine into a single dimension. The result was
positive and the Planning Dimension subsumed the five ‘vision’ items.
Clearly, having a dimension with 13 contributory items required further validation. For this
purpose, Cronbach's Alpha Test59 (Hair et al., 1998) was used. The Cronbach Alpha Test
asserts that when the value of the coefficient exceeds 0.700, it indicates internal consistency
(reliability) of components (Hair et al. suggest that 0.600 is acceptable in exploratory work).
The results of the Cronbach Alpha Test are set out in Table 85 below:
Table 85 – Results Of The Cronbach Alpha Test
Dimension Result Research Comment
Planning 0.910 Good, therefore validating the inclusion of the ‘vision’ statements
Cultural 0.650 Satisfactory – lower than expected but not a cause for concern
Command 0.700 Satisfactory result
Enforced Choice 0.750 Good result
Incremental 0.580 Low result (see explanation on the Incremental Dimension below)
Political 0.730 Good result, validating the inclusion of Item 20
The low coefficient for incrementalism reflects the results of Bailey et al. (2000) and Collier et
al. (2004). Since the Alpha co-efficient (Hair et al., 1998) is close to the acceptable borderline
(Hair et al., 1998) and there is no focus on this one particular dimension in this research, all
five constituent items have been retained. Bailey et al. (2000) and Collier et al. (2004) adopted
the same approach.
59 The measure of reliability that ranges from 0 to 1, with values of 0.60 and 0.70 deemed the lower limit of acceptability
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A further departure from both referenced pieces of work is in the calculation of factor, or
dimension, scores. Here both papers used the simple means of constituent item scores, though
Collier et al. did report that means weighted by loadings were almost identical. For this type of
analysis, two elements need to be considered: (a) whether, for each item or each respondent or
both, the data need to be standardised to zero mean and unit standard deviation; and (b)
whether scores should be simple means of those on each item, weighted means or calculations
based on multiple regression techniques.
On (a), a principal components analysis with scores standardised on each item failed to
converge after 50 iterations; the sample of respondents is fairly homogeneous in terms of
cultural background and standardisation for each respondent was deemed unnecessary – a
visual check on the consistency of standard deviations confirmed this.
Unlike those of Collier et al., weighted and unweighted means of dimension scores were not
so closely correlated that (b) could be ignored. The topic is well covered by Comrey and Lee
(1992), who suggest computations from multiple regressions as the technical ideal, but this
procedure uses standardisation by item and produces standardised results that are difficult to
interpret. Comrey and Lee therefore leave the choice of statistical method to the researcher.
Scores based on the procedure recommended by Comrey and Lee were computed from the
731 sets of observations and these were compared with (i) unweighted means of item scores
and (ii) means weighted by factor loadings. The latter were found to be much more closely
correlated with scores from the ideal procedure, with correlation coefficients as follows:
Political 0.90, Incremental 0.93, Command 0.94, Cultural 0.96, Planning 0.98 and finally,
Enforced Choice 0.99. Given these close correlations, it was decided to use the weighted
means as factor scores.
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6.5.2.4 Reconciling The Research Instrument To The Work Of Bailey et al. (2000)
This section of the report takes the opportunity to reconcile the research instrument used in
Project 3 to the strategy process questionnaire used by Bailey et al. (2000). There are five
categories within the reconciliation: identical dimensions, minor amendments, re-defining the
planning dimension, discarded items, and finally, redundant items.
Beginning with the category identical dimensions, three dimensions fit into this grouping:
command, cultural and enforced choice. The detail of the specific items relating to these three
dimensions is set out in Table 86 below. The second category in this reconciliation is minor
amendments. The two dimensions that fit into this grouping are incremental and political. The
minor amendment is a consequence of transferring item 20 from the incremental dimension to
the political dimension. The reason for this transfer is set out in Section 6.5.2.3. The detail of
specific items relating to these two dimensions is also set out below in Table 86.
The next category is the re-defining of the planning dimension; in this research the instrument
uses items 1, 3, 9, 14, 17, 34, 38 and 42 in the same way as Bailey et al. However, there are
five items added to this dimension (see Table 86 below); first, item 21 which was used in the
command dimension in Bailey’s original thesis but not used by Bailey et al.; second, item 30
which was not used in Bailey’s thesis or by Bailey et al.; third, item 37 which was used in the
command dimension in Bailey’s thesis but not used by Bailey et al.; fourth, item 44, which
was used in the cultural dimension in Bailey’s thesis but not used by Bailey et al.; and finally,
item 47, which was not used in Bailey’s thesis or by Bailey et al.
Table 86 – Breakdown Of The 49 Items In This Research
Dimensions Item Numbers Number Of Items
Planning Dimension 1, 3, 9, 14, 17, 21, 30, 34, 37, 38, 42, 44, 47 13
Incremental Dimension 2, 20, 24, 36, 40, 45 6
Cultural Dimension 5, 8, 13, 25, 33, 39, 46 7
Political Dimension 10, 19, 23, 29, 35, 48 6
Command Dimension 6, 11, 16, 27, 41 5
Enforced Choice Dimension 7, 15, 18, 22, 28, 32, 43 7
Discarded Items 4, 12, 31 3
Redundant Items 26, 49 2
TOTAL 49
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The next category is the discarded items. As identified in Section 6.5.2.3, Bailey et al.
discarded items 4, 12, 21, 30, 31, 37, 44, and 47. This research has discarded only items: 4,
12, and 31; the remainder of these previously discarded items (21, 30, 37, 44 and 47) have all
been subsumed into the planning dimension. The reason for using these items in this way is
also set out in Section 6.5.2.3.
The final category is the redundant items. Here the research makes a distinction between
questions that were asked and the response subsequently discarded, and questions that were
asked where the response was never intended to be loaded into the dimensions of strategy
development process. The two items that fall into this category are 26 and 49; the detail of
these two questions is set Table 87 below:
Table 87 – Redundant Items For Project 3
No. Item
26 As a strategic business unit our strategy is set by Barclays PLC
49 When strategy develops in this organisation I am actively involved
A reconciliation of the items that were used differently in this research from their application
in the work of Bailey et al. (2000) is set out in Table 88 below:
Table 88 – Reconciling The Different Use Of Items To The Work Of Bailey et al. (2000)
No. Item Bailey et al. (2000) Project 3
20 Within this business unit we keep early commitment to
a strategy tentative and subject to review
Incremental Political Dimension
21 Our strategy is driven by a vision of the future Discarded Planning Dimension
30 There is a commonly shared belief in this organisation
about the strategic direction we should pursue
Discarded Planning Dimension
37 There is a clear vision of our future which we pursue Discarded Planning Dimension
44 Our strategic direction is driven by commonly shared
values
Discarded Planning Dimension
47 A vision of what this strategic business unit will look
like in the future guides what we do strategically
Discarded Planning Dimension
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6.5.2.5 The Finalised Research Instrument For Project 3 With Weighted Means
As outlined in Section 6.3.4.2, the strategy process questionnaire used in Project 3 was based
on the original thesis published by Bailey (2000). However, the strategy process questionnaire
used in this research was modified based on: a review of the relevant literature (see Section
4.2); a consideration of other referenced research that has previously used this instrument
(Bailey et al., 2000; Fishwick et al., 2000; Collier et al., 2004); the Project 3 pilot (see Section
6.4); and the principal components analysis (see Section 6.5.2.3).
The construction of the final strategy process questionnaire that was used as the research
instrument for Project 3 (with weighted averages) is set out in Table 89 below. As detailed in
Section 6.5.2.4, items 4, 12, and 31 together with all the additional management information
(see Appendix A) were discarded from the statistical analysis.
Table 89 – The Modified Research Instrument For Project 3
Planning Cultural Command EnforcedChoice Incremental Political
Item Weight Item Weight Item Weight Item Weight Item Weight Item Weight
1 0.625 5 0.641 6 0.574 7 0.746 2 0.440 10 0.300
3 0.726 8 0.643 11 0.609 15 0.379 24 0.472 19 0.603
9 0.701 13 0.619 16 0.756 18 0.747 36 0.687 20 0.417
14 0.689 25 0.487 27 0.422 22 0.728 40 0.515 23 0.628
17 0.690 46 0.415 41 0.740 28 0.576 45 0.622 29 0.551
21 0.437 33 0.384 32 0.530 35 0.350
30 0.531 39 0.420 43 0.628 48 0.574
34 0.757
37 0.604
38 0.699
42 0.688
44 0.386
47 0.420
As the Executive Doctorate is concerned with understanding the relationship between
perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development processes, the additional
management information did not form part of the statistical analysis. This also ensured that
Project 3 was kept to a manageable size given that it only represents one component of the
overall research programme.
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6.5.3 Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays
6.5.3.1 Introduction
This section of the report looks at the outputs of the strategy development process
questionnaire to identify strategy development processes across the Barclays Group. The
objective of this section is not to test specific propositions, but to identify strategy
development processes and to make comparisons across the Group and within the various
clusters. In order to achieve this purpose, there are three key objectives:
1. To identify strategy development processes across the Barclays Group.
2. To identify strategy development processes across the seven clusters and make
comparisons with the Group results.
3. To identify strategy development processes in each of the strategic business units and
make comparisons across each cluster and with the Group results.
6.5.3.2 The Group Results
6.5.3.2.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes At The Barclays Group Level
The results for the Barclays Group show that the incremental dimension and the planning
dimension represent the predominant processes for developing strategy. The detailed results
for the Group are set out in Table 90 below. Results significant at the 5% level are highlighted
in bold text, and those significant at the 1% level are highlighted in red and bold text.
Table 90 – The Barclays Group
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Centre Of Scale 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
Barclays Group 4.300 3.861 3.908 4.408 3.840 3.606
Result 0.300 -0.139 -0.092 0.408 -0.160 -0.394
t-values 9.958 -3.482 -2.941 10.862 -4.231 -10.826
The results show Barclays is significantly below the centre of the scale for the command,
cultural and political dimensions. The low score for the enforced choice dimension illustrates
that few respondents believe strategy to be developed outside each particular business unit.
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The results from across the Group present a rather interesting finding, as strength in both the
incremental and planning dimensions is counter-intuitive. In his original thesis, Bailey (2000)
proposed that the incremental and planning dimensions would be negatively correlated. The
reason for this is that the incremental dimension is based on the assumption that strategy
emerges as the organisation adopts a particular course, whereas the planning dimension is
predicated on the assumption that strategy is formed at the outset and the organisation follows
a pre-determined plan. The evidence at Barclays suggests that although the organisation
develops plans, it remains incremental in its approach to strategy, probably by continually re-
scheduling its plans. This fits more closely with the notion of ‘logical incrementalism’
developed by Quinn (1980), and discussed in detail in the literature review (see Section 4.1.6).
6.5.3.2.2 The Radar Graph For The Group Results
The application of planning and incrementalism as processes for developing strategy is
displayed on the radar graph (see Figure 33 below). The radar graph also displays the low
score for enforced choice as a process for developing strategy at Barclays. The results are set
against the centre of the seven-point Likert scale.
Figure 33 – Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclays Group
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6.5.3.2.3 Comparing The Group Results With The Results Across The Various Clusters
Comparing the Group results with the seven clusters, and it is again evident that the
incremental and planning dimensions are the predominant processes. Barclays Private Clients
provides evidence of politics and enforced choice (see Table 91 below). Results significant at
the 5% level are highlighted in bold text, and those significant at the 1% level are highlighted
in red and bold text. Criterion levels of significance vary with sample sizes in each cluster and
with the standard deviation of scores across the Group on each dimension.
Table 91 – Comparing The Group Results With The Various Clusters
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard 0.135 -0.175 0.014 0.031 -0.039 -0.287
Barclays Africa 0.110 -0.324 -0.007 0.010 -0.167 0.252
Barclays Capital 0.069 -0.040 -0.060 0.217 -0.268 -0.137
Barclays Private Clients -0.204 0.095 0.084 -0.392 0.195 0.281
UK Retail Bank 0.073 0.142 -0.119 0.234 0.087 0.009
Business Bank 0.124 0.126 0.115 0.391 -0.044 -0.184
Barclays Global Investors -0.086 0.071 -0.227 0.169 -0.103 0.016
Barclays Group 0.300 -0.139 -0.092 0.408 -0.160 -0.394
The results from across Barclays can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 34 below):
Figure 34 – Comparing The Group Results With The Results From The Various Clusters
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6.5.3.3 Barclaycard
6.5.3.3.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across Barclaycard
The results from the Barclaycard Cluster (see Table 92 below) also show a reliance on
incrementalism and planning. Interestingly, the results from Barclaycard UK and Barclaycard
International provide contradictory evidence on the enforced choice dimension. By the same
token, Barclaycard International and Barclaycard Corporate provide contradictory evidence on
the cultural dimension. Compared with the centre of the scale, the cluster has low scores that
are statistically significant on the command, political and enforced choice dimensions.
Table 92 – Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclaycard Cluster
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard UK 0.574 0.318 0.080 -0.558 0.167 0.668
B’card Int’al 0.467 0.008 -0.404 0.476 -0.423 -0.881
B’card Corporate -0.364 -0.630 1.903 -0.647 0.665 -2.046
Cluster Total 0.434 -0.314 -0.077 0.439 -0.199 -0.680
The results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 35 below). The difference in the
strategy process at Barclaycard Corporate is particularly evident on the radar graph.
Figure 35 – Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclaycard Cluster
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6.5.3.3.2 Comparing The Barclaycard Cluster With The Group Results
This section compares the results from the Barclaycard Cluster with the centre (4) of the
seven-point Likert scale and the Group results. Here the results show that the Barclaycard
Cluster relies significantly more than the Group on the incremental process for developing
strategy. The results from the Barclaycard Cluster are similar to the Group results on the
cultural, planning and political dimensions. The results (see Table 93 below) show that there
is significantly less evidence of command and enforced choice as processes for developing
strategy at Barclaycard than in the Barclays Group as a whole.
Table 93 – Comparing The Barclaycard Cluster With The Group Results
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
a) Centre Of Scale 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
b) Group 4.300 3.861 3.908 4.408 3.840 3.606
c) Barclaycard 4.434 3.686 3.923 4.439 3.801 3.320
Result (c-a) 0.434 -0.314 -0.077 0.439 -0.199 -0.680
Result (c-b) 0.134 -0.175 0.015 0.031 -0.039 -0.286
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 36 below):
Figure 36 – Comparing The Barclaycard Cluster With The Group Results
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6.5.3.4 Barclays Africa
6.5.3.4.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes At Barclays Africa
The results from Barclays Africa also show the predominance of incrementalism and planning
as the processes for developing strategy (against the centre of the scale). Interestingly,
Barclays Africa shows less statistically significantly evidence of command as a process for
developing strategy. This could be a consequence of its geographical location. There are no
statistically significant differences between Barclays Africa and the Barclays Group in the
processes they adopt for developing strategy. The results are set out in Table 94 below:
Table 94 – The Barclays Africa Results
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
a) Centre Of Scale 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
b) Group 4.300 3.861 3.908 4.408 3.840 3.606
c) Barclays Africa 4.409 3.537 3.901 4.507 3.672 3.858
Result (c-a) 0.409 -0.463 -0.099 0.507 -0.328 -0.142
Result (c-b) 0.109 -0.324 -0.007 0.099 -0.168 0.252
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 37 below):
Figure 37 – Comparing The Results From Barclays Africa With The Group Results
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6.5.3.5 Barclays Capital
6.5.3.5.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays Capital
The reliance on incrementalism and planning as processes for developing strategy is
particularly evident across Barclays Capital (see Table 95 below, which shows deviations
from the centre of the Likert scale). The interesting aspect of these results is the statistically
significant move away from the political and enforced choice processes across the cluster and
Barclays Capital as a whole. It is also clear from these results that there is a relatively high
level of consensus across Barclays Capital regarding the strategy development process.
Table 95 – Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclays Capital Cluster
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Collateralised Fin. 0.444 -0.127 -0.126 0.964 -0.553 -0.574
Global Financing 0.242 -0.334 -0.175 0.382 -0.375 -0.498
Global Markets 0.447 -0.200 -0.162 0.697 -0.530 -0.641
Private Equity 0.342 -0.055 -0.139 0.468 -0.255 -0.413
Cluster Total 0.368 -0.179 -0.151 0.625 -0.427 -0.531
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 38 below):
Figure 38 – Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclays Capital Cluster
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6.5.3.5.2 Comparing The Barclays Capital Cluster With The Group Results
The report now moves on to compare the results from the Barclays Capital Cluster with the
centre (4) of the seven-point Likert scale and the Group Results. Similarly to the results from
the Barclaycard Cluster (see Section 6.5.3.3.2), the results show Barclays Capital relies
significantly on the planning process for developing strategy. Barclays Capital also applies
more planning than the Group and significantly less strategy development on the political
dimension. The results for incrementalism, command, culture and enforced choice are aligned
to the overall Group results (see Table 96 below).
Table 96 – Comparing The Barclays Capital Cluster With The Group Results
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
a) Centre Of Scale 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
b) Group 4.300 3.861 3.908 4.408 3.840 3.606
c) Barclays Capital 4.368 3.821 3.849 4.625 3.573 3.469
Result (c-a) 0.368 -0.179 -0.151 0.625 -0.427 -0.531
Result (c-b) 0.068 -0.040 -0.059 0.217 -0.267 -0.137
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 39 below):
Figure 39 – Comparing The Barclays Capital Cluster With The Group Results
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6.5.3.6 Barclays Private Clients
6.5.3.6.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays Private Clients
The evidence from Barclays Private Clients shows no significant differences from the centre
of the Likert scale across the cluster as a whole (see Table 97 below). At the strategic business
unit level, the data from Europe show a statistically significant lack of enforced choice, and a
statistically significant move away from planning as a process for developing strategy.
Table 97 – Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclays Private Clients Cluster
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Europe 0.128 0.104 0.181 -0.331 0.157 -0.396
International Bank 0.074 -0.109 -0.121 0.240 -0.180 -0.224
Investment Mgmt 0.035 -0.055 -0.095 -0.294 0.274 0.429
Private Bank 0.046 -0.146 0.123 0.176 -0.142 -0.087
Premier Bank 0.197 -0.051 -0.181 0.403 0.035 -0.228
Cluster Total 0.096 -0.044 -0.008 0.016 0.034 -0.113
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 40 below):
Figure 40 – Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclays Private Clients Cluster
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6.5.3.6.2 Comparing The Barclays Private Clients Cluster With The Group Results
A comparison of the results from Barclays Private Clients with the centre (4) of the seven-
point Likert scale and the Group results produces some interesting observations (see Table 98
below). First, there is evidence that the application of incrementalism and planning as
processes for developing strategy at Barclays Private Clients is significantly lower than
elsewhere across the Group. Second, this cluster appears to apply significantly more political
processes than other areas of the Group. Finally, the results for enforced choice show much
more evidence of strategy being imposed from outside Barclays Private Clients than elsewhere
across the Group, especially when compared with Barclays Capital and Barclaycard.
Table 98 – Comparing The Barclays Private Clients Cluster With The Group Results
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
a) Centre Of Scale 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
b) Group 4.300 3.861 3.908 4.408 3.840 3.606
c) Private Clients 4.096 3.956 3.992 4.016 4.034 3.887
Result (c-a) 0.096 -0.044 -0.008 0.016 0.034 -0.113
Result (c-b) -0.204 0.095 0.084 -0.392 0.194 0.281
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 41 below):
Figure 41 – Comparing The Barclays Clients Cluster With The Group Results
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6.5.3.7 UK Retail Bank
6.5.3.7.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The UK Retail Bank
The results from the UK Retail Bank also show the domination of incrementalism and
planning as processes for developing strategy (see Table 99 below, again showing deviations
from the centre of the scale). The data also show significantly less evidence of the cultural
dimension of strategy development across Personal Financial Services, which suggests that
strategy is not developed through the social fabric of the UK Retail Bank. The low score for
enforced choice shows that managers at Personal Financial Services and the Woolwich believe
themselves to be active in the strategy development process.
Table 99 – Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The UK Retail Bank Cluster
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
PFS 0.399 -0.134 -0.299 0.522 -0.147 -0.458
Woolwich 0.350 0.124 -0.133 0.747 -0.008 -0.320
Cluster Total 0.373 0.003 -0.211 0.641 -0.073 -0.385
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 42 below):
Figure 42 – Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The UK Retail Bank Cluster
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6.5.3.7.2 Comparing The UK Retail Bank Cluster With The Group Results
Comparison of the results from the UK Retail Bank with the centre (4) of the Likert scale and
the Group results produces three key observations (see Table 100 below). As identified in the
previous section, there are statistically significant levels of incrementalism and planning in the
process for developing strategy, and a move away from culture or the perception of enforced
choice. When compared with the Group, the UK Retail Bank displays a high degree of
synergy across all six dimensions, but a statistically significant higher level (at the 5% level)
of planning.
Table 100 – Comparing The UK Retail Bank Cluster With The Group Results
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
a) Centre Of Scale 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
b) Group 4.300 3.861 3.908 4.408 3.840 3.606
c) UK Retail Bank 4.373 4.003 3.789 4.641 3.927 3.615
Result (c-a) 0.373 0.003 -0.211 0.641 -0.073 -0.385
Result (c-b) 0.073 0.142 -0.119 0.233 0.087 0.009
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 43 below):
Figure 43 – Comparing The UK Retail Bank Cluster With The Group Results
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6.5.3.8 Barclays Global Investors
6.5.3.8.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes At Barclays Global Investors
Four key observations emerge from the comparison of the results from Barclays Global
Investors with the centre of the Likert scale and the Group results (see Table 101 below): first,
the dominance of planning in what appears to be verging on a single process for developing
strategy; second, a significantly low level of culture in the strategy development process; third,
clear evidence that strategy development is not imposed from outside the organisation; and
finally, high levels of synergy across all six dimensions with the Barclays Group as a whole.
Table 101 – The Barclays Global Investors Results
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
a) Centre Of Scale 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
b) Group 4.300 3.861 3.908 4.408 3.840 3.606
c) BGI 4.213 3.931 3.682 4.577 3.737 3.622
Result (c-a) 0.213 -0.069 -0.318 0.577 -0.263 -0.378
Result (c-b) -0.087 0.07 -0.226 0.169 -0.103 0.016
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 44 below):
Figure 44 – Comparing The Results From Barclays Global Investors With The Group Results
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6.5.3.9 Business Bank
6.5.3.9.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes At The Business Bank
This section compares the Business Bank Results with the Likert scale and the Group results;
and three observations emerge (see Table 102 below). First there is the dominance of
incrementalism and planning as the processes for developing strategy – the mean of 4.799 for
planning is the highest in the Group. Second there is evidence that strategy is not imposed on
the cluster (low enforced choice), highlighting a view that the cluster determines its own
strategy – through planning and incrementalism. And finally there is the high level of synergy
with the overall Group results, apart from a statistically significantly higher level of planning.
Table 102 – The Business Bank Results
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
a) Centre Of Scale 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000 4.000
b) Group 4.300 3.861 3.908 4.408 3.840 3.606
c) Business Bank 4.423 3.987 4.023 4.799 3.795 3.422
Result (c-a) 0.423 -0.013 0.023 0.799 -0.205 -0.578
Result (c-b) 0.123 0.126 0.115 0.391 -0.045 -0.184
These results can also be displayed on a radar graph (see Figure 45 below):
Figure 45 – Comparing The Results From The Business Bank With The Group Results
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6.5.4 Analysing Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays
6.5.4.1 Introduction
In his original thesis, Bailey (2000) found that the strategy development process is unlikely to
be characterised by a single unitary dimension. Therefore, the process in an organisation like
Barclays is likely to be multi-dimensional. Consequently, strategy development processes or
dimensions are unlikely to be mutually exclusive but are much more likely to transpire in
combination. The evidence collected in this research and presented in the previous section (see
Section 6.5) supports this observation.
Based on this observation by Bailey and subsequent pieces of research, most notably Bailey et
al. (2000), this section analyses the research results (see Table 103 below, again showing
deviations from the centre of the Likert scale) to observe the relationships that exist between
the individual strategy development processes or dimensions. The analysis is carried out at
both the Group and individual cluster levels.
Table 103 – The Barclays Group Results Expressed At The Strategic Business Unit Level
Business Unit Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard UK 0.574 0.318 0.080 -0.558 0.167 0.668
Barclaycard Int. 0.467 0.008 -0.404 0.476 -0.423 -0.881
Barclaycard Corp. -0.364 -0.630 1.903 -0.647 0.665 -2.046
Barclays Africa 0.409 -0.463 -0.099 0.507 -0.328 -0.142
Collateralised Fin. 0.444 -0.127 -0.126 0.964 -0.553 -0.574
Global Financing 0.242 -0.334 -0.175 0.382 -0.375 -0.498
Global Markets 0.447 -0.200 -0.162 0.697 -0.530 -0.641
Private Equity 0.342 -0.055 -0.139 0.468 -0.255 -0.413
Europe 0.128 0.104 0.181 -0.331 0.157 -0.396
International Bank 0.074 -0.109 -0.121 0.240 -0.180 -0.224
Investment Mgmt 0.035 -0.055 -0.095 -0.294 0.274 0.429
Private Bank 0.046 -0.146 0.123 0.176 -0.142 -0.087
Premier Bank 0.197 -0.051 -0.181 0.403 0.035 -0.228
PFS 0.399 -0.134 -0.299 0.522 -0.147 -0.458
Woolwich 0.350 0.124 -0.133 0.747 -0.008 -0.320
Business Bank 0.423 -0.013 0.023 0.799 -0.205 -0.578
BGI 0.213 -0.069 -0.318 0.577 -0.263 -0.378
Group Mean 0.300 -0.139 -0.092 0.408 -0.160 -0.394
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6.5.4.2 Analysing Correlations Across The Barclays Group
6.5.4.2.1 Expected Correlations
The research carried out by Bailey et al. (2000) was also underpinned by the expectation that
there would be a number of relationships between the six strategy development processes or
dimensions. These expected relationships are detailed in Table 104 below:
Table 104 – Expected Correlations (Bailey et al., 2000)
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental – +
Command – – +
Cultural – + +
Planning + – – – –
Political + + – +
Enforced Choice + – +
Based on a review of relevant literature and starting with the command dimension, Bailey et
al. predicted a negative relationship with planning and incrementalism but a positive
relationship with political processes. Bailey et al. take the idea of command to reflect the
application of power through institutionalised authority or the personality of the leader, rather
than the rational application of planning processes or broader participation in the planning
process, which underpins Quinn’s (1980) notion of logical incrementalism.
Developing their expectations further, Bailey et al. anticipated negative relationships between
planning and the political, cultural and enforced choice dimensions on the basis that planning
may be employed more readily in less constraining or turbulent environments. The expectation
of a positive relationship between planning and incrementalism by Bailey et al. was a clear
reflection on Quinn’s logical incrementalism. Finally, Bailey et al. predicted positive
correlations among the political, cultural and enforced choice dimensions. The basis for this
assumption was that power structures might reinforce cultural influences on strategy
development, and therefore normative political and cultural influences may be more prevalent
in highly regulated or coercive competitive environments.
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6.5.4.2.2 Analysing The Group Results
This section looks at correlations between the dimensions in the Group results. The critical
values are: 0.196 at the 5% significance level; and 0.258 at the 1% significance level. Where
critical values are significant at the 5% level they are highlighted in bold; where the values are
significant at the 1% level they are highlighted in red and bold (see Table 105 below):
Table 105 – The Group Correlation Matrix
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command -0.041873 1
Cultural 0.066435 0.181822 1
Planning 0.429834 -0.113938 -0.167811 1
Political -0.047269 0.319822 0.401973 -0.428980 1
Enforced Choice -0.083750 0.187310 0.229983 -0.273104 0.392108 1
The Group results show a positive relationship that is significant at the 1% level for: planning
and incrementalism; command and politics; culture and politics; and enforced choice and
politics. The positive relationship between enforced choice and culture is only significant at
the 5% level. The Group results also show a negative relationship that is significant at the 1%
level between: planning and politics; and the planning and enforced choice dimensions.
The Group results can be analysed against the ten key relationships identified by Bailey et al.
(2000) (see Table 106 below). There were no other statistically significant relationships
between the strategy development processes in the Group results.
Table 106 – Group Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  Not Significant
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  <1%
Planning Political Negative  <1%
Planning Cultural Negative  Not Significant
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  <1%
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  <5%
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6.5.4.3 Analysing Correlations Across The Various Clusters
6.5.4.3.1 Barclaycard
This section looks at correlations between the dimensions from the Barclaycard cluster. Owing
to the sample size (159), critical values are the same as the Group: 0.196 (5% significance)
and 0.258 (1% significance). Critical values significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold;
values significant at the 1% level are highlighted in red and bold (see Table 107 below):
Table 107 – Barclaycard Cluster: Correlation Matrix
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command 0.092242 1
Cultural -0.038671 0.079973 1
Planning 0.397623 -0.219035 -0.221535 1
Political -0.068329 0.447170 0.410103 -0.505716 1
Enforced Choice 0.033882 0.053519 0.208687 -0.272773 0.285954 1
These results also show positive relationships, significant at the 1% level for: planning and
incrementalism; command and politics; culture and politics; and enforced choice and politics.
Again, the positive relationship between enforced choice and culture is only significant at the
5% level. The results also show negative correlations significant at the 1% level for: planning
and politics; and the planning and enforced choice dimensions. Analysis of the results against
the work of Bailey et al. (2000) shows the predicted negative correlation between command
and incrementalism to be in fact positive at Barclaycard (see Table 108), although it is not
statistically significant. There were no other significant correlations in the Barclaycard data.
Table 108 – Barclaycard Cluster Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  <5%
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  <1%
Planning Political Negative  <1%
Planning Cultural Negative  <5%
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  <1%
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  <5%
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6.5.4.3.2 Barclays Africa
The analysis now moves on to look at correlations between the dimensions from Barclays
Africa. Owing to the size of the sample (37), the critical values are: 0.316 (5% significance)
and 0.408 (1% significance). Critical values significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold;
values significant at the 1% level are highlighted in red and bold (see Table 109 below):
Table 109 – Barclays Africa: Correlation Matrix
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command 0.099924 1
Cultural -0.153883 0.378186 1
Planning 0.554553 0.155080 -0.175851 1
Political -0.095536 0.254777 0.525861 -0.423940 1
Enforced Choice -0.415091 -0.015489 0.472587 -0.322163 0.484350 1
These results show positive relationships significant at the 1% level for: planning and
incrementalism; culture and politics; enforced choice and culture; and enforced choice and
politics. The results from Barclays Africa show a negative correlation significant at the 1%
level for planning and politics.
Analysis of the results against the work of Bailey et al. (2000) shows the predicted negative
correlations between command and planning, and command and incrementalism, to be
positive at Barclays Africa, although neither result is statistically significant. The results are
set out in Table 110 below:
Table 110 – Barclays Africa Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  Not Significant
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  Not Significant
Planning Political Negative  <1%
Planning Cultural Negative  Not Significant
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  <5%
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
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The interesting aspect of the results from Barclays Africa is the emergence of two
relationships that were not predicted by Bailey et al. (2000): first, the negative correlation at
the 1% significance level between enforced choice and incrementalism; and second, the
positive relationship at the 5% significance level between culture and command.
Beginning with the negative correlation between enforced choice and incrementalism, the
results show that as enforced choice becomes more prevalent at Barclays Africa, then
incrementalism declines, and vice versa. Although this relationship is predictable, as there is a
high correlation between incrementalism and planning, and a predicted negative correlation
between enforced choice and planning, the observation of such a strong negative relationship
(-0.4151) between enforced choice and incrementalism is interesting.
There are two possible explanations for this relationship: first, the geographical dispersion of
Barclays Africa, which may lead to the perception that strategy is developed by the Group
Centre in London and tends to be constant in the short-term; and second, that the high level of
merger and acquisition activity in Barclays Africa during 2003 (primarily managed from
London) means that strategy may be perceived as being enforced on the cluster rather than
emerging from within Barclays Africa in Johannesburg.
The second new relationship to emerge from Barclays Africa is the positive relationship
between culture and command (0.3782), which is significant at the 5% level and is therefore a
weaker relationship than the correlation between enforced choice and incrementalism. This
result shows that as command increases then the cultural approach to strategy development
also increases, and vice versa.
Again, this relationship is predictable and consistent with the Group results however, the
strength of the correlation is interesting and again there are two possible explanations. First,
the strategy development process although closely associated with a strong leader, or
commander, could be one of subtle symbolism, ritual and the application of experience,
consistent with the cultural dimension of strategy development (see Section 4.2.8).
Alternatively, the result could be a product of the cluster changing Chief Executive Officer
during 2003 and this change being reflected in a ‘mixed’ process for developing strategy.
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6.5.4.3.3 Barclays Capital
This section looks at correlations between the dimensions from Barclays Capital. Owing to the
size of the sample (123), the critical values are the same as for the Group: 0.196 (5%
significance) and 0.258 (1% significance) – see Table 111 below:
Table 111 – Barclays Capital Cluster: Correlation Matrix
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command -0.083322 1
Cultural 0.106707 0.076070 1
Planning 0.473630 -0.050259 0.100251 1
Political 0.020602 0.216057 0.404979 -0.318274 1
Enforced Choice -0.017363 0.149592 0.191717 -0.263208 0.378991 1
Consistent with the Group results, the data from Barclays Capital show positive relationships,
significant at the 1% level for: planning and incrementalism; culture and politics; and enforced
choice and politics. The positive relationship between command and politics is only
significant at the 5% level. These results also show negative correlations significant at the 1%
level for: planning and politics and the planning and enforced choice dimensions.
Analysis of the Barclays Capital results against the work of Bailey et al. (2000) shows the
predicted negative correlation between planning and the cultural approach to strategy
development to be positive at Barclays Capital, but it is not a statistically significant result
(see Table 112). There were no other significant correlations in the Barclays Capital data.
Table 112 – Barclays Capital Cluster Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  Not Significant
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  <5%
Planning Political Negative  <1%
Planning Cultural Negative  Not Significant
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  <1%
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  Not Significant
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6.5.4.3.4 Barclays Private Clients
Analysis of the results from across the cluster at Barclays Private Clients forms this section of
the report. Once again owing to the size of the sample (221), the critical values are the same as
for the Group results: 0.196 (5% significance) and 0.258 (1% significance) – see Table 113
below:
Table 113 – Barclays Private Clients Cluster: Correlation Matrix
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command -0.040167 1
Cultural 0.140320 0.271860 1
Planning 0.348879 -0.164477 -0.286889 1
Political 0.025085 0.316916 0.361745 -0.446267 1
Enforced Choice -0.075278 0.261524 0.155586 -0.260352 0.406299 1
The results from Barclays Private Clients are also consistent with the Group results, showing
positive relationships significant at the 1% level for: planning and incrementalism; culture and
politics; command and politics; and enforced choice and politics. These results also show
negative correlations significant at the 1% level for: planning and culture; planning and
politics; and finally the planning and enforced choice dimensions.
Analysis of the results from Barclays Private Clients against the work of Bailey et al. (2000)
shows a high level of consistency with the correlations predicted in their research. The results
are set out in Table 114 below:
Table 114 – Barclays Private Clients Cluster Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  Not Significant
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  <1%
Planning Political Negative  <1%
Planning Cultural Negative  <1%
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  <1%
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  Not Significant
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The results show the predicted negative correlations between planning and the command
approach to strategy development, and command and incrementalism to be negative, but not
statistically significant result. By the same token, the predicted positive correlation between
culture and the enforced choice dimension is positive but not statistically significant. There
were no other significant correlations evident in the data from Barclays Private Clients.
An interesting aspect of the results from Barclays Private Clients is the evidence of two
correlations that are both statistically significant at the 1% level and that were not predicted by
Bailey et al. (2000): first, the positive correlation between enforced choice and command; and
second, similarly to Barclays Africa, the positive relationship between culture and command.
Beginning with the positive correlation between enforced choice and command (0.2615), the
results show that when managers believe strategy is being imposed on them from outside
Barclays Private Clients, then the perception held by senior managers is that strategy is
developed by a strong leader, or commander. The explanation for this could lie in the
experience of 2003, where the strategy may have been perceived as being determined by the
Group Executive Committee as a consequence of consistent under-performance. This resulted
in the Chief Executive Officer being replaced by the Group Finance Director in April 2003.
The explanation for the significant positive correlation between culture and command
(0.2719) could also lie in the leadership of the cluster. In the same way that Barclays Africa
produced a mixed process for strategy development owing to leadership changes, Barclays
Private Clients produced similar results. This also appears to be linked to the leadership of the
cluster because during the period of the data collection (2003), Barclays Private Clients had
three different Chief Executive Officers and three different Chief Operating Officers.
Clearly, the change in leadership had ramifications for how leadership was perceived in the
organisation and this is reflected in the command dimension. The strong correlation with the
cultural dimension is probably a consequence of a symbolic and ritualistic approach to
strategy based more on the application of experience than on the manipulation of managerial
techniques by the various leaders of Barclays Private Clients during 2003.
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6.5.4.3.5 The UK Retail Bank
The report now moves on to analyse correlations between the dimensions in the results from
the UK Retail Bank. Owing to the size of the sample (98), the critical values are: 0.197 (5%
significance) and 0.257 (1% significance). The results are set out in Table 115 below:
Table 115 – UK Retail Bank Cluster: Correlation Matrix
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command -0.047349 1
Cultural 0.216002 0.246024 1
Planning 0.369904 -0.059684 -0.041287 1
Political -0.072335 0.279784 0.383903 -0.377474 1
Enforced Choice 0.064747 0.237356 0.337629 -0.159665 0.536467 1
Also consistent with the Group results, the UK Retail Bank results show positive correlations
significant at the 1% level for: planning and incrementalism; culture and politics; culture and
enforced choice; command and politics; and enforced choice and politics. The results also
show a negative correlation significant at the 1% level for planning and politics.
Analysis of the results from the UK Retail Bank against the work of Bailey et al. (2000) shows
a high level of consistency with the correlations predicted in their research. The negative
correlations between: command and planning; command and incrementalism; planning and
culture; and, planning and enforced choice are negative but not statistically significant. The
results are set out in Table 116 below:
Table 116 – UK Retail Bank Cluster Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  Not Significant
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  <1%
Planning Political Negative  <1%
Planning Cultural Negative  Not Significant
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  Not Significant
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
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The interesting aspect of the results from the UK Retail Bank is the evidence of three
relationships that were not predicted in the work of Bailey et al. (2000). These three
correlations which are positive, and significant at the 5% level are between: incrementalism
and culture; command and culture; and command and enforced choice.
The first correlation (0.2160) recognises that when incrementalism is present in the strategy
process then so is the cultural approach to strategy development, and vice versa. This
observation is particularly interesting because the logical prediction would be for a negative
relationship between incrementalism and culture owing to the high level of correlation
between incrementalism and planning, and the predicted negative correlation between
planning and culture. However, the positive relationship is consistent with the Group results
and could be explained by a cultural change in the strategy development process following the
acquisition of the Woolwich, resulting in a mixture of two different strategy development
processes.
The second two correlations recognise that when command is present in the strategy
development process, then so is the cultural approach (0.2460) and the enforced choice
(0.2374) dimension of strategy development, and vice versa. These relationships are also
counter-intuitive, as one would logically expect that the presence of enforced choice and
culture would exclude characteristics associated with the command dimension (see Section
4.2.4). For example, enforced choice (see Section 4.2.9) is when the responsibility for strategy
development lies outside the organisation. This approach is not compatible with strategy being
developed by a strong leader, or commander, which implies that the leader is within the
cluster – unless of course the particular leadership resides in the Group Centre and is therefore
perceived as being outside the cluster, a view that appears consistent with the results from
Barclays Private Clients (see Section 6.5.4.3.4).
The positive correlation between command and culture is also consistent with the results at
Barclays Private Clients (and Barclays Africa), providing evidence that although leadership is
perceived as strong, the style adopted is cultural – depending on the use of symbols and the
application of experience rather than the manipulation of managerial tools and techniques (see
Section 4.2.8), as for example with value-based management (see Section 2.1.7).
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6.5.4.3.6 Barclays Global Investors
This section of the report looks at correlations between the dimensions from Barclays Global
Investors. Owing to the size of the sample (36), the critical values are: 0.321 (5% significance)
and 0.413 (1% significance). The detailed results are set out in Table 117 below:
Table 117 – Barclays Global Investors: Correlation Matrix
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command -0.198370 1
Cultural -0.148871 0.066513 1
Planning 0.610441 -0.156274 -0.326227 1
Political -0.151536 0.320491 0.449058 -0.568013 1
Enforced Choice 0.040190 0.148753 0.502992 -0.289018 0.578587 1
Consistent with the Group results, the results from Barclays Global Investors show positive
correlations significant at the 1% level for: planning and incrementalism; culture and politics;
command and politics; culture and enforced choice; and enforced choice and politics. The
positive relationship between politics and command is only significant at the 5% level. The
results also show a negative correlation significant at the 5% level for culture and politics.
Analysis of these results against the work of Bailey et al. (2000) shows a high level of
consistency with the correlations predicted in their research. The negative correlations
between: command and planning; command and incrementalism; and planning and enforced
choice are negative but not statistically significant. The results are set out in Table 118 below:
Table 118 – Barclays Global Investors Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  Not Significant
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  <5%
Planning Political Negative  <1%
Planning Cultural Negative  <5%
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  Not Significant
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
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6.5.4.3.7 The Business Bank
The final part of this section examines correlations between the dimensions from the Business
Bank. Owing to the size of the sample (57), the critical values are: 0.268 (5% significance)
and 0.335 (1% significance). The detailed results are set out in Table 119 below:
Table 119 – Business Bank: Correlation Matrix
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command -0.164594 1
Cultural 0.021863 0.190494 1
Planning 0.511059 -0.007252 -0.180075 1
Political -0.048663 0.304821 0.455715 -0.278219 1
Enforced Choice -0.241745 0.363545 0.116720 -0.133474 0.081486 1
The results from the Business Bank show positive correlations significant at the 1% level for:
planning and incrementalism; and culture and politics. The positive relationship between
politics and command is only significant at the 5% level. The results also show a negative
correlation significant at the 5% level for politics and planning. Analysis of these results
against the work of Bailey et al. (2000) shows a high level of consistency with the correlations
predicted in their research. Interestingly an unpredicted relationship statistically significant at
the 1% level is identified between command and enforced choice. This observation is
consistent with other areas of the Group, where strategy is developed through a strong leader
but the individual is perceived as being outside the organisation. The results are set out in
Table 120 below:
Table 120 – Business Bank Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  Not Significant
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  <5%
Planning Political Negative  <5%
Planning Cultural Negative  Not Significant
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  Not Significant
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  Not Significant
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  Not Significant
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6.5.5 Strategy Process And Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
6.5.5.1 Introduction
This report now goes on to set out a key component of this Executive Doctorate, the analysis
of the relationship between strategy development process and perceived environmental
uncertainty. In order to achieve this objective, this section consists of seven (statistically
significant) component parts:
1. Differences in strategy development process across the seventeen strategic business
units in the Barclays portfolio.
2. Differences in perceived environmental uncertainty across the Barclays portfolio.
3. Differences in the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty.
4. Differences in the importance of each strategic business units being able to cope with
perceived environmental uncertainty.
5. Correlations between strategy development process and perceived environmental
uncertainty across the Barclays portfolio.
6. Correlations between strategy development process and the ability of the various
strategic business units to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
7. Correlations between strategy development process and the importance of the various
strategic business units being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
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6.5.5.2 Strategy Development Processes
6.5.5.2.1 Comparing Strategy Development Processes Across Strategic Business Units
This section of the report identifies significant differences in strategy development processes
across the individual strategic business units within the Barclays Group. Here the results of the
individual strategic business units have been compared with the overall Group results. Results
significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold text; those significant at the 1% level are
highlighted in red and bold text. The full results are set out in Table 121 below:
Table 121 – Identifying Significant Differences In Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclays Group
Business Unit Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard UK 0.574 0.318 0.080 -0.558 0.167 0.668
Barclaycard Int. 0.467 0.008 -0.404 0.476 -0.423 -0.881
Barclaycard Corp. -0.364 -0.630 1.903 -0.647 0.665 -2.046
Barclays Africa 0.409 -0.463 -0.099 0.507 -0.328 -0.142
Collateralised Fin. 0.444 -0.127 -0.126 0.964 -0.553 -0.574
Global Financing 0.242 -0.334 -0.175 0.382 -0.375 -0.498
Global Markets 0.447 -0.200 -0.162 0.697 -0.530 -0.641
Private Equity 0.342 -0.055 -0.139 0.468 -0.255 -0.413
Europe 0.128 0.104 0.181 -0.331 0.157 -0.396
International Bank 0.074 -0.109 -0.121 0.240 -0.180 -0.224
Investment Mgmt 0.035 -0.055 -0.095 -0.294 0.274 0.429
Private Bank 0.046 -0.146 0.123 0.176 -0.142 -0.087
Premier Bank 0.197 -0.051 -0.181 0.403 0.035 -0.228
PFS 0.399 -0.134 -0.299 0.522 -0.147 -0.458
Woolwich 0.350 0.124 -0.133 0.747 -0.008 -0.320
Business Bank 0.423 -0.013 0.023 0.799 -0.205 -0.578
BGI 0.213 -0.069 -0.318 0.577 -0.263 -0.378
Group Mean 0.300 -0.139 -0.092 0.408 -0.160 -0.394
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6.5.5.2.2 Incremental
The results show that Barclaycard UK is the only strategic business unit to show a significant
result at the 1% level on the incremental dimension (0.574). The research can therefore
conclude that incrementalism is applied at Barclaycard UK significantly more than at other
business units across the portfolio, and significantly more than in the Group as a whole. The
Private Bank shows a significant result at the 5% level (0.046); the report is therefore able to
conclude that there is significantly more incrementalism in the strategy development process
at the Private Bank than elsewhere in the Barclays Group.
6.5.5.2.3 Command
This analysis shows that Barclaycard Corporate is the only strategic business unit to show a
significant result on the command dimension (-0.630), significant at the 1% level. The
research can therefore conclude that there is significantly less command in the strategy
development process at Barclaycard Corporate than elsewhere across the Group.
6.5.5.2.4 Culture
The results show statistically significant differences on the cultural dimension. Barclaycard
Corporate (1.903) and Europe (0.181) show more evidence of the use of culture (both at the
5% significance level) than elsewhere across the Group. By way of comparison, Barclaycard
International (-0.404) shows significantly (at the 5% level) less use of culture in its strategy
development process.
6.5.5.2.5 Planning
The results from the investigation into statistically significant differences on the planning
dimension show significantly more use of planning as a process for developing strategy at: the
Business Bank (0.799), which is significant at the 1% level; and Collateralised Financing
(0.964), which is also significant at the 1% level. By way of comparison, the results show that
there is significantly less planning in the strategy process at: Europe (-0.331) and Investment
Management (-0.294), both significant at the 1% level.
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6.5.5.2.6 Political
The results from the investigation into statistically significant differences on the political
dimension show a significantly greater use of politics in the process for developing strategy at:
Investment Management (0.274), which is significant at the 1% level; and Europe (0.157),
which is significant at the 5% level. It is therefore safe to conclude that there is a significant
use of politics in the strategy development process at Investment Management and Europe –
and appreciably more politics in these two organisations than elsewhere across the Group. The
relationship between the use of politics and organisational performance is examined later in
this report (see Section 6.5.6.2).
By way of comparison, the Group results show that there is significantly less evidence of
politics in the strategy development process at: Collateralised Financing (-0.553), Global
Markets (-0.530), and the Woolwich (-0.008), which are all significant at the 5% level.
6.5.5.2.7 Enforced Choice
The final element of this section examines statistically significant differences in enforced
choice as a process for strategy development across the Barclays Group. There are four
statistically significant differences on this dimension. The result from Investment Management
(0.429), which is statistically significant at the 1% level, highlights a perception of strategy
being imposed upon the business unit. By the same token, the data from Barclaycard UK
(0.668), which are statistically significant at the 5% level, also highlight a perception of
strategy being developed from outside the strategic business unit. The relationship between
organisational performance and the enforced choice dimension is examined later in this report
(see Section 6.5.6.2).
By way of comparison, the result from Barclaycard International (-0.881), which is statistically
significant at the 1% level, shows that they believe themselves to have more input and
influence (or less enforced choice) on the development of strategy in their particular business
unit than elsewhere across the Group. This finding is consistent with the data at the Premier
Bank (-0.087), although this latter finding is significant only at the 5% level.
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6.5.5.3 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
6.5.5.3.1 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty Across Strategic Business Units
This section of the report identifies significant differences in perceived environmental
uncertainty across the Barclays Group. Here the results of the individual strategic business
units have been compared with the centre (50) of the 0–100 scale used in Project 2 to identify
statistically significant means, and also with the total Group score (‘Variance’). Owing to the
size of the sample (15), the critical value for significance at the 5% level is 2.16, the critical
value at the 2% level is 2.62, and the critical value at the 1% significance level is 3.01.
Results significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold text, those significant at the 2%
level are highlighted in green and bold text, and the results significant at the 1% level are
highlighted in red and bold text. The full results are set out in Table 122 below. When
considering these results it is useful to be mindful of the lack of managerial consensus that
was discovered in Project 2 among the assessments of perceived environmental uncertainty
made by the fifteen members of the Group Executive Committee (see Section 5.7.2.1).
Table 122 – Identifying Significant Differences In Perceived Environmental Uncertainty Across Barclays
Levels Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Degree Of Uncertainty Rate Of Change Level Of Complexity
Business Unit Centre Variance Centre Variance Centre Variance
Barclaycard UK 48.400 -1.280 56.000 7.836 52.333 2.482
Barclaycard Int. 58.333 8.653 56.667 8.503 53.000 3.148
Barclaycard Corp. 37.667 -12.014 41.667 -6.497 42.000 -7.852
Barclays Africa 49.000 -0.680 42.000 -6.164 44.667 -5.185
Collateralised Fin. 50.385 0.704 44.615 -3.548 46.538 -3.313
Global Financing 55.769 6.089 46.538 -1.625 54.615 4.764
Global Markets 62.000 12.320 50.769 2.606 52.308 2.456
Private Equity 58.571 8.891 37.143 -11.021 45.714 -4.137
Europe 46.667 -3.014 48.333 0.170 48.333 -1.518
International Bank 46.667 -3.014 47.667 -0.497 47.733 -2.118
Investment Mgmt 55.667 5.986 53.000 4.836 57.000 7.148
Private Bank 51.733 2.053 55.400 7.236 47.667 -2.185
Premier Bank 46.000 -3.680 54.000 5.836 55.733 5.882
PFS 46.400 -3.280 54.000 5.836 66.333 16.482
Woolwich 44.733 -4.947 44.400 -3.764 41.333 -8.518
Business Bank 42.000 -7.680 42.333 -5.830 48.000 -1.852
BGI 50.067 0.386 44.333 -3.830 43.667 -6.185
Group Mean 49.680 48.164 49.852
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6.5.5.3.1.1 The Degree Of Uncertainty
The key observation from these results is that the mean assessment for the degree of
uncertainty faced by Barclaycard Corporate is significantly different both from the middle of
the construct (50) presented to the members of the Group Executive Committee (0–100), and
compared with the overall Group results. This result is significant at the 1% level. Therefore,
the results show that the Group Executive Committee believe that Barclaycard Corporate faces
a low degree of uncertainty. This result is also reflected in the comparison with the Group
results, where the variance is significantly lower than the rest of the Group. This result is
significant at the 5% level and suggests that the Group Executive Committee believes that
Barclaycard Corporate face a significantly lower level of uncertainty than other strategic
business units within the Group.
By way of comparison, Global Markets in the Barclays Capital Cluster show evidence of
facing a significantly higher level of uncertainty – this result is significant at the 5% level.
Again, this result is also reflected in the comparison with the Group results, which therefore
suggests that the Group Executive Committee believes that Global Markets faces significantly
more uncertainty than other strategic business units within the Group. This finding could be a
product of the fee-based business model in investment banking at Barclays Capital, as
opposed to the traditional, well-proven business model of the Barclays Group (see Section
5.5.2.1).
6.5.5.3.1.2 The Rate Of Change
The observation here is that Barclaycard Corporate faces a significantly lower rate of change –
this result is significant at the 5% level. Equally, Private Equity in the Barclays Capital Cluster
is also perceived to be facing a significantly lower rate of change, a result that is significant at
the 2% level.
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Interestingly, the Private Bank is deemed to be facing a rate of change that is significantly
higher than the rate of change being experienced by every other strategic business unit within
the Group. This result is significant at the 2% level. None of the other strategic business units
is deemed to be facing a significantly higher or lower rate of change than the rest of the
Group, an interesting observation in that the qualitative exploration in Project 2 of this report
(see Section 5.5) identified discernible qualitative differences between the environments
within which these various strategic business units operate.
6.5.5.3.1.3 The Level Of Complexity
The key observation here is that Personal Financial Services is perceived as being faced with a
significantly high rate of complexity, a result that is significant at the 1% level. This finding is
consistent with the qualitative exploration (see Section 5.5.2.3), which found that the size of
an organisation increases the level of complexity it faces. During 2003, Personal Financial
Services had 2,070 branches, 25,800 employees, and 10.5m customers. The qualitative
exploration also identified as contributory factors in the level of complexity: the number of
stakeholders, the level of information required to manage the business, and the geographical
dispersion of the organisation. All these factors represent key characteristics of the business
model at Personal Financial Services.
When compared with the rest of the Group, Personal Financial Services is deemed to face an
appreciably higher level of complexity than the rest of the strategic business units in the
Barclays portfolio, a result significant at the 1% level. This finding is also a consequence of
the relatively complex business model (also see Section 5.5.2.3). None of the other business
units can be differentiated from any other areas of the Group in terms of the level of
complexity they are perceived to face. As in the previous section, this observation is
interesting in that the qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5) identified
discernible qualitative differences between the environments within which these various
strategic business units operate.
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6.5.5.3.2 Comparing The Ability To Cope Across The Portfolio
This section of the report identifies significant differences in the ability to cope with the
degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity faced by business units
in their competitive environment. Here the results of the individual strategic business units
have been compared both with the centre (50) of the 0–100 construct used in Project 2 to
identify statistically significant means, and also with the overall Group results (‘Variance’).
Owing to the size of the sample (15), the critical value for significance at the 5% level is 2.16,
the critical value at the 2% level is 2.62, and the critical value at the 1% significance level is
3.01.
Results significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold text, those significant at the 2%
level are highlighted in green and bold text, and the results significant at the 1% level are
highlighted in red and bold text. The full results are set out in Table 123 below. When
considering these results it is again useful to be mindful of the lack of managerial consensus
that was discovered in Project 2 among the assessments of perceived environmental
uncertainty made by the members of the Group Executive Committee (see Section 5.7.2.1).
Table 123 – Identifying Significant Differences In The Ability To Cope Across The Barclays Group
Ability To Cope With
Degree Of Uncertainty Rate Of Change Level Of Complexity
Business Unit Centre Variance Centre Variance Centre Variance
Barclaycard UK 69.643 8.304 72.333 11.960 74.000 10.868
Barclaycard Int. 58.000 -3.339 55.333 -5.040 57.667 -5.465
Barclaycard Corp. 67.400 6.061 66.400 6.027 67.333 4.202
Barclays Africa 58.000 -3.339 59.667 -0.707 60.067 -3.065
Collateralised Fin. 74.231 12.892 71.154 10.781 77.000 13.868
Global Financing 74.615 13.277 73.846 13.473 78.077 14.945
Global Markets 74.615 13.277 72.692 12.319 79.231 16.099
Private Equity 71.429 10.090 65.714 5.341 79.357 16.225
Europe 50.333 -11.006 51.333 -9.040 51.333 -11.798
International Bank 58.667 -2.672 53.733 -6.640 56.000 -7.132
Investment Mgmt 46.667 -14.672 46.333 -14.040 49.333 -13.798
Private Bank 57.400 -3.939 52.333 -8.040 57.733 -5.398
Premier Bank 53.000 -8.339 51.333 -9.040 53.333 -9.798
PFS 51.333 -10.006 51.667 -8.707 50.000 -13.132
Woolwich 44.667 -16.672 48.400 -11.973 40.667 -22.465
Business Bank 71.000 9.661 72.067 11.694 71.733 8.602
BGI 67.000 5.661 66.533 6.160 75.667 12.535
Group Mean 61.339 60.373 63.132
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6.5.5.3.2.1 The Ability To Cope With The Degree Of Uncertainty
The key observation from these results is that the ability to cope with uncertainty is
significantly high against the centre (50) of the 0–100 scale at all the strategic business units
within: the Barclaycard Cluster, the Barclays Capital Cluster, the Business Bank, and Barclays
Global Investors. All these results are significant at the 1% level and show that the Group
Executive Committee believes that these strategic business units have a significantly high
level of ability to cope with the degree of uncertainty in their competitive environments.
The Private Bank in the Barclays Private Clients Cluster has also been deemed to have a
significantly high level of ability to cope with the degree of uncertainty in its competitive
environment – this result is significant at the 5% level. Interestingly, the overall mean for the
Group as a whole is significantly high at the 1% level, which shows the Group Executive
Committee believes the Group has a significantly high level of ability to cope with the degree
of uncertainty in its competitive environment.
When comparing individual strategic business units with other business units in the Barclays
Group, it is evident that the four strategic business units in the Barclays Capital Cluster are
deemed to have a significantly higher level of ability to cope with uncertainty than the Group
as a whole. The same applies for the Business Bank and Private Equity, albeit their results are
significant only at the 5% level.
By way of comparison, the Woolwich in the UK Retail Bank Cluster is deemed to have a
significantly lower level of ability to cope with uncertainty than the Group as a whole. This is
almost certainly the result of the Group Executive Committee not yet having seen the
Woolwich cope with a period of uncertainty, as the Woolwich only joined the Barclays Group
in 2001 (see Section 5.5.3.1). The two other strategic business units that are deemed to have a
significantly lower level of ability to cope with uncertainty are Investment Management and
Europe. These two business units are within the Barclays Private Clients Cluster and are
significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. These two business units produced relatively
poor results in 2003. The relationship between the ability to cope with uncertainty and
organisational performance is covered later in this report (see Section 6.5.6.3).
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6.5.5.3.2.2 The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
The key observation from these results is that the ability to cope with the rate of change is
significantly high against the centre (50) of the 0–100 scale at all the strategic business units
within: the Barclays Capital Cluster, the Business Bank, and Barclays Global Investors. In the
Barclaycard Cluster, Barclaycard UK and Barclaycard Corporate are deemed to have a
significantly higher level of ability to cope with the rate of change. All these results are
significant at the 1% level. As in the previous section, the overall mean for the Group as a
whole is significantly high at the 1% level, which shows the Group Executive Committee
believe the Group has a significantly high level of ability to cope with the rate of change in its
competitive environment.
When comparing the individual strategic business units with other business units in the
Barclays Group, it is evident that three of the four strategic business units in the Barclays
Capital Cluster are deemed to have a significantly higher level of ability to cope with change
than the Group as a whole. Only Private Equity fails to produce a significant result. By the
same token, only Barclaycard UK in the Barclaycard Cluster is deemed to have a significantly
higher level of ability to cope with change (1%), when compared to the rest of the Group. The
same applies for the Business Bank which is also significant at the 1% level.
In comparison, the Woolwich in the UK Retail Bank Cluster is deemed to have a significantly
lower level of ability to cope with change than the Group as a whole. As in the previous
section, this is almost certainly a consequence of the Group Executive Committee having not
yet seen the Woolwich cope with a period of change, as it only joined the Barclays Group in
2001 (see Section 5.5.3.1). The two other strategic business units that are deemed to have a
significantly lower level of ability to cope with change are Investment Management and the
Private Bank – these two business units are within the Barclays Private Clients Cluster and are
significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. As identified in the previous section, these
two business units produced particularly poor results in 2003. The relationship between the
ability to cope with change and organisational performance is covered later in this report (see
Section 6.5.6.3).
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6.5.5.3.2.3 The Ability To Cope With The Level Of Complexity
Along similar lines to the previous two sections, the key observation from this part of the
research is that the ability to cope with complexity is significantly high against the centre (50)
of the 0–100 scale at all the strategic business units within: the Barclays Capital Cluster, the
Business Bank, and Barclays Global Investors. In the Barclaycard Cluster, Barclaycard UK
and Barclaycard Corporate are deemed to have a significantly high level of ability to cope with
the level of complexity. All these results are significant at the 1% level.
Aligned to the findings of the previous section, the Private Bank in the Barclays Private
Clients Cluster again is deemed to have a significantly high level of ability to cope with the
level of complexity in its competitive environment – this result is significant at the 5% level.
Again the overall mean for the Group is significantly high at the 1% level, which shows the
Group Executive Committee believes the Group has a significantly high level of ability to
cope with the level of complexity in its competitive environment.
Comparing the individual strategic business units with other business units in the Barclays
Group, it is evident that the four strategic business units in the Barclays Capital Cluster are
deemed to have a significantly higher level of ability to cope with complexity than the Group
as a whole. The same applies for the Business Bank (5%) and Barclays Global Investors (2%).
In the Barclaycard Cluster, only Barclaycard UK is deemed to have a significantly higher level
of ability to cope with complexity (1%) when compared to the rest of the Group.
In comparison, both strategic business units in the UK Retail Bank (Personal Financial
Services and the Woolwich) are deemed to have a significantly lower level of ability to cope
with complexity than the Group as a whole. The three other strategic business units that are
deemed to have a significantly lower level of ability to cope with complexity than the rest of
the Group are: Investment Management (1%), Europe (2%), and the Premier Bank (2%).
These three strategic business units are in the Barclays Private Clients Cluster and produced
particularly poor results in 2003. The relationship between the ability to cope with complexity
and organisational performance is also covered later in this report (see Section 6.5.6.3).
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6.5.5.3.3 Comparing The Importance Of Being Able To Cope Across The Portfolio
This section of the report identifies significant differences in the importance of the various
business units in the Barclays Group being able to cope with the degree of uncertainty, the rate
of change, and the level of complexity. Once again, the results of the individual strategic
business units have been compared both with the centre (50) of the 0–100 scale used in
Project 2 to identify statistically significant means, and also compared with the mean for the
overall Group (‘Variance’). Again, the critical value for significance at the 5% level is 2.16,
the critical value at the 2% level is 2.62, and the critical value at the 1% significance level is
3.01.
Results significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold text, those significant at the 2%
level are highlighted in green and bold text, and the results significant at the 1% level are
highlighted in red and bold text. The full results are set out in Table 124 below. When
considering these results it is once again useful to be reminded of the lack of managerial
consensus among the assessments of perceived environmental uncertainty made by the fifteen
members of the Group Executive Committee (see Section 5.7.2.1).
Table 124 – Identifying Significant Differences In The Importance Of Being Able To Cope Across Barclays
The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With
Degree Of Uncertainty Rate Of Change Level Of Complexity
Business Unit Centre Variance Centre Variance Centre Variance
Barclaycard UK 74.333 16.588 80.667 18.509 75.000 12.523
Barclaycard Int. 65.333 7.588 70.000 7.842 67.667 5.189
Barclaycard Corp. 44.667 -13.078 48.000 -14.158 50.333 -12.144
Barclays Africa 40.333 -17.412 45.333 -16.825 48.333 -14.144
Collateralised Fin. 62.308 4.563 59.231 -2.927 68.462 5.984
Global Financing 71.923 14.178 70.077 7.919 77.692 15.215
Global Markets 71.923 14.178 71.154 8.996 80.000 17.523
Private Equity 52.857 -4.888 51.786 -10.372 62.500 0.023
Europe 37.667 -20.078 43.000 -19.158 43.333 -19.144
International Bank 54.667 -3.078 64.400 2.242 62.333 -0.144
Investment Mgmt 55.333 -2.412 59.067 -3.091 55.333 -7.144
Private Bank 44.667 -13.078 55.667 -6.491 54.333 -8.144
Premier Bank 61.000 3.255 70.333 8.175 66.000 3.523
PFS 71.333 13.588 76.667 14.509 73.000 10.523
Woolwich 48.000 -9.745 54.000 -8.158 45.667 -16.811
Business Bank 73.000 15.255 75.667 13.509 72.000 9.523
BGI 53.667 -4.078 60.333 -1.825 62.000 -0.477
Group Mean 57.745 62.158 62.477
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6.5.5.3.3.1 The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Degree Of Uncertainty
The key observation from this part of the research is that the score in respect of the importance
of being able to cope with uncertainty is significantly high against the centre (50) of the 0–100
construct at the Business Bank and at three of the strategic business units within the Barclays
Capital Cluster. Only Private Equity failed to produce a significantly high result. In the
Barclaycard Cluster, both Barclaycard UK and Barclaycard International produced
significantly high results, both significant at the 1% level.
Another of the large value-creating businesses, Personal Financial Services, also produced a
significantly high score (1%) on this dimension. The overall Group mean is significant at the
2% level and shows the Group Executive Committee believes it is important that the Group is
able to cope with the degree of uncertainty in its competitive environment.
When comparing the individual strategic business units with other business units in the
Barclays Group it is evident that two of the four strategic business units in the Barclays
Capital Cluster (Global Financing and Global Markets) are deemed significantly higher in
terms of the importance of their being able to cope with uncertainty. The same applies with
the Business Bank and Barclaycard UK within the Barclaycard Cluster. These results were
significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively.
At the opposite end of the scale, it is deemed significantly less important that: Barclays Africa,
Europe, the Private Bank and Barclaycard Corporate are able to cope with the rate of change
in their competitive environments. As in the previous section, all these strategic business units
produced relatively low levels of economic profit for the Group in 2003. The relationship
between the perceived importance of being able to cope with uncertainty and the level of
economic profit created is covered in detail later in this report (see Section 6.5.6.3).
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6.5.5.3.3.2 The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Rate Of Change
This element of the research discovers that the score in respect of the importance of being able
to cope with change is significantly high against the centre (50) of the 0–100 construct at the
Business Bank and Barclays Global Investors. On this dimension, two of the three strategic
business units within the Barclays Capital Cluster produced significantly high results – Global
Financing and Global Markets. As in the previous section, in the Barclaycard Cluster, both
Barclaycard UK and Barclaycard International produced statistically significant high results –
both significant at the 1% level.
Once again, the large value-creating business at Personal Financial Service produced a
significantly high score (1%) on this dimension. The results from the International Bank and
the Premier Bank were both significantly high on this dimension. This result is almost
certainly a consequence of the high levels of change they encountered during 2002 and 2003.
The overall Group mean is significant at the 1% level and shows the Group Executive
Committee believes it is important that the Group is able to cope with the rate of change in its
competitive environment.
When comparing the individual strategic business units with other business units in the
Barclays Group, it is evident that two of the four strategic business units in the Barclays
Capital Cluster (Global Financing and Global Markets) are deemed significantly higher in
terms of the importance of their being able to cope with change. The same applies with the
Business Bank and Barclaycard UK within the Barclaycard Cluster. These results were
significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively. Once again, the large value-creating business
at Personal Financial Service produced a significantly high score (5%) when compared with
the rest of the Group in terms of the importance of its being able to cope with change.
At the opposite end of the scale, it was deemed significantly less important that: Barclays
Africa, Europe and Barclaycard Corporate are able to cope with the rate of change in their
competitive environments. As in the previous section, all these strategic business units
produce relatively low levels of economic profit for the Group. The relationship between the
perceived importance of being able to cope with change and the level of economic profit
created is covered in detail later in this report (see Section 6.5.6.3).
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6.5.5.3.3.3 The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Level Of Complexity
The final part of this element of the research investigates the importance of being able to cope
with complexity. When compared against the centre (50) of the 0–100 construct, the level of
importance on this dimension was significantly high at the Business Bank and at three of the
strategic business units within the Barclays Capital Cluster. Only Private Equity failed to
produce a significantly high result. In the Barclaycard Cluster, both Barclaycard UK and
Barclaycard International produced significantly high results, both at the 1% level.
As in the previous sections, the large value-creating business at Personal Financial Services
also produced a significantly high score (1%) on this dimension, as did the Premier Bank.
Again this is likely to be a consequence of its relatively complex business model (see Section
5.5.2.3). The overall Group mean is significant at the 1% level and shows the Group
Executive Committee believes it is important that the Group is able to cope with the level of
complexity in its competitive environment.
When comparing the individual strategic business units with other business units in the
Barclays Group, two of the four strategic business units in the Barclays Capital Cluster
(Global Financing and Global Markets) are deemed significantly higher in terms of the
importance of their being able to cope with complexity. The same applies to Barclaycard UK
in the Barclaycard Cluster. Interestingly, the largest value-creating business (the Business
Bank) does not produce significant results in terms of the importance of its being able to cope
with complexity. This is likely to be a consequence of its relatively simple business model
(see also Section 5.5.2.3).
At the opposite end of the scale, it was deemed significantly less important that: the
Woolwich, Barclays Africa, Europe, the Private Bank and Barclaycard Corporate are able to
cope with the level of complexity in their competitive environments. As in the previous
section, all these strategic business units produce relatively low levels of economic profit for
the Group. The relationship between the perceived importance of being able to cope with
complexity and the level of economic profit created is covered in detail later in this report (see
Section 6.5.6.3).
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6.5.5.4 Testing The Relationship
6.5.5.4.1 Strategy Development Processes And Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
6.5.5.4.1.1 The Findings
The research now moves on to analyse the relationship between strategy development
processes and perceived environmental uncertainty. For this part of the analysis, the results
from the strategy development process questionnaires collated in Project 3 are compared with
the mean assessments on perceived environmental uncertainty collected in Project 2.
For Project 2 (see Figure 10 in Section 5.2.1), the investigation into perceived environmental
uncertainty was broken down into three sections: first, the degree of uncertainty, change, and
complexity; second, the ability to cope with uncertainty, change and complexity; and finally,
the importance of the various strategic business units being able to cope with these three
phenomena. This section of the report utilises the same structure to analyse the relationship
between perceived environmental uncertainty and strategy development process.
The analysis begins with the relationship between strategy development processes and: the
degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity (see Table 125). In terms
of the observation of the seventeen business units, the significant value of the correlation
coefficient is 0.482 at the 5% level and 0.606 at the 1% level. Here the results show only one
statistically significant relationship, namely a negative correlation (-0.489) between the degree
of uncertainty and the cultural approach to strategy development (highlighted in bold). There
are no statistically significant relationships between: strategy development processes and
perceptions on the rate of change; or strategy development processes and the level of
complexity with which strategists believe the various strategic business units to be faced.
Table 125 – Testing The Relationship: Strategy Development Process And Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Degree Of Uncertainty Rate Of Change Level Of Complexity
Incremental 0.191 0.002 0.112
Command 0.165 0.164 0.090
Cultural -0.489 -0.238 -0.407
Planning 0.023 -0.233 -0.149
Political -0.421 0.165 0.106
Enforced Choice -0.027 0.028 0.048
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6.5.5.4.1.2 Culture And The Degree Of Uncertainty
This section of the analysis investigates the relationship between the degree of uncertainty and
the cultural dimension of strategy development. This finding shows a statistically significant
negative correlation (-0.489) between the degree of uncertainty faced by a strategic business
unit and the application of the cultural dimension in the strategy development process. This
correlation is significant at the 5% level (see Figure 46 below).
Figure 46 – The Cultural Dimension And The Degree Of Uncertainty
In managerial terms, this finding shows that where the degree of uncertainty is high, then the
application of culture as a process for developing strategy decreases across Barclays. The
qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.2.1) found that under conditions of high
uncertainty the environment is typified by the increasing demands of customers, regulation
and new technologies. The literature review in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.8) found the cultural
approach to strategy development to be characterised by symbolism, rituals, and the
application of experience rather than the manipulation of managerial tools such as value-based
management (see Section 2.1.7). The findings of Project 3 show that the cultural dimension to
strategy development and the perception of a high degree of uncertainty are mutually
exclusive at Barclays.
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6.5.5.4.2 Strategy Development Processes And The Ability To Cope
6.5.5.4.2.1 The Findings
The analysis of the relationship between strategy development processes and perceived
environmental uncertainty now moves on to investigate the association between strategy
development process and the ability to cope with the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change,
and the level of complexity (see Table 126). As in the previous section, in terms of the
observations of seventeen strategic business units, the significant value of the correlation
coefficient is 0.482 at the 5% level, and 0.606 at the 1% level. The relationships that are
significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold, significant values at the 1% level are
highlighted in bold with red text.
Table 126 – Testing The Relationship: Strategy Development Process And The Ability To Cope
The Ability To Cope With
Degree Of Uncertainty Rate Of Change Level Of Complexity
Incremental 0.390 0.498 0.364
Command -0.433 -0.459 -0.392
Cultural -0.006 0.008 -0.053
Planning 0.494 0.539 0.430
Political -0.731 -0.679 -0.679
Enforced Choice -0.561 -0.594 -0.477
Through this analysis, the findings show statistically significant relationships across all three
aspects of the perceived ability to cope. First, there are statistically significant negative
relationships between the ability to cope with the degree of uncertainty on the one hand and,
on the other, the political and enforced choice dimensions. Second, there are statistically
significant positive correlations between the ability to cope with change on the one hand and,
on the other, the incremental dimension, and the planning dimension. There are also
statistically significant negative correlations between the ability to cope with the rate of
change and the command, political, and enforced choice dimensions. Finally, there is a
statistically significant negative correlation between the ability to cope with the level of
complexity and the political dimension.
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 366 of 444
6.5.5.4.2.2 Politics And The Ability To Cope With The Degree Of Uncertainty
This element of the analysis investigates the relationship between the perception of the Group
Executive Committee on the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with the
degree of uncertainty and the political dimension of strategy development. This finding shows
a statistically significant negative correlation (-0.731) between the ability to cope with
uncertainty and the application of the political dimension in the strategy development process.
This is a strong correlation, significant at the 1% level (see Figure 47 below).
Figure 47 – The Political Dimension And The Ability To Cope With The Degree Of Uncertainty
This finding shows that where business units across Barclays are deemed highly able to cope
with uncertainty, they do not use the political process for developing strategy. The qualitative
exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.3.1) found the ability to cope with uncertainty to be
characterised by: a resilient business model, a dominant market share, and the experience of
managing uncertainty in the past. The literature review in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.7) found
the political dimension to be characterised by: imbalances of power, partially conflicting
priorities, and coalitions with competing interests where the most powerful manage to get
what they want. These findings show that the political dimension to strategy development and
the perception of a high ability to cope with uncertainty are mutually exclusive at Barclays.
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6.5.5.4.2.3 Enforced Choice And The Ability To Cope With The Degree Of Uncertainty
The research now moves on to investigate the relationship between the Group Executive
Committee’s perception of the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with
uncertainty on the one hand and, on the other, the enforced choice dimension of strategy
development. The research identifies a statistically significant negative correlation (-0.561) in
this relationship. This negative correlation is significant at the 5% level (see Figure 48 below).
Figure 48 – The Enforced Choice Dimension And The Ability To Cope With The Degree Of Uncertainty
In managerial terms, this finding shows that where business units across Barclays are deemed
highly able to cope with uncertainty, the enforced choice process for developing strategy
diminishes. As detailed in the previous section, the qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see
Section 5.5.3.1) found the ability to cope with uncertainty to be characterised by: a resilient
business model, a dominant market share, and the experience of managing uncertainty in the
past. The literature review in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.9) found the enforced choice
dimension to be a consequence of the environment constraining the organisation and strategy
being determined by forces external to the business. These findings show that when business
units at Barclays are deemed highly able to cope with uncertainty, managers within the units
do not perceive enforced choice as a dominant process for developing strategy.
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6.5.5.4.2.4 Incrementalism And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
This section of the report examines the association between the perceptions held on the Group
Executive Committee regarding the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with
the rate of change, and the incremental approach to strategy development. The research
identifies a statistically significant positive correlation (0.498) in this relationship, significant
at the 5% level (see Figure 49 below).
Figure 49 – The Incremental Dimension And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
This positive correlation shows that where business units across Barclays are deemed highly
able to cope with change, then there is a propensity to adopt the incremental approach to
strategy development. The qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.3.2) found the
ability to cope with change to be characterised by: a strategic agility; a speed of response to
market forces; and organisational flexibility. The literature review presented in Project 1 (see
Section 4.2.6) found the incremental dimension to be a rational process, typified by: the
strategy process being split into stages; an acceptance by managers of uncertainty; and the
stating of goals in non-specific terms. This finding is consistent with the literature and shows
that when business units at Barclays adopt the incremental approach to strategy development,
they are deemed more able to cope with the rate of change, and vice versa.
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6.5.5.4.2.5 Command And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
Developing this section on the ability to cope with change, this part of the report examines the
relationship between perceptions held on the Group Executive Committee regarding the
ability of the various strategic business units to cope with change, and the command
dimension to strategy development. The research identifies a statistically significant negative
correlation (-0.459) in this relationship, significant at the 5% level (see Figure 50 below).
Figure 50 – The Command Dimension And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
This negative correlation shows that where business units adopt the command dimension to
strategy development, then they are deemed less able to cope with the rate of change, and vice
versa. As in the previous section, the qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.3.2)
found the ability to cope with change to be typified by: a strategic agility; a speed of response
to market forces; and, organisational flexibility. The literature review in Project 1 (see Section
4.2.4) found that the command dimension identifies the role of Chief Executive Officer, or
Commander, assuming sole responsibility for internal operations, taking the role of a rational
actor and issuing directives from the seat of power. Interestingly, this research finds this
approach to strategy development to be incompatible with an increased perception on the
Group Executive Committee of the ability of the business unit to cope with the change.
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6.5.5.4.2.6 Planning And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
The report now moves on to examine the association between the perceptions held on the
Group Executive Committee regarding the ability of the various strategic business units to
cope with the rate of change, and the planning approach to strategy development. The research
identifies a statistically significant positive correlation (0.539) in this relationship, significant
at the 5% level (see Figure 51 below).
Figure 51 – The Planning Dimension And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
In simple managerial terms, this positive correlation shows that where business units across
Barclays are effective in adopting the planning dimension to strategy development, they are
deemed more able to cope with change. As in the previous sections, the qualitative exploration
in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.3.2) found the ability to cope with change to be characterised by:
a strategic agility; a speed of response to market forces; and organisational flexibility. The
literature review presented in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.5) found the planning dimension to be
a rational process, involving a logical, sequential, analytical and deliberate set of procedures.
This finding is consistent with the literature review, and shows that when business units at
Barclays adopt the planning approach to strategy development, they are deemed more able to
cope with the rate of change.
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6.5.5.4.2.7 Politics And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
This section of the report now moves on to examine the association between the political
dimension to strategy development and perceptions held by the Group Executive Committee
of the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with the rate of change. The
research identifies a statistically significant negative correlation (-0.679) in this relationship,
significant at the 1% level (see Figure 52 below).
Figure 52 – The Political Dimension And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
In managerial terms, this finding shows that where business units across Barclays adopt the
political dimension to strategy development, they are deemed less able to cope with the rate of
change. As in the previous sections, the qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see Section
5.5.3.2) found the ability to cope with change to be characterised by: a strategic agility; a
speed of response to market forces; and organisational flexibility. The literature review in
Project 1 (see Section 4.2.7) found the political dimension to be characterised by: imbalances
of power; partially conflicting priorities; and coalitions with competing interests where the
most powerful manage to get what they want. This finding is also consistent with the literature
review, and shows that when business units at Barclays adopt the political approach to strategy
development, they are deemed less able to cope with the rate of change.
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6.5.5.4.2.8 Enforced Choice And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
This final section on the ability to cope with the rate of change examines the relationship
between the enforced choice dimension to strategy development, and perceptions held by the
Group Executive Committee on the ability of the various strategic business units to cope with
the rate of change. The research identifies a statistically significant negative correlation in this
relationship (-0.594), significant at the 5% level (see Figure 53 below).
Figure 53 – The Enforced Choice Dimension And The Ability To Cope With The Rate Of Change
This finding shows that where business units across Barclays are deemed less able to cope
with the rate of change, they are more likely to perceive that strategy is enforced on them. As
in the previous sections, the qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.3.2) found the
ability to cope with change to be characterised by: a strategic agility; a speed of response to
market forces; and organisational flexibility. The literature review in Project 1 (see Section
4.2.9) found the enforced choice dimension to be a consequence of the environment
constraining the organisation and strategy being determined by forces external to the strategic
business unit. As identified earlier, such forces could be the result of strategy being perceived
as being enforced by the Group. This finding is therefore also consistent with the literature
review.
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6.5.5.4.2.9 Politics And The Ability To Cope With The Level Of Complexity
This section of the report examines the relationship between the political dimension to
strategy development, and perceptions held by the Group Executive Committee of the ability
of the various strategic business units to cope with the level of complexity. The research
identifies a statistically significant negative correlation in this relationship (-0.679), significant
at the 1% level (see Figure 54 below).
Figure 54 – The Political Dimension And The Ability To Cope With The Level Of Complexity
This finding shows that where strategic business units across Barclays adopt the political
dimension to strategy development, they are deemed less able to cope with the level of
complexity. The qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.3.3) found the ability to
cope with complexity to be characterised by: a willingness to trust other strategic business
units; the effective management of internal competition and conflict; and the eradication of
dysfunctional internal politics. The literature review in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.7) found the
political dimension to be characterised by: imbalances of power; partially conflicting
priorities; and coalitions with competing interests where the most powerful manage to get
what they want. Clearly, the political dimension to strategy development is diametrically
opposed to key elements that contribute to an increase in the ability to cope with complexity.
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6.5.5.4.3 Strategy Development Processes And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
6.5.5.4.3.1 The Findings
The analysis of the relationship between strategy development processes and perceived
environmental uncertainty now moves on to investigate the association between strategy
development process and the importance of being able to cope with: the degree of uncertainty,
the rate of change, and the level of complexity (see Table 127). As in the previous section, in
terms of the observation of the seventeen strategic business units, the significant value of the
correlation coefficient is 0.482 at the 5% level, and 0.606 at the 1% level. The relationships
that are significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold, and significant values at the 1%
level are highlighted in bold with red text. Again, it is important to be mindful of the lack of
managerial consensus discovered in the assessments of perceived environmental uncertainty
made by the fifteen members of the Group Executive Committee (see Section 5.7.2.1).
Table 127 – Testing The Relationship: Strategy Development Process & The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
Degree Of Uncertainty Rate Of Change Level Of Complexity
Incremental 0.577 0.469 0.519
Command 0.006 0.065 -0.094
Cultural -0.505 -0.503 -0.505
Planning 0.504 0.420 0.507
Political -0.424 -0.271 -0.580
Enforced Choice -0.475 -0.382 -0.495
This analysis identifies statistically significant relationships across only two of the three
aspects of the perceived importance of being able to cope: there are no statistically significant
relationships between strategy development processes and the perceived importance of being
able to cope with change. In terms of the perceived importance of being able to cope with the
degree of uncertainty, there are three correlations with strategy development processes that are
statistically significant at the 5% level. The relationship with incrementalism and planning is
positive, whereas the association with the cultural approach to strategy development is
negative. Observation of the relationship between strategy development processes and the
importance of being able to cope with the level of complexity highlights five correlations
significant at the 5% level. The correlations with incrementalism and planning are again
positive, but the relationship with culture, politics and enforced choice are all negative.
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6.5.5.4.3.2 Incrementalism And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty
This section of the report begins by examining the relationship between the assessments made
by the Group Executive Committee, of the importance of the various business units being able
to cope with the degree of uncertainty on the one hand and, on the other, the incremental
approach to strategy development. The research identifies a statistically significant positive
correlation (0.577) in this relationship, significant at the 5% level (see Figure 55 below).
Figure 55 – Incrementalism And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Degree Of Uncertainty
This finding shows that where it is deemed more important that a strategic business unit is
able to cope with uncertainty, then these business units will have a greater propensity to adopt
the incremental approach to strategy development. The qualitative exploration in Project 2
(see Section 5.5.4.1) found that the importance of being able to cope with uncertainty is
typified by: a long-term pressure to increase shareholder value; regulatory change breaking
down barriers to entry; the emergence of international competition; and a fall in the level of
inertia and loyalty in the customer base. The literature review presented in Project 1 (see
Section 4.2.6) found the incremental dimension to be a rational process, typified by: the
strategy process being split into stages; an acceptance by managers of uncertainty; and the
stating of goals in non-specific terms.
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6.5.5.4.3.3 Culture And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty
This part of the research examines the relationship between, on the one hand, the assessments
made by the Group Executive Committee of the importance of the various strategic business
units being able to cope with the degree of uncertainty and, on the other, the cultural approach
to strategy development. The research identifies a statistically significant negative correlation
(-0.505) in this relationship, significant at the 5% level (see Figure 56 below).
Figure 56 – Culture And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Degree Of Uncertainty
This negative correlation shows that where it is deemed more important that a business unit is
able to cope with uncertainty, then these business units are less likely to adopt the cultural
approach to strategy development. As in the previous section, the qualitative exploration in
Project 2 (see Section 5.5.4.1) found that the importance of being able to cope with
uncertainty is typified by: a long-term pressure to increase shareholder value; regulatory
change breaking down barriers to entry; the emergence of international competition; and a fall
in the level of inertia and loyalty in the customer base. The literature review in Project 1 (see
Section 4.2.8) found the cultural approach to strategy development to be characterised by:
symbolism; rituals; and the application of experience rather than the manipulation of
managerial tools such as value-based management (see Section 2.1.7).
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6.5.5.4.3.4 Planning And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty
The report now moves on to examine the relationship between the assessments made by the
Group Executive Committee of the importance of the various business units being able to
cope with the degree of uncertainty on the one hand and, on the other, the planning dimension
approach to strategy development. The research identifies a statistically significant positive
correlation (0.504) in this relationship, significant at the 5% level (see Figure 57 below).
Figure 57 – Planning And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Degree Of Uncertainty
In managerial terms, this positive correlation shows that that where it is deemed more
important that a business unit is able to cope with uncertainty, then these business units will
be more likely to adopt the planning approach to strategy development. As in the previous
section, the qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.4.1) found that the importance
of being able to cope with uncertainty is typified by: a long-term pressure to increase
shareholder value; regulatory change breaking down barriers to entry; the emergence of
international competition; and a fall in the level of inertia and loyalty in the customer base.
The literature review presented in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.5) found the planning dimension
to be a rational process, involving a logical, sequential, analytical and deliberate set of
procedures.
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6.5.5.4.3.5 Incrementalism And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity
The report now moves on to examine the relationship between the assessments made by the
Group Executive Committee of the importance of the various strategic business units being
able to cope with the level of complexity, and the incremental approach to strategy
development. The research identifies a statistically significant positive correlation (0.519) in
this relationship, significant at the 5% level (see Figure 58 below).
Figure 58 – Incrementalism And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Level Of Complexity
This finding shows that where it is deemed more important that a strategic business unit is
able to cope with complexity, then these business units will have a greater propensity to adopt
the incremental approach to strategy development. The qualitative exploration in Project 2
(see Section 5.5.4.3) found that the importance of being able to cope with complexity is
typified by: the relative complexity of the business model; globalisation; emerging distribution
channels, and, onerous legal and regulatory obligations. The literature review presented in
Project 1 (see Section 4.2.6) found the incremental dimension to be a rational process, typified
by: the strategy process being split into stages; an acceptance by managers of uncertainty; and
the stating of goals in non-specific terms.
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6.5.5.4.3.6 Culture And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity
The report now moves on to examine the relationship between the assessments made by the
Group Executive Committee of the importance of the various strategic business units being
able to cope with the level of complexity, and the cultural dimension to strategy development.
The research identifies a statistically significant negative correlation (-0.505) in this
relationship, significant at the 5% level (see Figure 59 below).
Figure 59 – Culture And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Level Of Complexity
This finding shows that where it is deemed more important that a strategic business unit is
able to cope with complexity, then these business units will be less likely to adopt the cultural
approach to strategy development. As in the previous section, the qualitative exploration in
Project 2 (see Section 5.5.4.3) found that the importance of being able to cope with
complexity is typified by: the relative complexity of the business model; globalisation;
emerging distribution channels, and onerous legal and regulatory obligations. The literature
review in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.8) found the cultural approach to strategy development to
be characterised by: symbolism; rituals; and the application of experience rather than the
manipulation of managerial tools such as value-based management (see Section 2.1.7).
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6.5.5.4.3.7 Planning And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity
This section of the report moves on to examine the relationship between the assessments made
by the Group Executive Committee of the importance of the various strategic business units
being able to cope with the level of complexity, and the planning dimension to strategy
development. The research identifies a statistically significant positive correlation (0.507) in
this relationship, significant at the 5% level (see Figure 60 below).
Figure 60 – Planning And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Level Of Complexity
In managerial terms, this positive correlation shows that where it is deemed more important
that a strategic business unit is able to cope with complexity, then these business units will be
more likely to adopt the planning approach to strategy development. As in the previous
section, the qualitative exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.4.3) found that the importance
of being able to cope with complexity is typified by: the relative complexity of the business
model; globalisation; emerging distribution channels; and onerous legal and regulatory
obligations. The literature review presented in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.5) found the planning
dimension to be a rational process, involving a logical, sequential, analytical and deliberate set
of procedures.
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6.5.5.4.3.8 Politics And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity
The examination of the relationship between the assessments made by the Group Executive
Committee of the importance of the various business units being able to cope with the level of
complexity on the one hand, and the political dimension to the strategy development process
on the other, forms the penultimate element of this section. The research identifies a
statistically significant negative correlation (-0.580) in this relationship, significant at the 5%
level (see Figure 61 below).
Figure 61 – Politics And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Level Of Complexity
This finding shows that where it is deemed more important that a strategic business unit is
able to cope with complexity, then these business units will be less likely to adopt the political
approach to strategy development. As in the previous section, the qualitative exploration in
Project 2 (see Section 5.5.4.3) found that the importance of being able to cope with
complexity is typified by: the relative complexity of the business model; globalisation;
emerging distribution channels; and onerous legal and regulatory obligations. The literature
review in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.7) found the political dimension to be characterised by:
imbalances of power; partially conflicting priorities; and coalitions with competing interests
where the most powerful manage to get what they want.
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6.5.5.4.3.9 Enforced Choice And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity
The final part of this section examines the relationship between the assessments made by the
Group Executive Committee of the importance of the various strategic business units being
able to cope with the level of complexity, and the enforced choice dimension to strategy
development. The research identifies a statistically significant negative correlation (-0.495) in
this relationship, significant at the 5% level (see Figure 62 below).
Figure 62 – Enforced Choice And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Level Of Complexity
This negative correlation shows that where it is deemed more important that a strategic
business unit is able to cope with complexity, then these business units will be less likely to
perceive that strategy is enforced on them. As in the previous section, the qualitative
exploration in Project 2 (see Section 5.5.4.3) found that the importance of being able to cope
with complexity is typified by: the relative complexity of the business model; globalisation;
emerging distribution channels; and onerous legal and regulatory obligations. The literature
review in Project 1 (see Section 4.2.9) found the enforced choice dimension to be a
consequence of the environment constraining the organisation and strategy development being
determined by forces external to the business.
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6.5.6 Considering The Managerial Implications
6.5.6.1 Introduction
This investigation now moves on to consider the managerial implications arising from the
examination of strategy development processes and perceived environmental uncertainty. The
managerial implications are considered within the context of value-based management (see
Section 2.1.7). In order to achieve its objective, this element of the report is broken down into
two sections: first, an investigation of the relationship between organisational performance
(value creation) and strategy development processes; and second, an investigation of the
relationship between organisational performance and perceived environmental uncertainty.
Beginning with the relationship between value creation and strategy development processes,
this section is also broken down, into four sections: first, a summary of value creation across
the seven clusters during 2003; second, a review of the different strategy development
processes across the seven clusters; third, the testing of the propositions built by Bailey et al.
(2000), which propose a positive correlation between organisational performance and the
planning and incremental dimensions of strategy development; and finally, the testing of the
propositions built by Bailey et al. (2000), which propose a negative correlation between
organisational performance and the political and enforced choice dimensions of strategy
development.
The second element of this section investigates the relationship between value creation and
perceived environmental uncertainty – this section is broken down into three propositions.
The propositions are built from the review of literature on perceived environmental
uncertainty presented earlier in this report (see Section 4.3): first, that there should be a
negative correlation between organisational performance (or value created) and the degree of
perceived environmental uncertainty the organisation is deemed to face; second, that there
should be a positive correlation between organisational performance and the ability of the
organisation to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty; and finally, that there should
be a positive correlation between the performance of an organisation and the importance of its
being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
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6.5.6.2 Organisational Performance And Strategy Development Processes
6.5.6.2.1 Organisational Performance: Total Shareholder Return
As identified in Section 2.1.5, the primary focus of the Barclays Group is to deliver superior
value to its shareholders (Barclays Bank PLC, 2004). In order to achieve this, the Group uses
the principles of value-based management to develop strategy, allocate resources and manage
performance. The approach is explained in the Barclays Group Accounts 2003:
“Through the application of value-based management principles, Barclays has
developed a disciplined fact-based approach to strategy development and business
planning, which aims to build sustainable competitive advantage. Individual
businesses generate alternative business strategies to facilitate the selection of the most
appropriate value-maximising option. Our aim is to achieve profitable growth in all
our businesses.”
At the end of 1999, Barclays set a series of four-year performance goals for the period 2000 to
2003 inclusive. The primary goal was to achieve top quartile total shareholder return relative
to a peer group60 of financial services companies. Total shareholder return is defined as the
value created for shareholders through share price appreciation, plus re-invested dividend
payments (Barclays Bank PLC, 2004). For the period 2000–2003, Barclays was positioned
third within its peer group, thereby achieving its primary goal of top quartile performance –
when measured by total shareholder return.
The supporting goal was to double the absolute value of a hypothetical £100 invested in
Barclays over this four-year period. At the time of setting the performance goal (1999),
analysis of financial services companies who had achieved top quartile performance
(measured by total shareholder return) indicated that this level of value creation would be
required for a financial services company to be in the top quartile of its peer group.
60 Abbey, ABN Amro, BBVA, BNP Paribas, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, Halifax Bank of Scotland, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, Royal Bank of
Scotland and Standard Chartered
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6.5.6.2.2 Value Creation: Economic Profit
As identified in Section 2.1.6, another supporting goal of the Barclays Group during the four-
year period (2000–2003) was to double economic profit. Economic profit is defined as:
“Profit after tax and minority interests plus certain gains (and losses) reported within
the statement of total recognised gains and losses where they arise from the Group’s
business activities and which are in respect of transactions with third parties, less a
charge for the cost of average shareholders’ funds (which includes purchased
goodwill).” (Barclays Bank PLC, 2004)
When computing economic profit, the cost of shareholders’ funds is calculated using the
capital asset pricing model for the Group. The cost of equity comprises three key components:
the equity risk premium, the market beta, and the risk-free rate of capital.
It is important to note that the success criterion across the Barclays Group is purely the
measured growth of economic profits across the portfolio – against the four-year goal set out
in the previous section. No consideration or weighting is given to additional competitive
factors (or volatility), for example relative market growth across the portfolio or prevailing
economic conditions. It is also not possible to monitor performance of the various clusters
over time as the structure of the clusters changed significantly during the period of the
research (1999–2005). The performance of the seven clusters during 2003 is set out in Table
128 below:
Table 128 – Value Creation: Economic Profit Contribution Across The Various Clusters In 2003
2003 (£m) % Contribution 2002 (£m) % Variance
Barclaycard 319 15.69% 267 19.48%
Barclays Africa 36 1.77% 22 63.64%
Barclays Capital 320 15.74% 178 79.78%
Barclays Private Clients 163 8.02% 328 -49.70%
UK Retail Bank 460 22.63% 395 16.46%
Business Bank 623 30.64% 574 8.54%
Barclays Global Investors 112 5.51% 56 100.00%
TOTAL 2,033 100.00% 1,820 11.70%
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6.5.6.2.3 Organisational Performance: Operating Profits Before Tax For 2003
Using a more traditional measure of organisational performance (operating profits before tax),
the results for 2003 also display strong performance across the Group, standing at a record
level of £3,845m (2002: £3,205m) an increase of 19.97% (Barclays Bank PLC, 2004). The
only cluster that failed to produce annual growth on this measure was Barclays Private Clients
(-10.87%). The performance of the seven clusters during 2003 is set out in Table 129 below:
Table 129 – Organisational Performance: Operating Profits Before Tax (Cluster Results 2003)
2003 (£m) % Contribution 2002 (£m) % Variance
Barclaycard 722 16.36% 615 17.40%
Barclays Africa 113 2.56% 89 26.97%
Barclays Capital 782 17.72% 580 34.83%
Barclays Private Clients 328 7.43% 368 -10.87%
UK Retail Bank 967 21.92% 871 11.02%
Business Bank 1,308 29.66% 1,227 6.60%
Barclays Global Investors 192 4.35% 111 72.97%
TOTAL 4,412 100.00% 3,861 14.27%
*Source – Barclays Bank PLC, Audited Accounts For 2003, Published February 2004
6.5.6.2.4 Strategy Development Processes
Through the findings of Project 3 (cluster comparisons to the centre of the Likert scale), it is
also possible to present the adopted strategy development processes across the seven clusters
in the Barclays Group. Results significantly different from 4.000 at the 5% level are
highlighted in bold, with those results significant at the 1% level highlighted in bold and red
text. The detailed results across the various clusters are set out in Table 130 below:
Table 130 – Strategy Development Processes: Cluster Comparison To The Centre Of The Likert Scale
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard 0.434 -0.314 -0.077 0.439 -0.199 -0.680
Barclays Africa 0.409 -0.463 -0.099 0.507 -0.328 -0.142
Barclays Capital 0.368 -0.179 -0.151 0.625 -0.427 -0.531
Private Clients 0.096 -0.044 -0.008 0.016 0.034 -0.113
UK Retail Bank 0.373 0.003 -0.211 0.641 -0.073 -0.385
Business Bank 0.423 -0.013 0.023 0.799 -0.205 -0.578
BGI 0.213 -0.069 -0.318 0.577 -0.263 -0.378
Group 0.300 -0.139 -0.092 0.408 -0.160 -0.394
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Through this analysis it is possible to present the findings of Project 3 so as to compare the
cluster results to the overall Group results. Once again, results significant at the 5% level are
highlighted in bold, and results significant at the 1% level are highlighted in bold and red text.
The critical value at the 5% level is again 1.960 and the critical value at the 1% level is 2.580.
The detailed results are set out in Table 131 below:
Table 131 – Strategy Development Processes: Cluster Comparison To The Group Results
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard 0.434 -0.314 -0.077 0.439 -0.199 -0.680
Barclays Africa 0.409 -0.463 -0.099 0.507 -0.328 -0.142
Barclays Capital 0.368 -0.179 -0.151 0.625 -0.427 -0.531
Private Clients 0.096 -0.044 -0.008 0.016 0.034 -0.113
UK Retail Bank 0.373 0.003 -0.211 0.641 -0.073 -0.385
Business Bank 0.423 -0.013 0.023 0.799 -0.205 -0.578
BGI 0.213 -0.069 -0.318 0.577 -0.263 -0.378
The findings of Project 3 can be presented so as to compare the results from the individual
strategic business units to the overall Group results. Once again, results significant at the 5%
level are highlighted in bold, and results significant at the 1% level are highlighted in bold and
red text. The detailed results are set out in Table 132 below:
Table 132 – Strategy Development Processes: Comparing Strategic Business Units To The Group Results
Area Of Group Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard UK 0.574 -0.318 -0.080 0.558 -0.167 -0.668
B’card Int’nal 0.467 0.008 -0.404 0.476 -0.423 -0.881
B’card Corporate 0.103 -0.604 0.231 0.149 -0.062 -0.521
Barclays Africa 0.409 -0.463 -0.099 0.507 -0.328 -0.142
Collateralised Fin. 0.444 -0.127 -0.126 0.964 -0.553 -0.574
Global Financing 0.242 -0.334 -0.175 0.382 -0.375 -0.498
Global Markets 0.447 -0.200 -0.162 0.697 -0.530 -0.641
Private Equity 0.342 -0.055 -0.139 0.468 -0.255 -0.413
Europe 0.128 0.104 0.181 -0.331 0.157 -0.396
International Bank 0.074 -0.109 -0.121 0.240 -0.180 -0.224
Investment Mgmt 0.035 -0.055 -0.095 -0.294 0.274 0.429
Private Bank 0.046 -0.146 0.123 0.176 -0.142 -0.087
Premier Bank 0.197 -0.051 -0.181 0.403 0.035 -0.228
PFS 0.399 -0.134 -0.299 0.522 -0.147 -0.458
Woolwich 0.350 0.124 -0.133 0.747 -0.008 -0.320
Business Bank 0.423 -0.013 0.023 0.799 -0.205 -0.578
BGI 0.213 -0.069 -0.318 0.577 -0.263 -0.378
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6.5.6.2.5 Value Creation And The Incremental Dimension
Citing the work on logical incrementalism (see Section 4.2.6) proposed by Quinn (1980),
Bailey et al. (2000) postulated that measures of organisational performance could be related
positively to high scores on the incremental dimension of the strategy development process.
Logical incrementalism is described as a rational process, typified by various characteristics,
but primarily: the strategy process being split into stages; an acceptance by managers of
uncertainty and therefore a reduction in attempts to predict the future; and the stating of goals
in non-specific terms. For this study, organisational performance is the creation of long-term
shareholder value – measured in economic profit contribution (see Section 6.5.6.2.2).
The results at Barclays provide evidence of support for the proposition developed by Bailey et
al. (2000), because the clusters that are strong on the incremental dimension (Barclaycard,
Barclays Africa, Barclays Capital, the UK Retail Bank and Business Bank); all demonstrated
excellent organisational performance in 2003. The lowest performing cluster (Barclays Private
Clients) is significantly lower than the Group on the incremental dimension (see Table 133
below):
Table 133 – Value Creation And The Incremental Dimension
Variation From Value Contribution (Economic Profit)
Centre Group 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Barclaycard 0.434 0.135 319 267 19.48%
Barclays Africa 0.409 0.110 36 22 63.64%
Barclays Capital 0.368 0.069 320 178 79.78%
Private Clients 0.096 -0.204 163 328 -49.70%
UK Retail Bank 0.373 0.073 460 395 16.46%
Business Bank 0.423 0.124 623 574 8.54%
BGI 0.213 -0.086 112 56 100.00%
Evidence to support the proposition that there is a positive correlation between high scores on
the incremental dimension and superior organisational performance is not totally compelling,
as Barclaycard achieved the highest score on the incremental dimension and growth of 19.48%
against an overall Group performance of 14.79%, but were outperformed by Barclays Africa,
Barclays Capital and Barclays Global Investors. Interestingly, the highest growth area in
Barclays during 2003 (Barclays Global Investors) did not provide any significant results on the
incremental dimension.
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6.5.6.2.6 Value Creation And The Planning Dimension
Through their investigation Bailey et al. (2000) also proposed that measures of organisational
performance could be positively related to high scores on the planning dimension (Rhyne,
1986; Pearce, Robbins, and Robinson, 1987). As a process for developing strategy, planning is
typified as a rational model, involving a logical, sequential, analytical and deliberate set of
procedures (see Section 4.2.5). As in the previous section, organisational performance is the
creation of value, measured in the contribution of economic profit.
Once again, the results at Barclays provide evidence to support the proposition developed by
Bailey et al. (2000), because the clusters that outperformed the Group as a whole in 2003
(Barclaycard, Barclays Africa, Barclays Capital, the UK Retail Bank, and Barclays Global
Investors) all produced significant evidence of the application of the planning approach to
strategy development. Interestingly, the Business Bank, which is significantly more reliant on
planning than the rest of the Group, underperformed in relation to its peers with growth of
only 8.54%. However, as the Business Bank is the largest producer of economic profit
(£623m), it started from a very high baseline. The lowest performing cluster in the Group
(Barclays Private Clients) was again significantly weaker in the application of the planning
dimension in the strategy development process. The results are presented in detail in Table
134 below:
Table 134 – Value Creation And The Planning Dimension
Variation From Value Contribution (Economic Profit)
Centre Group 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Barclaycard 0.439 0.031 319 267 19.48%
Barclays Africa 0.507 0.100 36 22 63.64%
Barclays Capital 0.625 0.217 320 178 79.78%
Private Clients 0.016 -0.392 163 328 -49.70%
UK Retail Bank 0.641 0.234 460 395 16.46%
Business Bank 0.799 0.391 623 574 8.54%
BGI 0.577 0.169 112 56 100.00%
The support for this proposition is stronger than in the previous section as there is clear
evidence of a positive correlation between organisational performance and high scores on the
planning dimension.
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6.5.6.2.7 Value Creation And The Political Dimension
Developing their research further, Bailey et al. (2000) proposed that measures of
organisational performance could be negatively correlated to high scores on the political
dimension. Citing Hrebiniak (1982), Bailey et al. (2000) proposed that a level of consensus is
necessary for high performance. Making reference to Johnson (1988), they proposed that
political activity can increase in difficult times. Here the political dimension to strategy
development is characterised by: imbalances of power; partially conflicting priorities; and
coalitions with competing interests where the most powerful manage to get what they want
(see Section 4.2.7). Organisational performance is again defined by the creation of value or
economic profit.
Once again, the results at Barclays provide evidence to support the proposition developed by
Bailey et al. (2000), because the cluster that is the strongest on the political dimension
(Barclays Private Clients) was the lowest performing cluster during 2003. By the same token,
significantly low scores were evident on the political dimension from Barclaycard and
Barclays Capital, which were two of the highest performing clusters in the Barclays Group
during 2003. The results are presented in detail in Table 135 below:
Table 135 – Value Creation And The Political Dimension
Variation From Value Contribution (Economic Profit)
Centre Group 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Barclaycard -0.199 -0.039 319 267 19.48%
Barclays Africa -0.328 -0.167 36 22 63.64%
Barclays Capital -0.427 -0.267 320 178 79.78%
Private Clients 0.034 0.195 163 328 -49.70%
UK Retail Bank -0.073 0.087 460 395 16.46%
Business Bank -0.205 -0.045 623 574 8.54%
BGI -0.263 -0.103 112 56 100.00%
The results provide support for the proposition that there is a negative correlation between
organisational performance and high scores on the political dimension. However, the
correlation is not as strong as in the previous sections, as one would logically expect that the
highest performing cluster (Barclays Global Investors) would apply significantly less politics
than the Group as a whole in the application of the strategy development process.
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6.5.6.2.8 Value Creation And The Enforced Choice Dimension
The final proposition developed by Bailey et al. (2000) postulated that measures of
organisational performance could be negatively correlated to high scores on the enforced
choice dimension of strategy development. Quoting Grant (1995), Bailey et al. (2000) argue
that coercive pressures in mature industries (such as UK banking and the financial services
industry) may serve to limit strategic choice and therefore lead to lower performance. Here
again, organisational performance is defined as the level of value created or economic profit.
The results at Barclays once again provide evidence to support the proposition developed by
Bailey et al., because the cluster that is significantly stronger than the Group on the enforced
choice dimension (Barclays Private Clients) was the lowest performing cluster during 2003.
By the same token, five of the highest value creating clusters (Barclaycard, Barclays Capital,
the UK Retail Bank and the Business Bank) produced significantly low scores on the enforced
choice dimension. The results from Barclays Africa are not significantly different from the rest
of the Barclays Group. The results are presented in detail in Table 136 below:
Table 136 – Value Creation And The Enforced Choice Dimension
Variation From Value Contribution (Economic Profit)
Centre Group 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Barclaycard -0.680 -0.287 319 267 19.48%
Barclays Africa -0.142 0.252 36 22 63.64%
Barclays Capital -0.531 -0.137 320 178 79.78%
Private Clients -0.113 0.281 163 328 -49.70%
UK Retail Bank -0.385 0.009 460 395 16.46%
Business Bank -0.578 -0.184 623 574 8.54%
BGI -0.378 0.016 112 56 100.00%
The results from this aspect of the research provide support for the proposition that there is a
negative correlation between organisational performance and high scores on the enforced
choice dimension. Again one could logically expect that the highest performing cluster
(Barclays Global Investors) would perceive themselves to be more involved in the strategy
development process, by displaying significantly lower levels of enforced choice than the
Group as a whole.
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6.5.6.3 Organisational Performance And Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
6.5.6.3.1 Degrees Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
This section of the report tests the proposition that there should be a negative correlation
between organisational performance or value created on the one hand, and on the other hand
the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty the organisation is deemed to face. In
simpler managerial terms, the question is whether measures of organisational performance
could be negatively related to high scores for perceived environmental uncertainty.
The evidence from across the Barclays portfolio is presented in Table 137 below, where the
mean score obtained by the strategic business unit for the degree of uncertainty, the rate of
change, and the level of complexity it is deemed to face is compared with the Group mean for
the same three assessments. The strategic business units are then ranked in terms of their
variance from the Group mean, so that the business units deemed to face the highest degree of
perceived environmental uncertainty are ranked at the top.
Clearly, if the proposition were true then the highest creators of value, or the most successful
business units, would be ranked at the lower end of the spectrum.
Table 137 – Degrees Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Degrees Of Mean Comparisons
Unc Cha Com Mean Group Variance Rank
Barclaycard International 58.333 56.667 53.000 56.000 49.331 6.669 1
Personal Financial Services 46.400 54.000 66.333 55.578 49.331 6.246 2
Investment Management 55.667 53.000 57.000 55.222 49.331 5.891 3
Global Markets 62.000 50.769 52.308 55.026 49.331 5.694 4
Global Financing 55.769 46.538 54.615 52.308 49.331 2.976 5
Barclaycard UK 48.400 56.000 52.333 52.244 49.331 2.913 6
Premier Bank 46.000 54.000 55.733 51.911 49.331 2.580 7
Private Bank 51.733 55.400 47.667 51.600 49.331 2.269 8
Europe 46.667 48.333 48.333 47.778 49.331 -1.554 9
International Bank 46.667 47.667 47.733 47.356 49.331 -1.976 10
Collateralised Financing 50.385 44.615 46.538 47.179 49.331 -2.152 11
Private Equity 58.571 37.143 45.714 47.143 49.331 -2.189 12
Barclays Global Investors 50.067 44.333 43.667 46.022 49.331 -3.309 13
Barclays Africa 49.000 42.000 44.667 45.222 49.331 -4.109 14
Business Bank 42.000 42.333 48.000 44.111 49.331 -5.220 15
Woolwich 44.733 44.400 41.333 43.489 49.331 -5.842 16
Barclaycard Corporate 37.667 41.667 42.000 40.444 49.331 -8.887 17
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There is some evidence to support the proposition, with the Business Bank (15), Barclays
Africa (14) and Barclays Global Investors (13) represented at the lower end. However,
Personal Financial Services (2), Global Markets (4) and Global Financing (5) are ranked at the
top of the scale and each is a large creator of value.
Presentation of the results in the seven clusters gives a clearer picture (see Table 138), with
two of the highest performers in 2003 (Barclays Africa and Barclays Global Investors) deemed
to face the lowest degree of perceived environmental uncertainty. This is also the case for the
highest value contributor(the Business Bank), which is deemed to face a lower degree of
perceived environmental uncertainty. By the same token, the lowest performing cluster in
2003 (Barclays Private Clients) is deemed to face the highest degree of perceived
environmental uncertainty.
Table 138 – Value Creation And The Degree Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Mean Comparisons Value Contribution (Economic Profit)
Cluster Group Variance 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Barclaycard 49.563 49.331 0.232 319 267 19.48%
Barclays Africa 45.222 49.331 -4.109 36 22 63.64%
Barclays Capital 50.414 49.331 1.083 320 178 79.78%
Private Clients 50.773 49.331 1.442 163 328 -49.70%
UK Retail Bank 49.533 49.331 0.202 460 395 16.46%
Business Bank 44.111 49.331 -5.220 623 574 8.54%
BGI 46.022 49.331 -3.309 112 56 100.00%
Interestingly, the results from the UK Retail Bank and Barclaycard also support the
proposition as they are deemed to encounter a slightly higher degree of perceived
environmental uncertainty relative to other areas of the Group, and produced slightly lower
than average growth in value contribution during 2003.
By way of comparison, Barclays Capital provides evidence to refute the proposition because it
faces a higher degree of perceived environmental uncertainty relative to the Group itself, and
yet continues to outperform the Group with an increase in value creation of 79.78%. This
could be due to various factors, for example the uncertain nature of investment banking, the
quality of the people at Barclays Capital or the level of economic growth during 2003.
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6.5.6.3.2 The Ability To Cope
This section of the report tests the proposition that there should be a positive correlation
between organisational performance and the ability of the organisation to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty – or, in simpler managerial terms, measures of organisational
performance should relate positively to high scores for the ability to cope with perceived
environmental uncertainty.
The results from across the Barclays portfolio are presented in Table 139 below, where the
mean score obtained by the strategic business unit for its ability to cope with: the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity is compared with the Group mean
for the same three assessments. Again the strategic business units are then ranked in terms of
their variance from the Group mean, so that the business units deemed the most able to cope
are ranked at the top.
Clearly, if the proposition were true then the highest creators of value, or the most successful
business units, would be ranked at the top end of the spectrum and vice versa. This analysis
provides a great deal of evidence to support the proposition, with the highest value creators
dominating the top of the rankings.
Table 139 – The Ability To Cope With Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
The Ability To Cope Mean Comparisons
Unc Cha Com Mean Group Variance Rank
Global Financing 74.615 73.846 78.077 75.513 61.910 13.603 1=
Global Markets 74.615 72.692 79.231 75.513 61.910 13.603 1=
Collateralised Financing 74.231 71.154 77.000 74.128 61.910 12.218 3
Private Equity 71.429 65.714 79.357 72.167 61.910 10.257 4
Barclaycard UK 69.643 72.333 74.000 71.992 61.910 10.082 5
Business Bank 71.000 72.067 71.733 71.600 61.910 9.690 6
Barclays Global Investors 67.000 66.533 75.667 69.733 61.910 7.823 7
Barclaycard Corporate 67.400 66.400 67.333 67.044 61.910 5.135 8
Barclays Africa 58.000 59.667 60.067 59.244 61.910 -2.665 9
Barclaycard International 58.000 55.333 57.667 57.000 61.910 -4.910 10
International Bank 58.667 53.733 56.000 56.133 61.910 -5.777 11
Private Bank 57.400 52.333 57.733 55.822 61.910 -6.088 12
Premier Bank 53.000 51.333 53.333 52.556 61.910 -9.354 13
Personal Financial Services 51.333 51.667 50.000 51.000 61.910 -10.910 14=
Europe 50.333 51.333 51.333 51.000 61.910 -10.910 14=
Investment Management 46.667 46.333 49.333 47.444 61.910 -14.465 16
Woolwich 44.667 48.400 40.667 44.578 61.910 -17.332 17
Cranfield School of Management
Executive Doctorate – Final Thesis
1.9 (Final Version) © Cranfield University 2005 Page 395 of 444
Presentation of the results in the seven clusters again gives a much clearer picture of the
evidence that supports the proposition (see Table 140) with the two highest performers in the
Barclays Group during 2003 (Barclays Capital and Barclays Global Investors) being deemed
among the most able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty. This is also the case
for the highest value contributor (the Business Bank), which is deemed the cluster second
most able to cope with the degree of perceived environmental uncertainty. By the same token,
the lowest performing cluster in 2003 (Barclays Private Clients) is deemed the second least
able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
Table 140 – Value Creation And The Ability To Cope
Mean Comparisons Value Contribution (Economic Profit)
Cluster Group Variance 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Barclaycard 65.346 61.910 3.436 319 267 19.48%
Barclays Africa 59.244 61.910 -2.665 36 22 63.64%
Barclays Capital 74.330 61.910 12.420 320 178 79.78%
Private Clients 52.591 61.910 -9.319 163 328 -49.70%
UK Retail Bank 47.789 61.910 -14.121 460 395 16.46%
Business Bank 71.600 61.910 9.690 623 574 8.54%
BGI 69.733 61.910 7.823 112 56 100.00%
The cluster that provides evidence to refute the proposition is the UK Retail Bank, which is
perceived to be one of the least able to cope with uncertainty (-13.647), change (-10.607), and
complexity (-18.110) in its competitive environment, but produced £460m of economic profit
in 2003 – an increase of 16.46% on its performance in 2002. The explanation for this
irregularity could be the difficult integration programme with the Woolwich during 2002, or a
function of a business model that could not fail in 2003, irrespective of its ability to cope.
The results from Barclays Africa also appear to refute the proposition because it is deemed
considerably less able (-2.370) than the Group as a whole to cope with environmental
uncertainty yet outperformed the Group in terms of its growth in value contribution (63.64%).
These low scores are again spread across the ability to cope with: uncertainty (-3.647), change
(-0.973), and complexity (-3.376). The explanation for these results probably lies in the
uncertainty, change and complexity inherent in the political, social and economic ‘meltdown’
of Zimbabwe in 2003 and the forced transfer of operations to South Africa, a period of real
difficulty for Barclays Africa.
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6.5.6.3.3 The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
The final part of this section tests the proposition that there that there should be a positive
correlation between organisational performance and the importance of being able to cope with
perceived environmental uncertainty – or, in simpler managerial terms, that measures of
organisational performance should relate positively to high scores for the importance of the
strategic business unit being able to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
The results from across the Barclays portfolio are presented in Table 141 below, where the
mean score obtained by the strategic business unit for the importance of its being able to cope
with the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity is compared
with the Group mean for the same three assessments. Each strategic business unit is again
ranked in terms of its variation from the Group mean.
Clearly, if the proposition were true then the highest creators of value, or the most successful
business units, would be ranked at the top end of the spectrum and vice versa. As with the
previous analysis, this analysis also provides a great deal of evidence to support the
proposition, with the highest value creators dominating the top of the rankings.
Table 141 – The Importance Of Being Able To Cope With The Degree Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Importance Of Being Able Mean Comparisons
Unc Cha Com Mean Group Variance Rank
Barclaycard UK 74.333 80.667 75.000 76.667 60.831 15.836 1
Global Markets 71.923 71.154 80.000 74.359 60.831 13.528 2
Personal Financial Services 71.333 76.667 73.000 73.667 60.831 12.836 3
Business Bank 73.000 75.667 72.000 73.556 60.831 12.725 4
Global Financing 71.923 70.077 77.692 73.231 60.831 12.400 5
Barclaycard International 65.333 70.000 67.667 67.667 60.831 6.836 6
Premier Bank 61.000 70.333 66.000 65.778 60.831 4.947 7
Collateralised Financing 62.308 59.231 68.462 63.333 60.831 2.502 8
International Bank 54.667 64.400 62.333 60.467 60.831 -0.364 9
Barclays Global Investors 53.667 60.333 62.000 58.667 60.831 -2.164 10
Investment Management 55.333 59.067 55.333 56.578 60.831 -4.253 11
Private Equity 52.857 51.786 62.500 55.714 60.831 -5.117 12
Private Bank 44.667 55.667 54.333 51.556 60.831 -9.275 13
Woolwich 48.000 54.000 45.667 49.222 60.831 -11.609 14
Barclaycard Corporate 44.667 48.000 50.333 47.667 60.831 -13.164 15
Barclays Africa 40.333 45.333 48.333 44.667 60.831 -16.164 16
Europe 37.667 43.000 43.333 41.333 60.831 -19.498 17
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These results also provide evidence to support the proposition, with Barclaycard UK (1),
Personal Financial Services (3), and the Business Bank (4) ranked high – these organisations
were all large creators of value in 2003. Also at the top of the rankings are Global Markets (2)
and Global Financing (5), both of which are key to the creation of value at Barclays Capital.
At the other end of the scale, Europe (17), Barclaycard Corporate (15) and the Private Bank
(13) all make relatively small value contributions.
Presentation of the results in the seven clusters once again gives a much clearer picture (see
Table 142), with the four largest contributors of value in 2003 at the top of the list:
Barclaycard, Barclays Capital, the Business Bank and the UK Retail Bank. By the same token,
the lowest creator of value in 2003 (Barclays Africa) is deemed far less important in terms of
its ability to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
Table 142 – Value Creation And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
Mean Comparisons Value Contribution (Economic Profit)
Cluster Group Variance 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Barclaycard 64.000 60.831 3.169 319 267 19.48%
Barclays Africa 44.667 60.831 -16.164 36 22 63.64%
Barclays Capital 66.659 60.831 5.828 320 178 79.78%
Private Clients 55.142 60.831 -5.689 163 328 -49.70%
UK Retail Bank 61.444 60.831 0.613 460 395 16.46%
Business Bank 73.556 60.831 12.725 623 574 8.54%
BGI 58.667 60.831 -2.164 112 56 100.00%
Also at the bottom of the rankings is Barclays Private Clients, who are also relatively low in
terms of their value contribution in 2003 (£328m), closely followed in the rankings by
Barclays Global Investors who also created a relatively small level of value (£112m). These
findings show that there is a high level of correlation between the importance of being able to
cope with perceived environmental uncertainty and the value contribution made by each of the
seven clusters during 2003.
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6.6 Summary Of Key Research Findings
6.6.1 Key Research Findings: Strategy Development Processes
6.6.1.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclays Group
6.6.1.1.1 Using The Research Instrument In The Field
There are three key findings from the use of the strategy process questionnaire (Bailey et al.,
2000) in this research programme: first, the adaptation of the questionnaire to the
organisational context; second, the validation of the instrument; and finally, a comprehensive
analysis of the research data prior to the testing of formal research propositions.
Beginning with the adaptation of the questionnaire to the organisational context, there were
five key findings: first, it was essential to pilot the instrument thoroughly in the field; second,
the wording of particular items needed to be adjusted to suit the organisational context; third,
prior to distribution it was vital to obtain executive sponsorship to the circulation of the
questionnaire; fourth, it was useful to provide creative ‘teasers’ and incentives to encourage
completion of the questionnaire; and finally, regular reminders by electronic mail were an
efficient and effective method for chasing non-respondents and managing the response rate.
In terms of the validation of the instrument, there were three key elements: first, it was
important to focus on the absolute sample size from each strategic business unit rather than the
percentage response rate; second, the additional information questions were time consuming
to complete and not easy to analyse and were inappropriate at Barclays; third, unanswered
questions should be completed using the mean response for that question rather than the centre
of the Likert scale.
Finally, a comprehensive analysis of the research data was absolutely essential in order to
validate the research instrument at Barclays. This process included: a principal components
analysis to check the validity of individual dimensions; the moving of an item into a different
dimension and the completion of a Cronbach alpha test.
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6.6.1.1.2 The Key Findings
6.6.1.1.2.1 Strategy Development Processes Across The Strategic Business Units
With the modifications set out in the previous section, the self-administered strategy process
questionnaire built by Bailey (2000) and subsequently amended by Bailey et al. (2000) proved
to be an effective research instrument at Barclays.
Through the completion of 731 questionnaires across the Barclays portfolio, it is possible to
discern different strategy development processes across the seventeen strategic business units.
In this investigation, the relevant sample size is the number of individual responses received
from each strategic business unit. Once this exceeds thirty, the critical values approach 1.96 at
the 5% level, and 2.58 at the 1% level. There were no borderline cases in Project 3.
A summary of the results is presented in Table 143, with results significant at the 5% level
highlighted in bold and results significant at the 1% level highlighted in bold and red text.
Table 143 – The Strategic Business Unit Results: Variance From Centre Of Likert Scale
Area Of Group Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard UK 4.574 3.682 3.920 4.558 3.833 3.332
B’card Int’nal 4.467 4.008 3.596 4.476 3.577 3.119
B’card Corporate 4.103 3.396 4.231 4.149 3.938 3.479
Barclays Africa 4.409 3.537 3.901 4.507 3.672 3.858
Collateralised Fin. 4.444 3.873 3.874 4.964 3.447 3.426
Global Financing 4.242 3.666 3.825 4.382 3.625 3.502
Global Markets 4.447 3.800 3.838 4.697 3.470 3.359
Private Equity 4.342 3.945 3.861 4.468 3.745 3.587
Europe 4.128 4.104 4.181 3.669 4.157 3.604
International Bank 4.074 3.891 3.879 4.240 3.820 3.776
Investment Mgmt 4.035 3.945 3.905 3.706 4.274 4.429
Private Bank 4.046 3.854 4.123 4.176 3.858 3.913
Premier Bank 4.197 3.949 3.819 4.403 4.035 3.772
PFS 4.399 3.866 3.701 4.522 3.853 3.542
Woolwich 4.350 4.124 3.867 4.747 3.992 3.680
Business Bank 4.423 3.987 4.023 4.799 3.795 3.422
BGI 4.213 3.931 3.682 4.577 3.737 3.622
Barclays Group 4.300 3.861 3.908 4.408 3.840 3.606
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6.6.1.1.2.2 Strategy Development Processes Across The Seven Clusters
The results from the seventeen strategic business units can also be arranged in the seven
clusters. A cluster summary is presented below in Table 144 – again, the significant value at
the 5% level is 1.96, and the significant value at the 1% level is 2.58. Results significant at the
5% level are again highlighted in bold, and results significant at the 1% level are highlighted
in bold and red text.
Table 144 – The Cluster Results: Variance From Centre Of Likert Scale
Area Of Group Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Barclaycard 4.434 3.686 3.923 4.439 3.801 3.320
Barclays Africa 4.409 3.537 3.901 4.507 3.672 3.858
Barclays Capital 4.368 3.821 3.849 4.625 3.573 3.469
Private Clients 4.096 3.956 3.992 4.016 4.034 3.887
UK Retail Bank 4.373 4.003 3.789 4.641 3.927 3.615
Business Bank 4.423 3.987 4.023 4.799 3.795 3.422
BGI 4.213 3.931 3.682 4.577 3.737 3.622
A summary of the findings show that the incremental and planning dimensions are the
dominant processes for developing strategy at Barclays (see Figure 63 below):
Figure 63 – Summary Of Key Findings: Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across The Barclays Group
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6.6.1.2 Analysing Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays
6.6.1.2.1 The Group Correlation Matrix
This element of the summary of key findings highlights the correlations between the various
dimensions. A correlation matrix for the Barclays Group is presented below in Table 145, with
the significant value at the 5% level again 1.96, and the significant value at the 1% level 2.58.
The results significant at the 5% level are highlighted in bold, and results significant at the 1%
level are again highlighted in bold and red text.
Table 145 – Analysing Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays
Incremental Command Cultural Planning Political EnforcedChoice
Incremental 1
Command -0.042 1
Cultural 0.066 0.182 1
Planning 0.430 -0.114 -0.168 1
Political -0.047 0.320 0.402 -0.429 1
Enforced Choice -0.084 0.187 0.230 -0.273 0.392 1
6.6.1.2.2 Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
An examination of the findings against the ten key correlations predicted by Bailey et al.
(2000), show a high degree of correlation. The ten key tests are set out in Table 146 below:
Table 146 – Group Results: Testing The Ten Key Relationships (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Prediction Result Significance
Command Planning Negative  Not Significant
Command Incremental Negative  Not Significant
Command Political Positive  <1%
Planning Political Negative  <1%
Planning Cultural Negative  Not Significant
Planning Enforced Choice Negative  <1%
Planning Incremental Positive  <1%
Political Cultural Positive  <1%
Political Enforced Choice Positive  <1%
Cultural Enforced Choice Positive  <5%
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6.6.1.2.3 Identifying Unexpected Correlations In The Data (Bailey et al., 2000)
The results from across the seven clusters within the Barclays Group produced eight
correlations that were statistically significant, but were not predicted in the research of Bailey
et al. (2000). These relationships were between: command and enforced choice (3); command
and culture (3); incrementalism and culture (1); and finally, incrementalism and enforced
choice (1). These findings are summarised in Table 147 below:
Table 147 – Cluster Results: Unexpected Correlations (Bailey et al., 2000)
1st Variable 2nd Variable Cluster Result Significance
Command Enforced Choice Business Bank 0.364 <1%
Command Enforced Choice Barclays Private Clients 0.262 <1%
Command Enforced Choice UK Retail Bank 0.237 <5%
Command Culture Barclays Africa 0.378 <5%
Command Culture Barclays Private Clients 0.272 <1%
Command Culture UK Retail Bank 0.246 <5%
Incremental Culture UK Retail Bank 0.216 <5%
Incremental Enforced Choice Barclays Africa -0.415 <1%
Clearly, the positive correlation between command and enforced choice is interesting as it is
counter-intuitive, in that the enforced choice dimension for strategy development is present
when the responsibility for strategy development is perceived to reside outside the cluster.
Evidently, this approach is not compatible with strategy being developed by a strong leader, or
commander, which implies that the leader is within the cluster. The finding suggests that a
leader is developing strategy from outside the cluster, but within the Group, probably a
member of the Group Executive Committee.
The positive correlation between command and culture is also interesting but more
predictable. This finding suggests a leader is closely associated with the strategy but is
adopting a cultural approach to strategy development. The relationship between
incrementalism and enforced choice at Barclays Africa is less predictable but probably
represents a perception that the cluster has little ownership of its strategy development
process, while the strategy itself is constantly changing. Finally, the relationship between
culture and incrementalism at the UK Retail Bank is probably a reflection of a mixture of
strategy development processes following the acquisition of the Woolwich.
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6.6.1.3 Strategy Development Process And Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
6.6.1.3.1 Strategy Development Processes
6.6.1.3.1.1 Introduction
This summary of key findings looks at the research results across the six dimensions of
strategy development developed by Bailey (2000) and later enhanced by Bailey et al. (2000).
Each correlation is presented in the positive.
6.6.1.3.1.2 Incremental Dimension
The only business unit to show an average score on the incremental dimension significantly
higher than the Group mean is Barclaycard UK (0.274), a result significant at the 1% level.
Investment Management (-0.265) and the Private Bank (-0.254) produced results significantly
lower than the Group mean on this dimension, both significant at the 5% level. Significant
differences between business units on this dimension are set out in Table 148 below:
Table 148 – Differences Between Strategic Business Units: Incremental Dimension
Business Unit Score Business Unit Score Significance
Personal Financial Services 4.399 Investment Management 4.035 <5%
Personal Financial Services 4.399 Private Bank 4.046 <5%
Barclaycard UK 4.574 Europe 4.128 <1%
Business Bank 4.423 Investment Management 4.035 <5%
Barclays Africa 4.409 Investment Management 4.035 <5%
Barclaycard International 4.467 Investment Management 4.035 <5%
Barclaycard UK 4.574 Investment Management 4.035 <1%
Collateralised Financing 4.444 Investment Management 4.035 <5%
Global Markets 4.447 Investment Management 4.035 <5%
Business Bank 4.423 International Bank 4.074 <5%
Barclaycard International 4.467 International Bank 4.074 <5%
Barclaycard UK 4.574 International Bank 4.074 <5%
Global Markets 4.447 International Bank 4.074 <5%
Business Bank 4.423 Private Bank 4.046 <5%
Barclays Africa 4.409 Private Bank 4.046 <5%
Barclaycard International 4.467 Private Bank 4.046 <5%
Barclaycard UK 4.574 Private Bank 4.046 <1%
Collateralised Financing 4.444 Private Bank 4.046 <5%
Global Markets 4.447 Private Bank 4.046 <5%
Barclaycard UK 4.574 Premier Bank 4.197 <5%
Barclaycard UK 4.574 Barclays Global Investors 4.213 <5%
Barclaycard UK 4.574 Barclaycard Corporate 4.103 <1%
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6.6.1.3.1.3 Command Dimension
The only strategic business unit to show an average score on the command dimension that is
significantly different from the Group mean is Barclaycard Corporate, which has an average
score of 3.396, compared to the Group mean of 3.861. This difference from the overall Group
mean (-0.456) is significant at the 1% level.
Significant differences between the individual strategic business units on the command
dimension are set out in Table 149 below:
Table 149 – Differences Between Strategic Business Units: Command Dimension
Business Unit Score Business Unit Score Significance
Woolwich 4.124 Barclays Africa 3.537 <5%
Woolwich 4.124 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <1%
Woolwich 4.124 Barclaycard UK 3.682 <5%
Personal Financial Services 3.866 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <5%
Europe 4.104 Barclays Africa 3.537 <5%
Europe 4.104 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <5%
Europe 4.104 Barclaycard UK 3.682 <5%
Investment Management 3.945 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <5%
International Bank 3.891 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <5%
Premier Bank 3.949 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <5%
Barclays Global Investors 3.931 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <5%
Business Bank 3.987 Barclays Africa 3.537 <5%
Business Bank 3.987 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <1%
Barclaycard International 4.008 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <5%
Private Equity 3.945 Barclaycard Corporate 3.396 <5%
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6.6.1.3.1.4 Cultural Dimension
There are three significant differences from the Group mean (3.908) on the cultural
dimension. Barclaycard Corporate has a mean that is significantly higher (0.323) than the
Group mean – a result that is significant at the 5% level. Europe also has a mean on the
cultural dimension that is significantly higher (0.273) than the Group mean – this result is also
significant at the 5% level. The only strategic business unit to have a mean significantly lower
than the Group mean on this dimension is Barclaycard International (-0.312). This result is
also significant at the 5% level.
Significant differences between individual strategic business units on the cultural dimension
are set out in Table 150 below:
Table 150 – Differences Between Strategic Business Units: Cultural Dimension
Business Unit Score Business Unit Score Significance
Barclaycard Corporate 4.231 Woolwich 3.867 <5%
Europe 4.181 Personal Financial Services 3.701 <1%
Private Bank 4.123 Personal Financial Services 3.701 <5%
Barclaycard Corporate 4.231 Personal Financial Services 3.701 <1%
Europe 4.181 Premier Bank 3.819 <5%
Europe 4.181 Barclays Global Investors 3.682 <1%
Europe 4.181 Barclaycard International 3.596 <1%
Private Bank 4.123 Barclays Global Investors 3.682 <5%
Private Bank 4.123 Barclaycard International 3.596 <1%
Barclaycard Corporate 4.231 Premier Bank 3.819 <5%
Barclaycard Corporate 4.231 Barclays Global Investors 3.682 <1%
Business Bank 4.023 Barclaycard International 3.596 <5%
Barclaycard Corporate 4.231 Barclaycard International 3.596 <1%
Barclaycard Corporate 4.231 Global Financing 3.825 <5%
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6.6.1.3.1.5 Planning Dimension
There are three business units with mean scores on the planning dimension significantly
higher than the Group average (4.408): Collateralised Financing (0.556), the Business Bank
(0.391), and the Woolwich (0.339). The results from Collateralised Financing and the
Business Bank are significant at the 1% level. The Woolwich result is significant at the 5%
level. There are two business units with mean scores on this dimension that are significantly
lower than the Group average. These business units are: Investment Management (-0.702), and
Europe (-0.739). Both of these results are statistically significant at the 1% level. Differences
between individual strategic business units that are statistically significant at the 1% level are
presented in Table 151. See Appendix C for results significant at the 5% level.
Table 151 – Differences Between Strategic Business Units: Planning Dimension
Business Unit Score Business Unit Score Significance
Woolwich 4.747 Europe 3.669 <1%
Woolwich 4.747 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Woolwich 4.747 Private Bank 4.176 <1%
Woolwich 4.747 Barclaycard Corporate 4.964 <1%
Personal Financial Services 4.522 Europe 3.669 <1%
Personal Financial Services 4.522 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Europe 3.669 International Bank 4.240 <1%
Europe 3.669 Premier Bank 4.403 <1%
Europe 3.669 Barclays Global Investors 4.577 <1%
Europe 3.669 Business Bank 4.799 <1%
Europe 3.669 Barclays Africa 4.507 <1%
Europe 3.669 Barclaycard International 4.476 <1%
Europe 3.669 Barclaycard UK 4.558 <1%
Europe 3.669 Collateralised Financing 4.964 <1%
Europe 3.669 Global Financing 4.382 <1%
Europe 3.669 Global Markets 4.697 <1%
Europe 3.669 Private Equity 4.468 <1%
Premier Bank 4.403 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Barclays Global Investors 4.577 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Business Bank 4.799 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Barclays Africa 4.507 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Barclaycard International 4.476 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Barclaycard UK 4.558 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Collateralised Financing 4.964 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Global Financing 4.382 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Global Markets 4.697 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Private Equity 4.468 Investment Management 3.706 <1%
Business Bank 4.799 International Bank 4.240 <1%
Collateralised Financing 4.964 International Bank 4.240 <1%
Business Bank 4.799 Private Bank 4.176 <1%
Collateralised Financing 4.964 Private Bank 4.176 <1%
Barclaycard Corporate 4.149 Business Bank 4.799 <1%
Collateralised Financing 4.964 Barclaycard Corporate 4.964 <1%
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6.6.1.3.1.6 Political Dimension
Analysis of the results on the political dimension shows that there are two strategic business
units with mean scores significantly higher than the Group average (3.840): Investment
Management (0.434), and Europe (0.317). The result from Investment Management is
significant at the 1% level and the result from Europe is significant at the 5% level.
There are two business units with mean scores on this dimension that are significantly lower
than the Group average. These business units are: Global Markets (-0.370) and Collateralised
Financing (-0.393). Both of these results are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Statistically significant differences between individual strategic business units on the political
dimension are summarised in Table 152 below:
Table 152 – Differences Between Strategic Business Units: Political Dimension
Business Unit Score Business Unit Score Significance
Woolwich 3.992 Collateralised Financing 3.447 <5%
Woolwich 3.992 Global Markets 3.470 <5%
Europe 4.157 Barclays Africa 3.672 <5%
Europe 4.157 Barclaycard International 3.577 <1%
Europe 4.157 Collateralised Financing 3.447 <1%
Europe 4.157 Global Financing 3.625 <5%
Europe 4.157 Global Markets 3.470 <1%
Investment Management 4.274 International Bank 3.820 <5%
Investment Management 4.274 Barclays Global Investors 3.737 <5%
Investment Management 4.274 Business Bank 3.795 <5%
Investment Management 4.274 Barclays Africa 3.672 <1%
Investment Management 4.274 Barclaycard International 3.577 <1%
Investment Management 4.274 Barclaycard UK 3.833 <5%
Investment Management 4.274 Collateralised Financing 3.447 <1%
Investment Management 4.274 Global Financing 3.625 <1%
Investment Management 4.274 Global Markets 3.470 <1%
Investment Management 4.274 Private Equity 3.745 <5%
Premier Bank 4.035 Collateralised Financing 3.447 <5%
Premier Bank 4.035 Global Markets 3.470 <5%
Barclaycard Corporate 3.938 Collateralised Financing 3.447 <5%
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6.6.1.3.1.7 Enforced Choice Dimension
There are two business units with mean scores significantly higher on the enforced choice
dimension than the Group average (3.606): Investment Management (0.823), and the Private
Bank (0.307). These results are significant at the 1% level and 5% level respectively. There
are two business units with mean scores significantly lower than the Group average:
Barclaycard International (-0.487) and Barclaycard UK (-0.274), again significant at the 1%
and 5% levels respectively. Statistically significant differences between individual strategic
business units on the enforced choice dimension are summarised in Table 153 below:
Table 153 – Differences Between Strategic Business Units: Enforced Choice Dimension
Business Unit Score Business Unit Score Significance
Investment Management 4.429 Woolwich 3.680 <1%
Woolwich 3.680 Barclaycard International 3.119 <1%
Woolwich 3.680 Barclaycard UK 3.332 <5%
Investment Management 4.429 Personal Financial Services 3.542 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Europe 3.604 <1%
Europe 3.604 Barclaycard International 3.119 <5%
Investment Management 4.429 International Bank 3.776 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Private Bank 3.913 <5%
Investment Management 4.429 Premier Bank 3.772 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Barclays Global Investors 3.622 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Business Bank 3.422 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Barclays Africa 3.858 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Barclaycard Corporate 3.479 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Barclaycard International 3.119 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Barclaycard UK 3.332 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Collateralised Financing 3.426 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Global Financing 3.502 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Global Markets 3.359 <1%
Investment Management 4.429 Private Equity 3.587 <1%
International Bank 3.776 Barclaycard International 3.119 <1%
International Bank 3.776 Barclaycard UK 3.332 <5%
Private Bank 3.913 Business Bank 3.422 <5%
Private Bank 3.913 Barclaycard Corporate 3.479 <5%
Private Bank 3.913 Barclaycard International 3.119 <1%
Private Bank 3.913 Barclaycard UK 3.332 <1%
Private Bank 3.913 Collateralised Financing 3.426 <5%
Private Bank 3.913 Global Markets 3.359 <5%
Premier Bank 3.772 Barclaycard International 3.119 <1%
Premier Bank 3.772 Barclaycard UK 3.332 <5%
Barclays Global Investors 3.622 Barclaycard International 3.119 <5%
Barclays Africa 3.858 Business Bank 3.422 <5%
Barclays Africa 3.858 Barclaycard International 3.119 <1%
Barclays Africa 3.858 Barclaycard UK 3.332 <1%
Barclays Africa 3.858 Global Markets 3.470 <5%
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6.6.1.3.2 Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
6.6.1.3.2.1 Introduction
This section of the summary of key findings looks at the research results across the degree of
uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity. Each difference is presented in the
positive.
6.6.1.3.2.2 Degrees Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
This section examines differences in the degree of uncertainty across the portfolio. There are
two business units with mean scores significantly different from the Group average of 49.680.
First is, Barclaycard Corporate with a mean significantly lower than the overall Barclays
Group mean (-12.013); it is therefore deemed to face a significantly lower degree of
uncertainty than all the other business units in the Barclays Group. This result is significant at
the 1% level. Second is, Global Markets, which has a mean significantly higher than the
overall Group mean (12.320); it is therefore deemed to face a significantly higher degree of
uncertainty than all the other strategic business units in the Barclays Group. This result is
significant at the 5% level.
Statistically significant differences between individual strategic business units, in terms of the
degree of uncertainty they are perceived to face, are summarised in Table 154 below:
Table 154 – Differences Between Strategic Business Units: Degrees Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Business Unit Score Business Unit Score Significance
Investment Management 55.667 Barclaycard Corporate 37.667 <1%
Private Bank 51.733 Barclaycard Corporate 37.667 <5%
Barclaycard International 58.333 Business Bank 42.000 <5%
Barclaycard International 58.333 Barclaycard Corporate 37.667 <1%
Global Financing 55.769 Barclaycard Corporate 37.667 <2%
Global Markets 62.000 Woolwich 44.733 <2%
Global Markets 62.000 Personal Financial Services 46.400 <5%
Global Markets 62.000 Europe 46.667 <5%
Global Markets 62.000 International Bank 46.667 <5%
Global Markets 62.000 Premier Bank 46.000 <5%
Global Markets 62.000 Business Bank 42.000 <2%
Global Markets 62.000 Barclaycard Corporate 37.667 <1%
Private Equity 58.571 Woolwich 44.733 <5%
Private Equity 58.571 Business Bank 42.000 <5%
Private Equity 58.571 Barclaycard Corporate 37.667 <1%
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6.6.1.3.2.3 Rates Of Change
There are two strategic business units whose mean score for the rates of change they face are
significantly different from the Group average of 48.164: Private Equity and Barclaycard
Corporate.
Beginning with Private Equity, this business unit has an average score that is significantly
lower than the Group mean (-11.021), a result that is statistically significant at the 2% level.
Private Equity is therefore deemed to face the lowest rate of change in the Barclays Group.
Second, with a result that is statistically significant at the 5% level, on the assessments for the
rate of change Barclaycard Corporate has a significantly lower mean (-6.497) than the mean
for the Group. Barclaycard Corporate is therefore deemed to face a significantly lower rate of
change than every other strategic business unit in the Barclays Group – with the exception of
Private Equity.
Significant differences between individual strategic business units, in terms of the rate of
change they are perceived to face, are set out in Table 155 below:
Table 155 – Differences Between Strategic Business Units: Rates Of Change
Business Unit Score Business Unit Score Significance
Personal Financial Services 54.000 Private Equity 37.143 <5%
Investment Management 53.000 Private Equity 37.143 <5%
Private Bank 55.400 Business Bank 42.333 <5%
Private Bank 55.400 Barclays Africa 42.000 <5%
Private Bank 55.400 Barclaycard Corporate 41.667 <2%
Private Bank 55.400 Private Equity 37.143 <2%
Premier Bank 55.400 Private Equity 37.143 <5%
Barclaycard International 56.667 Business Bank 42.333 <5%
Barclaycard International 56.667 Barclays Africa 42.000 <5%
Barclaycard International 56.667 Barclaycard Corporate 41.667 <2%
Barclaycard International 56.667 Private Equity 37.143 <2%
Barclaycard UK 56.000 Business Bank 42.333 <5%
Barclaycard UK 56.000 Barclaycard Corporate 41.667 <5%
Barclaycard UK 56.000 Private Equity 37.143 <2%
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6.6.1.3.2.4 Levels Of Complexity
In terms of levels of complexity, there is only one strategic business unit that has an average
score significantly different from the overall Group mean of 49.852: Personal Financial
Services. With an average score that is statistically significant at the 5% level, on the
assessments for the level of complexity Personal Financial Services has a significantly higher
mean (16.481) than the mean for the Group. Personal Financial Services is therefore deemed
by the Group Executive Committee to face a significantly higher level of complexity in its
competitive environment than every other strategic business unit in the Barclays Group.
Significant differences between the individual strategic business units, in terms of the level of
complexity they are deemed to face, are summarised in Table 156 below:
Table 156 – Differences Between Strategic Business Units: Levels Of Complexity
Business Unit Score Business Unit Score Significance
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Woolwich 41.333 <1%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Europe 48.333 <5%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 International Bank 47.733 <2%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Private Bank 47.667 <2%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Barclays Global Investors 43.667 <1%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Business Bank 48.000 <2%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Barclays Africa 44.667 <2%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Barclaycard Corporate 42.000 <1%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Barclaycard International 53.000 <5%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Collateralised Financing 46.538 <2%
Personal Financial Services 66.333 Private Equity 45.714 <2%
Investment Management 57.000 Woolwich 41.333 <5%
Investment Management 57.000 Barclaycard Corporate 42.000 <5%
Premier Bank 55.733 Barclaycard Corporate 42.000 <2%
Barclaycard International 53.000 Barclaycard Corporate 42.000 <5%
Global Financing 54.615 Barclaycard Corporate 42.000 <5%
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6.6.1.3.3 Strategy Development Process And Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
6.6.1.3.3.1 Summary Of Key Findings
There was only one significant relationship between strategy developments processes and the
degree of perceived environmental uncertainty (see Table 157 below):
Table 157 – Strategy Development Processes And The Degree Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
1st Variable 2nd Variable Result Significance
Degree Of Uncertainty Cultural -0.489 <5%
The statistically significant relationships between strategy development processes and the
ability to cope with the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity
are summarised in Table 158 below:
Table 158 – Strategy Development Processes And The Ability To Cope
1st Variable 2nd Variable Result Significance
Ability To Cope With Degree Of Uncertainty Political -0.731 <1%
Ability To Cope With Degree Of Uncertainty Enforced Choice -0.561 <5%
Ability To Cope With Rate Of Change Incremental 0.498 <5%
Ability To Cope With Rate Of Change Command -0.459 <5%
Ability To Cope With Rate Of Change Planning 0.539 <5%
Ability To Cope With Rate Of Change Political -0.679 <1%
Ability To Cope With Rate Of Change Enforced Choice -0.594 <5%
Ability To Cope With Level Of Complexity Political -0.679 <1%
The statistically significant relationships between strategy development processes and the
importance of being able to cope with the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the
level of complexity are summarised in Table 159 below:
Table 159 – Strategy Development Processes And The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
1st Variable 2nd Variable Result Significance
Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty Incremental 0.577 <5%
Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty Cultural -0.505 <5%
Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Uncertainty Planning 0.504 <5%
Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity Incremental 0.519 <5%
Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity Cultural -0.505 <5%
Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity Planning 0.507 <5%
Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity Political -0.580 <5%
Importance Of Being Able To Cope With Complexity Enforced Choice -0.495 <5%
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6.6.1.4 Considering The Managerial Implications
6.6.1.4.1 Organisational Performance And Strategy Development Processes
6.6.1.4.1.1 Relating Value Creation To The Incremental And Planning Dimensions
Through a review of the relevant literature, Bailey et al. (2000) proposed that measures of
organisational performance can be related positively to high scores on both the incremental
and planning dimensions of the strategy development process – or, in simple managerial
terms, successful organisations score highly on both the incremental and planning dimensions
of the strategy development process.
The finding of this research supports the proposition developed by Bailey et al., and is
summarised in Table 160 below:
Table 160 – Relating Value Creation To The Incremental And Planning Dimensions
Dimension Score Value Created By The Barclays Group
Centre Of Scale Barclays 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Incremental 4.000 4.300 3,845 3,205 19.97%Planning 4.000 4.408
6.6.1.4.1.2 Relating Value Creation To The Political And Enforced Dimensions
Bailey et al. (2000) also proposed that measures of organisational performance can be related
positively to low scores on both the political and enforced choice dimensions of the strategy
development process – or, in managerial terms, successful organisations score lower on both
the political and enforced choice dimensions of the strategy development process.
The finding of this research supports the proposition developed by Bailey et al., and is
summarised in Table 161 below:
Table 161 – Relating Value Creation To The Political And Enforced Choice Dimensions
Dimension Score Value Created By The Barclays Group
Centre Of Scale Barclays 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Political 4.000 3.606 3,845 3,205 19.97%Enforced Choice 4.000 3.840
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6.6.1.4.2 Organisational Performance And Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
6.6.1.4.2.1 Relating Value Creation To Degrees Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
The study was unable to establish a relationship between measures of organisational
performance and the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity
different businesses within the Barclays portfolio are perceived to face.
This key finding is illustrated through a comparison of Barclays Capital and Barclays Private
Clients, who are deemed to be facing a similar degree of perceived environmental uncertainty
but are producing very different levels of organisational performance. This finding is
summarised in Table 162 below:
Table 162 – Relating Value Creation (Annual Growth) To Degrees Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Mean Comparisons Value Contribution
Cluster Group Variance 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
Barclays Capital 50.414 49.331 1.083 782 580 34.83%
Barclays Private Clients 50.773 49.331 1.442 328 368 -10.87%
6.6.1.4.2.2 Relating Value Creation To Degrees Of Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
The study was also unable to establish a relationship between measures of organisational
performance and the perceived ability of the different businesses within the Barclays portfolio
to cope with the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and the level of complexity in their
respective competitive environments.
This key finding is illustrated through a comparison of the UK Retail Bank and the Business
Bank. The Business Bank is deemed to be significantly more able than the UK Retail Bank to
cope with perceived environmental uncertainty, but it is being outperformed by the UK Retail
Bank. This finding is summarised in Table 163 below:
Table 163 – Relating Value Creation (Annual Contribution) To The Ability To Cope
Mean Comparisons Value Contribution
Cluster Group Variance 2003 (£m) 2002 (£m) % Increase
UK Retail Bank 47.789 61.910 -14.121 967 871 11.02%
Business Bank 71.600 61.910 9.690 1,308 1,227 6.60%
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6.6.1.4.2.3 Relating Value Creation To The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
The study was also unable to establish a relationship between measures of organisational
performance and the importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty, when organisational performance was measured in terms of the percentage
increase in value created. This finding is illustrated by the results for the Business Bank,
which is deemed most important in terms of the importance of its being able to cope.
However, it is only ranked sixth in terms of increases in its value creation during 2003. The
results are summarised in Table 164 below:
Table 164 – Relating Value Creation To The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
Cluster Group +/- Rank ’03 (£m) ’02 (£m) +/- Rank
Business Bank 73.556 60.831 12.725 1 1,308 1,227 6.60% 6
Barclays Capital 66.659 60.831 5.828 2 782 580 34.83% 2
Barclaycard 64.000 60.831 3.169 3 722 615 17.40% 4
UK Retail Bank 61.444 60.831 0.613 4 967 871 11.02% 5
BGI 58.667 60.831 -2.164 5 192 111 72.97% 1
Private Clients 55.142 60.831 -5.689 6 328 368 -10.87% 7
Barclays Africa 44.667 60.831 -16.164 7 113 89 26.97% 3
However, when performance is measured in terms of the size of the value contribution, the
relationship with the importance of being able to cope with perceived environmental
uncertainty is much clearer. Utilising this approach, the Business Bank assumes its place at the
top of the rankings, with Barclays Africa (the smallest contributor of value) at the bottom. The
other three large contributors of value (Barclays Capital, Barclaycard, and the UK Retail
Bank) occupy the other top placings in the rankings. This finding shows a positive correlation
between the level of value created and high scores in relation to the perceived importance of
being able to cope. This finding is summarised in Table 165 below:
Table 165 – Relating Value Creation To The Importance Of Being Able To Cope
Cluster Group +/- Rank ’03 (£m) ’02 (£m) +/- Rank
Business Bank 73.556 60.831 12.725 1 1,308 1,227 6.60% 1
Barclays Capital 66.659 60.831 5.828 2 782 580 34.83% 3
Barclaycard 64.000 60.831 3.169 3 722 615 17.40% 4
UK Retail Bank 61.444 60.831 0.613 4 967 871 11.02% 2
BGI 58.667 60.831 -2.164 5 192 111 72.97% 6
Private Clients 55.142 60.831 -5.689 6 328 368 -10.87% 5
Barclays Africa 44.667 60.831 -16.164 7 113 89 26.97% 7
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6.6.2 Serendipitous Findings
Through the research undertaken during Project 3, the research identified a series of
serendipitous findings, some of which could provide the starting point for other areas of
research. These serendipitous findings are set out below:
1. The close relationship between the incremental and planning dimensions in the
strategy development process questionnaire requires further investigation. The results
at Barclays suggest that planning is not always resolved at the outset of the strategy
development process and that as plans are re-published with amended baselines there
is an element of ‘incremental planning’ at Barclays.
2. The command dimension in the strategy process questionnaire also requires further
investigation as it relates more to the individual responsible for developing strategy
than to the process that is being followed. Clearly, the Chief Executive Officer, or
Commander, could be developing strategy through the application of one or more of
the other dimensions.
3. The research at Barclays could be developed to work with the managerial teams in the
strategic business units over a period of time. A programme of longitudinal research
would enable research of the strategy development process to monitor changes in
strategy process over time and therefore facilitate a closer comparison with events, for
example the Barclays Group results, over an extended period of time.
4. A useful area of research would be to re-run the distribution of the questionnaires but
to drop the additional managerial information section and collect the necessary
information, for example length of service, managerial grade, age and salary from the
central Barclays database.
5. An interesting development on the research would be to compare the results from the
strategy development questionnaire with other organisational characteristics, for
example the size of the strategic business unit in terms of the number of employees, or
the geographical dispersion of the business unit. An interesting improvement would be
to consider the results in terms of the geographical location of particular business
units, for example Barclays Global Investors in San Francisco, compared to Barclays
Capital in London or Barclays Africa in Johannesburg.
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6.7 Conclusions And Comparisons With The Literature Review
6.7.1 Identifying Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays
There were five key conclusions drawn from Project 3 when identifying strategy development
processes across the Barclays Group. These conclusions are set out below:
1. The strategy development process questionnaire built by Bailey (2000) and further
enhanced by Bailey et al. (2000) is a highly efficient and effective instrument for
collecting data at an organisation like Barclays.
2. Through its application in this research, the strategy development process
questionnaire (Bailey, 2000; Bailey et al., 2000) has been further validated and
enhanced. Such enhancements include: use of the arithmetic mean for unanswered
questions, the discarding of individual items, and the application of weighted averages.
3. The strategy development process at Barclays is dominated by the incremental and
planning approaches to strategy development. This is a further enhancement to the
original work by Bailey (2000), who proposed that the incremental and planning
dimensions would be negatively correlated. This research concludes that although
Barclays produces strategic plans, it remains incremental in its approach to strategy, by
continually re-scheduling its plans. This model of strategy development fits more
closely with the concept of logical incrementalism developed by Quinn (1980).
4. This report concludes that, like most successful organisations (Bailey et al., 2000),
Barclays has a low propensity for the adoption of the political approach to strategy
development. The political approach to strategy is typified by imbalances of power and
partially conflicting strategic objectives, characteristics that are not conducive to strong
organisational performance.
5. This research also concludes that strategic business units within Barclays are not
necessarily constrained by the environment and this is illustrated by a low score on the
enforced choice dimension, another characteristic of successful organisational
performance (Bailey et al., 2000).
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6.7.2 Analysing Strategy Development Processes Across Barclays
Analysis of strategy development processes across Barclays produced key conclusions:
1. Consistent with the findings of Bailey’s (2000) original thesis, the strategy
development process at Barclays is multi-dimensional and therefore not characterised
by a single unitary dimension. Consequently, strategy development processes at
Barclays are not mutually exclusive but transpire in combination, most notably the
incremental approach to strategy development and the planning dimension.
2. The correlations in the data at the Barclays Group level are entirely consistent with the
ten key relationships that were predicted through the work of Bailey et al. (2000). Of
these ten relationships, six are statistically significant at the 1% level, one at the 5%
level, and three are not statistically significant. These results show a high level of
consistency with the data presented in the academic literature (Bailey, 2000) and
published in previous research (Bailey et al., 2000; Fishwick et al., 2000; Collier et al.,
2004). No other significant correlations were evident in the Barclays Group results.
3. Analysis of the research data across the seven clusters in the Barclays Group produced
four statistically significant correlations: first, a positive correlation between command
and enforced choice (3); second, a positive correlation between command and culture
(3); third, a positive correlation between incrementalism and culture (1); and finally, a
negative correlation between incrementalism and enforced choice (1).
4. This report concludes that the relationship between command and enforced choice is
peculiar to Barclays. Although the Group is organised into seventeen business units
and seven clusters, it appears that responsibility for strategy development process is
perceived to reside in the Group Centre, hence the mixture between command and
enforced choice.
5. This report concludes that the correlation between command and culture is a product
of the original design of the questionnaire (Bailey, 2000) – the problem being that the
command approach to strategy is concerned with ‘who’ is responsible for strategy
development, whereas the other five dimensions are concerned with ‘how’ the process
is executed. Consequently, a mixture of the command dimensions with other
approaches to strategy development is inevitable.
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6.7.3 Strategy Process And Perceived Environmental Uncertainty
Examination of strategy development processes within the context of perceived environmental
uncertainty across the Barclays Group produced five key conclusions. These conclusions are
set out below:
1. There are significant differences in the processes that are applied for developing
strategy by the seventeen strategic business units within the Barclays Group.
2. There are also significant differences in the degree of uncertainty and the level of
complexity being experienced by strategic business units across the Barclays Group.
However, none of the strategic business units is deemed to face a significantly higher
or lower rate of change than elsewhere across the Group.
3. There is only one significant relationship between strategy development processes and
the degree of uncertainty being experienced by the various strategic business units in
the Barclays Group.
4. There is a series of statistically significant relationships between strategy development
processes and the ability to cope with the degree of uncertainty, the rate of change, and
the level of complexity. The most notable relationship is the negative correlation
between the political dimension to strategy development and the ability to cope with
uncertainty, change and complexity.
5. There is also a series of statistically significant relationships between strategy
development processes and the importance of being able to cope with the degree of
uncertainty, and the level of complexity. There are no significant relationships between
strategy development processes and the perceived importance of being able to cope
with the rate of change.
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6.7.4 Considering The Managerial Implications
When considering the managerial implications of the relationship between strategy
development processes and perceived environmental uncertainty across the Barclays Group,
there are eight key conclusions. These conclusions are set out below:
1. Organisational performance (value creation) at Barclays during 2003 was superior,
both in terms of comparison with previous performance, and when evaluated against
peer organisations in the UK banking and financial services industry.
2. Through this study, this research concludes that it is possible to discern strategy
development processes across the various clusters in the Barclays Group and compare
them with organisational performance.
3. This research concludes that there is a significant positive correlation between superior
organisational performance and the incremental and planning dimensions to strategy
development. This conclusion is consistent with the study by Bailey et al. (2000).
4. This research concludes that there is a significant negative correlation between
superior organisational performance and the political and enforced choice dimensions
to strategy development. This conclusion is also consistent with the conclusions drawn
by Bailey et al. (2000).
5. This study is unable to conclude that there is a significant negative correlation between
superior organisational performance and the degree of perceived environmental
uncertainty being faced by the strategic business units within the Barclays Group.
6. This investigation is also unable to conclude that there is a significant positive
correlation between superior organisational performance and the ability of the various
strategic business units to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty.
7. This research is able to conclude that there is a significant positive correlation between
superior organisational performance and the importance of being able to cope with
perceived environmental uncertainty.
8. This investigation is able to conclude that when assessing the importance of being able
to cope with perceived environmental uncertainty, strategists interpret this quality as
the level of value contributed to the Barclays Group.
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